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INTRODUCTION
The present work is chiefly based on the documents 
concerning Ceylon which are preserved in the Kolonial Archief 
section of the Algemeen Rijksarchief at the Hague# They 
consist, in the main, of three series - 1# Overgekomen Brleven 
En Papieren. 2# Batavlaesch Vitgaende Briefboek and 3* Brieven 
van de Vergaderingh van Seventhienen Naer Indien.
Of these, the first-mentioned is by far the most volu­
minous and the most important - at least so far as this thesis 
is concerned. This series consists of documents, which the 
Governor-General and Council sent to their superiors along 
with the Generale Missive or annual report. In the Generale 
Missive, the Batavian authorities review (among other things) 
the events and developments which have taken place in Ceylon 
since their previous Generale Missive. This review is often 
quite detailed, but sometimes sketchy. Nevertheless, whether 
detailed or sketchy, it is almost invariably an indispensable 
source for the history of the period covered by it. Generally, 
of greater importance than this review of Ceylon affairs are 
the originals or copies of letters, reports* etc. sent from 
Ceylon to Batavia and thence, along with the Generale Missive, 
to the Netherlands. Although, unfortunately, all the documents 
sent from Ceylon have not been dispatched to the Netherlands, 
yet, those sent are in sufficient number to give a fuller and
ii
truer picture of happenings in Ceylon than is given in the 
Generale Missive*
The second series of documents, the Bataviaesch Vitgaende 
Briefboek, contains (among other things) letters and instruc­
tions etc. from the Governor-General and Council to Ceylon, 
and to their subordinates proceeding to that island on various 
missions. This series though less voluminous and not so 
important as the first, is nevertheless invaluable and indis­
pensable. Sometimes the letters and instructions contained 
in this series are so wide in their scope and ramifications 
that with their aid many gaps in matters connected with Ceylon 
can be filled up. Moreover, for a study of Dutch policy, 
this series is probably the most important of all.
The third series, the Brieven van de Vergaderingh van 
Seventhlenen naer Indien, contains, as its name indicates, 
letters from the Heeren XVII to Batavia. These letters are 
chiefly important for a study of Dutch policy; they often 
serve to remind the reader that profit and commercial advantages 
were always meant to be the real touchstones of any policy in 
the island (or elsewhere).
All these documents contain various shortcomings which 
have to be carefully noted if wrong and hasty conclusions are 
to be avoided. For instance, letters written on the same 
subject either to one and the same person or to different 
persons, sometimes contain contradictory instructions. The
iii
explanation for this was given by the Governor-General and
a)
Council to the Directors, thusr
"That in our local letters we write to the Directors 
and merchants of the Company and, sometimes, to native 
princes ideas which are far removed from our resolutions, 
such as, that Muscat is going to be conquered, and coming 
victorious from there we shall attack Diu, Daman and 
other Portuguese forts; that • ••• we shall assist Bantam
Jmd
against Mataram, and Mataram against Bantam etc. - we 
request Your Honours to accept such ideas and projects 
in our letters .... which do not agree with our resolutions 
as being inventions made in order to throw our enemy into 
confusion."
Another reason for these contradictory statements appears, 
however, to have been due to a desire on the part of the 
writers to safeguard themselves in the event of matters turning 
out contrary to expectation. In fact, in their desire to 
safeguard themselves from criticism and reproach, the Governor- 
General and Council, in particular, are at times found to be 
making absolutely false denials and statements; but these are, 
generally speaking, so cleverly framed that only a thorough 
study of all the available materials can get at the truth.
1. 9 Dec. 16379 in Kolonial Archief No. 103U pp. 35-36
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The most notable shortcoming - and the one most to be
guarded against - in the reporting of the Dutch Company is the
fact that the "other fellow* - whether Raja Sinha or the
Portuguese or the "Engelsche vrtjhen" - is almost invariably
said to be a rascal and a cheat, whose actions are thoroughly
Machiavellian. This manner of reporting, it must be noted,
is seldom absent, to a lesser or greater extent, in the official
correspondence of all countries at all times; if the Sinhalese
archives had survived I doubt not that JLt^would have been in
fitting company when placed beside the Dutch East India
Company's archives. The unfortunate fact, however, is that
this characteristic of the Dutch Company's reporting has been
too often overlooked. In a way, this is not surprising,
because the charges of Machiavellianism made against the "other
fellow" are often accompanied by solemn (though on close
analysis, false) protestations and explanations of the Company’s
own uprightness, and the difficulty for the "open-hearted
(1)
Netherlander" to act contrary to his conscience.
Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks, the Company's 
records at the Hague still remain, on the whole, the most 
copious grid the best material for a study of the period surveyed
1. Cf. for illustrations of some of these points seef-siw.i56
the present work.
VIn this thesis. There can, perhaps, be no better testimony 
to their value than that it is possible, after all, to get a 
fair picture of the "other fellow’s" ideas and actions, even 
if this has to be obtained by the most exhaustive research.
As far as I know only three writers have hitherto made 
any considerable use of these records for a study of even a 
part of the subject dealt with in this thesis. Of these, the 
first in point of time and, indeed, of importance, has been 
W. van Geer, who utilised the documents for the years 1638-U5 
for his doctoral thesis, De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Ge&ag 
over Ceilon (Leiden, 1895). Van Geer’s thesis suffered from 
certain defects, which were due to no fault of his, but were 
merely the result of its being a pioneer work. For instance, 
his only Portuguese source was Ribeiro, and he naturally had 
not access to Raja Sinha’s correspondence preserved in the 
Ceylon archives and published by Donald Ferguson in 190U; nor 
had he at his disposal the works of scholars such as Dr. P.E. 
Pieris and H.W. Codrington who dealt with the Portuguese side 
of the story. There are, however, other defects in Van Geer’s 
work which must be ascribed to the writer’s own shortcomings.
He has often overlooked vital facts and documents; sometimes 
he contradicts what is stated in the documents (even where the 
relevant document is given among his appendixes); sometimes 
he supplies details by mere guess-work, which, unfortunately, 
has proved wrong; moreover, he sometimes accepted at their
Vi
face-value, the tendentious or false statements of the Dutch
(1)Company’s officials. When all this is said and done,
however, the fact remains that Van Geer’s work is still the
best available on his subject; no other writer has a fuller
(2)
account or a more impartial one.
In his well-known work De Oost-Indische Conrpagnie als 
Zeemogendheid in Azie, Rijswick (Z.H.) 1927, N. MacLeod has 
devoted some attention to a study of matters connected with 
Ceylon in the years 1638-50. He is the second writer, in 
point of importance, who has used a considerable number of 
the Company’s records at the R1jksarchief for a study of part 
at least of the subject covered in this thesis. As he was 
primarily interested in the V.O.C. as a sea-power, and was
to*'}/ ,
1. Cf. on the above pointssov».v8*'I*S9M^ 0Cl1,,,,*,t,‘*»191 of 
the present work.
2. The fact that none of the three Ceylon writers, who 
avowedly utilised his work, were able to maintain the 
degree of impartiality shown by him, is a good testimony 
to the merits of Van Geer's work. (cf. Donald Ferguson, 
’’Raja Sinha II and the Dutch'*, Journal of the Ceylon 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XVIII, 166-275 ;
R.G. Anthonisz, The Dutch in Ceylon, Colombo, 1929;
H.W. Codrington, A Short History of Ceylon, London, 1929*) 
In fact, only two writers (Prof. P. Geyl in Camb. Hist. 
of India, v. ch. ii and Dr. F.W. Stapel, Geschiedenis 
van Nederlandsch Indie, iii-25iff» ) appear to have 
made rather detailed and fair use of Van Geer's work.
Dr. Stapel’s work, however, has many inaccuracies.
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able to devote only some thirty pages for what he says
regarding Ceylon, it is to be expected that his work should
be very much less comprehensive and satisfactory than that of
Van Geer. There are also other factors, which detract from
the value of his work. He has sometimes misunderstood or
misrepresented whaf is contained in the documents. To a
greater extent than Van Geer he seems to have accepted the
tendentious or false statements of the Company’s officials at
their face-value. On the other hand it must be said that
with regard to certain matters he has a fuller account than
Van Geer, and, sometimes, where the earlier writer is hopelessly
(1)
incorrect, MacLeod has not missed the truth. Moreover, 
considering the aims and the scope of his work - he covers some 
forty to fifty places with which the Company had relations of 
some form or another, and that too, often over a period of 
three or four decades - the surprising thing perhaps is that 
the degree of accuracy of what he says is as considerable as 
it actually is.
The third writer who has made a considerable use of the 
Company’s records preserved at the Hague, for a work dealing 
with part at least of the subject covered in the present thesis,
i. cf. on the above points 3&»i, 5o»«.2.i3, 
etc. of the present work.
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is J. Aalbers. In his book Rijcklof Van Goens. Commissaris ... 
... en zljn Arbeijdsveld. 1655/51* en 1657/58. Groningen, 1916, 
his main concern is with the activities of Rijcklof Van Goens 
during four specified years. To describe these activities 
and to indicate the necessary background to them, Aalbers 
appears certainly to have made much less use of the V.O.C. 
records at the Hague than either Van Geer or MacLeod in their 
respective studies. Except for a few documents connected 
with the activities of Van Goens in 1657-58, he appears to have 
consulted only the Generale Missives, from the Missive of 
2l\ December 1652 to that of 11+ December 1658. As far as it 
concerns the military exploits of Van Goens, his account of 
matters dealing with Geylon is well-nigh excellent; But, as 
regards events prior to 1657* and the relations between Raja 
Sinha and the Dutch, what he says is faulty; mainly because 
he utilised (from the Hague records) only the Generale Mlssiven, 
and sometimes accepted without qualification the false or 
tendentious statements therein of the Governor-General and
(i)
Council.
There is a fourth writer, who, while he has not himself 
consulted any of the V.OvC. records at the Hague, has yet had 
access to the translations/at the India Office - of a few of
1. cf. on the above points 2»oS'*i etc.
of the present work.
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these records. This writer, Dr. P.E. Pieris, has incorporated 
precis^extracts,or entire reproductions of these translations 
in a hook entitled: Some Documents Relating to the Pise of
the Dutch Power in Ceylon. 1602-1670* from The Translations 
at the India Office, Colombo 1929. It is, I believe, fairly 
well-known that these translations have been rather ineptly 
done; nevertheless it is probably not out of place to indicate 
here a concrete example of the gross errors committed in them;
Original words
"want boven in* t 
hoff alias schier 
aen si^n eijgen 
zinneli^cheijt 
hangt, daer onse 
Hren ^rs in <aese 
gelegentheijt 
immers seer veel
a)
aengelegen is.”
India Office Trans, 
(in Dr. Pieris* book)
"Whilst quietly at 
Court he is enslaved 
,to his sensual appe­
tites, and the 
interests of the 
Company demands the 
actual display of his 
allegiance to us.”
Trans, as it should 
be
”For, up there in 
the Court, almost 
everything depends on 
his own humour, upon 
which our Lords 
Principals are really 
very much dependent 
in the present cir­
cumstances.”
The defects in Dr. Pieris’s book cannot, however, be all 
ascribed to the shortcomings of the translators. A good deal 
of the defects in it arise from the fact that it is neither a
1. A. van der Mei^den and Council to Governor-General & C7 
1U May 1655, Kol. Arch. 1100 fo. 1*18. The India Office 
translation is on p. 17$ of Dr. Pierisfs work.
Xbook of documents nor a history; trying to be both it falls 
between two stools.
Apart from the V.O.C. records at the Hague, there are 
known to be many at Batavia; but I have not been able to con­
sult any of them. The only unpublished V.O.C. records in 
Ceylon which are relevant to the present work are the "Council
(a)
Minutes" of Galle, Colombo and Negombo. With many gaps, 
they cover the period from July 161*0 to the end of 1658. 
Unfortunately, I have yet been unable to consult any of these 
"Council Minutes" except those of Galle from July 161*0 to 
March 16kk which have been available to me from the translations 
published by E.G. Anthonisz in the Journal of the Ceylon Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society (1902) XVII. Nevertheless, I 
feel certain that what is contained in the available Ceylon 
records will not in any way alter the main conclusions arrived 
at in this thesis.
Of the published V.O.C. records of Ceylon, by far the most 
important for the period under consideration is the Memoir of
(ytitk the  iu f c l1 tex t tuqtis li
Joan MaetgiJiijeker, 1650. editedtyby E. Reimers, Colombo, 1927* 
This Memoir furnishes some important information, which is not 
available from other sources. The Instructions from the
1. cf. M.W. Jurriaanse, Catalogue of the Archives of the
Dutch Central Government of Coastal Ceylon, Colombo, 19U3#
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Governor-General and Council of India to the Governor of Ceylon 
—    *—
1656 to 1665» translated by Sophia Pieters, Colombo, 1908
and the Memoirs of Ryckloff van Goens, 1663-1675> edited (with
the Dutch text and an English translation) by E. Reimere,
Colombo, 1932, also contain data which are somewhat relevant
to the subject-matter of this thesis.
The Dutch records, which have been, next to the Hague
documents, the most useful and important for the purposes of
this thesis are those embodied in the Dagh-Register gehouden
inyt Casteel Batavia, the relevant volumes of which, covering
the years 1636-1659» were printed serially at Batavia in
1887-190U. These volumes are of unequal value, some containing
transcripts of original documents in full, others omitting
them altogether or confining themselves to brief digests (The
available volumes from 161*6 to 1658, inclusive, are of very
little use for matters dealing with Ceylon). Where the
documents are printed in extenso (as for example Raja Sinha1 b
letter on pp. 1*07-18 of the 161*1 volume) then, however, this
series is of great value, although non-Dutch names are often
badly mutilated, and the information given is sometimes
(2)
incorrect, and, occasionally, deliberately distorted.
1. There is really nothing in these "Instructions" which could 
be said to apply definitely to the period before 1659•
2. cf. 67 , iyi*v.i, i87"*3, !***•■ Gf tkg present work.
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Generally speaking, however, the Dagh-Register is a reliable 
and invaluable source.
Of contemporary printed Dutch works, the most important 
is the work of Philippus Baldaeus: Naauwkeurige Beschryvinge
van Malabar en Choromandel ?*.. en het machtige Eyland Ceylon 
(Amsterdam, 1672). In his capacity of Predikant or Preacher, 
Baldaeus spent some years in Ceylon himself (I656-I663) and 
took much trouble in amassing material for his book, which 
includes copious extracts from contemporary state-papers and 
correspondence. He has been severely criticised for plagia­
rising and making unscrupulous use of his Portuguese predece­
ssor’s materials, nor can it be denied that he has been
(i)
convicted on this point. Moreover, occasionally he seems
to present a garbled version of a treaty or other document,
with quite a happy face and he is even found deliberately
(2)
denying the truth. But the standards of the 17th century 
in these respects were not those of the 20th, and although 
Baldaeus’ book must be used (like all others) with due caution, 
the fact remains that it is an indispensable and generally 
reliable work.
1. cf. the articles of J. Charpentier in Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, ii (1923) 731-5U 
and ibid., lii (19&4) Ul3-2d.
2. ef. I7w*i v'*»i 3° h * pPesent work.
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A work compiled (though not published) next to Baldaeus
in point of time is that of Pieter Van Dam, the "Advocate" of
the V.O.C. His Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnle,
Bk. II part II (edited by Dr. P.W. Stapel, Hague, 1932)
contains (on pp. 21+7ff) an account of Dutch relations with
Ceylon from 1602 onwards. Although it appears certain that
his work is of greater value for the period after 1658, the
fact is that for the period prior to that date, Baldaeus has
a fuller and better account than Van Dam. Whereas Baldaeus
appears to have consulted many and a varied number of the
Company’s documents for his work dealing with this period, Van
Dam appears to have confined himself for the most part to the
(1)
Generali Missiven.
In Francois Valentyn’s well-known work, Pud en Nieuw 
Oost-Indien, Dordrecht-Amsterdam, 172U-26, volume five contains 
his Beschryvinge van het Byland Ceylon^ The same adverse 
comments which have been made on the work of Baldaeus apply 
also to that of Valentyn. While the importance of Valentyn’s 
work for the period up to 1658 is somewhat overshadowed by the 
fact that Baldaeus has already covered much of the ground, 
nevertheless Valentyn’s work is also indispensable for a study 
of this period. Apart from certain letters of Maetsuijcker,
1* e.g. pp. 255-62 consist almost entirely of transcripts from 
the Generale Missiven of 1 Feb. 1656 (Kol. Arch. 11&2 fos. 
63—72) and of i+ Dec. 1656 (Kol. Arch. 1101+ fos. 52-59). 
Needless to say, Van Dam’s entire work is generally useful 
for anyone studying almost any matter connected with the 
V.O.C. in the 17th century.
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Van Kittensteynetc. which are available only in his work,
the invaluable and extremely accurate glossary of Sinhalese
terms and the almost equally useful and accurate description
of the various castes which he gives at the beginning of his
(1)
work are still indispensable.
Lastly, there is the Beknopte Historie van de voornaamste
gebeurtenissen op Ceijlon  tot den jare 1757 compiled
in 1760 by W. van Damast Limberger and published in translation 
by F. H. de Vos in J.C.R.A.S., (1889) XI 1-1U7- For the 
purposes of this thesis Limberger1s compilation has been useful 
only for the purpose of collation with the works of Baldaues 
and Valentyn. It is apparent th&ti.the compiler has almost 
entirely derived his account from these two authors.
Two memoirs of German mercenary soldiers who served the 
Dutch Company against the Portuguese in Ceylon, contain 
interesting "background material", and occasionally indicate 
the way in which those in the ranks viewed the actions of their 
superiors. J.J. Saarfs Ost-Indlanische Funfzehen-Jahrige 
Kriegs-Dienste (Nurriberg, 1662) is better known than the 
Ost-Indisches Tage-Buch of J. von der Behr (Leipzig, 1668).
Saar was first in Ceylon in October 161*7 and last there in the 
latter half of 1658; Von der Behr first arrived in the island 
in December l6i*l* and was last there in October 161*9. Von der
1. For a general estimate of Valentynfs works cf. Stapel, 
GeschiedeniB, iii, 1*87-91.
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Behr’s account of events is extremely accurate as regards dates
, there f©1'*'0
(and isj^  useful check dn the official records of his superiors) 
and is generally less fanciful than that of Saar, whose account
(i)
is, however, more interesting.
The Portuguese archives at Lisbon and Goa are known to
contain much 17th century material on Ceylon, but I have not
consulted them, and comparatively little of this material has
been published, There is nothing printed in Portuguese to
compare with the Dagh-Register Gehouden lnft Casteel Batgvia,
or with the English Factories in India for the period under
review, since the corresponding Portuguese series, Documentos
Remettidos da India ou Livros das Moncoes, has only reached
)
th^rear 1619 in print.
Reliance has therefore chiefly been placed on the Conqulsta 
Temporal e Espiritual de Ceylao, of Pr. Fernao de Queyro? and 
the Fatalidade Historlca dat Ilha de Ceilao, by CaptAin Joao 
Ribeiro. These works were completed in 1686/87 and 1685 
respectively, but were first printed in 1916 and 1836 in their 
original form. Queyroy was never in Ceylon but a lifetime 
spent in Goa brought him into close and continual contact with
1. cf. the collected edition of th3@e German soldiers1 narratives 
by S.P.LlHonore Naber, Reisebeschreibungen von Deutschen 
Beamten und Krlegsleuten" in Dienst der Nederlandischen West- 
und Ost-Indischen Compagnie, 1602-1797 (Hague, 1931-32) 
of which Von der Behr1s account is Vol. IV and that of 
Saar, Vol. VI.
xvi
many of his compatriots who had lived there, and he had access
to the Indo-Portuguese archives. His work is diffuse, badly
co-ordinated and unmethodical. Moreover - and this appears
to have been hitherto unnoticed - he twists his material some-
(1)
times to suit his purposes. nevertheless, h§& work contains 
a great mass of useful and interesting material, and is 
essential for the Portuguese side of the story. Ribeiro spent 
some nineteen years as a soldier in Ceylon (I6UO-I658) and his 
work though very much shorter than that of Queyroy, remains 
invaluable for the viewpoint of the man in the ranks. His 
dates and figures are seldom reliable, but his description of 
Sinhalese life and customs, though inevitably marred by the 
prejudices of his age and nation, remains of lasting value.
Owing to ray insufficient knowledge of Portuguese, I have 
had to depend on English translations of Queyroy and Ribeiro;
but these versions are preferable in many respects to the 
printed Portuguese editions which have no annotation worth 
mentioning, whereas the English translations are competently
1. cp. e.g. his attitude towards the Portuguese General, Diogo 
de Melo de Castro on pp. 800-01 of his work (for which, see 
next note, below) with that on p. 1095* For an estimate 
of ftueyroy as historian of Ceylon see G. Schurhammer, S.J* 
and E.A. Voretzsch, Ceylon zur Seit des Konigs Bhuvaneka 
Bahu und Franz Xavers 1559-1852 (Leipzig, 1928) UO-49 and 
Fr. G. Schurhammer's article in B.S.O.A.S., V (1929) PP. 
209-27.
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jby Sinhalese scholars. Inadequate knowledge of Portuguese 
has also prevented me from making use of the documents concer­
ning the truce negotiations (in Europe) over Ceylon published 
by E. Prestage and P. de Azavefclo in the Cor re sponde nc la 
Diplomatica de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua 
embalxada erri. Hollands, 1643-1648 (2 vols. Coimbra, 1920-26) 
or proper use of the narratives of the last days of Portuguese 
rule in Ceylon printed by M.A.H. pitzler in 0 Cerco de Columbo. 
Ultimos dias do dominlo Portugues em Ceilao. Rpmpimento das 
hostilidades pelos Holandeses ate a rendlcao de Columbo 1652-
i
1656> Coimbra, 1928. To some extent this is compensated for 
by my use of the translations from the unpublished Livfos das 
Moncoes for the years 1637-1656, which are in the India Office 
Library; although these must be used with caution since the 
translations (and even the transcripts) often leqve a good
(2)
deal to be desired.
Twenty-four letters, which Raja Sinha wrote to the Dutch 
during this period and, which are preserved at the Ceylon
1. The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon, translated 
by S.G. Perera, S.J. (3 vols., Colombo, I930T5 The 
Historic Tragedy of the Island of Ceylpn, translated and 
edited by Dr 7 P.E. Pieris. I have used the 1925 edition 
(Colombo).
2. For the original Livros das Moncoes at Goa and Lisbon cf. 
C.R. Boxer "A glimpse of 'the Goa Archives" in B.S.0.A.S.
XIV (1952) pp. 299-324.
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Archives^ were translated from the original Portuguese and 
published by Donald Ferguson in J.C.R.A.S., XVIII 185-245* 
passim and XXI 260-66. These letters of Raja Sinha, together 
with a considerable number available at the Hijksarchief at 
the Hague, in the Dagh-Register of Batavia, and in the works 
of Baldaeus and Valentyn (some of which missives are only in 
summary form) constitute the only important documents known to 
be extant from the Sinhalese side. The Kandyan archives 
appear to have been completely lost. There is the Sinhalese 
chronicle the Rajavaliya in a confused variety of versions; 
but what it says is so confused and little, that it is almost 
of no use for the subject of the present work. In passing, 
it may also be noted that the work of Robert Knox, An Historical 
Relation of the island of Ceylon (London, 1681) while invaluable 
for its description of various aspects of the political, 
economic and social life within the Kandyan Kingdom, is not of 
direct use for the subject-matter of this thesis. As for 
Knox’s picture of Raja Sinha as an unmitigated tyrant - it 
really does not belong to this period, although a streak of 
tyranny ran through some of his actions even at this time.
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After the study of the above documents, I have come to 
certain conclusions, which in many respects revise completely, 
or in part, many of the views, hitherto generally accepted, on 
the topics dealt with in this thesis. Of these conclusions, 
the most important are those which concern the mutual relations 
between the King of Kandy, Raja Sinha, and the Dutch.
It has been generally accepted, that although Raja Sinha 
called in the Dutch to drive out the Portuguese, he gave his 
allies little or no assistance in their task, because he 
wished to see them do all the fighting, and himself reap any 
benefits resulting therefrom. In actual fact, however, it is 
apparent that, generally speaking, he gave his allies all 
possible help against the enemy; indeed, during a critical 
period, one Dutch Governor went so far as to declare to his 
superiors that the King’s help had been only second to that of 
God.
It has also been generally believed that Raja Sinha1s 
policy was to play off the Dutch against the Portuguese and 
vice versa. But in reality, the King steadily supported the 
Dutch against the common enemy except during a brief period, 
when his allies began to act as enemies; even then, he did not 
proceed further than to observe a friendly neutrality towards 
the Portuguese.
Finally, it has been generally held that, because he did 
not repay, according to promise, the huge expenses which they 
had incurred in his service, the Dutch were forced to take over
XX
territorial control in order, thereby, to obtain satisfaction 
of their debts. The truth, however, is that not only did the 
Dutch grossly exaggerate the extent of the King’s debts, but 
they also ensured, in the most ingenious manner, that however 
hard he might try, he would never be able to clear up his debts 
for, they wished to use his indebtedness as a pretext for 
establishing their power in Ceylon,
(1)
The well-known historian of Ceylon, H.W. Codrington says 
of Raja Sinha;
"He was a master in craft and double dealing, but met his 
equal in diplomacy in the Dutch, who found it impossible 
to act otherwise with so shifty an ally.,r 
Even if this statement were completely inverted the truth is 
still not well expressed; for, Raja Sinha was not quite the 
equal of the Dutch in diplomacy.
1, Short History, 136.
1CHAPTER I,
Ceylon : Prom The Arrival Of The Portuguese Up To The 
Accession Of Raja Sinha II,
"The island of Ceylon is said to be one of the 
finest islands that have been discovered up to our 
times, and, the most fruitful (ir.?.rr,d7 under the
A
sun* "
When these words of Linschoten were being eagerly
read by the adventurous merchants of the Netherlands,
their Portuguese enemies had been enjoying most of
the fruits of this island, for more than half a
century. The Portuguese were appraising the value
of Ceylon at least as highly as Linschoten himself;
for, after all, he was only repeating information
about Ceylon which he had obtained, for the most
part, from the Portuguese themselves*
When recounting the riches of this "terrestrial 
2
paradise", as some of them called the island, the 
Portuguese named cinnamon as the first in importance.
1.H.Kern(Ed.) Itinerario-Voyage ofte Schipvaert van Jan 
Huygen van Linschoten naer Oest-ofte Portugaels Indien.
1579-1592. IWerken der Linschoten Vereeniging il Hague,, 
1910) Pt. i. p.55.
2.P.E.Pieris (Trans.) Captain Joag Ribeiro, The Historic 
Tragedy of the Island.of Ceilao. 3rd Edition, Colombo,192j 
p*2W-. This work will be thereafter referred to as : 
Ribeiro.
zSpeaking of its valued and uses, Garcia da Orta
says in 15^9 •
!l ...for Portugal, it is certainly a very 
good article of commerce* It is sent there 
in sufficient quantity, for besides being 
a good medicine, it is useful in seasoning 
dishes* as is the practice in India* 11
ilR —^ The quality of the Ceylon cinnamon was such that 
Ribeiro dismissed the inferior varieties found 
elsewhere as being practically worthless, when he 
declared : "We know that this spice is found nowhere 
but in Ceylon," ^ In addition to the cinnamon, the 
island possessed a number of other products such as 
pearls and precious stones, elephants, arecanut and 
pepper, all of which were highly valued on account 
of the great profits which they yielded.
All these products enumerated above, were from 
ancient times royal monopolies. By means of the
1. Sir Clements Markham (Trans.) Garcia da Orta, 
Colloquies on the Simples & Drugs of India (New 
Edition, Lisbon, 1895, Edited and Annotated by 
the Conde de Ficalho,) London, 1912, p*131.
2. Ribeiro, 159.
Joae Ribeiro: Born at Lisbon 1622 of humble
parentage, came out to the East in 1640 and served 
in Ceylon until the capture of Jaffna in 1658.
After his return to Europe he fought in the campaign 
against the Spaniards in Alemtejo 1661-65. In 1667- 
80, Garrison Commander at Funchal (Madeira) where 
he married. Returned to Lisbon 1780, where he wrote 
Fatalidade Historica (dedication dated Jan.1685) 
and died in 1699.
3prevalent system of land tenure, the King was able
to exploit them without any expense to his treasury.
For instance, the work o f  peeling and gathering the
cinnamon was done by men of the Chalea caste for no
other payment than the lands, which they were assigned
for use as long as they did this work. If anyone was
unable to perform this work, his lands were given
over to another, who was prepared to do so. This
system of land tenure ijas so extensive in its
application that even military service had to be
rendered by certain classes of people, not in return
for any cash payments, but for usufructuary rights
over certain specified lands# Thus, as Hibeiro
enthusiastically explains, 11 the King was not put to
the expense of a single real11 in maintaining his
soldiers, who would otherwise cost more than a vast 
1
treasure.
7*------------------------------------------------------------------------- - --------------------------------------------------
1. Ribeiro, 29.
For thfc- system of land tenure see (among others) ; 
Ribeiro, 28ff; Robert Knox, An Historical 
Relation of the Island of Ceylon. London. 1681,
P. b-3
Sir John D ’Oyly, A Sketch of the Constitution of 
Kandyan Kingdom. Colombo 1929; H. W. Codrington, 
Ancient Land Tenure and Revenue in Ceylon. Colombo. 
Tyjfil  ■*
kFrom all this, it might appear as if the Portuguese 
would find, when they came to rule over a rich portion 
of this"terrestrial paradise", that they had almost 
every requisite for the successful exploitation, of 
its riches. But they lacked at least one absolutely 
essential requisite; namely,the continued co-operation 
and allegiance of a sufficient number of the inhabitants 
of the country. In the words of the well-known
1
Portuguese historian of Ceylon, Fernao de Queyroz,
his countrymen were opposed by :
"the disloyalty and desperation of the 
Chingalaz, a subtle, proud, treacherous 
and fickle race, by no means inferior in 
courage to the bravest in India; who bear 
their own native yoke so ill that it is 
impossible they should not decline a foreign 
one, as may well be seen by the pertinacity 
with, which for more than a century they 
obliged us to turn that island into a pool 
of their own and foreign blood.11
1. S.G.Perera, (Trans.) Fernao de Queyroz, The
Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon, Colombo, 
p.S06. This work will be hereafter referred 
to as : Queyroz.
Queyroz : Born 161J; entered orders of Society of 
Jesus; arrived in India, Nov*16^5J occupied various 
posts such as Professor of Theology, Parish Priest 
of Salsette, until in 1677 ix© became Provincial of 
the Order* After laying down this office in 1685, 
he continued at Goa where he died in April 1688, 
after a continuous residence of 53 years in India* 
He composed various works of which, apart from his 
book on Ceylon, the "Life of the Venerable Brother 
Pedro de Basto......." is best knnyn,
5When the Portuguese first came to the island at
the beginning of the sixteenth century there were
three kingdoms of varying economic and political
importance* In the north was the Kingdom of Jaffna,
inhabited by the Tamils, a people differing very much
in race, language, customs and religion, from the
Sinhalese who inhabited the rest of Ceylon* In
comparison with the rest of the country, Jaffna was
a poor area; at least, not a stick of the much-sought-
after cinnamon grew in that country* Then, there
was the Kingdom of Kandy, occupying the central
highlands of Ceylon* At the time the Portuguese
arrived, it was becoming an important factor in the
politics of Ceylon. Finally, there was the Kingdom
of Kotte, occupying the western and south-western
areas of the country* It was the richest and the
most powerful of the three kingdoms, and had been
exercising varying degrees of overlordship over the
other two kingdoms. Most of the cinnamon of the
country was to be found in the Kotte Kingdom; the
1
rest was in the Kingdom of Kandy*
1* For the history of the so-called 'Portuguese Period' 
see (among others) :
Queyroz and Ribeiro.
P*E.Pieris, Ceylon: The Portuguese Era, 2 Vols*
(continued)
6The Portuguese had their first contacts with 
the ruler of Kotte, who, overawed by their military 
might, allowed them to build a fort at Colombo, in 
1518; furthermore, he promised to pay tribute to the 
King of Portugal. Nevertheless, he could not be 
persuaded to exclude the Muslims (or Moors, as they 
were usually called by the Portuguese) from the trade 
which they had conducted for so long in cinnamon and 
other articles. In fact, the populace and many of the 
nobles, whose sympathies were with the peaceful Muslim 
traders, felt that the King had gone too far in 
permitting the construction of a fort. The consequent 
attacks made on the unpopular foreigner proved a 
failure. When in 1520 a new Sinhalese King gave in 
to the popular clamour against the Portuguese, his 
attempts to destroy the fort ended in a fiasco.
(continued) :
fr.S.G.Perera, A History of Ceylon for Schools (1JMf3)
pt. 1.
H. W. Codrington., A Short History of Ceylon. (1929).
There are various editions of the last two works.
I have indicated the editions used by me*
For the territorial boundaries during the 16th C.
see the last-mentioned work, Map VI, p.1^1.
7In the following year* an event took place which 
considerably weakened the power of the Sinhalese to 
resist Portuguese ambitions in Ceylon* The three 
sons of the King of Kotte did away with their father, 
and partitioned the Kingdom amongst themselves. The 
mutual rivalries of two of these sons - the third 
died within a few years of the partition - gave the 
Portuguese a splendid opportunity of strengthening 
their own position. Bhuwanekabahu, the elder of these 
sons, although he had obtained the capital city of 
Kotte and a major share at the partition!, was very 
much of ^weakling and became increasingly dependent 
on the Portuguese for maintaining his position against 
his ambitious and abler brother, Mayadunne, who had 
obtained the subordinate principality of Sitawaka.
While Bhuwanekabahu called in the aid of the Portuguese, 
Mayadunne obtained help from the Samorin of Calicut 
who had his own quarrels with the Portuguese#
The successor of Bhuwanekabahu, his grandson, 
Dharttagala, was even more of a weakling than his 
grandfather, consequently, he soon came to rule only 
in name, his indispensable allies and protectors, the 
Portuguese, exercising all effective power. His 
conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1557, made Dharmapala
8only too happy to see the Portuguese so powerful 
in his state. In August I58O he appointed the King 
of Portugal as heir to his Kingdom, by a testament 
to that effect. When , therefore, Dharmapala died 
in 1597, the Portuguese became the rulers of the 
Kingdom of Kotte, in fact and in name.
Nevertheless , although they inherited a Kingdom, 
they also inherited, on account of the barbarism and
A
religious bigotry displayed by them almost from the 
beginning, the implacable hostility of the vast majority 
of the Sinhalese. When Dharmapala had become a 
Catholic, many of his courtiers and some of his other 
subjects had followed his example. Though the Portuguese 
had a somewhat loyal element from amongst these 
Catholics, the majority of their subjects obeyed them
1. "It was the day of the festival of the Pagode of
Alugao and the concourse of Pilgrims was large; and 
to turn their tears into blood, the arrayal {i.e. the 
Portuguese army) marched to that Pagode.1 These 
words of Queyroz (42J) indicate the behaviour of the 
Portuguese rather well* It is tru&^tjiat the idea of 
religious tolerance__had not been/developed in Europe 
at that time; but this fact could not be understood 
by the Buddhist Sinhalese,who had always respected 
other people's opinions and had at first extended a 
friendly welcome to the Portuguese missionaries.
9through fear and necessity and by no means through
1
love and affection.
To all these Sinhalese who were hostile to 
Portuguese domination, Mayadunne of Sitawaka had 
been the champion of Buddhism and of Sinhalese 
culture, till his death in 1581. In fact, he and 
his son, Raja Sinha, had driven Dharmapala and the 
Portuguese to such straits that long before Dharmapala 
donated his Kingdom, the Kotte King and his Portuguese 
friends had little more than the city of Colombo in 
their possession. Raja Sinha, although he was 
considered a godless King by many of his subjects, 
was certainly no Catholic; nor was his hatred for 
the Portuguese less than that of his father; his 
military genius and his successes against them were
1. Most of the Sinhalese Catholics were so only in name. 
The Portuguese could not be assured of the continued 
loyalty and co-operation of even the few practising 
Catholics, because of the excesses committed against 
them by Portuguese of all classes. Roughly, however, 
it could be said that Portuguese pov/er depended, to 
some extent, on the not very steady loyalty of the 
practising Catholics, the dangerous, but often happily 
effective assistance of ambitious and self-seeking 
Sinhalese noblemen and the divisions among the 
subjects of the Sinhalese ruler ; but, overwhelmingly, 
their power depended on their own military 
strength.
to
mutfh greater* He all but drove them into the sea*
But the Portuguese who were in full command of the 
seas, always obtained relief from Goa in the nick of 
time*
Various circumstances, not the least of which was 
his ill-judged and ill-timed conguest of the Kandyan 
Kingdom, brought about the downfall of Raja Sinha and 
the Kingdom of Sitawaka. Before that happened, 
however, there appeared on the scene a new figure, 
which, while contributing in a large measure to the 
downfall of Raja Sinha , at the same time came to fill 
the vacant position of the Sitawaka King as a rallying 
point for the Sinhalese against the Portuguese 
tyranny*
It happened that in 159*1 the Portuguese had decided 
to set up on their behalf on the throne of Kandy one 
of the heirs oij'the King, whom Raja Sinha had driven 
out from that Kingdom. To head the movement in favour 
of their protege, they sent a valiant Kandyan Sinhalese 
named Konappu Bandar a, who had taken service under 
Dharmapala but, was himself the son of a nobleman^ who 
had once aspired to the throne of Kandy* The 
Portuguese plans seemed on the point of realisation, 
because the whole country flocked to.the standard of
It
Dorn Philip, their protege, against the tyrannous
usurpation of Raja Sinha. But when Dorn Philip died
suddenly under suspicious signs of having been
poisoned, Konappu Bandara utilised the popular
suspicion and resentment in order to oust the
Portuguese, and become King.
Thus, at fcbout the same time that Raja Sinha and
the Kingdom of Sitawaka came to be no more, Wimaladharma
Surya (as Konappu Bandara now became to be known)
and the Kandyan Kingdom, came to the fore as the
champions of the Sinhalese in the struggle against
Portuguese domination.
If, in the eyes of any Sinhalese Wimaladharma
lacked a perfect title to the throne of Kandy, the
Portuguese, quite unwittingly though, provided him
with one. Determined to obtain control of the
Kandyan Kingdom, the General Pero Lopez de Souza set
out on an expedition to Kandy taking with him Dona 
2
Catherine, the sole remaining heir of the late dynasty 
of Kandy. At first, he carried all before him, being 
very much assisted in the enterprise by an able and 
respected Sinhalese commander; but when he did away
1. A baptismal name given by the Portuguese.
2 # « *• M W « H tl
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with this commander, and when it appeared that de 
Souza intended to marry Dona Catherine to a Portuguese, 
almost all the Sinhalese troops deserted him* Soon 
after this, Wimaladharma surrounded the Portuguese 
and killed or captured all of them on the 8th October 
Among the booty which fell into his hands was 
Dona Catherine herself* He made her his queen and 
thereby obtained a perfect title to the Kingdom,
In the years succeeding, the Portuguese and the 
Sinhalese waged a fierce warfare, but neither side was 
able to conquer the other. The Portuguese maintained 
a hold over q vast area. The internal dissensions 
which followed in Sitawaka at the death of Raja Sinha, 
had enabled the Portuguese not only to regain the 
original kingdom of Bhuwanekabahu, but also to 
capture most of the Sitawaka territory. Wimaladharma 
ruled the remainder of Sitawaka, and his own Kingdom 
of Kandy# Roughly, this was the territorial position 
of the two powers. The Portuguese, however, could at 
no time enjoy the perfect submission of their territory, 
because of the antagonism of their subjects towards them. 
A letter which the inhabitants of the Pour and Seven 
Korales addressed to Wimaladharma in 1599 is a
13
testimony to this irreeonciliability of the people 
to Portuguese rule :
!,The inhabitants of the frontiers of the 
Portuguese make known to you, the 
Universal King and Victorious Lord of 
this Laneab,1 how on all sides the 
robbers of cattle, the shedders of blood, 
the Enemies of Life, the causers of 
captivity, have come upon us, which makes 
it necessary for us either to abandon 
our possessions to them, or to obey them 
against our will. Wherefore you, who 
are the guardian and refuge of this orphaned 
and afflicted people, succour the miserable, 
who are in this condition, if you do not 
wish to see altogether extinguished the 
Nation of which you are the Restorer, 2 
Guardian, Relief and firm protector. 1
Nevertheless, despite all the hostility of their 
subjects, the experience of Raja Sinha had shown that 
without the support of sea-power to prevent relief 
being sent to them from outside the island, the 
Portuguese could not be driven from Ceylon*
This was the situation in the island, when the first 
Netherlanders appeared on it* Of the early expeditions 
which the compatriots of Linschoten sent out to the 
East in order to break into the Portuguese monopoly 
of the valuable spice trade, the first to touch at 
Ceylon was the expedition, sent under Joris Yarn 
Spilbergen. Acting on the express instructions of the
1* Sic* for ^aukawa”, a Sinhalese name for Ceylon.
2. Queyroz, 52*0*
promoters of the voyage, Spilbergen journeyed to
Kandy to meet the King, in July 1602,, Although trade
was the real object of their expedition, he artfully
passed himself off before the King more as a diplomat
than as a trader, because he realised that the King
looked upon matters of trade with contempt. He
declared that he had been sent to Ceylon to offer
the friendship and the help of Prince Maurice of
Nassau against the Portuguese, The overjoyed
Wimaladharma presented Spilbergan with all the
cinnamon and pepper which he had at the moment; and,
finally, he sent him back with rich presents and letters
1
for Prince Maurice,
Hardly three months after the departure of Spilbergen 
from Ceylon, there arrived another Netherlander, This 
was Sebald de Weert who had been instructed to proceed 
first to Ceylon and thence to Achin, He was received
1, For the history of Dutch contacts with Ceylon up 
to about 16^8, see in particular :
Philippus Baldaeus, Beschrijvinge van het machtige 
By!and Ceylon, in (Naauwkeurige beschrijvinge van 
Malabar en Choromandel,,,en het Machtige Byland Ceylon, 
Amsterdam 1672) 20ff; Francois Valentyn,
Beschryvinge van het Eyland Ceylon, in (Cud en Nieuw 
Qost-Indien, Dordrecht-Amsterdam, 172if-26 ,V) p, 101 ff, 
Willem van Geer, De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch 
Gezag over CeilonV Leyden. 1895. on.11-26.
N.Mac Leod, De Oest-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid 
in Azie, Rijswick (Z.H.) 1927,3*. i. 1j>ff.
15*
warmly by Wimaladhama when the latter heard that the 
newcomer belonged to the same nation as Spilbergen,
On account of the very favourable conditions which 
the King offered in return for Dutch help against 
the Portuguese, de Weert decided to give the required 
help* To strengthen his forces for the agreed attack 
on the Portuguese, he sailed to Achin and fetched 
additional men and ships from the Dutch vessels which 
were at the moment at that port. The King though 
pleased at his return with a large force, soon found 
reason to suspect the Dutchman’s good faith. His 
suspicions soon changed into wrath when the drunken 
de Weert made a lewd and insulting remark. He ordered 
his men to bind de Weert; when the latter prepared 
to resist, he was cut down, together with some forty- 
seven of his men, by the Sinhalese. Although the 
remaining Dutch tarried at the port of Batticaloa for 
nearly a month after this event, and even sent an 
envoy to the King, from whom they received some 
cinnamon and pepper, they were unwilling to assist him 
against the Portuguese. Thus, Wimaladhama never 
obtained the naval support which he knew was essential 
for driving out the Portuguese*
16
The ex-monk Senarat who succeeded his step-brother 
Wimaladhama Surya in l60*f, was most anxious to obtain 
butch assistance against the Portuguese, who had 
become bolder since the death of Wimaladhama, whom 
they had feared. Although in 1610 he succeeeded in 
concluding a treaty with the commander of a Dutch
co<ast
ship which touched at a port on the east^of the island,
1
nothing further came of this treaty. Except the 
successful attempt of various Dutch officials on the 
Coromandel Coast to obtain elephants from Senarat by 
holding out false promises of armed assistance, nothing 
of importance occurred until February 1612. In that 
month an envoy named Marcelis Boschouwer arrived with 
letters from, the Sates General and Prince Maurice to 
Senarat.
2
These two letters were part of the many similar 
letters addressed to Eastern princes by the States- 
General and Prince Maurice in They were all to
the effect that a twelve-year truce had been concluded 
with the King of Spain and Portugal, and that each of 
the rulers to whom these letters were addressed, could 
rely on the armed support of the States-General and
1. J.E.Heeres, Corpus Diplomatieum Neerlando-Indicum. 
Hague, 1907, 'i. 81-8J. ^
2. India Office Library, Dutch Records (Transcripts)
( B 1 ) ,  v .3.
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the Prince, if the Portuguese violated the truce 
which expressly stipulated that these rulers were 
also included in its terms*
It is certain that neither the States-General nor 
Prince Maurice had any intentions of giving armed 
help to all these rulers if the Portuguese continued 
the wars against them* It was, however, expected 
that on the strength of these promises of help, the 
Dutch could obtain great commercial and other 
privileges from these rulers* Senarat, of course, knew 
nothing of all this when on the 11th March 1612 he
1
agreed to the terms of a treaty proposed by Boschouwer* 
By this he granted the Dutch vast commercial privileges , 
amounting in effect to a monopoly of all the trade of 
the country* In addition, he ceded to them the 
harbour and the land of Kottiyar in full sovereignty*
1. Ibid*
In the Corpus Din. (i.95-99) He^res gives the 
version of this treaty as given by Baldaeus. 
Baldaeus1 version., however, is hopelessly confused 
and misleading. For instance, he gives the date of 
the Treaty as 11 May; bat the actual date is 11th 
March. (There was a slight modification of the terms 
on 5 April of the same year). Moreover, the treaty 
consisted of articles, of which Baldaeus gives 
only =#♦
i
!
i
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All this was in return for the ^th article of the 
treaty by which the Dutch promised to give armed 
assistance against the Portuguese, if the latter 
were directly or indirectly the aggressors.
Although Boschouwer pointed out to them the great 
advantages to be derived from the concluded treaty, 
his immediate Superiors on the Coramandel Coast were 
unable to send any assistance to Senarat, to whom, 
however, they held out promises of sending help within 
a short time. At length, in March 1615> Boschouwer 
left Ceylon promising to return with the necessary 
help. Failing to obtain assistance from Bantam, the 
then headquarters of the Dutch Company, in the East, 
I^schouwer decided to press the matter before the 
Directors in the Netherlands. The Directors too were 
not prepared to give the required assistance, and he 
turned to Denmark, where he found a willing ally.
Meanwhile, however, the situation had changed in 
Ceylon. King Senarat despairing of obtaining assistance 
from the Dutch, concluded peace with the Portuguese in 
August 1617* When, therefore, the Danish expedition 
arrived in Ceylon in May 1620 , he could not accept its 
help without violation of the sworn peace* This, much 
more than the absence of Boschouwer, who had died on 
the voyage, explains why he refused the proferred
19
assistance of the Banes.
War was resumed between the Sinhalese and the 
Portuguese when the latter flagrantly violated the 
peace by fortifying Trincomalee and Batticaloa, two 
ports belonging to the King. Although the King made 
preparations for the war, the Portuguese General 
Constantine de Sa de Noronha was able to make a 
practically unopposed raid into Kandyan territory in 
1627. Ke followed this up with a less successful 
expedition in 1629 the grand expedition of 16^0.
In the early part of this expedition., he captured 
and burnt the city of Badulla in the principality of 
Uva, the King and his three sons avoiding an 
engagement. But, suddenly, the Sinhalese army 
appeared in force, and in the battle of Randeniwela 
(25 August 16JO), de Sa with most of his men. were killed 
and over 200 Portuguese remained prisoner. This 
expedition showed the Portuguese, more clearly than 
ever before, that in the last resort "the blacks are 
all our enemies.1 Almost all the important Sinhalese 
commanders, great favourites of de Sa, and many of them 
allied through marriage and a common religion to the 
Portuguese, went over with their men to the Kandyans, 
at the beginning of the engagement*
2 o
Although, as a result of this defeat, Portuguese
power in Ceylon reached a very low ebb, yet the
Kandyans were unable to make an effective siege of
Colombo, as they lacked the necessary naval support
to cut off all relief from the city. To remedy this
defect the Kandyan King requested help from the Dutch
1
Governor of Pulicat. But the Dutch, apparently did 
not feel strong enough to give any assistance. Finally, 
after well over a year's siege of Galle and Colombo, 
the Sinhalese were forced to give up their hopes of 
capturing these places. Thereafter, an indecisive 
warfare was waged by the two parties until about 163k- 
when peace was concluded between them.
1. Marten Ysbrants to (Governor-General & Council# 
k December 1630, in I. O.L. (ie: India Office 
Library} Dutch Rees. IX; Viceroy to King (of Portugal 
& Spain) 2 Aprii 1632, in I.O.L.§ Portuguese Records
(Trans). VII. '
It is interesting also to note that the Governor-
General, Hendrick Brouwer had (some time before June
163^) ordered a ship to be sent in order to offer 
assistance to the King. (y. on this point, Philip 
Lucas to Directors, 20 June 163^, I.O.L*, Dutch 
Rees. X) Whether this order was carried out is not 
known.
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At the end of this year, or early in the following,
1
King Senarat died, and his youngest son, the Prince 
Maha Asthana, who seems to have been actually 
administering the state since about 1629* became 
King of Kandy under the name of Raja Sinha II. His 
eldest brother had died some time earlier; his elder 
brother, Wijayapala, became ruler of the principality 
of Matale, but remained subordinate to him. Raja 
Sinha was thus the acknowledged overlord of all the 
territories outside Portuguese control.
1. Whether Raja Sinha was Senerat's youngest son or 
only son, is still an unsolved problem. But I 
incline to believe that the other Princes were 
both sons of Wimaladharma. The Sinhalese chronicle 
the Rajawaliya (or, at least, the versions of it at 
the British Museum; indicate clearly that Raja Sinha 
was Senerat’s only son. («f B.M. , Sinhalese MSS. . 
OR5JO7, 0R2J02, Add. 22q$*12)«. This seems to be 
further substantiated by the details , regarding the 
ages of Raja Sinha and Wijayapala, given in 
W.J.Coster to Governor-General, 31 December 1638. 
in Kolonial Archief 1039, f0.308.
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CHAPTER 2
The Alliance Between Raja Sinha And The Dutch.
Raja Sinha was an astute, able and ambitious king,
much unlike his late father, who had been too mild -
mannered and weak for the turbulent times ushered in
by the Portuguese. In many ways, the new king recalled
the memory of his great namesake of Sitawaka. Like
the King of Sitawaka, he had distinguished himself
at quite an early age as a military commander and a
administrator; consequently, he too had been entrusted
with the government of the country even during the
life-time of his father, just as Mayadunne long before
his death had entrusted his son with the administration
of his kingdom.
Raja Sinha himself was aware of this similarity;
what was more he consciously set out to emulate, and
elfen surpass the achievements of his illustrious
1
namesake of Sitawaka. Whether he would succeed in
1. Vf Raja Sinha to Adriaen van der Meijden, 23 Oct. 
1656, Kol.Arch (ie: Kolonial Archief) 1105 fo*957» 
Except for a few words which are missing because 
the MS. is torn, this letter is found translated 
from the original in Journal of the Ceylon Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society, XVIII. 242-43*
these ambitions, or not was still a matter for the
future to decide; but he had already made a good
beginning, by putting order into his kingdom, and
bringing his subjects firmly under control. All
the princelings and hereditary chieftains who had
enjoyed semi-independent powers in previous reigns
were brought down to the level of royal officials,
holding office at the King’s pleasure. His subjects
were made to recognise that there was only one
1
master in the Kingdom.
Outside his Kingdom, however, he was faced with 
the unpleasant fact that the Portuguese were 
| dominating over rich and extensive areas of Ceylon.,
1 and had ringed him round with a number of strongholds,
f
| from which they effectively controlled his trade and 
communications with the outside world. In addition 
to possessing a vast extent of inland territory in the 
West, South-West and North of the island, they were
I.See the interesting evidence of Raja’s strong rule 
in : W.J.Coster to G.G. , 31 Dec.1638, Kol.Arch.1039 
fo.388. Even in the principality of Matale his brother 
acknowledged him as the overlord. For all practical 
purposes the principality of Matale could be considered 
as being under Raja Sinha’s control* Cfc P.E.Pieris, 
p e  Prince Vijaya Pala of Ceylon. 1 documents
Zk
masters of practically the whole coast of Ceylon#
Although they did not actually occupy the entire
littoral they yet exercised effective domination
1
over it from six great strongholds which they had 
at various poin ts on it* Of these strongholds, 
three were on the west coast^at Colombo, Negombo 
and Galle v> one was in the north - at Jaffna; the 
other two were on the east coast - at Batticola 
and Trincomalee. Portuguese domination over the 
east coast was not such a thorough-going affair as 
that over the western and northern littor^lB. In 
these two latter areas they were in full occupation 
of the territories; but on the eastern littoral 
they occupied only the forts at Batticeloa and 
Trincomalee^
And although Raja Sinha had a few roadsteads 
like Yale and Hambantota which were rather far 
removed from these two forts, nevertheless, by means 
of cruisers based at Batticaloa and Trincomalee, they 
could control his trade and contacts with the outside 
world as effectively as they wished#
1* Apart from the great strongholds, there were 
two lesser forts on the West Coast at Kalutara 
i and Manar*
!
i
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i
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What made this sorry situation altogether
unbearable to the King, was the repeated violation
by the Portuguese of the sworn peace. For instance,
the Viceroy at Goa and the Captain-General of Colombo
were carrying on a secret correspondence with his
brother, the Prince of Matale, with the intention of
1
stirring the Prince to turn against him. Some of 
his rebellious subjects had been assisted against him 
by the Captain of Batticaloaf Shortly afterwards, 
the Portuguese had plundered a vessel bringing goods 
for him? To add to these injuries, he was insulted 
by the Captain-General, Diogo de Melo de Castro, when 
the latter seized a tusker and other valuables, which 
he had presented to a certain Portuguese trader.^ 
Finding this situation intolerable, Raja Sinha 
resolved to set all his energies to the task of driving 
out the Portuguese completely from Ceylon. Since the 
time of his great namesake, experience had shown that
1. Pieris, Prince Vi jay a. docs. 1-7, 12.
2. Raja to Gov. of Pulicat, 9 Sept. 1696, in 
Baldaeus, lf.5.
5. Ibid.
Ribeiro, 109-05; Queyroz, 801, 9^5, 1095.
De Castro;came from Lisbon to Goa in 1620 as 
Captain of a carrack; Captain-General of Sao 
Tome (Meliapur) & the Coromandel Coast, 1625- 
91; Captain-General of Ceylon from Nov.1693 
(with a short interruption in 1695-96) until 
his defeat and death in March 1690.
this could not be accomplished without the aid of a 
Naval Power superior to the Portuguese.
It was natural, therefore, that the King should
call in the aid of the Dutch, the one such Power,
which was known all over the Bast as the successful
enemy of the Portuguese , and whose aid his predecessors
had attempted to obtain. On the 9th September 1636 ,
Raja Sinha wrote to Carel Reijniersz, the Governor of
Pulicat, requesting Dutch help. Owing to various
reasons, the chief of which was the effectiveness of
the watch kept on the Ceylon coasts by the Portuguese,
it was not much less than a year afterwards, when this
2
letter was delivered to Reijniersz.
Before they heard of Raja Sinha1s request, the 
Dutch authorities at Batavia had already decided to 
offer their help to the King^ They were very anxious 
to obtain at least a share of the Ceylon cinnamon, 
the one important spice, which they had hitherto neither 
monopolised nor even shared. As late as August 16^3,
1* Letter in Baldaeus, 45*
2. So said the later Governor of Ceylon. Adriaen van 
der Meijden, who had accompanied Thyssen and Helmont 
to Kandy in 16^7* For the mission to Kandy, see below 
PP3I-53
For the statement of Van der Meijden, see Kol.Arch* 
1105 fo.907; also Valentyn,162, where an extract is 
given from a report made by van der Meijden.
9. In their letters to the Directors, on 9 Dec. 1637 
(Kol.Arch.109^, pp.25-36)the Batavian authorities 
say that they had received Raja's letter by 16 July 
1697. This would mean that when they wrote
(continued)
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they had been writing ruefully to the Directors of
the Company, thus s MWe still see little prospect
of obtaining cinnamon from Ceylon, because the
Portuguese have somewhat strengthened their fallen
1
position there.H But within less than four years 
afterwards they had decided to make a bid for the 
cinnamon by allying themselves with the King of Kandy* 
There were at least two important factors which
(continued) :
to Reijniers& on July 1 (See text, be low ,^ 43^ , 
asking him to offer help to the Kings of Ceylon* 
they knew the contents of Raja’s letter. But 
strangely enough, there is absolutely no mention 
of Raja’s letter (or his request’Jfor assistance) 
in this letter of ^  July. Moreover, the terms 
which Reijniersz was instructed to offer the Kings 
of Candy and Colombo (note the vagueness and 
irmacuracy in this respect, throughout the letter), 
were so very favourable to the Sinhalese, and so 
completely ignore the incorporation! of all the most 
favourable terms pffered in Raja’s letter, that it 
appears certain that G*G.& C had not yet received 
Raja’s letter, when they wrote to Reijniers#. 
Fortunately, there is further evidence, which 
convincingly proves this point. In their instructions 
of 21 Aug.1637 to West^wolt (Kol. Arch*762.p. 659) ,G.G.
& C. actually say that they had received a copy of 
Raja’s letter only after they had written to 
Reijniersz. Thus the view hitherto held by Van Geer 
0 2 _55) and all the other writers, that G.G.&C. 
thought of offering help to Raja Sinha only when, the 
latter requested it, is mistaken*
1. Mac Leod, ii.108.
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led to this decision. They knew from intercepted
A
letters that the Portuguese were in a very bad state 
in Ceylon, For instance, in two of these letters the 
Captain-General, Diogo de Melo himself was found 
complaining to the Viceroy that there was such a dearth 
of men, money and materials, in order to embark upon 
a war, that he dared not violate the peace with Ra3a 
Sinha by interferring with the latter1s trade in 
elephants, although the Viceroy himself was urging 
this course of action upon him. But the second, and 
indeed the most important, factor behind this decision, 
was undoubtedly the bold leadership of the able and 
resourceful Governor-General, Anthonio Van Diemen.
From 1656, the first year of his rule, the Batavian 
authorities began to send an annual fleet to blockade
0
Goa, the centre of Portuguese power in Asia, 
a-*- An attack on the Portuguese position in Ceylon now 
appeared feasible. During the seven or eight months 
in the year when Goa could be kept blockaded, no 
assistance could be sent by the Viceroy to his countrymen
1. Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia, 1637. p.83. 
The letters of de Melo are dated 21 Oct. and 13 Hov.1636 
cf. G.G. & C„ to Reijniersz., 21 July 1637,Kol.Arch.
762 fo.577.
2. For Van Diemen and his policy, see: Dr.F,W.Stapel,
I Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie. (Amsterdam.1939^
iii 2Vlff. ' *
\
\
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in Ceylon* A1 least during these months, the Dutch j
would have a good opportunity of achieving something
in the island* Moreover, Van Diemen and his Council
believed that an attack in Ceylon, would force the
Portuguese to divide their comparatively meagre
resources between that island and Malacca, which the
Dutch had been seriously thinking of capturing ever
since 1633 when they had begun an annual blockade of
1
that stronghold. In addition, to all these considerations,
however, was the fact that the lure of the cinnamon
had become irresistible to the Dutch.
Thus it was, that on July 1637 the Batavian
authorities wrote to Carel Reijniersz, instructing him
to offer Dutch assistance against the Portuguese to
2
the"Kings of Kandy and Colombo”. If the "Kings11 
promised to withold the cinnamon from the Portuguese 
and to give it to the Dutch, he was to offer them not 
only assistance and arms and ammunition, but also 5QJS 
more for the cinnamon than the Portuguese had paid; 
payment would be made in cash or merchandise or in 
munitions of war, whichever the Kings preferred*
1. See these ideas expressed in : G. G.&C. to Reijniersz,
31 July,163J, Kol.Arch.762 fo.577J Instructions for 
Westeiwolt, 21 Aug.1637, Kol.Arch.762.p.659*
2. cf p. 26 n.iO above*
For letter to Reijniersz, see previous note*
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Shortly after the despatch of this letter the 
Governor-General and Council heard from Reijniersz 
how the King of Kandy himself was re guesting their 
assistance, under conditions which appeared to he 
very advantageous to them*. If the required assistance 
was given, he promised to give them all necessary 
material for the building of a fort at Trincomalee 
or at Batticaloa; moreover, he would pay all the 
expenses which might be incurred by five ships (which 
he considered to be an adequate naval force for a 
successful attack on some of the Portuguese strongholds*) 
When they saw that the King himself was very 
eager to obtain help from them, and that he was 
offering them very advantageous terms, the Batavian 
authorities lowered their offer regarding the cinnamon. 
Instead of offering to pay for it 5°$ more than the 
Portuguese had paid, he was now to be merely told that 
they would pay more than the Portuguese; but they were 
not going to commit themselves by saying how much more. 
Accordingly, this was one item of the instructions given 
to Adam Westerwolt, who left Batavia at the end of 
August as Commander of the fleet sent to blockade Goa.
On his return from the blockade of Goa, he was to 
proceed to Ceylon, with seven ships and the 250 soldiers
31
in the fleet and effect whatever was possible against
the Portuguese there. As a member of the Batavian
Council, he undoubtedly did not need very detailed
instructions from it; he was therefore reminded in
general terms that he should !,direct affairs in such
a way that we may obtain from the King of Kandy a good,
profitable and binding contract and a great quantity
of cinnamon-** To impress upon him all the more the
importance of his task, he was reminded of the fact
that the Portuguese attached greater importance to
Ceylon than to anty of their other possessions in the
East. Finally, Westerwolt was warned not to agree
to attack any place around which no cinnamon was to
be found - even though the King should request it,
and promise to bear all the expenses connected with 
1
it.
Meanwhile Reijnierz had made preparations to send
envoys to the King, in order to discuss preliminary
terms. Towards the close of October he sent two envoys,
2
Jan Thijssen and Adriaen Helmont, with a letter to the
1. Instructions, 21 Aug. 1 697 , Kol.Arch-762 p.659.
2. Had been a prisoner of the Portuguese in Ceylon, some 
time previously, in 1639 in charge of Batticaloa;16A0, 
succeeded Coster as President of Ceylon; 16^5
Governor;16^6 removed from office and later in same 
year sent as Governor of Malacca), where he remained 
till 1662 when appointed Vice-Pres.of Council of 
Justice at Batavia. Had been Councillor Extraordinary 
of India since 16A8. Returned to Holland in 1668-69.
King. In the latter half of November the envoys 
presented themselves before Raja Sinha and handed 
over the Governor*s letter. This letter and the 
further declarations of the envoys were, in brief, 
to the effect that the Dutch were prepared to assist 
him if he would grant them the cinnamon trade; they 
promised to pay more for the cinnamon than the 
Portuguese had paid; finally, to transport cinnamon 
and other merchandise, and in order to assist him, 
the commander of the fleet before Goa would send some 
ships towards April next."*
Raja Sinha was overjoyed when he heard that 
the Dutch were prepared to assist him. As the envoys 
had no authority to conclude any precise agreement, 
he decided to send with them a letter and ambassadors 
to the Commander of the fleet at Goa. In this 
letter^ he extended his previous favourable terms
1. Diary of Helmont, Kol.Arch.10J7 fos.175 * 79 
Reijniersz’s letter of 20 Oct., in Baldaeus, 4B.
2. 22 Nov.1697, Kol.Arch.IO97 fo.179.
Baldaeus (if9) does not give a faithful copy of 
this letter. Even the date he gives for it is wrong. 
There is a translation of this letter in : P.E.Pieris 
Some Documents Relating to the Rise of the Dutch 
Power in Ceylon , 1 6 0 2 - 1 from the Translationsat 
the India Office. (Colombo 1929) Regarding the
innacuracy of these translations see below,
Introduction p- ix.
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by explicitly stating that he would sell the cinnamon, 
pepper and wax to the Dutch only.
The Dutch envoys and the King’s ambassadors 
appeared before Westerwolt, the commander of the fleet, 
on the 23rd December 16^7* Following the advice 
of the King and his ambassadors, Westerwolt decided 
to attack Batticaloa first. For this purpose he 
sent his Vice-Commander Will&m Jacobsz Coster** ahead 
with three ships; the King’s ambassadors accompanied 
Coster.
In the meantime, differences between Raja Sinha 
and the Portuguese had come to a head. Despite the 
differences which seem to have existed from shortly 
after the peace of war had not been declared by
either party, because neither felt strong enough to 
do so. When, however, the Captain-General, Diogo de 
Melo heard that Raja Sinha had begun negotiations with 
the dreaded enemy, he decided to act before these 
negotiations should contrive the utter ruin of the
1.In Company’s service from before 1 6 ^  with the rank 
of merchant; in 1658 was Chief at Batticaloa; 16^9, 
served as Vice-Commahder of Antonio Caen, with whom 
he returned to Batavia (at the request of G. G.& C.) 
in order to report on Ceylon affairs; returned to 
Ceylon as Vice-Commander of fleet under Lucas, after 
; whose departure, he became Commander; in this capacity
captured Galle (March 16W )  where he became the first 
President; fowe months later, returning from a mission 
. to Kandy, he was murdered by the King’s men, oil account
| of his arrogant and unseemly behaviour.
I
Ii
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Portuguese in the island.
Early in 1658 he received considerable 
reinforcements. Thereupon spurred on by certain 
humiliations1 he had suffered at the King’s hands, 
and determined to prevent the impending combination 
between Sinhalese and Hollander, he invaded Kandy 
in force. Raja Sinha felt himself unprepared for 
the war, and wished to talk of peace; but the 
Captain-General would not listen to his suggestion.
He marched on Kandy and burned the city to the 
ground. Immediately after that, however, he realised 
his mistake. The armies of Raja Sinha and Prince 
Wijayapala appeared on the scene, and when he began 
a hasty retreat, he was harassed on all sides and 
finally brought to bay at Gannoruwa, where apart from 
the Kaffirs, Kanarese and Sinhalese who had accompanied 
him, all his Portuguese troops (about 900 in number)
1. The King had retaliated for the seizure by 
de Melo of the tusker and other presents 
($?©p. 15 above) by seizing two horses 
belonging to de Melo, Riheiro, 10^# 
Dr.Pieris (Port Era ii.ZQ^-Qk) places the 
private quarrel between de Melo and Raja 
Sinha as having arisen after the visit of 
Thijs. and Helmont. But de Melo’s letter 
of 21 Nov. 1637 in Pieris, Prince Vijaya. 
22-2^)> indicates that the quarrel had 
arisen much earlier*
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were killed or captured* Diogo de Melo and most 
of his officers were among those slain in this 
battle, which took place on the 23rd and 24-th March 
16^8.
This was the welcome news which Coster heard
on the 4-th April at Kalmunai, near Batticaloa. He
also heard that the King had sent an army to lay
siege to Colombo. Thus it appeared certain that
the garrison of Batticaloa would obtain no help from
the Portuguese headquarters in Colombo. (On the
April, Coster arrived before Batticaloa, and soon
after that he began to erect batteries with the help
of the men supplied by the local governors of the King.
He received news on the 25th of the month from Raja
Sinha to the effect that he himself would soon be
2
coming to Batticaloa.
Meantime, Westerwolt, who had left Goa for
Ceylon with five ships, arrived at Batticaloa on
the 10th May. Pour days later the King himself
3
with some 15,000  ^soldiers and pioneers.
1. Not the 18th as given by Van Geer, 38; Stapel, 
Geschiedenis... iii.252: Pieris, Some Docs.56:etc.
2. Coster to G.G.& C. ,4- June 1638, Kol.Arch. 1037 fos. 
165-166; Note that Baldaeus(53955) conjures up a 
meeting between Coster and Raja before the arrival 
of Westerwolt.
3. Coster to G. G.& C. , 4- June 1638, Ibidiit. ; 
Westerwolt to Dircs. , 24- Sept. 1638 ,Kol. Arch. 1036 
fos.305-22.
(continued)
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It was then decided to storm the fort after a 
preliminary bombardment. The attack was to he made 
from two sides; on one side, Coster with the Dutch 
soldiers were drawn up, and on the other, Raja Sinha1s 
troops. But it did not come to a storm, because the 
Portuguese hoisted the white flag. The cannon had 
so battered the fort, and the enemies v/ere in such 
numbers that the Portuguese realised that resistance 
would be useless* On the 18th May the forint was 
surrendered on condition that the Portuguese and half- 
castes should be transported to Kegapatam. The 
’blacks* who were with the Portuguese were handed
(continued) :
Vap Geer(^8) says 1^00* This is probably a printer’s 
error.
The assistance which Raja gave, and was prepared to 
give, at the capture of Batticaloa, does not in 
itself deserve special notice. But in order to test 
the validity of the later charge, that his policy was 
to let the Dutch dd all the fighting, and to reap 
for himself all the consequent advantages , it is 
necessary to note what assistance was given by the 
King at the various attacks oh the Portuguese.
Regarding Raja Sinha’s assistance at Batticaloa,
MacLeod (ii.114-15) is the only writer whogives a 
fair and full account. On the other hand, cf.DofcoW 
Ferguson, ’’Raja Sinha II and the Dutch”, dCCRAS xviii. 
179; S.G.Perera, History of Ceylon. p,1lfl
1. Where the word ’’Swarten11 seems to refer to several 
races, I have used the word ’blacks”.
Among the Sinhalese who fell into Raja’s hands by 
the capture of the fort, were some seven or eight 
men who had been concerned in the murder of one of 
his governors (efp.25 above). He caused these men to 
be impaled at the corners of the fort. (Westerwolt to 
Dirs.2K Sept.1638>Kol. Arch. 1036^ 0.325)# The interesting
(continued)
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over to the King.
A
As Westerwolt reported afterwards to the 
Directors of the Company, the King’s joy at this 
victory was unbounded.. He related with wonder to 
Westerwolt and Coster that the fort which their 
artillery had forced to surrender by a battering 
of only a few hours, had at one time withstood a 
mighty force which he had sent against it.
Before Raja Sinha’s ecstacies at this victory 
could abate, Westerwolt offered him the terms of a 
draft treaty. The King deliberated over them with 
his chiefs for a few days, and finally agreed to 
the terms put forward by the Dutch. On the 2jjrd May
1638 two copies of the Treaty written out in.
2
Portuguese, were signed by Raja Sinha on the one hand, 
and Westerwolt and Coster on the otheir. Bach party
(continued) :
fact is that Baldaeus(55) adds some ^2 more 
to the number impaled.
1.24. Sept.1638, Kol.Arch. 1036 fos. 305-22.
2.All writers on the subjeic have made the strange error 
of believing that while the original copy of the treaty 
which Raja retained was written out in Portuguese, that 
kept by the Dutch was made out in the Dutch language. 
This would mean that when he signed the Dutch eopy,Raja 
was signing a sort of blank cheque, for, everyone agrees 
that the King knew no Dutch. Even the available copies 
of the Treaty leave no doubt regarding the fact that*: 
Both original copies were drawn up in Portuguese. The 
Dutch translation of this treaty available at the Ceylon 
Archives indicates this in the most obvious manner 
possible, for it says by way of introduction to the
(continued)
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kept one of these original copies.
Neither of these originals are now extant*. But 
from the Dutch translations, which are available, it 
appears that this treaty was a most advantageous one 
for the Dutch. They obtained a monopoly of all the 
most important articles of trade except elephants.
Even with regard to elephants, the King was bound 
to sell at least the same number of beasts, which he 
sold to outsiders, to the Company. As regards the 
expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by the Dutch in 
assisting the King, the latter was bound to repay them 
in cinnamon, pepper, wax and other merchandise.
(continued) :
actual treaty, thus : “Translaat uit de Portuguese 
tale van Tt Contract van Alliantie en anders gemaact 
tusschen Syn Majest van Ceylon, ter eenre ende fd
doorl: Compe: ter andere zeyde den 23 May A0 .1638..
(Text given in: E.Keimers, Memoir of Joan Maetsuyker,
1650. Colombo, 1 3 2 7, p.if7- Appendix A.) Moreover, in 
their lettero £  26 Sept.l6if0 to Coster, G. G.& C. 
explicitly admit that the originals of the treaty were 
both in Portuguese (Kol.Arch. 767 p.623). See Further, 
below, p. 63.
For copy of treaty in Heeres, Corp.Dip, i, see 
pp. 300-16.
1. Westerwolt to Dirs. , 2 b - Sept. 1 6 3 8, Kol.Arch. 1036 fos. 
33>34.
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This monopoly of trade and the repayment of the 
expenses incurred in his service, had both been 
previously promised by Raja Sinha. What is 
startingly new about this treaty is contained in 
Articles 5 and 4.
A
Article 5 was to the effect that all the captured 
forts would be garrisoned by the Dutch; moreover, if 
they considered that these forts were not properly 
fortified, the King was bound to get them fortified 
in the manner indicated by them.
Article 4, which is closely related to the previous 
one, dictated that in case any captured forts were 
garrisoned by the Dutch, the King would be bound to 
provide the garrison-personnel with the necessary 
rations and pay their wages.
That Raja Sinha ever conceded these two articles 
(particularly Article is incredible. He must
have known that when the ^rd Article was put into 
effect he would have merely substituted Dutch garrisons 
for the existing Portuguese ones. According to the 
treaty, not only would he have nothing to say against 
this, but, on the contrary, he would also be bound to 
pay all the expenses incurred by the Dutch in
1. MacLeod,ii.1 gives a quite innacurate summary 
of this Article.
capturing the forte, and also continued to provide 
the monthly rations and wages of all the garrison- 
personnel, and, finally, see that the forts were 
fortified at his own cost, and in the manner desired 
by the Dutch.
When Raja Sinha1s burning ambition was to rid 
his country of a hated foreign domination, it is 
hard to believe that he could have merely wished to 
substitute a new foreigner for the old one* It is 
also difficult to believe that the concession of the 
^rd Article was due to an oversight; because he had 
deliberated otorer the terms of the treaty, for several 
days with his chiefs. It is, however, just possible 
that there is in all this some error or mistake which 
time might perhaps indicate; otherwise, the King 
had committed an act of unbelievable stupidity.
From the Dutch point of view, however, the treaty 
fully conforms to their declared policy. On the Jth
p
of December 1637, the Batavian authorities had 
written to the Directors of the Company :
1. Indeed, it will appear later on that there is 
something more serious than an error or mistake 
regarding this matter. See below pp.62ff
2. Kol.Arch. 10^^, fos.
4*1
1 We shall regulate our further assistance 
to the Persian and Achinese King, as well 
as to other Indian princes, in such a way 
as to occasion the least expense and to 
bring the greatest profit to the Company.1
After the signing of this treaty, Raja Sinha 
requested^ Westerwolt to leave for its protection 100 
Dutch as garrison in Batticaloa. Westerwolt 
accordingly left his Vice-Commander, Coster, in 
charge of the fort with a hundred men as its garrison.
Of his eight ships, he sent one to Coromandel with 
a sample lading of cinnamon, from the merchandise 
which Raja Sinha had already given; with one ship 
he decided to go ahead to Batavia with a further 
lading of this spice, leaving the other six behind 
to take in further quantities of merchandise and then 
to return to Batavia. Accordingly, he left for 
Batavia on 4-th June 16^8. With him went two Sinhalese 
ambassadors to obtain ratification of the treaty.
Raja Sinha himself had left Batticaloa for the 
hill-country some time before Westerwolt1s departure.
The relations between the Dutch and the King had been 
excellent, and Westerwolt and Coster had had reason to 
be thankful for the munificence of the King not only 
towards the Company but also to them personally.2
1. So sqys Westerwolt (24 Sept.16^8,Kol.Arch.10^6 p.^24). 
But according to the ^rd Art.which we have been 
considering, he could have placed a garrison, even
on his own authority.
2. (See next page)........
kl
(continued) :
2. Coster values the gifts given to Westerwolt 
by the King at about 1000 reals (ie: about 
2500 ifui&ters). He does not say how much 
the gifts he received would amount to (Coster 
to G.G., if June l6jj8, Kol.Arch. 1057 fo.166*
*►3
Chapter 5.
The Policy of the Dutch
On the departure of Westerwolt, Coster set about the 
task of obtaining from the King’s Officials ladings of cinnamon, 
pepper, wax and other merchandise for the ships left behind at 
Batticaloa# He obtained a considerable quantity of these articles; 
but not as much as he desired# Ee was more or less given to under­
stand by the Ka&dyans, that enough merchandise had already been given 
to cover all the expenses so far incurred in the King’s service by 
the Dutch# Co3ter, however, maintained that the value of the 
EBrchandise received did not by any means meet the expenses incurred 
by the Company#
This was a rather seriais difference of opinion; it is, there-
1
fore, worth attempting to find out which was the correct opinion.
2 k 3
According to Coster’s own statement, the Dutch had received 143 bahars
269 pounds of cinnamon, 21 bahars 421 pounds of wax, and 6 bahars 179
pounds of pepper# The revealing fact is, that the cinnamon alone
1# Particularly since the question of the King’s debt to the Company 
was one of the most important questions which arose between Raja 
Sinha and the IXitch; it runs right through (and even beyond )the 
period surveyed in this thesis#
2# Kol# Arch# 1039, p#396#
3# For words marked with an asterisk see Glossary#
Iflf
1
fetched well over the 100,000 florins in Holland, while the Dutch
claim (later on sent from Batavia) for expenses did not amount to more
2 3
than 53,750 florins • Even allowing for the costs of transport and
other incidental expenses, it appears certain that the Dutch must not
only have covered their expenses incurred in the King’s service, but
also have made a profit out of the cinnamon alone# Thus, it appears
that Coster was either highly exaggerating tho Company’s expenses or
else highly minimising the value of the merchandise received#
However that may be, the fact was that he decided to journey to
the court in order to indicate to the King that tho merchandise so far
received was totally inadequate to meet the Dutch expenses# He made a
4
written "Bequest” to this effect on the 28th August (1638). In the
same document he requested that the cinnamon and other articles should
be priced moderately#
On the 8th September, Raja Sinha gave his reply# He asked for
an account of the Dutch expenses pointing out that he had made this
same request earlier to ITesterwolt# Regarding the price of the cinnamon,
he said that the Governor of Puli cat and ITesterwolt had both promised
to pay him a higher price than the Portuguese; but, despite this, he
would, in consideration of the loyal service of the Dutch, price the
3
bahar of cinnamon at 110 xerafims - which was twenty xerafims less than
1# Frcm the "Petitle" of the Directors for various articles (22 Oct#
1639)# ICol Arch# 454#
2# Kol# Arch# 765. pp# 643-48. It will be seen later on (cf pp#99-96 )
that in this claim also there is a gross exaggeration#
3# For some idea regarding the costs of transport see: Dr# F.W.Stapel 
(Ed#), Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de 0o3tindische Compagnie 
(Hague, 1932) Bk# i# Pt.il, 5, 52# Also, HacLeod, ii#434#
4# This "Request" and the Ring’s reply to it are in Kol# Arch# 1039 
pp. 393-401*
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the price paid by the Portuguese in Colombo* He explained that the 
wax and the pepper were also being moderately priced by him* 
finally, he placed his good will in this natter beyond all doubt by 
declaring that if the Dutch could not agree to the prices which he had 
stated, then he would pay their expenses fully in cash*
Coster replied to all this by saying that he would refer to 
Eat avia what the King had said and await the orders of his superiors*
He was perhaps a little relieved when, on the 15th September he 
obtained leavo to depart; because his activities at the Court seem to 
have aroused the King’s suspicions* The King had commanded that no 
one should see Coster without the royal remission; despite this 
order, the Dutchman had managed to meet all types of people from whom
he obtained information on the trade and the political situation in 
1
the Kingdom*
2
Shortly after his return to Batticaloa, ho received a letter
of instructions from Batavia* The authorities there had been very
3
much impressed by news which he bad sent early in July regarding a big 
Portuguese defeat at the hands of the KaSdyans* This news had apparently 
given them hopes of achieving great success; for, they now explained to 
Coster that they had instructed Antonio Caen, the commander of the fleet 
sent to blockade Goa for the third year in succession, to proceed to 
Ceylon early in 1539 and capture some of the enemy strongholds there*
1* Coster to CO*, 31 Dec. 1533, Kol*Aroh. 1C39 pp. 382-92*
2* 11 Aug* 1638, Kol* Arch* 764 pp* 375-76*
3* 2 July 1638, ICol* Arch* 1037 fo. 164* Uone of the available Portu­
guese sources mention this defeat* But whether this event was 
fictitious or not, the fact remains that to the Batavian 
authorities, tjiis must have been a perfectly true event, and tho 
effect on their policy must have been real*
Coster was asked to join Caen at Goa as soon as possible and give him
all necessary advice# If he thought that any further delay at Goa
might jeopardise the chances of success in Ceylon, he was to advise
Caen to leave immediately for Ceylon; in concrete terms they
explained that they would rather see Galle captured than the rich
Portuguese vessels prevented from, going to Lisbon*
As they considered that Calle had a better harbour, and was in
every way more secure, and profitable for then than Colombo, they
instructed him to conduct matters in such a way that the King would be
induced to agree to the capture of Calle before that of Colombo. In
addition, he was also given the following rather strange instructions:
"You shall also thoroughly sound tho King's humour
and inclination towards [[the idea of3 our undertaking
alone by ourselves something against the Portuguese
forts; since it is not advisable to have his men and
his as si stance .n
Kith these instructions, Coster left once again for the Kingts
Court# Having arrived there on the 15th November, he handed over a 
1
letter, which had been sent from Batavia for Raja Sinha# The letter 
infoimed the king that a Dutch Fleet would soon come to his assistance#
1. 11 Aug# 1628, Kol# Arch# 764 pp# 378-79# Translations or translated
extracts (from the translations made for the India Office Library) 
of this letter and the one to Coster, are given in Pieris, Some
Docs* But these translations have to be used with great caution,
because they are very often faulty# cp#, e.g# the relevant part 
of the extract from the latter to Coster (given on pp# 64-65) with 
the sentence quoted above frcm that letter* See further pp.2 , **.i;
He was requested to prepare to support it with his forces, and to have
cinnamon and other merchandise ready for loading into the ships. As
for the request which he had made through VJesterwolt, that the
expenses should be assessed in a reasonable manner, they would deal
so very reasonably that he would be content; although the expenses
would undoubtedly run to a high figure.
The King was pleased with the letter; but when Coster had
audience on the 20th November, he found the ICing averse to discussing
anything of importance cn that day, because it was considered to be 
1
an unlucky day. A few days later, however, ho was able to broach the
subject of making an attack on Calle before any attack on Colombo.
2
But to Baja Sinha, Colombo was "the mother of all the evil" that had
befallen his dynasty and his people; therefore, his determination to
capture that centre of Portuguese power could not be shaken. It would
also seem that Coster found the King unwilling to entertain the idea of
the Dutch attacking any forts without his assistance. In fact, he
impressed on Coster the fact that ha would hurry towards Colombo as
soon as the fleet appeared. To facilitate matters he said that he would
send two ambassadors, an interpreter, and a pilot, who knew the ins and
outs of all the Ceylon harbours, to accompany Coster to the fleet at 
3
Goa.
1. This belief in astrology, etc., was an important element governing
Raja's actions. See further, pp*2l3jZ3h-
2. Dagh - Register 1641, p.413
3. Coster to G.G., 31 Dec. 1638, Kol Arch. 1039 pp. 382-92.
Following these arrangements, Coster went back to Batticaloa,
1
where he left the Merchant Jacob Compost el in charge of the fort. Then
he proceeded to the rendezvous of Tfolawe in the south where he was to
meet the King* 3 ambassadors an& their retinue* Embarking for Goa with
these men, he joined the fleet of Antonio Caen on the 23rd January 1639*
Fortunately, Haja Sinha*s insistence on an attack on Colombo did
not create a very difficult problem for Caen, because by their letter
2
of 9th November 1638, the Batavian authorities had left him some
/
latitude in this matter# Y/hile emphasising their preference for an 
attack on Calle first, they instructed him to give in to tho Eing*s 
wishes, if tho latter insisted that Colombo should be first attacked#
The Governor-General and Council gave two reasons for this modification 
of their previous attitude. Firstly they had heard recently that the 
area around Colombo was really the richest in cinnamon and the most 
opulent in trade# Secondly, they had ccme to the conclusion that it 
was not advisable to\undertake any enterprise without the King*s 
advice and assistance#
After raising the blockade of Goa, Caen sailed for Ceylon, 
where, on the 9th March 1639, he touched at a place some thirty odd miles
1# One item in the instructions (Kol# Arch. 1039 p. 377) which Coster 
gave Compost el, shows unmistakeably what ambitions the Dutch were 
having: Article 9, "The *blacks* who are in the fort should be at
first treated softly until such time as our position is somewhat 
better grounded#w Firther evidence on this point is revealed in his 
letter of 31 Dec# 1638 Maer.mijns bedunckens, en
zalt voor ons, voor eerst met de coopmanschappen det vele hebben 
te bed&ijen, tot dat wat vaster zijn gezeten rontam het Eijilandt#” 
2# Kol# Arch# 764 pp. 547 - 52#
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nortli of Colombo* There, at the request of the King* s ambassadors,
he dispatched two Sinhalese with a letter, informing the King of the
arrival of thefLeet* Immediately after this, he left with his fleet
for Colombo, and on the 12th of the month anchored within cannon-shot 
1
of the city*
In the meantime, the Kandyans had not been idle* After the
defeat of de Melo in March 1638, they had forced the Portuguese to
abandon most of the inland territories and concentrate their forces at
Colombo, Gallo and Hegambo* Towards the close of that year, however,
the Portuguese had recovered scsn9 of the inland territories, and in
particular the fort of Malwana, which was captured without loss owing
2
to the treachery of seme of the King* 3 men* But now, once again, the 
Kandyans resumed the offensive, and the Portuguese retreated on 
Colombo, regarding the safety of which place they had be cane much 
concerned after the arrival of the Dutch fleet
1* The main sources for the narrative of the events connected with 
Caen*s operation in Ceylon, are:
(1) nJournal” of the fleet under Caen, 27 July 1638 - 19 July 1639, 
Kol* Arch* 1039, pp. 108-233*
(2) "Resolutions” of Caen and his Council, Kol* Arch. 1039 pp* 261- 
325.
Van Geer appears to have used the first document, but overlooked some 
important information in it; a few of these oversights will be 
indicated in this thesis* He has, apparently, not consulted the 
second doc., where some relevant and important information Is to be 
found*
2* v. Coster to G.G., 31 Dec* 1638, Kol* Arch. 1039, 383. Queyroz 
~  (813-15) refers to the capture of Malwana by the Portuguese, but
does not mention its later re-capture by the Kandyans. This latter ex 
event is established without doubt from Kol* Arch. 1039, pp*
187-200 (’Journal” of Caen).
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On the 19th, Caen .received a letter from the Kandyans infoiming 
1
him that Dom Balthazar, one of the principal councillors of the King,
would soon arrive with an array before the city* Four day3 later he had
a letter from Dom Balthazar himself giving news of his arrival within
nine or ten miles of Colombo, and informing him that he was awaiting orders
frcm the King to inarch upon the city* Caen, however, concluded that this
letter 7/as very probably a fabrication of the Portuguese and decided to
sail away from Colombo* The reasons given for this conclusion are not
realy convincing; one was, that he had found the talk of the two
Sinhalese letter-bearers to be variable; another reason was, that no
mention of Caen’s name was made in the letter; the third was, that Raja
Sinha’s embassadors did not know the two messengers personally* The
actual reason, however, for the Dutch Commander’s decision to leave
Colombo, appears to have been his fear of the south-west monsoon winds
and current^ regarding which he had become apprehensive within four days
2
of his arrival before Colombo.
3
After leaving Colombo, he sailed south to Galle; but finding that
1* This was his baptismal name, given when he was a subject of the Portu­
guese* Hems one of the principal Sinhalese who went over to the 
Kaudyans during the expedition of de Sa in 1630* His military abili­
ties had won equal recognition among the Kandyans as among the Portu­
guese* His Sinhalese name was Siyane Korale Rala*
2* For the information regarding the letters from the Kandyans, see:
Resolution of 21 March* Kol* Arch* 1039, pp* 311-12; "Journal” of Caen
under date 23 March, Kol*Arch* 1039 pp* 160 ff. For Caen’s fear of the
monsoon and his hurry to leave Colombo, see Resolutions of 1? and 23
March pp* 300 ff* Yan Geer (47) and MacLeod (ii*12l) have completely
ignored the contact established with Caen’s fleet by the Kandyans*
3* Caen left Colombo on 23 or 24 March* Yan Geer (47) gives an utterly
wrong picture of Caen’s actions between 24 March and the end of April*
The period in which Caen was putting order into Batticaloa, and was
making arrangements for the projected attack on Trincomalee, etc* is
conceived by Yan Geer as a period of desultory cruising before Colombo*
MacLeod (iiJ21) has, however, a somewhat accurate picture of this 
period*
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place to be too strongly defended, he sailed on to Batticaloa* There,
on the 4th April, he dispatched Jacob Compostel with a letter to Baja
Sinha* In it (among other things) he complained that the King’s delay
in bringing his army before Colombo, had been the only reason why that
city had not been captured* Compostel was also instructed to explain
the good intentions of the Dutch, and to find out what the King’s wishes
were* On the came day, Caen proposed in Council that an attack should
be made on Trincomalee or Jaffna by the Dutch alone, without the King’s
help* This v;as turned down by the Council, because orders from Batavia
had stressed that no enterprise should be undertaken without the King’s
request and help, and also because the Dutch forces were considered to
be too weak to attempt anything successfully, without the King’s help.
It was, hOTjever, decided that a combined attack should be made on 
1
Trincomalee*
In the meantime, the Kandyan governor of Sammanture had been 
providing tho Dutch fleet with necessary provisions* when he was 
informed of the intended attack on Trincomalee, he sent word toKottiyar 
(near Trincomalee) asking that stoibiing-ladders, gabions, sufficient
1* As seen earlier, GG. & C* had recommended to Coster to see whether 
he could persuade the King to agree to the Dutch attacking 
any forts without his assistance; but in the letter of 9 ITov 
(1638) Caen had been enjoined not to undertake anything in 
Ceylon without the King’s advice and help* That, despite this, 
Caen should have proposed in Council, something quite contrary 
to his written instructions, suggests two things: Either, Caen
was a careless and insubordinate commander (although a member 
of the Council of India) or else, he knew better than the others 
that his colleagues at Batavia would rather see, in this matter, 
the instructions to Coster followed than the (written) instruc­
tions given to him* The second of these two alternatives seems 
to be the more probable*
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provisions and other necessary items should be got ready against the
arrival of the fleet* On the 12th he him elf left for Kottiyar to see
that everything was properly attended to*
Caen continued at Batticaloa until the 17th of the month*
Baring this period he busied himself in putting seme order into the
place* Compostol had been found unsuitable for his post and Jan
Thijssen was placed instead as Chief at Batticaloa* Having attended to
these and othor matters, he set sail with his fleet and arrived in the
Bay of i'ottiyar on the 13 th*
IT .3 was visited on board ship by tho Governor of Hanmantura and
the Vhirmiya or hereditary Chief, of Kottiyar* The latter knew-the lay
of the land wall and indicated a suitable place near Trincomalee whore
a landing could be made just beyond range of the artillery in the
Portuguese fort* He volunteered to hold this landing place with his
9C0 men while tho Dutch troops woro disembarking there. Bollcvang this
plan, the troops were landed* Immediately after that the Dutch and the
1
Sinhalese set about erecting batteries and entrenchments*
On the 23th of the month, Ccmpostel returned from his mission 
to Baja Sinha* He reported that the King had resolved to continue in 
the lowlands around Colombo, because, if he departed, the inhabitants 
who had flocked to him. would again return to the Portuguese* lie had,
35
however, decided to send a few of his principal mndaliyars with some
1* The assistance given by the Sinhalese has been completely
ignored by Van Geer (47)* HacLeod (ii*121) also makes no 
mention of it* But, c«f*, Pieris, Some Docs*, 70*
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4,000 men to assist the Dutch in the capture of Trinconalee and Jaf^a#
Ccmpostel had brought a letter for Caen, from the ICing himself; but,
1
strangely enough, its meaning could not be understood#
Meantime, everything had been made ready for the attach on the
fort* On the 1st of Hay it was heavily bombarded and a breach uas
soon made* The Portuguese, jLOYuever, refused to treat for surrender#
But, alien on the following day Caen prepared to make an assault, they
agreed to accept terns offered thorn# There aero rather noro
favourable than those granted to the garrison of Batticaloa. Unlike
at Batticcloa, the Trinconcd.ee garrison uas permitted to take away
with it all movable personal property. But the request that the 
3f
Caress or fishermen should be allowed to accompany the Portuguese mas 
refused^ Caen declaring that these fishermen must remain to serve the 
Dutch#
Kit bin. a few hairs of the capture of the fort, two Kandyan 
muduliyars arrived with scmo 3000 men. The r.iudaliyars requested Caen 
to hand over the fort to than# The latter replied by asking them 
whether they could protect the fort without Dutch assistance# The 
Sinhalese answered, that they did not think so; but since the Bing had 
clearly stated, even in the letter which they had brought for Caen, that 
the fcrt should be handed over to then, they wished to see the King’s 
orders put into effect# Alien he found that he could not refuse the re­
quest of the mudaliyars merely by pointing out their inability to defend
1# So it is said in the Journal of Caen# As a short while before another 
letter sent from the King is also reported (in the "Journal”) to 
have been unintelligible, the idea suggests itself that these 
letters contained some information which. Caen did not wish to 
divulge to the others#
the fort, Caen produced a copy of the Treaty of 1638. lie caused the
3rd Article to be translated, and solemnly pointed out to the
Sinhalese that the treaty expressly stated that all the captured forts
1
would he garrisoned by the Dutch* The ihdaliyars were effectively
silenced* They next proposed a joint attack on Jaffna* Gaen
excused himself pleading lack of tine, insufficiency of his forces and
2
other difficulties *
1* ITote that Caen took his stand on the treaty, only as a last resort, 
for, hsci he had been told by G.G-«kcv(9 ITov* 1638, Kil*Arch*764 pp. 
551-52): "ende alsoo de geaccordeerde conditien voordese Comp*
Seer voirderl, zijin, zall geensints gerauden wesen onsent wegen 
net zijin Ilayt. in merdcr ccmrnmicatie op die materie comen, off 
eefjlgs motie desen aengaende te doentT. And strangely enough the 
Batavian authorities seem to have anticipated difficulties with 
the King, over the garrisoning of forts, for they say (in the sane 
letter): "Gelijck zijin Kayt. ons guarnisoen in Batacaloa, van
cost ende dranck onderhoudt, zoo zall dienen geleth bij 
veroveringh van meerder en andere fortressen, dat d’onse op den 
selven voeth gosustenteert,  edoch alles dient soo dis­
creet lijck gemenagieerdt dat dierhalven met de niet in
contentie geraecken* Nijt disordre, zal den tijt ordre voortbrengen".
2* On account of an exceedingly faulty andnisleading translation 
of a portion of Caen’s "Journal”, it has been believed that it 
was the Sinhalese who were unwilling to proceed to the attack 
on Jaffna* For the trans., see: JCRASx* 123-40. A more 
accurate and extensive extract from Caen’s Journal is given in,
Pieris: Some Docs*, 65-71; but here too much important,
information has been cut cut*
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Caen left the fiscal &errit Herbers in charge of Trincomalee*
In accordance with the instructions from, the Governor-General and 
Council, Coster was to accompany him to Batavia to report on the 
situation in Ceylon* On the 19th Hay three ambassadors arrived at 
Trincomalee from Kandy, in order to leave for Batavia in Caen's fleet* 
A few days later, the Dutch Commander set sail accompanied by Coster 
and the Sinhalese ambassadors and taking with him a cargo of 
merchandise, which the King had sent to him for delivery at Batavia*
T^hen he had heard that Caen had refused to hand over Trincomalee
1
to his officers, Raja Sinha had written several strong letters to the
Dutch Commander before the letter's departure from Ceylon; but in
vain* He had therefore sent his ambassadors with letters to the
Governor General to complain of Caen's actions* He complained that
just when his forces had appeared near Colombo, Caen had sailed away;
also that the Dutch commander had refused to attack Jaffna despite his
requests* Most important of all, he complained that Caen had refused
to hand over Trincomalee to his Mudaliyars* He made it clear that on 
account of all these reasons, Caen was unacceptable to him and should
1* No reference is made to these letters either in the "Journal" or 
the "Resolutions” of Caen* They are referred to in the letter 
of Lucas of 9 Jan* 1640 to the Directors (Kol* Arch* 1059 p* 20) 
and in the "Resolutions" of G*G* & C*, of 20 Aug*, and 23 Sep* 
1639* (Kol* Arch* 564)* The references to these letters have 
been overlooked by Van Geer, MacLeod and all others*
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not be sent on any further expedition to Ceylony.
These complaints were, however, only one aspect of Raja Sinha’s
letter; a more pleasing aspect for the Batavian authorities, was his
earnest request for further assistance against the Portuguese. Apart
from the forces which were to attack Colombo from the sea-side, the
King requested a force of 500 Hollanders to accompany his army overland
against that city*
Governor-General and Council deliberated long over the King’s
complaints and his request* They heard the reports on the situation in
Ceylon given by Caen and Coster* They next considered whether tho
available force of about 1300 men could be most profitably used against
Malacca or Macao, or to suppress once and for all the opposition in the
Moluccas, or to attack the Portuguese in Ceylon* Finally, they decided
that nothing was so important as their objectives in Ceylon* So great
was tho importance attached to the conduct of affairs in Ceylon, that
2
Van Diemen himself volunteered to lead the proj'ected expedition to
1* Note how these complaints were reported by Lucas and the Council of 
Batavia to the Directors* YJhereas the King had clearly indicated 
that he was displeased with Caen’s refusal to hand over Trincomalee, 
both Lucas and tho Council reported that the King was displeased 
merely because Trincomalee had been captured (cp. "Resolutions” of 
G.G. & C*, 20 Aug* 1639, KolArch* 564 with Lucas to Dirs*, 9 Jan* 
1640, Kol.Arch. 1039 p*20, and G.G* & C*, to Dirs*, 18 Dec* 1639, 
Kol*Arch* 1039 fo* 64 ff.) Similarly, no attack was made on 
Jaffna because Caen was not prepared to do so; but G*G* & C., 
reported that it was the King’s co-operation which had been lacking 
and not that of Caen (cp. "Journal" of Caen, Kol.Arch. 1039, p*213 x 
with G.G. & C., to Dirs*, IS . Dec* 1639, Ibrjctt.)
2* Realia* Register op de Genarale Resolution van het Kasteel Batavia 
1652-1805, lague - Batavia, 1882-85} i* 227j G.G. cc C., to Dirs.,
18 Dec* 1639, BEol.Arch. 1039 fo* 64 ff*
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Geylon* But sines that would violate the recent orders of the 
Directors of the Company prohibiting the Governor-General freni 
leaving Batavia, it m s  decided that the Director-General, Philips 
Lucas, who was next in rank, should lead the expedition*
The conduct of military operation against the Portugese was 
only one of the tasks entrusted to Lucas; there were others, as 
important, if not more so* In 1G38, Caen had been told:
"As the accorded conditions (i#Q. in the Treaty of 
1638|are extremely advantageous for this Company, it 
will be in no way advisable, on our part, to enter 
into further communication with His Kajesty regard­
ing this matter, or to make any suggestion regarding 
1
it."
But now,’/1639, the Batavian authorities have completely changed their 
former opinion* Lucas is asked to stipulate "further and more 
binding" conditions with the King* The reason for this change appears 
undoubtedly to be closely connected with the King’s demand for the 
handing over of Trincomalee and the suspicions, which he had shown 
regarding Dutch actions* In fact, Van Diemen and his Council were so 
disturbed regarding Raja Sinha’s suspicions, that they authorised Lucas 
to withdraw (if he thought it necessary) all the Dutch forces from 
Ceylon^; "since we find the Ceylonese Ji*e* the King] to be very
1. S38 p.51+ Note 1* above*
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variable in his actions, and is suspicious even of us"#
Although a comparatively large force of 1500. men was placed at 
the disposal of Lucas, yet it y;as realised that without the assistance 
of Raja Siriha’s army, Colombo could not be attacked with advantage# 
Therefore, to give the King sufficient time to have his forces ready to 
support Lucas immediately on the latter’s arrival in Ceylon, two ships, 
the Oudebater and the Santvoort mere sent ahead rrith letters of advice 
to Raja Sinha and to Thijsssn, the Chief at Batticaloa# By the same
2
ships 2C0 Dutch soldiers were sent in response to Raja Sinha1s request 
for SCO Dutchmen to accompany him overland to Colombo* These slips
1# G.G# & C#, to Dirs., 18 Dec. 1639, Kol#Arch* 1039 fo. 64 ff;
"Commissie" for Lucas, 22 Sap. 1639, Kol.Arch. 765 p. 581# It is 
not possible to say whether this idea of withdrawing from Ceylon 
(if matters turned out contrary to expectation) was seriously 
entertaired by the Dutch. Considering tho great importance which 
they attached to the cinnamon of Ceylon, it is ccrtqin that only
i nsmcuntnl le obstacles would make them withdraw from Cay Ion.
The prevailing view regarding the attitude of G.G. k C. to Raja, 
is v/ell-expressed by Codrington (Short hist., 118) thus: "The 
Council at Batavia, in spite of their unfavourable opinion of 
Raja Sinha’s trustworthiness, decided to comply with his wishes, 
but held it necessary to enter into a more binding agreement..."
2# Although Van Geer refers to the letter of G.G. 1 C. to the
Directors, of 18 Dec. 1639, he seems to have overlooked and 
also misinterpreted some of the important statements in 
that letter. Bor instance, the 2C0 soldiers were sent at 
Raja’s request to accompany him to Colombo; they v.Tero not sent, 
as Van Geer (51-52) implies, in order to make a lone march 
across the island from the east coast to Colombo in case Raja’s 
assistance was not forthcoming#
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arrived in Ceylon at the end of September 1659* Following tho
instructions contained in tlic letter which, ho "then received, Thijssor
proceeded on a mission to Raja Sinha, in order to present van BieSJexi’G
letter to the Ring, and to cay that a force of SCO Hollanders had
arrived at Ratticaloa to join tho Ring’s army*
Cn the 24th September, a month after the departure of the Cudematcr
and Santvoort, Lucas himself left for Ceylon with the rest of the fleet*
Delayed very much by extremely bad weather, he mas able to sight the coast
of Coy Ion only on the 2nd of December* Shortly after that, ho net tho
Cud; mier and Santvoort from which he learnt that the Ring had at first
forbidden tho Rumiya of Rottiyar to supply any provisions to Trincomalee,
1
on the ground that Caen had garrisoned it against his wishes; but, that 
after the news brought from Batavia by the two ships, he had issued fresh 
orders, as a result of which Trincomalee was being supplied with
1* Van Geer believed that G.G. &, C., did not know why Raja had witheld
provisions from Trincomalee; but sea "Resolutions” of G.G. R C* of 
20 Aug. 1639, Kol.Arch. 564. He also says that Lucas first went 
to Trincomalee. The fact is, Lucas never saw that place* He says 
Lucas found the garrison of Trincomalee in a miserable state 
on account of the King’s witholding of supplies, and that the 
provisions which Lucas had brought freed the garrison from starva­
tion; it was not Lucas’ fleet but the Curderaterand Santvoort 
which had found the fort in sore straits and had provisioned it* 
Van Geer further says that finding Trincomalee so badly treated, 
Lucas sent a pressing request to the King asking him to fulfill his 
obligations better; Lucas sent no such letter* The ohly letter 
which he sent to the King was dated 11 Nov., and was sent from the 
Hicobar Islands, long before he saw Ceylon. (This type of 
inaccuracy in Van Geer could be noted ad nauseam) On the above 
points cp* Van Geer, 49,52 with G.G. cc C. to Dirs. 18 Dec* 1639, 
Kol.Arch. 1039 fo. 64 ff; Lucas to Dirs*, 9 Jan 1640, Kol. Arch* 
1039 pp. 14-22.
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provisions* The King's displeasure and his suspicions regarding the 
Hitch had, apparently, not quite abated; because he had strictly 
prohibited his subjects fTcra having any communications, without his 
orders, with the Dutch garrisons* Of more immediate use to Lucas than 
all this information was what he learnt ft cm the officers of the 
Pudewater regarding the places where drinking water, cattle and other 
provisions were being supplied on the King's behalf* Following this 
information, he proceeded to Yalo and Kalawo from where he obtained tho 
necessary provisions* Sailing on to Galle, he made ready on the 18th 
December, to attack this place; but heavy rain and a strong wind soon 
made him give up this design* lie then proceeded towards Colombo, but 
found no sign of the King's troops, nor of the 200 Hollanders who were 
to have accompanied them* Judging it inexpedient to attack Colombo 
without assistance from the King's Army, Lucas decided to make a 
surprise attack on IToganbo, which, it was heard, had diverted its main 
forces for the defence of Colombo* The idea of a surprise attack had, 
however, to be given up, because of the confusion caused in the fleet when 
one of the ships* was wrecked off Kegambo and some of the others were in 
danger of suffering the same fate*
In the meantime all had not been going well with Lucas* For many 
weeks he had been very ill, and towards the close of December he had 
decided to leave for Batavia hading over the command to his vice- 
commander, Coster* Among the documents, which he handed over to tho 
latter, Lucas laid particular stress on the draft articles of a treaty
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which ha had drawn up for presentation before Raja Sinha. To Coster 
and the other members of the secret Council he explained how the 
negotiations with Raja Sinha, and other connected matters were to be 
conducted* But at the last moment, his illness took a favourable turn 
and he decided to continue in charge*
Otv
Towards the close of January 1640, he was forced by lack of 
drinking water in the fleet, to put into Ksmmala, a village a few miles 
to the north of Kegombo* On hearing of this, the Portuguese Captain- 
General ordered his forces, which were at Arandora to retire upon Eammala 
and, if possible, to dislodge the Dutch from their entrenchments* ITow, 
these forces at Arandora had up to that time been successfully 
preventing the Ping’s Army from descending on the lowlands in support 
of Lucas* Y.lien, therefore, the Portuguese forces following the orders 
of the Captain-General turned back and rushed upon Kammala, the King’s 
army followed in their wake*
The Portuguese are said to have rushed down from Arandora in such
haste that during the three-days’ march to Ksmnala, no halt was made for
cooking food* Heedless of their exhausted state, they made a disorderly 
but impetuous charge on the Hollanders, who were strongly entrenched at 
Kammala* But though they were forced back for a while, their
1* See the letter of Lucas to the Dirs* (9 Jan. 1640, Kol*Arch*
1039, pp* 14-30) for the great importance which he attached to 
these articles, and the impending negotiations with Raja*
2* MacLeod’s account of the expedition is substantially correct
up to about 9 Jan.; thereafter, it is extremely erroneous*
See MacLeod, ii. 127-28*
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superiority in numbers, the strength, of their entrenchments and the 
exhaustion of the enemy, enabled the Dutch to turn the Portuguese 
attack into an utter rout* On the 29th January, Raja SinhaTs army 
joined the forces of Lucas* Kith the King’s aimy there was also the 
Dutch force which had accompanied it; but through illness and other 
causes, this force now numbered only 150 men* On the 6th February, 
the combined Dutch-Sinhalese forces arrived before Hegombo* Three 
days later a joint assault was made on the fortifications, which were 
carried with little loss* Tho Portuguese, who took to flight were 
pursued by the Sinhalese; the Dutch, it would appear, being only
1
concerned with occupying the fort and repairing its damaged walls*
As soon as Raja Sinha (who was in person with his array) saw the 
Dutch repairing the damaged walls of Negombo, he immediately asked Lucas 
to stop all repairs and hand over the fort to him as he wished to raze
it to the ground* Lucas did not agree to this* It would appear that,
1* Thijssen to Cardenijs, 11 April 1640, Kol* Arch* 1043 fo* 214; G.G*
& C. to Coaster, 26 Sept* 1640, Kol* Arch* 765 pp* 620-21; G.G. to 
Raja, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol* Arch. 765 pp. 638 ff; Rajas reply (no 
date) to above letter of G.G., Dagh.Reg* 1641, 408-18; G.G* & C* 
to Dirs. 30 Nov. 1640, Kol. Arch* 1042 fo. 10 ff; Same to same,
9 Sept*, 1640, Kol* Arch. 1043, fos. 242-44* Extracts from the 
last two documents and from the letter of 26 Sep* to Coster are 
given in Van Geer, Appendix v, vi, vii* Appendix vi and, more 
particularly, vii, are inadqoate.(The Dutch documents at the Hague 
Archives for the years 1640-41 are unusually few, because most of 
the Ceylon documents seem to have been lost).
From the account of Queyroz (819-26) it appears clearly that the 
Sinhalese played as large a part as the Dutch at the capture of 
Negombo* But the available Dutch documents make no mention of this
beyond saying that the King’s forces joined theirs shortly after
the battle at Kammala*
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then, not only did Lucas base his refusal, of the King’s request, on
the strength of the 3rd Article of the Treaty of 1638, but, strangely
enough, Raja Sinha also based his demand for ITegombo on the strength
of the same article of the treaty* Out of this difference of opinion
there ultimately emerged the remarkable fact, that the 3rd Article of
a
the Treaty of 1638 substantiated R^ 'a Sinha’s contention, and not that 
1
of Lucas*
The explanation of this is not very complicated* In both the
original copies of the treaty, it had been clearly stated that forts
captured from the Portuguese would bo garrisoned by tho Dutch, only
if His majesty thought it fit* As observed in tho previous chapter,
these two original documents mere in Portuguese, and had been signed
by the King on the one hand and TJasterwolt and Coster on the other*
Each party had taken one of the original copies* But tho Dutch, it is
clear, put aside this original copy, and for all practical purposes
made use of a Dutch translation* This would not have nattered, if only
the translation had not omitted the vital clause: if Kis rajesty 
2
thought it fit*
1* Por the reconstruction of this dispute and other connected matters 
see the documents cited in the previous note*
2* ITote hou G.G* & C* while admitting the truth' “ or rather, part of the 
truth - attempt to slur over it: Raeckende het derde articul
t’zelve hebben geconfronteert met t’origineel in Portugese Tale 
ges* twelclc eenighsints schijnt to differeren, dicteerende 
t’Kederlandts, dat alle forten, die vande Portugesen cp Ceylon cor.en 
te veroveren, tot laste vande I'aijt, met Aederlandts crijgsvolck 
zullen worden beseth, endo int origineol staeth, alsulche forten 
te besetten die de Kaijt* dienstich oordeelt*”
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What excuse or explanation Lucas gave Raja Sinha for the
omission of this clause in the Dutch translation or for having relied
at all, so heavily, on a translation, and not on the original, is not
really known. But, having given scrae explanation or excuse, Lucas
1
placed before the King the draft of a new treaty to replace that of 
1638, which, in Lucas’ opinion, was unsatisfactory in many ways. In 
the course of a very long preamble to this proposed treaty, he stated: 
"Therefore, we declare on our part by these fpresents) in all 
fidelity, that we do not aspire after the least sovereign or 
absolute authority, title or powers, in Your Majesty’s lands
......But in case Your Imperial Majesty, your nobles or
vassals, have conceived the least distruet of our good and
upright intentions. , we declare sincerely by these
£presents")that jwe would^ rather abandon the work begun in 
Ceylon (despite the conquest of the forts of Batticaloa and 
Trincomalee which lias been made for the service of Your 
Imperial Majesty) and hand over the aforesaid forts to Your 
Imperial Majesty, remove our men and munitions from there, 
and remain with Your Imperial Majesty in the former character 
of allies".
The King really saw no need for a new treaty; yet he consented 
to consider Lucas’s proposals. As he read through them, however, Raja 
Sinha quietly realised - if he had not done so already - that the Dutch
1. Kol. Arch. 1039, pp. 32-65.
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were only out to deceive him and to step into the shoes of the 
Portugese*
Article 4, it is true, explicitly conceded the right of deciding
whether captured strongholds should be garrisoned or dismantled, to
the Iving; but the reservation stipulated in that same article made this
concession worthless* The reservation was to the effect that the
Dutch should be permitted to fortify themselves in such places, and
with such facilities placed at their disposal, that they would be able t
defend themselves not only against open enemies, but also against
"pretended friends"* I'ore over, the provisions of many of the other 
1
articles gave the Dutch further opportunities of establishing their 
power in the island*
Hhen he perceived v:hat the Dutch were attempting to encompass, 
Raja Sinha was full of indignation* He refused to listen any longer
1# ©*g* part of Art* 7 ran as follows:
"Alle heijdense Sanguleesen nu order de Jurisdictie der 
portugiesen resorte&snde, sullen met haere persoonen landerijen, 
tfhuijnen, plantagien, huijsen, ha^ven, wesen ter believen.** 
vande keijser IIjeke maijt, aijtgesondert Christen wesende, 
welfcke zijn haijt uijt goeder gratie vrijheijt van conscientie 
ende onder de hederlanderen jurisdictie toestonde te resideren* 
Jegens welcke sullen de Neder landers toegevoecht ende onder 
subjectie gestelt werden alia Caria Celis, lijfeijgene, slaven 
der portugiesen toebehoorende, van wat natie ofte religia dfselve 
wesen ofte professie doen raochten, midtsgaders hare goederen**•"♦
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1
to Lucas and treks off all relations witli the Dutch* lie then moved 
away with his army some miles into the interior* Although the King 
had shown in word and deed that he had more than "the least distrust
v
of our good and upright intentions", Lucas (as is to he expected frcm 
what has been seen above), did not, of course, hand over the forts 
and remove his men and munitions from Ceylon*
To return, for a moment, to the draft treaty of Lucas. It is 
remarkable not only for its contents, but also for the date by which 
it was ready* It was ready by the 9th January 1640, on which date Lucas 
dispatched copies of it to the Directors of tho Company. But the 9th 
of January (1640) is one month before Raja Sinha first indicated the 
vital conditional clause in the 3rd Article of the original copy of 
the 1638 treaty* But, then, on the 9th of January, before he even 
set foot on Ceylon - let alone met the King - Lucas had anticipated 
this clause by the provisions of the 4th Article of his own draft 
treaty* If Lucas and the Council at Batavia had been all along, really 
unaware of the vital clause, which gave the King full power to deal with 
captured forts as he liked, how then did Lucas contrive to anticipate 
that clause, by the 9th January 1640? There can be only one reasonable 
answer: Lucas and the Council at Batavia, had been all the time
1* Lucas had, therefore, been mistaken when he thought that he had made 
a clever job of this draft treaty for he had written to the 
Directors (9 Jan 1640, Kol* Arch. 1039 p.22) thus:
"Desen prince is seer ietdunckende, moedich ende niet al te 
fijdeel, redenen waerom met het instellen van de capitulatien 
bijsonder geleth, ende oock soo circumspect bepaelt hebben, 
als geoordeelt sij, dat eenichsints met goede redenen, soude 
mogen gediffendeert".
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perfectly awaro of the full provisions of Article 3 of the original
copies of the Treaty of 1638♦
Referring to the emission (in the Dutch translation which they
had U3ed) of the vital clause - if His Kajesty thought it fit - the
Governor-General and Council told Coster in September 1640, that they
did not know how this had happened* Sight months later, the
Dagh-Register of Batavia contained some tiling more precise; the
"assistant" (or clerk) Nicolaes HolstfSyn had either by error or wantonly,
left out the clause in question* In a letter of September 1641 to Jan
at 1
Thijssen, this explanation was repeated by the authorities Batavia*
1* G.G* & C., to Coster, 26 Sep* 1640, Kol.Arch. 767 p* 623; Dagh 
Register 1641* 335; G.G* & C., to Thijs., 20 Sept. 1641, Kol .Arch# 
768 p. 440. This attempt to make it appear that the fault lay with 
Holsteijn was carried to great lengths. For instance, on 18 Oct* 
1641 (Kol*Arch* 768 p. 516) G.G. & C*, wrote to Holsteijn (who was 
at Kandy at the time) saying that they believed that he had made this 
wrong translation not through malice but through an error* The 
letter had the effect, which was apparently desired* Eolsteijn 
wrote back a letter full of apologies for his "error" (Dagh-Reg*
1642, 255) That G.G. & C’s letter was really sent for Ajja’s 
information is apparent from the fact that they wrote to Thijssen at 
the same time (Kol*Arch* 768 fos* 503-03) asking him to send the 
letter for Eolsteijn, only if he thought it prudent; for, after 
all, they could not be sure what Raja might do to Holsteijn on 
the strength of that let ter I That Holsteijn was one of the 
most trusted of the Company’s servants in Ceylon, is apparent 
from the fact that in their letter to Coster (26 Sep* 1640)
G.G* & C., expressly say that if any of the G.G.’s letters to ^
Raja require any alteration it should be entrusted to Holsteijn*
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Commenting on this explanation, the Dutch historian Viillem van 
Gear said nearly sixty years ago:
"It cannot he decided with certainty whether the alteration 
made in the copy presented to the Kaharaja, has been caused 
by an error, or deliberately, in order to deceive him..*,.*
it is, however, hardly credible that an unconscious, yet so
glaring, error of a subordinate should not have been
immediately perceived# The nature of the alteration and the
obvious objective that was aimed at by tho alteration, make us
rather believe that there is no question here of an error,
but that really, this has been done according to a fixed plan
and that the translator has only been the tool of people in
1
higher positions".
Even the slight hesitation, which he had, would have disappeared 
completely if Van Geer had noted seme of the facts indicated in tho 
preceding pages, and had realised that the "error" occurred, not in the
copy of the treaty which had been given to the King, but in a translation,
whifih the Dutch had made out of the original copies of the treaty*
It may be argued that the plan for deceiving Raja Sinha was
1* Van Geer, 422* The unfortunate fact is that many writers who
avowedly followed Van Geer, have left this question much more 
undecided than Van Geer* See e.g., H.T. Colenbrander, Kfrloniale 
Geschledenis, Hague 1925-26, ii. 144-45; Codrington, Short Hist* 
118; D.VT. Ferguson, "Raja Sinha ii and the Dutch", JCRAS* XV111 
174* This last writer in fact says (167$ also: "Raja Sinha’s 
duplicity in his dealings with the Dutch is forcibly set forth by 
hr. u 0 Van Geer m  h i s . ».#.•••., a work of the utmost 
value, which badly needs translating into Rnglish".
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conceived only after Westerwolt's return to Batavia in July 1638*
One important consideration, however, proves beyond reasonable 
doubt that the plan had already been decided upon when Westerwolt 
first placed the draft treaty before Raja Sinha. This important 
consideration relates to the offer of a fort in Ceylon which Baja 
Sinha had made to the Dutch by his letters to Beijniersz in 1636 
and Westerwolt in 1637. The fact that Westerwolt did not incorporate 
this most advantageous offer in the articles which he presented to 
Raja Sinha, indicates that he expected to obtain the substance of this 
offer - or rather, more than the substance - by otlier means already 
decided upon.
Once the Dutch plan is understood, then most of their actions
or ideas (relating to Ceylon) which appear puzzling or singular or
contradictory, explain themselves. For instance, the caveat^ to Caen
not to bring up any discussion of the treaty; the instructions
asking him to place garrisons in any newly-captured forts, but to
manage everything so discreetly that no dispute arose with the King on 
1
this matter; the instructions to Lucas asking him to conclude a new 
and more binding treaty, when only a few months previously Caen had 
been enjoined not to bring up any discussion of the existing treaty 
because it was so very advantageous for the Company - all these things 
become intelligible now.
The deceit practised on Baja Sinha by the Dutch had a profound 
and permanent effect on the relations between the two parties. The
1. See p. ttt. 1 above.
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King could never afterwards lave much trust in tho v:ords or the actions 
cf his allies* Iio continued to co-operate with the Hitch only 
because of his fervent conviction that no enemy could te as tad as tho 
Portuguese; and to achiove his lifcTs ambition of driving them out, 
tho assistance of the Dutch was indispensable* lie, therefore, 
dissembled with them, and attempted to frustrate their ambitions, 
as far as possible by covert methods* Tho Dutch, for their part, 
attempted to justify their conduct, by bringing various charyos apalnet 
the King, the main charge being, as they 'said, tho non-payment of the 
front c::p cases which they had incurred in his service* Loro over, they 
consistently distrusted the Liny, because - quite apart from any 
cause which the Liny himself might have given then for such distinct - 
they felt that the latter could never behave honestly towards then 
after what they themselves had dona to him*
Fee liny himself utterly deceived and rebuffed, Baja Sinha had
broken off all relations with the Dutch* But it was only a week or two
1
after this event, that he sought out the Dutch in order to effect a 
compromise with them* This ffcome-down” of the, otherwise exceedingly 
haughty, monarch and the big concessions which he soon made to the Dutch, 
illustrate quite clearly, that no other consideration was so important 
to him as the burning ambition which he had cherished all his life;
1* Apparently following Van Geer (57-58) it has been hitherto accepted 
that it was Coster who made the first advances* But G.G* & 0*3 
letter of £6 Sep. 1640 to Coster (Kol* Arch* 767. p. 622) 
proves the contrary*
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n a m e l y , to drive the hated Portuguese completely from the island#
The Dutch had given more than sufficient indication that they Tie re
attempting to fill the vacuum, which would be caused by the expulsion
of the Portuguese# But to I^ ja Ginha no danger seems to have been so
1
fearful as the danger from the presence of the Portuguese in Ceylon.
Thus ho reopened negotiations with tho Dutch by sending a summons to
Coster tc appear before him#
Coster had been left in charge of the further conduct of affairs
2
in Ceylon, with the title of "President", by Lucas, who left for 
Batavia on the 21st of February# when he received the summons, Coster 
was too apprenhensive to go himself and, therefore, sent one Herports to 
hear the King's proposals#
Out of the ensuing discussions between the Dutch and the King, 
an agreement resulted which was very advantageous to the Dutch# Its 
terns were: Trincomalee was to be handed over to the King as soon as
he gave the Dutch ten elephants to meet the cost of capturing that 
fort; after its capture, Colombo wa3 to be razed to the ground; all 
other forts would be garrisoned by the Butch till the King paid all the 
expenses incurred by then in his service; when all expenses were paid,
1* Qnoyroz (836) was aware that Raja had made a definite choice in
favour of the Dutch; but he considered the choice to have been 
made rather later than 1640#
2# Not "Governor" as Van Geer has said; thereby, he has contradicted 
what is stated in Appendix V p# 10 of his work# Although 
KacLeod (ii.129) correctly points out that Coster was dead by the 
time he was appointed Governor, this seems to have been ignored 
by other writers# See e.g. K. V«rijnaendts van Resandt, De 
Gezaghebbers der Oost-Indische Compagnie op hare Btuten-Comptoiren 
inAzie, Amsterdam 1944; 55#
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then, the King would assign the Dutch one fort in possession*
After the conclusion of this agreanent, it was next decided that 
a joint attack shculd he made on Galle* But CosterTs intention was to 
rake a surprise attack on tho niece, with or without the assistance of 
the Sinhalese• On the 9th Llarch (within six days of leaving ilegcnibo) 
Coster was able to land his troops just beyond cannon-shot of the fort of 
Galle* But on that ssne day, a Portuguese force, which had been rushed 
frcn Colombo immediately the Dutch intentions on Galle were understood, 
made a fierce attack* By a pre-concerted arrangement, the garrison 
of Galle made a sally at the same time* The Dutch, however, had been 
forewarned by spies, and they were ultimately able to beat back the 
enemy with heavy loss* Coster himself had suffered considerable losses; 
but, being strengthened by the chance arrival of threo ships returning . 
from the blockade of Goa£ ho felt himself strong enough to attempt 
a storm on the fortress* This he did on the 13th of larch* Both sides 
fought gallantly; but the fort was finally in the hands of the Hollanders. 
Although the Kingrs Dissama of I.Iatara appears to have joined the Dutch
1* G.G. & C* to Coster, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol.Arch* 762 p* 622; G.G. & C.,
to Dirs., 9 Sep. 1640, K61* Arch. 1043 fo* 240 ff* See for this last 
document, also Van Geer, Appendix V. pp 8-10. It seems almost 
certain that the agreement, so far as it affected Hegombo, was rdher 
different to what these documents imply. It appears possible from 
G.G.*3 letter of 26 Sep* 1640 to Baja (Kol* Arch 767, p. 638 ff) 
and almost certain from the reply of Raja (Da eh-Reg* 1641, 411 - 13) 
that ITegocxbo was to be handed over to the King immediately he paid 
the Dutch the expenses which they had incurred in the capture of 
that fort* The fact that when the King later on demanded the handing 
over of Negambo, the Dutch did not base their refusal on this 
agreement strengthens the above idea further*
2. G.G. & C.,.to Gardenijs, 14 April 1640, ICol.Arch* 767, p*422*
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far ces before the storm, the main body of the Kandyans arrived only in
1
time to take part in the plunder.
To the Dutch, there could not have been a more important victory
in Ceylon that the capture of Galle. In comparison with Galle they had
always attached a second-rate value to Colombo, the centre of Portuguese
power. They believed that from Galle the whole of Ceylon could be kept
under their control. Moreover, Galle and Negombo were, as the Batavian
authorities phrased it, "The keys to the most fruitful cinnamon lands
2
of the island of Ceylon"• They naturally expected great profits through 
the two important conqiecto made in the first months of 1640.
Whether they would obtain the expected profits, would depend very 
much on the King, in whose name they had captured the forts, and whose 
Officials had taken possession of the teritories surrounding these 
forts. And, indeed, it appeared that the Dutch could expect much 
profit, because they soon heard that tho King had sent 2000 dhaleas or 
cinnamon-peeler3 into the newly occupied territories to harvest the 
cinnamon. Moreover, the King informed them that he did not wish for any 
further assistance until he had paid off all the expenses which they had 
hitherto incurred in his service. That the King was concentrating on 
this task was also shown by the delivery of ten elephants in payment of 
Dutch expenses incurred in the capture of Trineomalee. (On receipt of
1* Quoyroz (828-48) has the fullest account of the capture of Galle^
It is he who mentions that the King’s Dissawe had joined the 
Dutch before the storm. The main Kandyan force, however, arrived 
too late*, for, Raja accused Coster of having attacked Galle before 
the time agreed upon far it. (Dagh-Rcg. 164ft p. 409)
2. G.G. & C., to Dirs., 30 Nov. 1640, Kol.Arch. 1042 fo. 10.
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these elephants the Dutch handed over the fort to the King’s officials,
1
who demolished it*)
Coster, however, was not quite pleased with this situation* He
wanted the King to continue active military operations with Dutch
assistance against the Portuguese* At the same tine, he wanted large
quantities of cinnamon and other merchandise* Ihrthemore, he felt that
2
Galle was being inadquately provisioned by the King* To lay these and 
3
other natters before tho King, he left for Kandy and arrived there on 
the 15th July*
1* G.G* & C., to Coster, 26 Sep* 1640, Kol.Arch* 757 pp. 620-30.
2* In this matter, as in so many others, Coster was only taking up
attitudes which G.G. & C* wished him to take, for in their letter 
of 26 Sep* (Kol.Arch* 767 p* 625) they wrote: T,gestadich moeten de 
I.iOdeljaers (wiens last is onse besettingen te versorgen) hert 
aengesproocken worden, ten eijnde de rantsoenen verschaffen, 
ende noch de forten van rijs ende sout provideren, omrae in tijt van 
noode hiet verlegen te vallen*”
3* Van Geer (64) says that Coster had heard that merchandise was being 
sold to outsiders in violation of the treaty by the King; and that 
having several times written in vain to the King, he had decided to 
go to Kandy and make direct representations. In tho representations 
which Coster is known to have made, there is really no mention of the 
above charge* Van Geer also says that although the King had sent 
s large number of cinnamon-peelers into the lowlands, hardly any 
cinnamon had been received at Galle; he implies that Coster was 
displeased over this matter also. In actual fact, however, Coster’s 
own statements show that he did not expect any cinnamon at the 
moment, because it was only peeling and gathering time* (Cinnamon 
peeled from about Kay to August was usually brought from the woods 
only from Sepl onwards). See on above points, Dagh Reg. 1640 
92-101* Note that Van Geer’s implication regarding the alleged 
selling of cinnamon to outsiders was taken up by other writers, who 
made the allegations more explicit* See e*g*, Cambridge History of 
India. V* ch*ii (by P* Geyl) 44; Colenbrander, K£I* Ges», ii* 147J 
Stapel, Geschiedenis. iii* 255*
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Although, he Y/as at first welcomed with great friendliness,
he soon brought the King's wrath upon himself on account of his actions*.
Uithin two days of liis arrival at Kandy, his interpreter was caught having
1
secret communication with Prince Kijayapala, who was being kept at 
Kandy as a prisoner on account of hi3 intrigues against the King, his 
brother* A few days later, Coster submitted a memorandum in which he 
used the tactless and impudent argument, that the Dutch should be given 
some villages and estates in tho environs of Galle, "since the right of 
war permits us to enjoy the aforesaid prerogative as far as our cannon- 
shot o can reach"• On the 16th of August, he infringed all court 
etiquette, when he turned his back on the King and began to leave the 
audience-hall without saying a word to him or obtaining his leave;, 
merely, because he had seen within the hall four chiefs, whoijj. he 
considered to have insulted him earlier* V/hen he was called back by the 
KingTs officials, he returned; but immediately began a torrent of 
abuse against tho four chiefs* Stifling his anger, the King calmed 
the Dutchman and gave him permission to return to Galle on the following 
day* But during his return journey Coster committed a final insult to 
the King when, in a fit of wrath, he removed from his neck'the golden 
chain, which the King had presented to him seme time earlier, and threw
1* Ever since ITov* 1638 (see Kol* Arch* 1039 p* 388) Coster seems to
have carried on a secret correspondence with Vfitfayapala* G*G. & Co 
feared that some misfortune might result from this and on 26 Sep* 
1640 (Xol* Arch* 767 pp* 620-30) they v/rote: "In alien gevalle 
verbieden U*E* wel strictelijck geen correspondence met coning3 
broeder te houden. TJ*E. doen niet wel de saecke to voeden ende 
brieven buijten kennisse van Radja Singa t'ontfangen* T'is 
quaet twee heeren te dienen, daeromme circumspect ende met 
commanicatie vande kaijt in dese zake gaen suit." This salutary 
advice was given much too late*
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it at the feet of a Kandyan official* Thereby, Coster’s -fate appears
to have been sealed, for, a few days later he was murdered by some
2
Sinhalese at a village named ITilgalo in the King’s territory*
Immediately on hearing of this murder, the King wrote to Jan 
Thijscon, the Chief at Batticaloa, to the effect that the murder had 
been committed quite without his knowledge, and had been really 
committed by the Sinhalese concerned, over a question of a private 
nature* The Dutch, hou.ver, were -probably correct in believing that it 
hud boon committed on the King1 s ordersj but they were wrong in 
surmising that it had been largely the result of instigation by foreigner, 
and Sinhalese, who wero attached to the Portuguese and hostile to the 
Dutch* Any instigation iaist have been superfluous; because Coster’sr*O
actions were in themselves more than sufficient to docido his fate*
1* Dagh-Kog* 10401 92 - 101* Yan Goer (G5) underestimates very i;Uch the 
offence given to the King by Coster’s insulting behaviour* Ferguson 
(JCMS* KY111, 170-10) considered not Baja but Coster to have been 
the insulted and aggrieved party* However, in a note (n* Oh) on 
p*255, Ferguson .modified his attitude somewhat. Dr* Stapel was 
incorrect when he said (Yan Bum, ii* Pt*ii, 250, n*9) that Coster 
had behaved very courteously* The Darli-Beg* account to which he 
refers for fall details, indicates just the opposite*
2* Dr* Fieris seems to believe (see, Port* Fra* ii* 303; Pome Docs.,
83) that the King had no hand in this murder* But the available 
evidence seems to indicate the contrary*
3. Pint C-.G* h C*, themselves say regarding Coster’s conduct, shows, once 
again, that the principal cause of his death v/as M s  own behaviour.
In their letter of 30 Kov* 1640 (Kfcl.Arch. 1042 fo* 77; also in 
Yan Geer, Appendix Yl.p.16.). they told the Dirs*: "Coster sal».is
seer rude van iiuneur geweest, hebbende vrij groote impwrtinentie, 
omtrent dese diffidento race g:epleeght•” To this the Dirs* added 
(5 Sep. 1641, Kol.Arch. 454):rt hoewel de voornoemde Coster all eenige 
corsaeche daer toe schijnt gegeven te hebben door sijn gedebaus- 
cheert leven met vrouwen en anders rneer, genoeghsaen uijt alle 
omstandicheden blijeken*
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To return to the narrative of events* As soon as Thijssen
heard of the death of Coster, he hurried to Galle frcm Batticaloa,
1
accompanied by the Senior Merchant Marten Vinck* They arrived none
2
too soon; for the Captain ’.Talraven de St* Amant, who had been left in 
charge of Galle by Coster, had deserted on the 10th October to the 
Portuguese, along with two Motherlanders and nine "blacks*• As a 
result, the garrison of Galle was in a disturbed state, and the arrival 
of Vinck and Thijssen was most opportune*
St* Amant was to become in a very short time one of the most 
trusted and energetic officers among the Portuguese. The first-hand 
information, which he was able to give them regarding the Dutch 
position in Ceylon, made the Captain-General, Dom Antonio Kascarenhas 
resolve to accack Hogombo at the first opportunity* But whilo he was 
making preparations for the projected attack, there arrived from Goa
1* had been for seven years at Kandy during time of Sonarat, and had
acquired a good knowledge of Sinhalese# Apparently after a return
to Europe, he came out to the East once again in May 1639 with
rank of Senior Merchant; in the following year he was ordered to 
proceed from Pulicat to Ceylon, where he was to be used as a spy 
in Kandy, and in the low-country as an instrument for drawing 
the affections of the inhabitants towards the Dutch; until 1645, 
he continued as second in rank to Thijssen at Galle* In that year
he was made Chief at Kegombo; but in 1646 he was replaced by
Cverschie because he was .persona non grata with the Portuguese
Captain-General - he died that very year*
2* A French mercenary soldier who came out to the East in the Companyts
service, with the rank of Sergeant; after his desertion to the 
Portuguese he became the favourite and confidant of Dom Philipe 
de Mas care nhas, who took him to Goa when he assumed the Viceroyalty 
in 1645. According to Taaernier, St. Arnant was Chief-Engineer 
and Master gunner of Portuguese India in 1648; he was later killed 
in an encounter at Muscat#
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1
his elder brother Dom Philip© Ifascarenhas, with a force of 360
soldiers and with inanitions and other provisions# Dam Philips
had bean sent as Captain-General of Ceylon, by the newly-arrived
2
Viceroy, the Conde d’Aveiras. The raw Captain-General acted with
Great diligence. Tailing advantage of the preparations which had already
been made, Dom Philip© proceeded to besiege ITegombo. He disguised
his actions so effectively that, at first, the Dutch garrison did not
realise that a siege was being undertaken.
Although a messenger from the Handyan forces made his way into
the fort and infoimed the Dutch that a force of 3000 men would soon be
3
arriving to support them, the Dutch Commander decided to surrender
1. Hirst cam© out to India in 1623; Captain-General of Cochin, IODI­
SE and of Ceylon, 1640-45; Governor of Portuguese India, 1545- 
SI; died on his homeward voyage to Portugal in 1652. He was 
notorious for his great personal wealth, and Ojieyroz says the 
Dutch and Sinhalese called him the "King of Gold". Hibeiro 
speaks very highly of him, but other contemporaries criticised 
the way in which he amassed his wealth; his administration 
in Ceylon was marked by ability as well as by unscrupulousness.
2. Viceroy of Portuguese India, 1640-45, reappointed in 1650, but died
on the outward voyage; despite his equivocal, attitude in 
accepting at Goa Joao IV as King, he was much trusted by that 
monarch. His enemies, among vdiom was the celebrated Jesuit Antonio 
Vieira, accused him of having amassed great wealth through illicit 
means during his term as Viceroy.
3. Philips llascarenhas to Viceroy, 12 Kov. 1640, Ek. 47 fo. 86 (of Bks.
of the I'onsoons) I.O.L. Port. Pecs. (Trans.) 13. This fact has 
hitherto escaped notice* That the Dutch garrison surrendered 
despite this message adds still greater weight to the opinion of 
G.G. & C., that the garrison had not made a proper resistance.
(to Dirs., 12 Dec. 1641, Kol.Arch. 1044 fo. 50ff). Ilascarenhas 
mentions the Kawdyan force to have been about 3CC0 men. Compare this 
figure with the figure of 20,000 given by Hibeiro (120) and "that 
large host of Chingalas" mentioned by Queyroz (860). This illustrates 
clearly the characteristic exaggeration of these two authors. 
Hibeira's exaggeration is all the more significant because he was 
in Ceylon, and almost certainly at Hegcmbo, at the time.
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the fort, after only eight days* siege* Tlie Sinhalese messenger was 
captured, leaving the fort at the time the Dutch surrendered* Hearing 
of the expected Kandyan army, Don Philipe dispatched some companies of
3e
Portuguese troops and 2000 lascarins to attack it* In the meantime, 
the Kandyan coiimi&nder, Don Balthasar, had mrelied rapidly to relieve 
Kegombo* Iii staking the salvo, which the Portuguese fired to greet the 
hoisting of their flag Hegombo for the sound of the actual assault 
on the fort, Dorn Balthazar hurried the pace of his army all the noro# 
Thus it was, that the Kandyan Commander and his 3000 men were taken
quite unawares by the Portuguese force* The Kandyan force was routed;
K 1
Dcm Balthazar and four of his arachchis were among the slain*
Dora Philipe estimated this latter success to be no less important 
than the re-capture of ITegombo itself - and the re-capture of the fort 
was important enough* Quite apart fran the rich cinnamon districts, 
which could thereby be brought under the control of the Portuguese, 
this capture had a great effect upon the morale and the prestige of the
1* Kascarenhas to Viceroy, 12 Kov* 1640 (sea previous note);
Dagh-Rev* 1541, 410
Hot only did the Dutch (whether in Ceylon or in Batavia) maize no 
mention of the Sinhalese assistance, but on the contrary they also 
accused Raja of having been aloof and even hostile towards them 
during the siege of hhgombo and before* (e*g* see G.G. & C* to 
Thijs; 13 April 1641, Kol*Arch. 768, p*100; G.G. & C., to Dirs* 
12 Dec* 1641, Kol. Arch* 1044 fo* 5Off, also in Van Goer, Appendix 
Vlll pp* 18-19) As lias been, and will be, often noted that this 
misrepresentation or total contradiction of facts is by no means 
an unusual characteristic in the Dutch correspondence, and must 
be guarded against, if wrong conclusions are to be avoided.
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PortuOIQ30, for, it was the first stronghold which they had captured
1
from the Dutch in Asia*
The Captain-Cone ml, however, did not rest on hi 3 laurels# He
25
sent detachments to the Four and Seven It oral es and to Mat arc and 
SabaragamS<wa, uith orders to' bring these territories once a pain under 
Portuguese control and to capture the large stcchs of cinnamon, uhich
O
he know had teen collected for the Mollanders ty the Ming’s men.
The Portuguese forces did not meet with recent success in their
attempts at cubjuyatinp the lends in tho interior# On the other hand,
not only wore moot of tho coastal areas soon reduced, tut also largo
quantities of cinnamon which had teen collected ty tho Ming’s men,
fell into Portuguese hands* At Ali.itpema alone, out of nearly 1150
bailers, SCO fell into their hands, the remainder havi?:g teen already
o
trens-sorted to Gallo ty the Sinhalese. Frcra Alutgana the Portuguese
1* As DrAre!ran triumphantly wrote to his Ming, 10 Jan* 1641, Lk* 47 
fo. 85 (of Eks of Monsoons) I.0.L# Port* Ikes* (franc) 15*
2* I.Iascafenhas specifically says so in his letter of 12 Mov* 1640 to the 
Viceroy, 13k* 47 fo* 86*
5. G.G* & C* to Dirs., 12 Dec* 1641, Mol.Arch. 1044 fo* 45; DaMa-Rcy*
16411 253-59; G.G. A C* to Tkijs., 13 Apr* 1641, Mol.Arch. 763, 
p. IC'O. Although G.G. h G. knew the contrary, they represented the 
delivery of the cinnamon to them, .as being the result of Raja’s 
trepidation at the success of Portuguese arms in the capture of 
ITegombo (2ee letter of 12 Dec* 1341 to Dire., and p*79 rr* 1 above) 
In truth, however, as they and the Portuguese (see ITo* 2 above) 
both knew, cinnamon had been collected for the Dutch before the 
sudden success of the Portuguese* 545 bahars had already been 
delivered at Galle by the Ming’s men, before the capture of the 
rest by the Portuguese. Van Goer was misled by the statements of 
G.G* & C., and he echoed their assertion that Raja showed himself 
disposed to support them once again, only after the success of 
Portuguese aims; according to him (71) the ^delivery of tho 
cinnamon was a sign of this new disposition#
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moved sou.tli into tlie Dissawani or ilatara, cutting off pretty effectiva- 
1 y the assistance of the Jang from the Dutch in Galle. The King 
Innseli mas hard put to it to maintain his hold over the lorn—country, 
Wiero success seems to have swayed tc-o and fro for a considerable tine 
after the loss of he combo to the Portuguese*
Tnus, with the loss of i.egombo the tables mere turned on the 
allies — Paja Sinha and the Dutch* Prcn the offensive they mere forced 
on to the defensive*
In the meantime, matters had so developed between the allies,
tnat it mas not certain miiether they could present a united front
against the progress of Portuguese arms*
It has been seen earlier hovr the Dutch had practiced a piece of
deceit (over the 3rd Article of the Treaty of 1633) in order to be able
to occupy the forts captured from the Portuguese. To exercise
sufficient control over the King and the country and, thereby, "have
1
our way in this island" (as they phrased it)^ fee possession and 
occupation of forts was a sine qua non* But the deceit had been soon 
discovered and they had to seek sane other justification or excuse for 
the continued occupation of the forts. This was not a difficult task 
because they had amply provided for it in the Treaty of 1633 itself.
By Article 8 it had been stipulated that the King should pay in 
cinnamon, pepper and other wares, all the expenses, ¥/hich the Dutch 
might incur in assisting him against the Portuguese. But during the 
period Then the Dutch v/ere relying on the "error" in the translation of
1. G.G. & C., to Gardenijs, 23 Kay 1641, Kol.Arch. 768, p* 178^
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the 3rd article, no connection was drawn between their garrisoning
of forts and the provisions of Article 8. During this period,
1
however, the theme of the "great expenses" which were being incurred
in his service was dinned continually into the King’s ears, both by
Van Dieman (in his letters) and by the visiting commanders and the
officers in Ceylon, in accordance with repeated orders from Batavia.
And the King was earnestly requested to make good these expenses "by
2
delivering large quantities of merchandise *
But the moment the "error" in the 3rd Article proved to be no 
longor serviceable, then the themo of the "great expenses" acquired a 
new significance. Article 8 now came to be the justification for 
holding on to the forts. Coster was told by the Batavian authorities 
that the maxim should now be: "Ve shall not occupy any place longer
r7o
than till satisfaction of our expenses is made". Cost or-, who was
1. "groote oncosten" or "groote gastos" etc. This is a constant formula
in the Dutch correspondence relating to Raja Sinha and Ceylon 
affairs. See below for an estimate of how great these
"great expenses" were*
2. e.g. Instructions for Gardenijs, 11 Aug. 1638, Kol.Arch. 764 pp. 364—
65; Van Diemen to Raja, 11 Aug. 1638, Kol. Arch. 764 pp.378-79; 
G.G. Sz C* to Caen, i-o. 1638, Kol. Arch. 764 p. 551 
3* G.G.&C.to Coster, 26 Sept. 1640, Kol.Arch 767 p. 623. Tills same 
instruction is given to Thijssen in an even more interesting and 
revealing manner in their letter of 20 Sep. 1641 (Kol.Arch 768, 
pp. 438-441): "t’derde artijckel is disputabel, ende schijnt den 
assistent liolsteijn int translateren na behooren niet gegaan 
te hebben, echter t’can gesont worden aijtgeleijt, namentlijch 
dat geen geconquesteerde fortressen, als met des Kaijts consent, 
sullen besetten, te weten wanneer Ceijlon vande Portugesen sul 
gesuijvert, ende de kaijt ons contentecit. gedaen heeft."
S3
thoroughly versed in the plans of his superiors, had already
followed this maxim* As seen earlier, under the nerj agreement entered
into 7*ith the King, it had been stipulated that the captured forts
(yith certain exceptions) were to be garrisoned by the Dutch until all
the expenses incurred by them in the King’s service were paid for; when
these expenses were paid, the Dutch would be permitted to possess one
fort, which would be assigned to them by the King*
Raja Sinha was very anxious to clear up his debt without any
delay, because he was keenly aware of the consequences which would result
if tho Hollanders were allowed to fortify themselves whenever they
pleased* His idea was to drive the Portuguese completely out of the
island with the help of the Dutch, and then to assign one fort in
possession to his allies; in return for the valuable monopoly of the
cinnamon and other trade of tho island, he expected that his merchant-
allies would be eager to prevent the Portuguese from staging a come-
1
back, and would keep the island free from all foreign invasion*
Although he was keenly alive to the fact that his allies had mufh 
greater ambitions in Ceylon than he liked, he yet had great hopes of 
being able to check them* Therefore, to recover his freedom of action 
in dealing with the Dutch, he set all his energies to the task of 
clearing up his debt* And immediately after the capture of Galle
and llegombo he sent large numbers of Ckaleas to peel cinnamon for
1* Pran G.G* & C*,s statements at this stage the implication is clear 
that they little doubted (G.G* & C* to Dirs* 50 ITov* 1640,
Kol*Arch* 1042, fo* lOff) Raja’s sincerity in wishing to execute 
this plan of his* But they of course were not satisfied with it, 
and Raja was over-rating his own abilities far too much when he 
thought; that he could order the affairs of Ceylon as he wished*
It is interesting to note that when Raja conceived the above plan 
he was thinking of the way in which his great namesake of 
Sitawaka had controlled Ceylon (see Darh-Revr* 1641* 415)
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delivery to the Dutch#
V/ith the military successes of the Portuguese and their
capture of almost all the cinnamon collected by his men, the King saw
his hopes of paying off the debt vanish for the time being# Hardly two
months later, however, when he saw the amount of the debt, as it was in
the statement presented to him, in January 1641, he must have felt
that it might never be possible to gather sufficient merchandise to
pay off the debt#
In January 1641, the Senior I-Ierchant, Karten Vinclc arrived at the
court, bringing with him a letter, dated 2otli September 1640 from Van
1
Diemen , together with a statement of the Dutch expenses # Van Diemen 
laid much emphasi3 on the expenses which the Company had undergone for 
three years in tho King*s service* If the King had promptly repaid 
their expenses, then, argued Van Disnsn , the Dutch would have 
violated the 3rd Article of the treaty, by their garrisoning of the 
forts against the King’s wishes; but since he had not paid their 
expenses, they were justified in their actions; only when the expenses 
were paid, could the forts be handed over to him# Little pleased as ho 
was, with the honesty of Van ;.Dienen T s arguments, Raja Sinha was perhaps 
even less pleased with the statement of expenses which Van Dj-eMen 
had sent along with this letter#
2
The ICing particularly objected to , and refused to pay for, two
1# For the embassy of Vinck see: Dagh-Req# 1641, 237, 334; G.G# & C#
to Dirs. 12 Dee. 1641, Kol.Arch# 1C44 fo# 45ff. The letter of Van 
Diemen and the King’s account are to be found in: Kol#Arch 765 
p# 638 ff#
2. For the King’s objections, see: Dagh.Reg# 1641, 335, 400-01#
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items ill this statement of expenses* Firstly, lie refused to pay for
the monthly salaries of the men, who had been left in Garrison in
Trincomalee, because this fort had been garrisoned directly against
his wishes* Secondly he refused to pay for the loss of the car co-ship,
the Rarob. which had been wrecked off Negambo in January 1640.
1
According to Article 13 of the Treaty of 1638, the Dutch would have
to bear this loss by themselves. Quite apart from these two points
of objection, he suspected that all the items of expenditure had been
rated inordinately high; but beyond making a general criticism to that
effect ho could do nothing else*
As a matter of fact, the King’s suspicions were correct; the
actual expenses must have been only a fraction of the 517,983 sera fins
or 776,975 florins claimed by the Dutch* Fortunately, there is eaougli
evidence to show that the statement of the King’s debt is very much of
a concoction, turned out by the commission, which was specially
2
appointed for the purpose. For instance, the claim in respect of the 
loss of the Rarob and part of its goods, was made cut to be 87,000 
florins* But in the Galle "trade-books", the actual loss is given as
r?o
41,135 florins* Then again, in the calculation of the king’s debt, 
the average salary and rati on-al Iowa nee per man per month, is fixed at
1* See He ore s, Corp. Dip*, i* 315. Although Raja was perfectly
correct in his objection, G.G. & C* (in characteristic fashionj
informed the Dirs* (12 Dec. 1641, Kol*Arch. 1044 fo* 45 ff) that 
Raja’s objection was "geheel ongefondeert/*
2* Realia, i. 228 (Resoln. of 17 Sep. 1640).
3. y i "Extract from the Trade Books of   ..Galle"*,
Kol* Arch* 1116 fo* 884*
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twenty-five ffcrins; tut from a calculation rude "by the later
Dutcli Governor of Ceylon, Jacob van Fittenstei jn, it is apparent that
1
the correct average figure should he ten florins less# Since abcr.it
three-quarters of the Ring’s total debt is made up of salaries and
allowances, the significance of the above calculation can be
estimated* Finally, apart from the C7,CC0 florins claimed in respect
of tie less of tho Rarob, a sun of 131,GCO florins was claimd as
expenses incurred during the expedition sent under Luca3# The
hups exaggeration involved in this claim can be realised when it i3
iiOtel that even for tho bigger expedition sent to Ceylon in 1344
under Franccis Caron, only 33,302 florins wore put down as engonses,
2
in tho " tra de-bo oh s,T at Batavia*
Although Raja Sinha did not hncw these and certain other
similar details concerning hie debt, he certainly Lnew what he had
contributed towards its payment* TIis surprise and indignation can,
therefore, be imagined when ho caw that cone of the most important
articles, which he had given to tho Dutch towards the payment of tho
1* Kitt to G.G. & C. 6 Nov. 1650, Kol.Arch. 1070 (Bis.) fo. G7Q,
ICittensteijn is hero calculating the average salary and ration- 
allovance of 15C0 men (soldiers, sailors, artisans and various 
officials).
2* HeereSy/ De Onkcnst van het Lederlandsch Cezag in Oost-
Indie (2nd Beries) ill. 200-203; cf. Van Dan, ii.pt. ii Appendix 
iv. 435. It is, however, likely that in tins figure, the 
portions of the salaries which were to be paid in the ITtherlands 
are not included. But even allowing for this, it is certain that 
the total encunt of 433,600 florins claimed a3 expenses for 
Lucas’s expedition, is a gross exaggeration. Regarding the 
portions of salaries paid in the Netherlands see: J. Aalbers, 
Rijcklof van Coens»♦♦♦♦»en zijn Arbeijdsveld, Groningen 1916,
18.
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debt, were not included in the list of articles, acknowledged as 
living been received* For instance, the 14-3 hahars and 269 pounds of cin­
namon, and the pepper and waac which he had Given the Dutch after the 
capture of Eatticaloa, 7/ere not included in this list* Van Dienen 
maintained that those items had been given as presents to Commander 
YTestemolf and himself, and not as contributions towards the debt* But, 
like so many of tho other bold-faced statements of Van Diemen, this also 
was not true, for, in 1633, Coster, who had shipped most of these
articles, had shown no doubts about this matter, and referred to these
1
as articles given in payment of the debt*
The price which the Dutch were prepared to offer for tho
cinnamon arid other merchandise, was another important factor
bearing on the question of the ICing* s debt* The Batavian authorities
had progressively lowered the price which they offered for cinnamon*
At the very beginning, in July 1637, they had wanted the Governor of
Puli cat to offer for it 5C$-« more than the Portuguese had paid* But
soon realising that the King v/as as keen as they were to enter into
an alliance they instructed Ucsterwolt only to offer to pay more than
the Portuguese, v/ithout saying how much more* Following these
instructions, Reijniorsz offered by letter to pay the ICing "to
satisfaction" for the cinnamon; Reijniersz’s envoys offered to pay
more than the Portuguese had paid; and almost certainly Y/esterwolt 
2
did the same* All Dutch offers, however drastically changed
1* See p. A3 above*
2, See ppa^O,** above*
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immediately after Raja Sinha granted then, by the Treaty of 1638, a
monopoly of the cinnamon, along with many other articles# They now
wanted the King to sell than the cinnamon at a prico much less than that
1
paid by the Portuguese#
The King, on his part, stated that despite Dutch promises of
paying more for it, he would price the cinnamon even lov/er than the
Portuguese price, because he tool: into consideration the services which
the Dutch were rendering him# He pointed out that the Portuguese jnid
130 xerafims the bahar, but that he would charge only 110 xerafims for 
2
tho bahar#__________________________________________________________
1# G.G# & C#, however, at times said or implied that tho price which 
they offered was the sane as or even more than what the Portuguese had 
paid# The explanation of this is partly in what they chose to consider 
as the Portuguese price, and partly, of course, in their characteristic 
of assorting as true something which was not# Khen they stated (Kol# 
Arch# 1042 fo. 10 ff) that the King of Spain did not pay to the peasants 
more than 15 xerafims for the bahar of 384 lbs#, then they were referring 
to the' "Portuguese, price", more than which they were offering to pay#
But this 15 xerafims was, of course, nothing more than a sort of 
gratuitous payment which was made to the semi-servile chaleas#
Ses p*.itirivFabove#
vThen Raja spohe of the "Portuguese price" he referred to the price 
at which the cinnamon collected in Ceylon was valued by the Portuguese 
before dispatch to Goa# It appears that ho was not exaggerating when 
he'fetid that the:-price.inf Colombo: wa& 15CP xerafims# See on this point 
Qjueyroz, 1192-93, remembering that a Portuguese bahar was only 384 
Dutch pounds#
The Dutch v;ere themselves not unaware that RajaTs figure was 
correct. See on this point, G.G# 5c C#, to Dirs#, 3C Nov# 1640, Kol# 
Arch, 1042 fo. lOff# The most that they were prepared to pay was, 
however, only 80 xerafims#
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The most that the Dutch were prepared to pay was, however, only 
80 xerafims, or 120 florins, although at this time, they were making
1
in Europe over 1000 florins for a hahar of tho lowest quality cinnamon* 
The explanation for the Dutch attitude since the signing of the 
Treaty of 1638, is quite obvious* By thi3 treaty, the King bound 
himself to sell the cinnamon (along with certain other specified wares) 
to the Dutch alone* Thereafter, the Dutch being the only legal buyers, 
the King had to sell the cinnamon at whatever price tho Dutch wero 
pleased to offer* By lowering the imice as they thought fit the Dutch 
could not only got the cinnamon (and other merchandise) for a mere 
song, but they could also keep the King in their debt as long as they 
wanted to# However .much cinnamon was delivered by Raja Sinha, it 
would be of little avail, if the value of the cinnamon could be lowered 
as much as the Dutch wanted to*
Thus, they ensured their hold on the forts of the island and on 
Raja Sinha, not only by utterly exaggerating their expenses and by 
excluding from the account some of the merchandise delivered by the King, 
but also by under-valuing, as they pleased, what they did admit having 
received*
But there is more to this extremely ingenious scheme* VJhen Raja 
Sinha realised that the Dutch wanted the cinnamon for a mere nothing, and
1* Although in the first sale of Ceylon cinnamon, a pound did not fetch 
more than 32 stivers, in subsequent sales it fetched more than 
42 stivers* For instance, wven the cinnamon, which G.G* & C* told 
Raja was worthless on account of its low quality, fetched 42*2/3 
stivers in the Netherlands* See on these points "Hesoliltions of 
the Iieeren Seventeen”, Kol*Arch* 185 and G.G* & C* to Thijs* 20 
Sep* 1641, Kol* Arch* 768, p* 441*
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that, in any case, considering the extent of the debt it would be a
difficult task to pay it off with merchandise, since little could be
gathered in the disturbed state of the lands* he offered to pay the
1
full debt in cash* Coster1 sjreply to this offer had already
indicated to Raja Sinha, that the Dutch did not wish to sedhim
ever pay up his debt; Van Diemen me rely confirmed this, when he
2
replied to Raja Sinha* s offer, in the following words, unmistakeable 
in their import:
"The contract speaks of merchandise and not of 
cash; furthermore gthe contract says^ } that all 
the wares of Ceylon, may be sold to no other 
nation than the Netherlands; excepting the 
elephants, of which not more than half is due to 
us* Therefore, we request you to maintain 
inviolate the concluded contract*"
Thus, it is apparent that his creditors had fully ensured that
3
Raja Sinha*s indebtedness was going to be eternal*
Nevertheless, though the Dutch had acquired a hold over the 
King by means of the debt, it would be of little avail, if he dis­
owned his debt and became openly hostile* This, Van Diemen and his 
Council, were anxious to avoid; because, if, the King became hostile 
and joined the Portuguese, their position in the island would be in
1* See on this point, "Diary" of Pieter Borell, ICol* Arch* 1056, 
fo. 398 ff*
2* 18 Oct* 1641, Kol*Arch. 768 pp. 510 - 11*
3* They were never fully aware of the fact that Raja would not turn
to the Portuguese under almost any circumstances*
1
grave danger. They, therefore, instructed Coster (and their other
officers in Ceylon) to do everything possible to dull the King’s
suspicions# He was to make no mention of matters touching the
sovereignty of the lands since the King was very touchy on this point,
and he was to make the King believe thatjthe forts v/ere of no use to
2
them, being only kept as securities for the payment of their debt*
This, however, was an impossible task. Mot only had the Dutch, 
given the King more than enough reasons to have the worst 
suspicions regarding their intentions and actions, but they also 
could not refrain from giving him further cause to suspect them# For 
instance, they could notjhelp suggesting to the King that even when the 
Portuguese were completely driven from the island he should have four 
forts garrisoned by the Dutch for the better protection of his Kingdom#
" 1# Hitherto, no writer has even suspected that the Dutch account of the 
King’s debt was very much of a concoction, devised to maintain 
their hold on the forts and to justify their actions. On the 
contrary almost every writer on the history of the period has 
seen a justification or at least a valid excuse for Dutch 
actions in the "fact" that the King had not paid the huge debt 
which he was supposed to owe the Company, See e.g# Tan Geer, 138; 
Colenbrander, ii, 145; MacLeod, ii, 148; Codrington, Short 
History, 118-19, 121; Perera, Hist, of Ceylon, i*116, 121; etc#
Dr, Pieris is probably the only writer who did not ascribe any 
justification or excuse for Dutch actions on the grounds of the 
King’s non-payment of his debt, although he too accepted the "fact” 
of a huge debt#
2, G.G, & C. to Coster, 26 Sept. 164-0, Kol# Arch# 767, pp. 619-37 
Tan Geer gives only a very small extract from this extremely 
important letter. See Tan Geer, appendix vii pp. 17-18#
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Tiieit.: acaii:, they could net refrain frcm at tempt iny to tahe tho
1
levying of tolls at the Hiny’s harbours into their hands* host 
notable of all, they rave a led that they coveted the rich hat era 
Dissamaui; in the seme latter instructing Coster to refrain from 
mahiny any mention of ratters toichiny the soveriynty of the lands, 
Van Dicncn and his Council ashed him to try to induce the I any to 
yrant them this dissawani in recognition of their servicos to him*
In fact, Van Diemen himself wrote to time Ihiny royucstiny that tho 
benefits which the Icrtuyueso had onicvod from the dirsnwani should bo
1* It soars to leave boon tho common practice of tho Dutch to 
yet tho rulers who had fallen into their dobt to 
deliver into their lia.nds the levyiny of tolls in the 
territories of these rulers {see e.y*: Da{h-hey »1141
394-95; Reeres, De Qrhomst  2nd Series, ii* 370}*
A number of the ideas and methods, which appear in 
Dutch relations with the Sultan of Ternate appear also 
in their relations vath Raja Sinha* Dor instance, in 
Ternate too they attempted to yet the income from the 
tolls into their hands; but, whereas they were able 
to coerce Sultan Hamza to yrant this income to them,
(see Heeres, De Cphomst, loc* cit*) they failed in 
their attempt to coerce Raja Sinha. See also next note*
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l
Granted to the Dutch*
All these things only served to strengthen the Ting's 
suspicions* Regarding the suggested four fortresses, he mde it 
clear that beyond one fort which he would assign to the Dutch he 
needed no others* A s for the levying of tolls, he put a stop to it 
by sharply ordering the Dutch to d::sist from doing so. To van Diemen's 
request ho replied by pointing cut that the Portuguese had enjoyed the
1* 86 Sep. 1640, Kol.Arch, 767 p. 625. In order to make the King
grant their desires ell tho bettor, G.G. A C*, toyed with 
the idea (for a brief moment) of beeping the Portuguese a 
little longer in the island (G.G. C* to Dirs., 30 Tov. 1640, 
Iiol. Arch. 1642 fo. lCff.) But they gave up the idea almost 
immedi&tely, probably because they felt that Raja Sinha wa3 a 
tougher customer than the Sultans of Ternate.
Tho pdicy which was being successfully followed in 
Ternate is best expressed in the following words of G.G. & C* 
in which they are summarising the views of tho Directors on 
this subject:
"..*dat ...on de Tarnatanen altijt we rob to geven, 
niet goraden sij, den Tidoreas end© Spangiaert doer onsa 
adsistentie off eijgen macht geheel uijtte Toluccos to 
vardrijvan.....ende dat de Tarnatanen.....van haer verlost 
sijnde, wel licht op jets cinders...* dene hen ende voornemen 
tiocht, comp6? staet in die quartieren prejudiciaebel ende 
schadelijck sijnde, ende om daer van gean perijchel to loopen, 
altijt in ectie van oorlogli blijv^en moet.” (G.G. & C*, to Dirs#, 
18 Jan 1649, in Ileeres, De Opkomst*.* 2nd Series, iii. 359)
Tor an earlier expression of these ideas see: Dagh Peg. 164-0,
20, 27*
It is really no wonder that the Dutch often explained Raja's 
nolicy to be none other than that of beeping them and the 
Portuguese balanced against * each other, so that he could talc© 
advantage of the situation* See p*273 below*
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profits from the lands by coercing the inhabitants, and ho concluded 
1
by saying:
’’But today, nov; that the lands are mine, and I an the lawful 
King of these some lands, through the mercy of God, you have 
no reason to make any mention of the profits enjoyed by tho 
Portugue se*M
It thus repeatedly appeared to Vara Diomen and his Council, that
the King would neither brool: any infringement of his sovereign rights
nor maize any concessions which would curtail those rights. They were
quite certain that once the Portuguese wore driven out they could obtain
what they wanted from the island; but they were inpatient at tho
delay this night involve, for, tho re-capture of ITegombo had shown that
the Portuguese could not bo easily ousted from Ceylon* Taking everything
into consideration, therefore, they decided, early in 1641, that if a
favourable opportunity arose they would take over direct control of as
many of the cinnamon lands as possible - no matter what the King*s
2
reactions might be*
1* Pugh-Reg* 1641, 408 - 18, passim
2* See e.g. G.G* & C. to Gardenijs, 3 April 1641, Kol.Arch* 768,
p.68; G.G* & C* to Thijs*, 13 April 1641, Kol.Arch* 768,
p. 99; Dagh* Reg* 1641. 239
The idea of taking control over the cinnamon lands was 
latent in the minds of the Dutch frcm the very beginning.
They had at first decided to proceed very slowly in this 
matter; but they soon became impatient at the delay In 
realising their aims; the Directors in Holland, in particular, 
became most impatient for quick results* (See Dirs. to 
G.G. A C., 11 Sep* 1640, ICol* Arch. 454).
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CHAPTER IV.
A Period of Stalemate. The Mission of Boreel.
Early in 1641 Raja Sinha was seriously threatened
with the prospect of having to fight a war on two
fronts* To the west and south of his Kingdom he was
menaced by the Portuguese, who, flushed with their
recent successes were in an aggressive mood. To the
south-east he was faced with the revolt of Prince
Wijayapala, who had escaped from Kandy in the latter
half of l6if0 and had established himself in the
1
Kingdom of Uva. Wijayapala was notorious for his
Portuguese sympathies, and in December 1640, Don Philipe
Mascarenhas had sent an insulting letter to Raja Sinha,
threatening to place the f,King of Uva11 on the throne
2
of Kandy. On the instructions of the Conde de Aveiras, 
Viceroy of Goa, Mascarenhas had previously offered
1. Dr.P.E.Pieris (Port.Era.ii.?1 5) and those who follow 
him place this event in April 1641. But from Philipe 
Mascarenhafs letter to Raja of 21 Dec.l£>40 (Dagh-Reg., 
i6M>257) it is obvious that by then Wijayapala was 
already well established in Uva.
2. Mascarenhas to;t(Raja, 21 Dec. 1 £>40 (Dagh-Reg. 1 £>lt.1,237) - 
"I was born &  a strong predilection for the 
Portuguese nation1 confessed Wijayapala himself 
(Pieris, Prince Wijaya..51) cf.also the description 
of this Prince by Ribeiro (1^0ff. ) who knew him 
personally.
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certain terms of peace to Raja Sinha through the
agency of Antonio da Mota Galivao, the Portuguese
Captain-Major of the Field; but the King had rejected
1
these with scorn.
This was the situation when Marten Vinck had 
arrived at Kandy with Van Diemen!s letter of the 
26th September 164-0, and the account of the Dutch 
expenditure incurred in the King's service. As 
explained previously, Raja Sinha was quite convinced 
of the duplicity of the Dutch, but he realised that 
an open breach with them would only make matters worse 
for himself# He could not hope to drive the Dutch„ 
who were more powerful than the Portuguese, from their 
coastal forts; and still less could he hope to cope 
successfully with both Dutch and Portuguese simultaneously 
even if the two foreigners remained at variance with 
each other. Wijayapala's rebellion gave him an 
additional reason for keeping on good terms with the 
Dutch; so when Marten Vinck returned to Galle in April 
164-1, he was accompanied by four Sinhalese ambassadors
1. Summary of intercepted Portuguese letters in G. G. & C. 
to Gardeniys, 5 April 164-1, Kol.Arch.768 p.69; 
Mascarenhas to Raja, 21 Dec. 164-0, in Dagh-Reg. 164-1 f2 
Vinck to G.G.& C. , 25 June 164-3> Kol.Arch. 1052 fos.55- 
54-. Dr.Pieris gives erroneous dates for Mota’s 
embassy,in Some Docs.. 84--85»
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who proceeded thence to Batavia, where they arrived on 
2Vth August,
Raja Sinha did not send his envoys empty-handed*
He had sent some 10,000 pounds of wax and about half
that quantity of pepper towards the payment of his
debt to the Company, while his personal gifts for Van
Diemen his wife and councillors included six elephants
1
and various gold and jewelled ornaments*.
The ambassadors had their first audience on the 
26th August when they handed over Raja Sinha’s letter 
to Van DiemeiL, who read them with rather mixed feelings* 
In these missives Raja Sinha reiterated his affection 
for the Dutch, his desire to co-operate wholeheartedly 
with them against the Portuguese, and his intention of 
liquidating hi^debt in due time*. But he likewise made 
it plain that he did not accept their stateuaent of his 
debt, and that he had been justified in calling the 
Dutch ’’faithless1 and ’’covenant-breakers. ”
”1 have room to presume such, for it is not 
written in the articles of the treaty, that 
when any fortress was captured it should be 
kept as a security until I should have paid 
the expenses; nor that I should immediately 
pay the same, nor do you desire the payment 
in cash, but only in merchandise....And if 
you desired the repayment in cash whenever
1* For details regarding this embassy see Dagh-Reg*1 &f1. 
I|.00-Wf; Gr.Gr.& C. to Dir^s. ,12 Dec. 16if1,Kol.Arch. 10ifij. 
fo.if5 ff.
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11 any fortress is conquered, or if we had 
agreed in the articles of the treaty to 
lash ihen I would admit the reasonableness of your demand.
But since neither the one nor the other 
has been agreed on, I may well term, those 
who do the contrary, ’faithless1, and 
covenant breakers1, since they have done 
that which has not been agreed in the 
treaty. 1
The King added that despite all this he would abide
by the concession which he had made to Coster
1
concerning the captured forts.
Van Diemen and his councillors were annoyed at 
Raja Sinha1s candid criticisms of their policy, but 
they decided to send him further assistance against 
the Portuguese since their own interests demanded it.
•frOwi
Not only must Galle be relieved ay this stringent
blockade by land, but also they could not hope to
draw large profits from the cinnamon districts so
long as these were liable to be periodically overrun
z
by the Portuguese based on Colombo. The Portuguese 
had to be driven out from Colombo as well as from 
Negembo. Most important of all, they had recently 
received news of the truce negotiations between. 
Portugal and the United Provinces, and this made Van 
Diemen and his advisers anxious to secure as much as 
possible of the cinnamon lands before orders for the
1. Dagh-Reg. 1641, 41
2. (see next page).
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cessation of hostilities could be received from 
Europe
On the It9th October 1641, Commander Dominicus
Bouwens sailed for Ceylon with six ships and 455
At the same time, orders were sent to the Commander
of the fleet blockading Goa, to detach part of his
fleet early in 1642 to join that of Bouwens off Ceylon*
The combined force was then to attempt the capture
of Colombo, if this would seem an easy task without
the co-operation of Raja Sinha. If Colombo seemed
too tough a nut to crack, then the expedition should
2
endeavour to recapture Negambo.
(continued from previous page) :
G.G.&C. to Thijs., 15 April 1 641 , Kol.Arch.768 
same to same, 20 Sep.1641, Kol.Arch. 
768 pp*438-41 • cf. also P3g.h-Regj.l64i > 259, 956.
1. G. G. &C. to Dirs.; 14 Sept.1641, Kol. Arch. 1046 
(no pagination) G.G.&C. to Thijs., 20 Sep.1641, 
Kol.Arch.768 fo.4^8ff. cf. also Van Geer, 
Appendix XI, p. 26.
2. Instructions for Bouwens, 18 Oct.1641, Kol*Arch* 
768 pp.469“72J G. G. &C. to Comdr.Quast, 18 Oct. 
1641, Kol.Arch.768 pp*496-501; G.G.&C to Dies., 
12 Dec. 1641, Kol.Arch. 1044 fo.45
too
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Through Raja Sinha1 s ambassadors who left for 
Ceylon with Bouwens, Van Diemen dispatched to the 
King a letter dated 18th October Thinking,
perhaps, that the strong tone which the King had 
adopted in his letter was partly a result of his 
contempt for, the trading activities of the Dutch,
Van Diemen assured the King that the Dutch should 
in no way be considered as merchants. He himself 
adopted a strong tone towards the King, particularly 
when accusing him of the murder of Coster*
This tone was no doubt partly evoked by that 
adopted by Raja Sinha himself in his letters; partly, 
however, it seems to have been the result of Van 
Diemen’s conviction that at last the favourable time 
had approached for assuming territorial control in 
Ceylon* in open defiance of- the King. The idea of 
the contemplated breach with Raja Sinha is clearly 
indicated thus, in the letter sent to Thijssen on the 
18th October.2
*fc he
lf0n account of $, great likelihood of a peace 
with Portugal, it would not be a strange 
thing if, after this, everything remained 
in a status quo, and if we break off with
Raija, each of us would remain in possession
of the territory under his jurisdiction as
1. Kol. Arch. 768, pp. 509
2. Kol. Arch. 768, pp. 503 -08.
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!lhis own. Then, the cinnamon in the 
territory of Galle, being lawfully 
appertaining to us..............  M
Pursuing this idea of a contemplated breach with
the King, Thijssen was given the permission (which
he had previously asked) to enlist as many Sinhalese
as possible in the Dutch service, even if he had to
engage some of them on a regular pay*
By the time these advices and the fleet of Bouwens
arrived in Ceylon, many important events had taken
place there*
Realising that the defences of Galle were too
strong for an assault and that a successful siege was
also out of the guestion since relief by sea was
available at the will of the Dutch, Dom Philipe
Mascarenhas attempted to corrupt the garrison of the
fort and thereby obtain its surrender# He offered
lavish rewards to those who deserted and fabulous sums
to those who would hand over the fort to him. To
President Jan Thijssen himself he offered a fortune
and the hand of a Portuguese woman* towards whom he
thought the Dutchman had a fancy. In this work of
corrupting the garrison Dom Philipe was ably supported
by Miguel de Santaman (as Walraven de St.Amant was then
known). But Thijssen was not to be bought, nor was the
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vast majority of the garrison* Nevertheless,
desertions were not so rare as to cause no anxiety
1
to Thijssen and his officers.
Much more serious in ifs effects was the way in
which the Portuguese kept Galle virtually hemmed-in
on the land-side. Occasionally, the situation was
improved when some of the Portuguese forces were
withdrawn into the interior either to obtain supplies
or to meet a diversion or a serious attack from the
Kandyan forces* On such occasions, parties of Dutch,
guided by the 15Q or 200 King’s troops who were in
Galle, ventured out of the fort in order to obtain
supplies. Sometimes the King succeeded in sending
2
supplies into Galle. But these were by ho means
1. Thijs. to Gardenijs, 12f Sep. 164.1,Kol.Arch. 10^ -6 fos. 
96-99. Thijs. to Quast,. .Nov.l6il,Kol.Arch. 1C46,fos. 
102-05. Queyroz, 865.
2. The King seems to have made all possible efforts 
to provision Galle,, the loss of which would have 
meant the complete triumph of his arch-enemy.
When the close watch kept by the enemy prevented 
his sending supplies by land, he began to send 
them by sea (See on this Thijs.to G.G.&C., 18 Nov.
16M ,  Kol.Arch. 10^7 p. 69 -^; etc). But even this was 
hazardous because the Portuguese cruised in light 
vessels at several places between Batticaloa and 
Galle. (See R. G.Anthonisz,’’Resolutions and Sentences.... 
of Galle, l6if0-MVf, JCRAS XVII. 2*40,2*49). The 
statements of the Dutch that the King did not wish
to provision Galle or that what he sent was negligible, 
are proved to be false by other statements of their 
own (See eg. Dagh-Reg. 164-1. 120; Thijs to Quast,...
Nov.1641, Kol.Arch.1046,fos.102-05; Thijs.,to G.G.&C.,
(continued)....... .
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sufficient and could not be depended upon, because 
the Portuguese usually kept a thorough watch around 
the place. It is true that Galle was relieved by 
sea from Pulicat and Batavia not only with men and 
munitions, but also with rice and other food-provisions. 
But this relief was inadequate and could be obtained 
only at certain periods when Galle was navigable from 
these two places#
As a result of this situation, it became sometimes 
imperative for the Dutch to send out foraging 
expeditions somewhat into the interior as the Portuguese 
had laid waste all the land in the immediate vicinity 
of the fort* On one of these expeditions the Dutch 
suffered a severe defeat. On the 9th August a party 
of some ninety men was sent out under Captain Wakaven 
de Riviere, who had been recently sent from Batavia.
At Wakwella, a few miles outside Galle, the party was 
attacked by a Portuguese force# The Dutch officers
(continued) :
18 Nov. 1(>4l, Kol.Arch. 10if7 fo. 6jkt “Resolutions 
of GalleM, JCRAS XVII. 26k ,265,11-91,etc. ) However, 
it appears that all the writers on the subject 
have believed that the Ring was unwilling to, or 
at least, not keen on provisioning Galle#(See eg.
Van Geer, 196; Pieris, Port.Bra.ii. 517: Codrington, 
Short Hist.. 120).
10 4*
were not properly supported by the ordinary soldiers,
and Captain Riviere and most of the officers were
1
among the thirty dead on the Dutch side.
Death by battle was not the only cause of mortality
in Galle. Very many died of the dropsy, beri beri
and other diseases, as many as thirty dying through
illness within a period of three months; and at times
of the garrison of less than 4*00 men, about eighty
were on the sicR list. To strengthen the weakened
garrison, the King offered a further ^09 in
addition to the Kandyans already in the fort. But
Thijssen was afraid to trust so many Sinhalese in
2
the fort and accordingly declined the offer.
While his allies were undergoing great hardships 
at Galle, Raja Sinha himself was having a very difficult 
time with a war against the Portuguese on the one hand 
and against Wijayapala on the other. On the 18 th April
1. Estimates of the casualties vary widely, but the 
Dutch themselves termed this action a “disaster11. 
(Thijs.to Gardenijs, 14* Sep. 164*1, Kol. Arch. 104-6, 
fos.96-99: "Resolutions of Galle" JCRASXVII, 259-60, 
272,36^-00; Queroyz,86^-64-; Ribeiro, 121). Van Geer 
(70) is wrong in thinking that only the Dutch 
vanguard was concerned.
2. Thijs. to Gardenijs, 14* Sep. 164-1, Kol.Arch. 104-6 fos. 
9 6 -9 9 ;  D a g h -B eg .1641 . 39 5 .
ioS
he had left for Uva with an army against Wijayapala, but 
had to retire v/ith loss, With this success, Wijayapala 
extended his power northwards of Uva* tip to near 
Trincomalee, and in the ^ south, up to Sammanture, Raja 
Sinha had sent word to Laurens de Maerschalk, the Dutch 
Chief at Batticaloa requesting a Dutch force to assist 
him. Although Maerschalk did not comply with this 
request, he later on sent fifty men to help the King’s 
governor of Sammanture against Wijayapala. But by 
the time these fifty men arrived near Sammanture by 
sea, they found no sign of the King’s governor, as the 
province had apparently submitted to Prince Wijayapala.
Some time after these early reverses, Raja Sinha 
sent a large force to attack Wijaypala’s dissawe of 
Wellassa. This force drove the dissawe in flight, 
killing many of his men. Thereupon, Wijayapala in turn 
began to ask for assistance from Maerschalk promising 
great benefits and honours to the Dutchman, But 
Maerschalk replied by declaring his recognition, and 
loyalty to Raja Sinha as being the lawful King* Moreover, 
he sent to Kandy by an express messenger all the 
communications received from Wijayapala, The King was 
so pleased at this action that he immediately sent the 
Dutchman a golden chain as a present*
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Pressing home the victory obtained in Wellassa,
Raja Sinha*s forces moved on the province of Bintenna. 
There, on the 1st August, the King’s forces gained a 
decisive victory over the men of Uva. Most of 
Wijayapala’s chief officers were amongst the 600 men 
who were captured at this battle, Uva quickly 
submitted to Raja Sinha and Wijayapala became a 
fugitive]
For some time there was a talk of a possible
reconciliation between the two brothers. But Wijayapala
ultimately chose another path. In October, he passed
over to the Portuguese with a considerable retinue of
attendants and lascarins* This decision was a natural
one, for he had had increasingly strong pro-Portuguese
sympathies which had brought about most of the
2
differences of opinion with his brother* He was,
1. For the struggle between the two brothers, see : 
Dagh-Reg. 164-1, 482-8^; Dagh-Reg. 16M1 -4-2,219-21.
The account given in the Dagh-Register is particularly 
valuable, because it is derived from letters sent by 
Holsteijn, who was at Kandy during this period, and 
by Maerschalk, who was at Batticaloa. The accounts 
of Queyroz (781,804-,862,865) and Hibeiro (l2^-4-1) 
seem to be hazy and innaeurate for the period before 
Wijaypala joined the Portuguese, cf. also Pieris, 
Prince Vijaya. particularly documents 12 and 19.
Van Geer completely overlooked the struggle between 
the brothers*
2. Dagh-Reg.164-1-M2. 221; Ribeiro, 123ff*
107
however, soon disillusioned in his belief that he
would have happier dealings with the Portuguese than
he had with his brother. They were not prepared to
give him the assistance which he asked. They feared
1
a possible reconciliation between the brothers. Perhaps
they had other reasons also for their decision not
to assist him. However that may be, they soon kept
him as a virtual prisoner in Colombo. His consequent
attempts at communicating with his brother and the
Dutch only led to harsher treatment at the Portuguese 
2
hands. Finally, early in he was removed to Goa,
where he remained till his death in 165^.
1. Curiously enough Raja Sinha retained a lasting 
affection for Wijayapala despite the break between 
them. The Dutch, who knew this, attempted, later 
on, to make the King more embittered against the 
Portuguese by telling him that Wijapayala was being 
increasingly ill-treated at Goa. See eg. Diary
of Pieter Kieft, April 1691, Kol*Arch. 1077 pp^^OV- 
16.
2. Thijs. to G.G.&C. , 22 May l6if2 , Kol.Arch. 104.7 fo. 
678; Dagh-Reg, j 641 -42. 2$k-; undated letter of 
Wijayapala to the Dutch, Kol*Arch*1052 fos.Jf7-4 8; 
Wijayapala to Vinck, 29 April 16^3 , Kol^Arch.IO56 
(Bis) fo. 67A*
\o 8
Immediately after the crushing defeat which his 
forces had inflicted on Wijayapala (in August), Raja 
Sinha took the offensive against the Portuguese. These 
latter were forced to abandom Ruwanwella, which they 
appear to have held perhaps for more than a year 
previously.
In the south, the King’s forces appeared at Hakmana,
and the Portuguese in the vicinity of Galle were for
1
the most part withdrawn to meet this threat. But 
nothing decisive seems to have been achieved on either 
side; if anything, the Portuguese seem to have checked 
the further progress of the King's men, and Galle 
continued to be beleaguered by land.
This was roughly the situation in Ceylon, when on 
the 16 th December, Bouwejas, appeared at Galle with his 
fleet. It was then decided by Thijssen and Bouwens 
that the fleet should blockade Colombo and Negembo till 
the arrival of the Dutch fleet from Goa. Accordingly 
throughout the whole of January, and early part of
1. Thijs. to Gardenijs,1^ Sep. l6if1, Kol. Arch. 10if6 fos.96- 
99. Even during the period when he had the war with 
Wijayapala on his hands, Raja Sinha did all he could 
to relieve the pressure of the Portuguese blockade^of 
Galle. For instance, on the 28th of May, Thijssen 
had written to Gardenijs that the Portuguese had left 
the environs of Galle to deal with a force of 9000 
Kandyans (G.G.&C., to Quast, 18 0ct.l6VI, Kol.Arch.
768 p.4-9$)
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February 1 ^ 2  the fleet continued to cruise before
1
Colombo and Kegambo.
On the 10th February, Commander Cornelia Leendertsz 
Blaeuw arrived with four ships from Goa. After some 
discussion on points of precedence, the President Jan 
Thijssen was accorded the command over the combined 
fleet, which now comprised twelve ships and about 1100 
men. This force was considered much too weak for an 
attack on Colombo* Accordingly, Thijssen and his 
Council decided that they should, for the moment, 
proceed to Alutgama to meet the King’s dissawe, who 
was there with a considerable force.
On arrival at Alutgama, Thijssen was earnestly 
requested by the dissawe to land his forces and make 
an attack on the Portuguese in combination with the
p
King’s men. This did not suit Thijssen’s plans.
1. For the operations of the fleets of Blaeuw and 
Bouwens (under the supreme command of Thijssen) 
see: Thijs. to G.G.&C. .March 1642,Kol.Srch* 102*7 
fos. 680-82; same to same, 16 March l62f2, Kol.Arch. 
102*7 fos. 682-90; G.G.&C. , to Dir$s. ,12 Dec.l62*-2, 
Kol.Arch. 102*7 fo.12 ff. (Extract from last-mentkoned 
in Van Geer, Appendix XIV pp.29-30) “Resolutions of 
Galle”. JCRAS XVII. 285-519.
Ribeiro* l2*-2*
2. The co-operation and help given during this 
expedition by the Kandyans has been completely 
overlooked by Van Geer, who says (85-86)that Raja 
gave no assistance*
wo
He had already decided that if the Portuguese had 
followed his movements and come near Alutgama, he 
would attempt to sail to Negombo, unobserved by the 
enemy by keeping the fleet out of sight from the land- 
He would then be in a position to capture Negambo 
before its garrison received any relief. As he had 
expected, the Portuguese had indeed followed his 
movements and approached Alutgama. Therefore he 
decided to put his plans into effect. To the dissawe 
Thijssen explained that his plans were to move far 
out to sea and then to make a landing at Panadura, a 
few miles to the south of Colombo, as soon as the 
King's forces drew near to the city.
Having pleased the unsuspecting dissawe with 
this story, Thijssen put out to sea with his fleet.
But adverse winds forced the fleet to hug close to 
the coast, and thereby the Portuguese were able to 
follow the movements of the Dutch. Thus, at about 
the same time that the Dutch arrived before Negambo, 
that fort obtained all necessary reinforcements. In 
these circumstances, the Dutch had to abandon the 
idea of an attack on Negambo*
A few days later, on the 27th February, Thijssem 
received a letter from Raja Sinha. In this letter the 
King explained that his dissawes were near Kalutara 
with 15OO men. He, therefore, wished the Dutch to make
\\\
a landing and prepare to attack Colombo along with
his men. If this was done, he himself would hurry
to their support within, seven or eight days*
But the Butch decided to abide by a resolution
taken five days earlier, of not undertaking any land
operations even against Negambo, mainly on account
of the weakness of their forces* The additional strength
which they would now obtain from the support of the
King's forces, was considered a very doubtful quantity
by them* They argued that the King might perhaps not
turn up at all or that even if he did so he might not
keep his ground. There were, however, two very
important reasons (not mentioned in the Council’s
resolutions) which must certainly have influenced
Thijssen and his Council in their decision not to agree
to the King's request. Firstly, in their letter of 18 
' 1
October 164-1, the Batavian authorities had instructed 
Thijssen not to combine his forces with the King’s. If 
the King’s forces were at all engaged in an attack on 
Colombo, then the Dutch should attack the fort by sea, 
leaving the land-attack to the Kandyans. Secondly^ the 
authorities had strongly impressed on him the
1. Kol.Arch. 768 pp. 503-04.. cf. also G. G-.&C* to Quast.
18 Oct. 164.1, Kol*Arch. 768 p*4-98.
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desirability of capturing Colombo before the arrival 
of the King’s forces, the implication undoubtedly being 
that in such a case the Dutch could garrison Colombo, 
if they thought it necessary, without any let or 
hindrance from the King’s troops*. These instructions, 
taken into consideration with the weakness of the 
available Dutch forces, are sufficient to explain why 
Thijssen did not agree to the King’s request for a 
combined attack on Colombo.
When they realised that the Dutch were not prepared 
to attack Colombo, the King’s envoys to Batavia who were 
still aboard the fleet, requested that Dutch forces 
should be set on land in order to combine with the royal 
forces and attack the Portuguese in the field. This 
too Thijssen politely refused to do* A few days later, 
on the ^rd March, the envoys requested that the fleet 
at least should cruise for some time longer before 
Colombo, so that the Chaleas, who were harvesting the 
cinnamon might be unmolested by the Portuguese, who 
would not leave Colombo so long as the Dutch fleet was 
before it. This request was readily granted, and 
Commander Bouweus was instructed to cruise hefore 
Colombo until the 20th of the month with all the vessels 
except three, which were to sail to Galle with President
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Thijssen and Commander Blaeuw*.
Accordingly, having cruised before Colombo till
the appointed date, Bouwens arrived with his fleet on.
the 2^rd March at Galle. A few days later, both the
Commanders, Blaeuw and Bouweus, left for Coromandel
and Batavia with their fleets*. On the way they touched
at Batticaloa in order to hand over this fortress to
the King. The Dutch believed that it was too weak to
withstand a Portuguese attack; therefore, they felt
that they should hand it over to the King, although
he had not yet delivered the full 1000 bahars of
2
cinnamon, promised for it* As soon as the fort was 
handed over, the King’s men began to dismantle it on 
their master’s order. Before they leffr Batticaloa 
Blaeuw and Bouwens loaded their ships with considerable 
quantities of merchandise, which had been delivered on 
behalf of the King. They also took with them jbwo of
1. Thijs. to G. G.&C. , 16 March 164-2, Kol.Arch. 104*7 fos.- 
682-90; ’’Resolutions of Galle”, JCRAS XVII. 511-12.
2. G.G.&C. to Thijs. , 19 April 164-1, Kol.Arch.768 p.101* 
Note, incidentally, that the Dutch handed over 
Trincomalee and Batticaloa, mainly because they 
expected little profit from the territories around 
these forts. On 12 Dec. 164*1 G.G.&C. wrote to the 
Dirs. (Kol.Arch. 1044 fo.4-5 •) s ”Wij weten wel dat 
Batacaloa ende Trinquenemale van cleene importantie 
voor comp? sijn.14
Raja Sinha*s envoys, who were being sent to Batavia 
to ask for more substantial assistance than had been 
given recently.
The Batavian authorities were bitterly 
disappointed when they heard that neither Negambo 
nor Colombo had been captured by the fleets which 
they had sent for the purpose. Before the anticipated 
truce should come into operation, they had hoped to 
secure both these fortresses or at least one of them; 
they hoped thereby to control all, or at least a 
major share of the Ceylon cinnamon, which was, in 
their expressive phrase, flthe bride round whom we
i
dance in that quarter.1
Disappointed though they were in their hopes, they 
must have realised that neither Colombo nor Negambo 
had been captured, only because the Dutch forces had 
been utterly inadequate for the purpose. When, however, 
they reported matters to the Directors, they laid most 
of the blame for the failure to capture either of 
these places, at Raja Sinha*s door» Ignoring the facts, 
they stated that during the expedition, the Dutch had 
heard nothing from the King, who had remained at Kandy 
without coming to their assistance, apparently-as they
1. G. G.&G. to Quast, 16 Nov. 1 , Kol.Arch. 768 
p. 5^2.
said-in order to be on the side of the strongest party,
the Portuguese! This, of course, was a total
distortion of the facts. But this is not surprising
when it is noted that even President Jan Thijssen made
2
more or less the same allegation against the King,
when he wrote to Batavia on the 16th March (164-2).
However, the Batavian authorities need not have been
misled by this allegation, because, cuijfc>usly enough,
this same letter of Thijssen1 s contained sufficient
evidence to contradict the allegation.
Moreover, irrespective of the fact that the charge
made against the King was false, it was also
inconsistent with the previous instructions and
statements made by the Batavian authorities. For
3
instance, in their letter of 12 December 164-1, they
1. G.G.&G. to Dirs. 12 Dec. 164-2, Kol.Arch,} 04-7. f9-12 ff. 
Mac Leod (ii.1J2) has taken these statements at their 
full face value and says : !,Radja Singa draaide als 
de wind, naarmate de Portugueezen of de Hederlanders 
hem starker toeschenen”.
2. See relevant extract given by Van Geer, 89.
5. Kol. Arch. 104+ fo* 4-5 cf.extract in Van Geer, 
Appendix VIII p.22.
us
had written to the Directors that they did not expect
any assistance from the King in the operations which
were being undertaken, at the time, and that they had 
clearly
already forbidden their commanders to combine with 
the King1s forces, if the latter made an appearance.
It is apparent from all this, that the King was merely
1 2 
made the scape-goat for the almost futile operations
in Ceylon.
*
On the JQth November *l640f Van Diemen and his 
councillors had written to the Directors of the Company, 
assuring them that the Portuguese could be totally 
expelled from the East, if only the Company would send 
a force of 4000 men immediately. Moreover, all 
European nations could be forced to abandon the East, 
immediately after the expulsion of the Portuguese. The 
only requisites which tbey considered necessary for the 
attainment of these projects, were the force of 4000 men
1. Although Van Geer completely overlooked the fact that
the King had sent forces to support the Dutch, he
however, did not fail to see from other facts that the
King was made the scape-goat for the failure of the 
expedition. He illustrated this quite clearly on
pp.88-90.
2. Not wholly futile because during the presence of the 
fleet before Colombo, the Portuguese withdrew most of 
their forces from outside Colombo. As a result, the 
pressure on Galle was relieved for about three months.
9* Kol.Arch. 1042 fo. 98 ff.
asked for, and, of course, God’s blessings.
Fired as they were, with such a fervent belief in
their ability to obtain perfect dominion over the Orient
in the very near future, they reacted bitterly to the
news of the impending truce. They gave vent to their
bitterness by saying that they heartily wished that
1
Portugal had never separated herself from Spain.
However it was seldom, if ever, a characteristic
of Van Diemen and his Council, to accept unpleasant
situations as being inevitable or irreparable. With
characteristic skill and resourcefulness they
immediately set about * thinking of ways and means by
which they could continue their successful and profitable
warfare against the Portuguese, unhindered by a truce*
Some of the ways and means by which they hoped to achieve
their object, are expressed clearly in the following
2
extract from their letter of 12th December 1641, to the 
Directors :
1. G.G.&C. to Dirs., 12 Dec. kol-Arch, f>-93 ff
2. Kol.Arch.1044 It seems certain that if
the Portuguese had been in the position of the 
Dutch, they would have acted similarly to the 
latter. See on this point, Queyroz, 866*
"If it comes to a peace, we shall maintain 
.the same religiously. But we are bound by 
contract to the King of Ceylon to assist 
him to drive the Portuguese from his land; 
that must be accomplished or else he will 
remain unable to pay the expenses incurred 
by the Company in his service. Likewise, 
if the Bijapurese king has the right and 
the opportunity of driving his enemy from 
Goa, what shall forbid us to offer the 
helping hand for a work so useful for our 
position and to accommodate him in his 
lawful right with Netherlands soldiers ? 
and so forth in other, further opportunities.1
While the Dutch approached the idea of a truce in
this manner, the Portuguese considered the prospect of
one to be a god-send. The loss of Batticaloa in 16^8,
and of Triconmalee in 16^9, of Negambo and Galle in
164*0, and of Malacca in 164-1, had convinced the Portuguese
that if the war continued much longer, they would have
nothing left out of their estado da India. Therefore,
they grasped eagerly at the idea, the more so since
they realised that King Joao (IV) could spare little or
nothing out of his meagre forces, which were needed for
A
the defence of the mother country against Spain.
1. When the first news of a possible truce reached 
him D fAveiras wrote to the King of Portugal (27) 
Sep. 164-1, I.O.L. Port Rees. (Trans.) 14-)': am
compelled to declare to Your Majesty, prostrated 
at your royal feet, that,, in any case, it behoves 
to make peace or effect a truce at once with the 
Dutch in these parts.tf
M9
Thus it was that immediately he received news of 
the impending truce between Portugal and the United 
Provinces, the Viceroy sent two envoys to negotiate 
with Van Diemen over the conclusion of a truce. These 
two envoys, Diogo Mendes de Bi^to and Fr.Gon^alo Velosoy 
arrived at Batavia in January 16^ -2, but they were 
unable to achieve anything. Van Diemen was able to 
point out that according to the treaty (a copy of 
which had reached Batavia after their arrival) a truce 
was to take effect in the East only after the news of 
its ratification by Joao IV should have been sent 
there officially from the Hague.
On the 6th August, since no news of the ratification 
had yet arrived, the Batavian authorities despatched 
seven ships under Jan Dircksz Galen to blockade Goa (for 
the seventh year in succession). On the 2nd October, 
however, the Salamander arrived at Batavia with the 
official news of the ratification, and with an order 
from the States-General for an immediate notification, 
and observance of the truce. Accordingly, on the 7th
1. Pull text ins L.van Aitzema, Historic of Verhael van 
Saken van Staet en Oorlogh.(Hague 1660) v.20^-10.
For the conclusion of the truce in Europe, etc., see: 
Edgar Prestage, The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal 
with Prance. England and Holland from 164-0 to 1558 
(Watford 1925) ijj ££. ---
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of the month the truce was proclaimed at Batavia.
On the 21st, the Councillor Extraordinary, Pieter
A
Boreel was sent to proclaim an agreement with the
Viceroy over the delimitation of boundaries in Ceylon.
This question of the delimitation of boundaries
was based upon Article 12 of the treaty of truce* By
this article it was stipulated that each side should
remain in possession of that which it occupied at
the time of the proclamation of the truce, and that
the lands, situated between fortresses belonging to
the two parties, should be divided between them
according to the dependance of those lands on the
respective fortresses* Now, the significant point is
that Article 12 was meant to apply only to the West 
2
Indies; but Van Diemen and his councillors, conscious 
of their own military strength, had determined to 
make the Portuguese see otherwise*
1.A Doctor of Laws, was taken into the service of the 
Company on 14 March 1b4l, as a Councillor Extraordinary. 
He was soon despatched to Batavia, from where he was 
sent to conduct negotiations for a truce with the 
Portuguese. Prom all circumstances it would appear 
that Boreel had been sent to Batavia with secret 
instructions from the Directors.
2.Heeres (Corn.Diplomaticum) . i.442.n. ) corrects Van 
Geer (82,92; on this point* Even more convincing prrof 
than that which Heeres cites is to be found in Dirs. 
to G.G.&C. 11 April 1642, Kol.Arch*454*
\2I
Thus, fictiously basing their demands on the
strength of this article, they attempted to obtain all
the cinnamon lands around Galle which they had been
thinking of possessing ever since the capture of that
fort* The Directors too considered the possession of
the cinnamon districts as a sine qua non, and on the
1
5th September 1bif1, they had clearly instructed Van
Diemen and his Council to conduct matters in such a
way that on the proclamation of the truce in the East,
the Company would be assured of the cinnamon around
its forts in the island; as it was much too expensive
and prejudicial to the Company to possess fortresses,
which gave no economic advantages. This desirable aim
was to be promoted according to the circumstances of
the time; They regretted that they could not give
more-detailed advice until they had heard the opinion
of the Batavian authorities themselves , on this subject.
Thus Van Diemen and his Councillors were only attempting
to carry out the orders of their superiors and their
2
own long-contemplated designs, when they instructed
1. Kol. Arch*^-5^»
2. Instructions for Boreel, 20 Oct. 1 &j-2 ICol. Arch. 769 
pp.650-65. ^  •
Van Geer and 2) refers to the “Commissie1 for
Boreel as being • aL so his 11 Ins true tiefl. This is in­
correct. The instructions f&rm a separate document of 
sixteen pages and contain much more valuable 
information that is in the "Commissie**,which runs to 
only three pages (pp.647-6^ 9).
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Pieter Boreel to claim the Dissawanies of Matara
and Sabaragamuwa by virtue of the 12th Article.
Quite apart from the fact that this article was
not valid for the East, the Dutch could not claim
with justice that the Dissawanies of Matara and
Sabaragamuwa fell within the jurisdiction of Galle*
The Dissawani of Matara had always been administered
by the dissawe, who had his head-quarters at the town
of Matara, some thirty miles away from Galle; the
Dissawani of Sabaragamuwa was likewise administered by
its own dissawe from the town of Sabaragamuwa, situated
1
some seventy miles from Galle* Even in a military
sense, the Dutch could not rightly claim that they
2
commanded the dissawanies from Galle. Except for an.
1. See Ribeiro, if2— Aprt from anything else, the 
names "Matara Dissawani" and "Sabaragamuwa'Dissawani1 
themselves suggest where the centres of these 
dissawanies were*
2. The Dutch were quite conscious of this# For instance 
Thijssen wrote to Batavia on 22 May 16^2 (Kol.Arch#
1047 fo* 677) * "want soo maer bij U.Ed* conde te wegen 
gebracht werden, dat eenige macht van volck tot 6*a 
700 man toe, conde herwaerts gesonden werden ende de 
selvige met de grootste partije uijt Gales guarriisoen 
geconjun geert naer Colombo, soude sich den viandt 
sender omsien. daatelijck in sijn eijgen grensen am die 
te behouden vervoegen, als siahfceer al het land 
voornoem$d sonder slach offte stoot onder ons 
gehoorsaemheijt te brengen waare, ende daerop dan de 
vreede volgende, souden weinigh contestatij over 
t’deelen des lands met den Portugees behoeveim te hebben1
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occasional foraging party sent from Galle , the
Dutch had not even frequented the Matara Dissawani,
let alone been in command of it* As for the
Dissawani of Sabaragamuwa, it is certain that no
Dutchman had even seen a part of it, except perhaps
a stray envoy or messenger on his way to Raja Sinha1 s
court- Prom first to last, these two dissawanies
had been partly or wholly in the hands of the King
or of the Portuguese*
The Dutch would, however, have some substance
in their claims on the dissawanies if they could claim
them in the name of the King and not on any fictitious
jurisdiction of Galle* At least for about eight months
in l6if0, the King had been in possession of the Matara
Dissawani and since that year, he seems to have continued
1
in occupation of a good deal of Sabaragamuwa. These
facts were not overlooked by the Dutch, and indeed, in
addition to their other arguments, in support of their
claims, they also used the King’s name* Thus, Boreel
was also instructed to maintain that these dissawanies
belonged to Raja Sinha; but that the King had mortgaged
them to the Company as security for the debt which
1. Boreel claimed Uiat Raja Sinha had 5^ Korales or 
districts of Sabaragamuwa, while the Portuguese had 
only (Reply of Boreel to D ’Aveiras,9 April 164.3* 
Kol.Arch* 1056 fo. 2^2).
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he owed it.
The authorities at Batavia knew fully well that 
these arguments were rather weak and that their validity 
would certainly he denied hy the Portuguese. But this 
did not perturb them. They instructed Boreel to tell 
the Portuguese that if their claims were not granted, 
the war would be continued not only in Ceylon, but also 
in the rest of the East* This ultimatum, they were 
convinced, would speedily make the enemy grant all 
the Dutch claims. As they told Boreel :
" And as the situation of the Portuguese in 
Europe as also here (in Asia} is not suited 
for a continuation of hostilities with us, 
we•believe that they will concede rather 
more than they themselves imagine. You 
must take note of that. 11 *
1. The fact that Raja Sinha had never even thought 
of mortgaging these lands did not worry the Dutch. 
They apparently expected that Raja Sinha would be 
satisfied if they told him that this story of the 
mortgage was necessary in order to obtain, these 
lands for His Majesty from the Portuguese.
2. This idea was again repeated in the instructions, 
thus s "hare swacke constitutie ende onse macht 
geconsidersert, des oock te resoluter int 
pretenderen moeten wesen. M
12.5
'The policy, which Boreel was instructed to follow 
towards Raja Sinha, was to depend on the success or 
failure of the negotiations with the Portuguese. If 
the Portuguese conceded the Dutch claims, then a bold 
and confident policy was to be followed against him*
If necessary, Boreel was to conclude an alliance with 
the Portuguese against Raja Sinha! In any case, he 
was to be kept out of the dissawanies of Matara and 
Sabaragamuwa, which were to become in effect Dutch 
territory* Boreel was told that ffmany pretexts and 
well-founded reasons*1 could be brought forward to 
justify this action* The King was to be told that 
everything was being done in order to obtain payment 
of their debt as speedily as possible; and every item 
of income from these lands Y/ould be carefully noted, 
and the moment the debt was covered, all the lands would 
be handed over to the King. But, of course, an actual 
transfer of these lands to the King was never 
contemplated by the authorities, because, as they
1. ffProcuratie op den E, Pieter Boreel*1, 20 Oct. 16^2, 
Kol.Arch.7^9 p. 651. Thus the idea of an armed 
alliance with the Portuguese against the King,appears 
much earlier than 16^5, in which year such an alliance 
was actually concluded. Incidentally, neither the 
above instruction to Boreel, nor most of his other 
instructions on the policy to be followed towards 
Eaja Sinha have been noticed hitherto.
12.6
explained to Boreel, it would not be long before they
would be at enmity with the King.
If, however, the Portuguese refused to grant the 
Dutch claims, then Boreel was to pay more attention 
to the King and attempts were to be made to conserve 
his friendship.
There was, however, one thing which it was
desirable to attend to, before or during the time of
the negotiations with the Portuguese; Raja Sinha must
be persuaded to accede to the truce* There were at
least two reasons, which made it desirable (if not
essential) to see that the King entered the truce, along
with the Dutch* The first was that it would be rather
an inconvenient matter, if he continued the war with
the Portuguese, and called upon the Dutch to assist
him in accordance with the Treaty of 1638. To get over
2
this difficulty, Van Diemen wrote to Raja Sinha,
1. This idea was expressed even more clearly in the 
letter of 20 Oct. 1642 (Kol.Arch.769 p.678) which 
they sent to Thijssen: w * T is buijten bedencken 
bevoren ons achterstel hebben ingetrocken, off den 
Singless sal ons overvloedige stoffe geven, omme 
haer int Candise geberghte te confineren, ende van 
dien trouwloose race ^ontledigen, soo maer met den 
Portugees connen verd^agen.11
2. 20 Oct. 1642, Kol.Arch.769 p. 678 ff.
declining to assist him unless he paid the debt,
which was now brought to ^75>5^9 reals or well over
one million florins. “But11, as the authorities
explained to their subordinates, ”we know that this
1
is impossible for Raja to do.1 Boreel was instructed 
to use the same argument of Van Diemen’s in order to 
decline any assistance. The second, and more important 
reason, which made the Dutch authorities wish to get 
the Xing to accede to the treaty, was their 
realization that it would be difficult to claim lands 
from the,Portuguese in the King’s name, if the King 
himself chose to continue the war, and did not enter 
the treaty. Therefore, in his letter to the King,
Van Diemen used various arguments, to induce him to 
accede to the treaty. In particular, he pointed out 
that the Portuguese, being at peace with the Company, 
would use all their forces against him and thereby 
present a grave threat to his position. Thes^, and other 
reasons, Boreel was also to use in order to persuade 
the King to accede to the truce.
With these comprehensive instructions, Boreel left 
for Ceylon on the 21st October 16^2. Stopping at Malacca
1. G.G.&C. to Thijs. , 20 Oct. 16M  , Kol.Arch. 769 p. 678
U8
on the way in order to proclaim the truce there, he 
arrived at Batticaloa on the 28th of January 1&4-2*
Here he set ashore the two ambassadors, whom Raja 
Sinha had sent to Batavia the prevL ous year to 
request a powerful force to attack the Portuguese.
The ambassadors took with them Van Diemen’s letter to 
the King. On the 1st February, Boreel arrived at 
Galle, which he found as closely beleaguered as ever 
by the Portuguese.
For three months, from January to March 164-2, the 
Portuguese had left the garrison of Ga^le in comparative 
peace. This had been because that had withdrawn their 
forces around Galle for the defence of Colombo, which 
appeared threatened by the fleets of Blaeuw and Bouwens. 
But immediately these fleets gave up the blockade of 
Colombo, the Portuguese came once more in force into 
the lands around the fortress. They removed to Colombo 
all the inhabitants living around Galle whom they were 
able to capture, and devastated the lands in such a way 
that they themselves had to get most of their provisions 
from Colombo.
During this land-blockade, the Dutch ventured 
occasionally to send a foraging-party with the greatest 
circumspection. Although the fleets of Blaeuw and 
BoPwens had brought the strength of the garrison up to
129
it-50 with men transferred from the ships, yet the
memory of the disaster at \7akwella seems to have made
«
Thijssen and his men rather fearful of encountering
the Portuguese*
The King had sent large quantities of x>addy and
other provisions, as also had Batavia and Pulicat.
But since these supplies were not steady, the garrison
had at times to undergo great privations, sometimes
having to forego the meat rations* On such occasions *
however, a double ration of arrack was distributed as
1
a not unwelcome substitute*
It was, in these circumstances, a great relief to 
the garrison, when Pieter Boreel arrived; particularly 
since he brought from Batavia a force of 200 soldiers 
to strengthen the garrison still further* But, for the 
moment, this added strength was not of great 
significance because Boreel proclaimed a provisional 
truce, while negotiations with the Portuguese were 
conducted*
1. See (in particular) on the above points: Thijs. to 
G.G.&C., 22 May 162.2, Kol. Arch. 102.7 fos.675-79; same 
to same 1 Sep. 162.2, Kol.Arch. 1052 fos. 59“^1;
"Besolutions of Galle", JCRAS XVII. 519-58, 572.-82. 
passim*
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On the 3rd February, he sent a copy of the 
ratification, of the truce in Europe to the Portuguese 
Captain-Major, Antonio da Mota Galvao, and requested 
him to evacuate the dissawanies of Matara and 
Sabaragamuwa since these fell within the jurisdiction 
of Galle. The Captain-Major refused the request 
declaring that the dissawanies belonged to the King 
of Portugal, both by virtue of the donation, of
2
Dharmapala, and actual possession up to the present.
1. As early as 4- Oct. 164-2, Dom Philipe had sent to 
Thijssen a copy of the ratification of the truce, 
but on the ground that the ratification and formal 
assent of the States-General was lacking, Thijssen 
had refused to recognise it. "Resolutions of Galle", 
JCRAS XVII. 388).
2. The main sources utilised for what took place in 
Ceylon and Goa during the mission of Boreel are : 
Diary of Boreel, 21 Oct. 164-2-26 April 1643, Kol. 
Arch.1036 fos.376-410; Boreel to G.G.&C., 23 April 
164-3* Kol.Arch. 1052 fos. 199-203;; Letters, protests, 
and counter-protests during negotiations at Goa, 
Kol*Arch. 1056 fos. 4-11-4-2; Thijs. to G.G.&C., 17 
March 164-3* Kol.Arch. 1052 fos.99—108; Same to same,
29 March 164-3, Kol. Arch. 1052 ps. 56-58; Dagh-Reg.
1645-44. 203 ff. and 301 ff: "Resolutions of Galle", 
JCRAS.XVII 385-4-Iif.
Viceroy to King, 1 May 164-3, Bk*if8 fo.,151 (Bks. of 
the Monsoons) I. O.L. , Port.Rees. (Trans) 14-;
Ribeiro, 14-3 - 4-4-*
»3I
As a result of this refusal, Marten Vinck was sent 
on the 5th to Dorn Philipe Mascarenhas in Colombo, in 
order to ask for the withdrawal of the Portuguese forces 
from the dissawanies. But Vinck met with the same 
refusal from Mascarenhas that Boreel had received from 
de Mota.
Mascarendas pointed out that no land beyond the 
range of the guns in the fort was appertaining to Galle. 
Vinck protested that it was customary in Europe for a 
fort to have jurisdiction over all the adjacent territory, 
and that according to this custom., Galle possessed 
jurisdiction over the adjacent dissawanies* The Captain- 
General denied the validity of this argument, pointing 
out the complete control, which the Portuguese 
maintained over these dissawanies, and reaffirming the 
legal rights of the Portuguese King to those territories. 
As for Galle itself, he offered to buy it, if a suitable 
price could be agreed upon. Vinck replied that the 
Dutch had never made such a sale before this and never 
would, and that since their lawful claims were not 
granted, it was not possible to proclaim the truce in 
Ceylon. This threat, however, made little impression on 
Mascarenhas, who declared that he was not prepared to 
yield any territory, and that in any case he had no 
authority to do so, even if he had wished it. Before
Vinck left him, however, Mascarenhas expressed a hope
which foreshadows a later development, and indicates
Sinha
quite clearly that the Dutch attitude to Raj a^ was no
secret. He expressed the hope that matters might
so turn out that the Dutch and the Portuguese could
jointly make war on Raja Sinha. Since Vinck had
1
carefully left out from the !,ProcucriationH of Boreel 
which he showe:d the Captain-General, the section which 
authorised Boreel to conclude an alliance against Raja 
Sinha, and since the negotiations had proved fruitless, 
it was only to be expected that Vinck should fail to 
take up the suggestion made by Mascarenhas.
On the return of Vinck, Boreel decided to leave 
for Goa as soon as possible to see whether he could 
persuade the Viceroy to grant the Company's claims* 
Before he left Ceylon, Boreel and Mascarenhas had an 
exchange of protests and counter-protests, each
1* Referring to the papers, which he showed Mascarenhas, 
Vinck says : Mde missive van de E.Heer, alsoock de
copievan de notificatie en ratificatie tractact ende 
procuratie, uitgenomen de sake aengaende Radja-Sinha, 
overhandigde.M Diary of Vinck, contained in Diary 
of Boreel, Kol. Arch.1056 fos*5^7“^ ^ # Mascarenha's 
suggestion regarding a joint-war and other details 
on the negotiations between Vinck and Mascarenhas 
are contained in this Diary of Vinck. ef.Van Geer, 
Appendix XX pp*39-Vl.
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defending his actions and blaming the other for all
the evil consequences that might result from the
dispute regarding the dissawanies. Nevertheless,
until Boreel or the Viceroy should send further orders
from Goa, it was agreed that a provisional truce should
be observed.
The Dutch Commissioner left Galle on the 26th
February. On the Jrd Harch, Colomba Naide and Curipuli
Naide, two envoys from the King, arrived at Galle with
1
letters and presents fxxr the Dutch Commissioner. As 
they insisted bn handjnlhese personally to Boreel,
Thijssen decided to send the envoys per the Romerswael 
to catch up with Boreel; which they did on the 5th March. 
They handed over two letters and some gifts from the 
King to Boreel.
1. Van Geer (100) is incorrect in saying that these 
envoys arrived before Boreel left Galle* He has 
also noted the contents of only one out of the two 
letters sent to Boreel. It is also very doubtful 
whether Raja Sinha referred to the dissawanies of 
Matara and Sabaragamuwa *as Van Geer^elievesr X 100), 
wh^ en he asked Boreel to see that f,de lancTen vanden 
rivier Caleture herwaerts aen mij-blijvenff. Hilary of 
Boreel, Kol.Arch.i056 fo. 59$ ff £oir Raja*s letters)* 
How misleading the Dagh-Reg. can at times be, is shown 
by the fact that it reported the King as having 
requested the Dutch to obtain for him Jaffna, the 
Seven and Four Korales, etc. (Dagh-Reg. l6fr.3-Kk. 212).
In actual fact, in his letter of 25 Feb.,Raja had 
referred to all these places; but only to say that 
from Jaffna southwards, he was in occupation of 
certain territories in the Four£ad4 the Seven Korales, 
etc.
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One of these letters, dated 21st February, dealt
almost exclusively with Van Diemen*s letter of the 2oth
October 164-2. He expressed his intense displeasure at
the news of the contemplated peace with the enemy, and
recalled the fact that any peace made with the Portuguese
in former times had never been firm or certain. However,
if the lands which he now possessed were assured to
him at the truce, he would also enter it* As for the
proposition of the Governor-General that the tolls of
Batticaloa and other places should be granted to the
Dutch as part payment of the deot, he wished to point
out that tne tolls did not constitute merchandise but
cash. According to the treaty with Westerwolt, payment
of the debt had to be made in and Commander Coster
had referred very often to this fact. Therefore, he
1
would see that payment was made in merchandise.
1. The Dutch were deftly quoted to their own 
disadvantage. It was this sort of thing, 
which had soon convinced Van Diemen and 
his councillors that they had to deal with 
a tough customer.
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In the' other letter, dated 2^rd February, the King 
expressed his profuse thanks for the naval escort, 
which had been given by Boreel to his ambassadors, 
who were bringing as his brides two princesses from 
the Carhatic. In gratitude for this service, he 
promised not only to make a handsome present to Boreel, 
but also to fix the price of the cinnamon at a figure, 
which would make the Company satisfied.
Oh the 8th March Boreel sent back the two envoys, 
and proceeded on his way to Goa, where he arrived on 
the 1st April. Although he was received and entertained 
right royally, he sound found that the Viceroy was not 
prepared to cede any of the lands, which the Portuguese
had been occupying for so long and which the Dutch had
never occupied.
As Mascarenhas had already done at Colombo, and for
the same reason^ the Viceroy's deputies, who carried on
the negotiations with Boreel, maintained that the Dutch
in Galle could not lawfully claim any jurisdiction
beyond the territory which was within range of the cannon
of the fortress. In addition, they pointed out (though
1. The Viceroy's deputies pertinently pointed out that 
if the theory was accepted that by the mere possession 
of the fort of Galle alone, the dissawanies of Matara 
and Sabaragamuwa could be justly claimed, then, on ' 
that same thoery, it would be easy to conquer great 
kingdoms by capturing a part and demanding the whole. 
(Dagh-Keg. 164-5-44. 201).
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in vain) that the 12th Article did not apply to the 
East but only to the West Indies. They offered to buy 
Galle for a reasonable price; needless to say, the 
offer was.refused. Bareel’s claim on the dissawanies 
by virtue of the mortgage, which he said the King had 
made, was met by the deputies by denying that Raja Sinha 
had any authority to mortgage those dissawanies since 
he had no rights over them. They furthermore alleged 
that Raja Sinha could not be entered into the treaty 
of truce since he was an ups £> art and a heathen ruler, 
and the j>rd Article of the treaty by virtue of which 
Asian rulers allied to either side could be included in 
the truce, applied only to such rulers as were not 
r) heathen# It is easy to see why the Portuguese distorted 
* the meaning of the ^rd Article and refused to recognise 
Raja Sinha as a lawful ruler; there was no better way 
of meeting the Butch argument that the King had 
mortgaged the dissawanies to them, and that, therefore, 
these were appertaining to them#
In a last effort to secure at least half of the 
dissawanies, Boreel made, on his own authority - at least, 
it was not in conformity with his written instructions - 
the following proposal : Until a decision should arrive
on this subjadt from the Sovereign authorities in Europe,
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the dissawanies were to be divided equally between 
the two parties; the total of the incomes from both 
parts of the dissawanies would be divided egually 
between the two parties; but careful and separate 
notes would be made of the incomes derived from each 
korale or district, so that when the decision arrived 
from Europe, each party could restore to the other any 
incomes which it had already enjoyed from districts 
assigned to the other party by the sovereign*
The deputies of the Viceroy replied that they were 
prepared to grant the substance of this proposal but 
not its form* They were prepared to keep in deposit 
the incomes from these dissawanies until a decision 
should arrive from the sovereigns in Europe * Then, 
if any of these lands were assigned to the Dutch, the 
Portuguese would hand over, from the deposited incomes, 
what appertained to the Dutch* Till a decision should 
arrive, however, the Portuguese must remain in 
occupation, of the dissawanies in the same manner in
1
which they were occupying them at the present moment.
1. Dagh-Reg. 16^5-4-^. 216. Van Geer has over-looked 
this counter-proposal, which indicates that the 
Portuguese were not reluctant to effect a fair 
compromise. He therefore believed (102*.) that 
D'Aveiras was too obstinate in the matter.
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This counter-proposal, Boreel was not prepared to
accept. There then followed an exchange of protests
and counter-protests between the two parties. Finally,-
Pieter Boreel left the bar of Goa on the 26th April, 
having
after/proclaimed the resumption of the warrot only in
Ceylon but also over the whole of the East.
Thus, by refusing the claims of the enemy, the
Portuguese were once more embarked upon a war, from
which they could expect nothing but loss* But this
refusal was not merely, or even principally, the result
of a new confidence inspired by their recent successes
1
in Ceylon, as Professor Geyl has implied, but rather, 
the result of their conviction that the Dutch were 
making unjust demands, taking advantage of their own 
strength and the weakness of the Portuguese. The Count 
de Aveiras expressed the feeling of his whole council 
when he proposed to it that :
1. "It must be said that the Dutch interpretation 
fof Article 12} seems the correct one, and that 
the Portuguese Viceroy's attitude was most un­
yielding. The successes of the last two years 
in Ceylon had inspired the Portuguese with a 
new confidence." Cambridge History of India. v.2*-5. 
As already pointed out (pTizo above) the
Dutch interpretation of Article 12 was not the 
correct one*
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w it would not be creditable to yield.....
what they so unjustly demanded......,even
if by so doing we should have to suffer, 
as in effect we shall have to suffer, what 
we have experienced up to the present. 1
After leaving Goa, Roreel made straight for Ceylon.
He himself, however, did not touch at Galle, but
proceeded on to Batticaloa, sending Marten Vinck with
letters of instruction? for Thijssen. In these letters,
(received at Galle on the 25th May) Boreel informed
Thijssen that the war had been resumed, and instructed
him. to signify this to the Portuguese, towards whom
he was, thereafter to do all possible injury and loss.
On the 8th May, Boreel arrived at Batticaloa,
expecting fulfillment of what the King had promised
by the letter of 2j?rd February- But although the King
fulfilled his promise of rewarding Boreel himself, he 
2did not fulfill his promise of rewarding the Company 
by lowering the price fixed on the cinnamon* He had
1. Viceroy to King (of Portugal) 1 May jBk+bQ fo.151 
(Bks.of the Monsoons) I.O.L. Port.Rees. (Trans.) 1if.
2. At least, so it appears from the available Dutch 
accounts, which say that the Kingfs correspondence 
with Boreel during this period, is hardly worth 
mentioning. To conclude from this that the King did 
not lower the price of the cinnamon, is, perhaps„ to 
give the Dutch too much benefit of the doubt, 
especially because of what has previously been seen 
of their manner of reporting*
Incidentally * note once again how misleading the Dagh- 
Rejgs. can be. It refers to the wax and pepper, which 
the King gave to Boreel, as having been purchased by 
the Dutch. (Dagh-Seq.. 1643-M i. 223). Other accounts
^ (continued) .......
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apparently re-considered the matter and decided that
any reduction of the price would not get him any
further towards paying off the debt, because he knew
that the Dutch were determined to keep him in debt
always, A reduction of the price would only mean a
further concession on his part without any compensating
advantages. Whatever the reason for this action, the
fact was that he had broken his promise. And this
fact was not altered by the extraordinarily large
number of elephants - twenty - which he ordered to
1
be handed over to Boreel for the Company’s benefit.
(continued) :
indicate clearly that this merchandise had been 
given free by the King towards meeting his debts. 
(See eg. G.G.&C. to Dirs. 22 Dec. I&hj fo* 25 ff)*
1. Boreel, incidentally, did not reach Batavia, as 
he died at Pulicat on 3 July (1643).
Chapter* V
The Dutch Became A Territorial Power# The 
Conclusion of the Trace
Van Diemen and his Connell to re snip rise! at the Portuguese
rejection of their claims In Ceylon# As they explained to Thijssen,
they could not understand why the Portuguese should contemplate a
resumption of the war when their own situation was so desperate, both
in Asia and in Europe# The only explanation they could suggest, was
that the Portuguese imagined that the Dutch at Batavia had no
authority to renew the war in the East without reference to their
1
superiors in the Netherlands# If the Portuguese really imagined this,
they were soon dissilusioned, for when the Governor-General and
Council instructed Boreel to proclaim the resumption of the war
throughout the East, they acted with the knowledge that what they
2
did would be supported by the Directors of the Company#
The Batavian authorities had decided not to limit the way to
1# G.G. & C# to Thijssen, 24 July 1643, Kol#Arch# 770 p# 511#
2# Van Geer (110, 123-24) alleges that the Directors were more
peacably inclined, but he has overlooked their vital private 
letter of 10 Sep# 1643 (Kol#Areh# 454) to Van Diemen, which 
explicitly authorised G,G# & C# to continue the war "not only 
there [i#e# in Ceylon) but also before Goa, and anywhere else 
where you think the most advantage over the Portuguese can be 
obtained, until further orders and as long as they have not ceded 
the places under the aforesaid jurisdiction of Galle - for we, 
over here, think that it is better that they, rather than we, 
should complain*# c*f# also next note (below).
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Ceylon because they realised that the Portuguese position was much 
weaker elsewhere* Ceylon could be reinforced comparatively easily from 
the Portuguese possessions on the neighbouring Malabar coast, and if 
the war was limited to that island the Portuguese could have con­
centrated all their available forces there* As it was, they had to 
defend all tbeir scattered settlements from Macao to Mozambique, 
while Dutch command of the sea enabled the Hollanders not only to harry
alio
the outlying possessions butjto blockade Goa itself* The blockade of
Goa not only made it difficult for the Portuguese adjjuately to reinforce
Ceylon, but also prevented them from shipping spices to Europe and thus
frcm competing with the Dutch in the home market* Thanks to the 13
ships and 4,500 men recently sent by the Directors to Batavia in
1
expectation of a renewal of the war, the Dutch were able to send a
fleet of 8 sail under Corneliez Blocq, to blockade Goa, and to dispatch
the largest expedition which had yet been sent to Ceylon - 13 sail with
2
1700 men - under the command of Councillor Prancois Caron*
Caron*s orders envisaged the capture of both Colombo and Negcmbo 
if possible, since their fall would seal the fate of the Portuguese 
in Ceylon, their other settlements being of little or no account*
Eren if the Portuguese unexpectedly showed a desire to negotiate!,
Caron was informed that the war could still be continued in JRaja
Sinha*s name, since "we are bound by solemn contract to the Ceylonese
1* cf* Dirs* to G.G* & C., 25 Sept * 1642 (Kol*Arch* 454) and MacLeod, 
ii.142*
2* G.G* & C* to Dirs*, 23 Dec* 1644, Kol>*Arch* 105ft fo$5*l-80 passim: 
Thi js* to Arnold Heussen, 22 March 1644, Kol*Areh* 1054 fo*589* 
cf* also Van Geer, App* XXIV, pp* 52-60* Eor Caron* s career in 
the East Indies cf* C• R.Boxer j^ Ed*^  A true description of the 
mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam by Er» Caron and J» Schouten 
(London, 1935) XV-CX2QX#
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King to assist him against the Portugese at his expense, until they
shall have been driven from his lands”• Only if Raja Sinha did not
wish to continue the war, but wished to enter the truce, need Caron
negotiate with the Portuguese# If this last (and admittedly
unlikely) contingency occurred, then Caron was instructed to pitch
his demands so high, that the Portuguese would be quite unable to
fulfill them even if they had been willing to do so; for,apart from
the Dutch territorial claims round Galle, he was to insist on a cash
indemnity of over a million florins, and the surrender of Negombo as
1
security until this sum was paid#
As regards Raja Sinha, Caron was told that there was no need to
conclude any agreement with him as long as the Dutch had sufficient
forces in Ceylon, for then he would remain "well within the limits of
reaonsableness”; Although the Sinhalese monarch would be sure to
insist on the demolition of Negcmbo and Colombo (which, incidentally
was within his treaty rights) Caron was told to pay no attention to
him, but to garfison both places on their capture# Raja Sinha was
merely to be told in general terms that this great expedition was
being sent at his request, and that he should fulfill his obligations 
2
and pay his debt#
While Caronfs expedition was being mobilised at Batavia,
1# Instructions for Carcn, 29 Sep# 1643, Kol#Arch# 770 pp# 714-24 
cf# also Van Geer, App# XX111 pp# 46*52, and p# 109 n#2#
2# Although the garrisoning of Colombo against the wishes of the King 
would have been a clear breach not only of the agreement with 
Coster (p|F?above) but also of Van Diemens own written promises 
(Van Diemen to Raja Sinha, 26 Sep# 1640, Kol#Arch 767 p#658 ff; 
Dagh-Reg# 1641«, 414) yet G*G. & C# informed Caron that Raja Sinha 
wsi©h aen gene beloften zal binden, al waren die met Eede 
bevestight# Tot gouvemo*.
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> Thijssen had bean chafing at Galle under the temporary truce
proclaimed by Boreel# Despite the truce, and the fact that Portuguese
and Dutch paid frequent visits to each other* s encampments, the
Portuguese still prevented the Sinhalese from provisioning Galle by
savagely punishing any they caught doing so# Thijssen knew that his
own forces were superior in number to those of the Portuguese which
1
comprised sane 12 estancias or about 360 men, and he wrote to Batavia
in March 1643, wit is lamentable that there must be a truce, for now we
2
know their situation better"•
No sooner had Thijssen received Boreel*s letter notifying him of
the renewal of the war (6 May 1643] then ha sent a column of 300 men,
3
commanded by Captains Paulus Doncq and Jan van der Laen, to tell the 
Portuguese at Weligama to evacuate the territory around Galle# The 
Portuguese found themselves too weak to fight the Dutch at Weligama, 
since they had detached part of their forces to repel incursions by 
Kandyan troops in the interior# They therefore withdrew to Akuressa, 
where they were attacked by the Dutch on the 10th May; but the latter 
sustained a severe reverse with the loss of nearly 100 men in killed 
alone# The Portuguese were now masters of the country surrounding Galle 
again, while Dutch prestige sank to a low ebb in the eyes of the
1# or Companies# A Portuguese company (in Ceylon) comprised about 
36-33 men according to Ribeiro (46) or about 30 according to
Queyroz (813, 82R ). - . .
2* Thijs. to G.G. & C., 29 March 1643 (Kol#Arch. 1052 fos# 56-58) cf# 
also Same to Same, 17 March 1643 (Kol#Arch. 1052 fosl 10Q - 07#
3# The leading soldier on the Dutch side in their campaigns against the 
Portuguese in Ceylon, and the one most dreaded by them as can be 
seen fran the accounts of Ribeiro, Qjueyroz, Baldaens etc# He subse­
quently served in the abortive expedition to Fomosa and Macao in 
1660-61, and repatriated as Schout-bi j-Nacht or Rear Admiral of the
homeward-bound East India fleet in 1661-62# Ha returned to the 
fcast later, and served as Sergt. Major (garrison commander) in /over
I if?
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Sinhalese*
The King's men had also not fared too well against the enemy*
They had kept up an unrearied* though perhaps not a very bloody 
struggle for some time* until early in 1643 they suffered a loss when
2
two of their commanders were ambushed and slain in the Matara Dissawani. 
Nevertheless* the Kandyans continued to trouble the Portuguese in this 
dissawani and in Sabaragamnwa# In June they took the defensive in the 
Pour Korales; but had to retire when the Portuguese rushed all available 
forces there# The rest of the year appears to have passed with nothing
3
of note happening in the struggle between the Kandyans and the Portuguese* 
Meanwhile* Francois Caron* who had left Batavia on the 30th 
September 1643 arrived in the Ceylon waters towards the middle of 
December# After a secret conference with SJhijssen and Vinck at a rendez­
vous near Walawe* he decided to make an attempt to surround and 
annihilate the Portuguese force which was at Akmlnana near Galle# It 
was felt that once these 540 men, the flower of the enemy's troops* were 
put out of the way* the capture of Colombo would not be a difficult
1# Although the Dutch records make no mention of Sinhalese auxiliaries 
on their side* the Portuguese accounts do so* For different 
accounts of the battle of Akuressa and its repercussions cf# 
Thijssen to G#G# & C#, 21 May 1643, Kol#Arch. 1052 fos# 77-80;
Same to Boreel* 19 May 1643* k01#Arch* 1052 fos# 63-66; 
"Resolutions of Gallen* JCRAS 161 412-14, 420* 421* 440* 441-45; 
Viceroy to King, 4 Dec# 1643, Bk#48# fo# 266 (Bks of the Monsoons) 
I*0#L# Port*Rees* (Trans) 14; Ribeiro* 145-47; Qjueyroz* 870-73#
2# Dr. Pieris (Port .Era, il#324) mistakenly places this event in 1642.
3# Thijs# to G.G. & C.* 25 June 1643, Kol.Arch 1052 fo#49. Queyroz 
869, 874-75; Ribeiro 147#
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task#
Accordingly, on 20th December a farce of HOC men was set on
land# Accompanied by the Klngfs dissawe (who was in Galle) and his
2
lascarins, the Dutch forces marched near the Gin-Ganga# There they 
took up various positions commanding the escape-routesof the 
enemy, who was at Akmimana, Little attempt was made to close in on the 
enemy, as the latter was in an almost inaccessible position, surrounded 
by deep morasses; consequently the Portuguese were able to pass on, 
unobserved to Mapalagama on the upper reaches of the Gin-Ganga where 
they took up an even better position than at Akmimana#
frustrated in their aim of wiping out the enemy force, Caron 
and his men returned to Galle on the 28th* There, it was decided to 
set sail for Colombo as soon as possible# On the 2nd January 1644 
the fleet arrived near Panadnra, and until the 6th of the month,
Thijssen and a few other officers reconnoitered the coast between 
Colombo and Negombo# Except near Panadura itself, they found no
'L.
suitable place for landing the army, the artillery and other equipment# 
But as the terrain from Panadura to Colombo was considered too 
unsuitable for the transport of the heavy cannon, Caron decided to attaJsk 
and capture Negombo first, and thence to march on Colombo#
1# The main sources for what took "place in Ceylon during the expedition 
under Garon are: Report of Caron, 17 April 1644, kfi £ol#Arch# 1054 
fos# 616-70; Garon to Paulus Croocq, 31 Jan# 1644, kQl#Arch# 1054 
fos# 545-46; G*G. & C# to Dirs#, 23 Dec# 1644, Kol#Arch. 1054 fos# 
68-72; Dagh-Reg* 1645-44, 232-35; "Resolutions of Galle", JCRAS
m i .  456-506* Viceroy to King, 15 Feb. 1644, Bk. 48 fo. 290 (Bks 
of the Monsoons) X#0#L# Port#Recs# (Trans) 15; Queyroz, 875-89; 
Ribeiro, 147-52#
2# Ganga a (Sinhalese) river#
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The Portuguese realised in time that the Dutch intended 
attacking Negombo# Dorn Philips, therefore, placed a force of 600 
Portuguese and soma Lascarins at the disposal of his brother, Dorn 
Antonio Mascarenhas, who was placed in charge of the defense of 
Negcmbo#
Owing to the misplaced over-confidence of Dcm Antonio, the
Ditch were allowed to execute undisturbed the difficult operation
of disembarking seme 1500 men by night, and when battle wa3 joiiBd in
the morning (of the 9th January 1644) their superior numbers and
discipline soon told# Within two hours the Portuguese had been
completely defeated with the loss of about 300 dead including Dan
1
Antonio himself, and Negombo was again in Dutch hands#
Immediately after the capture of Eegonbo, Caron set about
repairing the damaged walls of the fort, and attending to such matters
as burying the dead, mustering the troops and appointing new
officers in place of the dead or badly wounded# When all these things
had been attended to, he placed 10G men in garrison in Negombo and with
a further 1000 men, marched on Colombo on the 20th January# The
dissawes of Matale and of the Seven Korales (whom Baja Sinha had sent
immediately he heard of the arrival of the Dutch fleet) marched along
2
with the Dutch, with 2000 of their own men#_________________________
1# For a full account of the battle cf# C#R# Boxer# A True Description 
of the mighty Kingdoms etc# Ixxvl - Ixxxlv 
2# Van Geer (118) quite wrongly says that during the entire expedition 
there had been no support at all from Raja Sinha and that the King 
had sent 2000 men only for the purpose of garrisoning Negombo# The 
Report of Caron, which he himself has consulted (cf#113#n#) clearly 
indicates the contrary# Ferguson's statement (in "Raja Sinha II and 
the Dutch" JCRAS xvlli#254 n 75) that Raja Sinha himself had been 
lying In perdus until the fighting at Negcmbo was over, is entirely 
unfounded; for, Caron himself decided on attacking Negombo only on 
6 Jan# ("Resolutions of Galle".JCRAS xvll# 469)
In the meantime, Dam Philips Mascarenhas, who had been on the 
way to relieve Negcmbo when he heard of the loss of that fort, returned 
to Colombo and took vigorous and resolute measures for the defence of 
that city# As a result, when the IXitch and Kandyan forces approached 
Colombo, they were effectively stooped at Mutwal near the crossing of 
the KelaJ/fi-ganga•
Ibr sir days, the combined armies continued near Mutwal# During 
that jeriod, Caron attempted to dislodge the Portuguese from their 
positions by a heavy cannonading, but in vain# The Portuguese 
continued in their positions, fortifying themselves more and more 
daily, and returning the fire of the Dutch# Finally, realising that 
there was no chance of successfully crossing the river, the combined 
Dutch and Kandyan armies returned to Negcmbo. It was further decided 
by Caron and his Council that there was no hope of successfully 
attaching Colombo even from the side of Panadura, because not only were 
the fortifications of Colombo strong, hut the forces in the city were 
also stronger than ezpected# As against a thousand men, wham he 
calculated he could lead against the city, there were, in his opinion, 
about 1400 to 1500 Portuguese, 2000 Sinhalese and half-caste5 and about 
400 Kaffirs for its defence#
Immediately after returning to Negcmbo he set about the task of 
constructing new fortifications according to the plan submitted by the 
Senior Merchant Pieter Vinckbocms, who had great talent as an engineer# 
The officers as well as the ordinary men worked hard and unceasingly at 
the task of building the new fortifications# They were helped in this
1^9
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work by the 150 slaves , wham the King’s dissawes sent them; when the 
work was complete, Caron placed in Negombo 500 men in garrison, under 
the charge of Vinckbocms*
Nhen the King had heard that the Dutch forces had turned back 
frcsn Colombo, he tried his best to persuade the Dutch to march once 
again against Colombo* Caron replied to his letters by indicating 
the difficulties of attacking Colombo* But the Dutch Commander was 
not able to answer very effectively some of the further letters 
complaining that Negcmbo was being garrisoned against his wishes, 
that the Dutch took too long a time to drive out the Portuguese and 
that they were thereby increasing his debt* -And, to use Caron’s
2
phraseology, the King wrote "more such-like Sinhalese tittle-tattle"* 
On the 22nd February, a fomer Dissawe of Galle, named 
Udapalatha Mudaliyar, and two other envoys were sent by the King to 
make further complaints* The surprised Caron was asked by these 
envoys whether he knew that the Sinhalese Kings were descended from 
the sun* In any case, protested the envoys, a King and a General were 
not of the same status; therefore, it was presumptuous of the
1* It is a surprising thing that the King should have sent any men at 
all to help construct the fortifications, since he was bitterly 
opposed to the garrisoning of Negcmbo* Farther, Caron admits in 
his Report that he had received seme food and other provisions 
from the King’s men* These actions seem to be explained, to a 
large extent at least^  by the fact /that although Raja Sinha was 
bitterly opposed to the Dutch garrisoning the fort, he always 
(at least, up to this time) thought it preferable tp&ee a Dutch 
rather than a Portuguese garrison there; although he would have 
preferred still more to see neither*
2* "diergelijcke Singalesche prat jens meer" Report of Caron (17 
April $644, Kol*Arch* 1054 fo. 648}*
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Governor General to have addressed himself as "Your affectionate 
friend** To this Caron replied as best as he could* But when the 
envoys complained further that the words "Tour* and Yours* had been 
used in that same letter instead of "Your Imperial Majesty* etc*,
2
Caron was quick to put the blame on the Dutch translator or copyist.
The envoys finally complained that the murder of Coster was being
persistently laid at the King’s door* Canon replied that if the
mrder had been committed without the knowledge and wish of the King,
he should have seen proper justice done* When they heard this reply,
the envoys rose from their seats in anger and prepared to go away,
one of them addressing to Caron these last wards: "Is it then so?
you people are not to be moved away from your opinion? In that case,
there is nothing more for us to say, and it will be better if we go
away". Caron was upset by this attitude* He feared that open
hostilities with the King might result, and at the moment the Dutch
were not prepared for it* Therefore, with soothing words he calmed
3
the Kandyan envoys and sent them back In a pleasant mood.
1* It was not Caron, as Dr* Pierls (Same Docs., 94) says, tut Van 
Diemen, wjio had addressed the King in that manner#
2, "daer van gaven wij den schrijver off Translateur de schult*"
(Report of Caron 17 April 1644, Kol*Arch 1054 fo* 649)* Thus the 
practice of getting out of a difficult situation or a false 
position by putting the blame on the translator seems to have 
been a ready expedient of the Company’s Officials*
3* Regarding this incident Thijssen wrote to Batavia (18 March 1644, 
Kol*Arch* 1059 fo* 321) that "if the cammander-in-chief Caron 
had not shown greater discretion than was shown by TJdapalath 
and his companions, the affair would probably have burst out 
into open war with the King of Kandy**
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Caron* for Ms part* did not neglect to make the representations,
which every Commander sent from Batavia had been instructed to make*
and which Tan Diemen had always made; namely* to represent to the
King the "huge expenses1** which the Company had incurred Hin the
Kingfs service1** and to request cinnamon and other merchandise in
1
repayment of those services* The replies which Caron got on his 
repeated representations* were not what he wished for* However* 
in a final letter the King said that he would be sending to Batticaloa 
some of the elephants for which Boreel had not waited* and in addition, 
a3 a personal gift to Caron* an elephant of great stature#
On the 5th March, leaving behind in Hegambo Vinckboans and the 
500 men referred to above* Caron sailed with his fleet for Galle* On 
the way* he tarried before Colombo for a while * hoping to obtain in 
exchange for some of the Portuguese prisoners* the Dutch who had been 
captured at Akuressa* But he learnt that all of them had tqken 
service under the Portuguese* Therefore, he sailed on to Galle, where 
he arrived on the 11th March* He raised the garrison of that fortress 
up to about 900 men* with soldiers taken from his fleet* and finally 
he left for Batavia on the 19th March 1644*
Caron1 s expedition marks a turning-point in the Mstory of the 
Dutch in Ceylon* not because of the recapture of Negcmbo per se* but 
because with the strengthening of the garrison of Galle and the
1# No details given by Caron*
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effective control thereafter acquired over seme of the adjacent
cinnamon districts, the Dutch became a territorial power: in Ceylon*
We have seen earlier that Van Diemen and his Council had
determined to get a grip on the cinnamon districts as soon as a
1
truce ms concluded with the Portuguese* The policy to be then
followed towards Raja Sinha was clearly exj3ained to Thijssen in their
letter of 20th October 1642 sent through Boreel# The King was to be
told that the Dutch were assuming territorial control in order to
liquidate his debt quickly by obtaining the incomes frcm the lands;
as soon as sufficient income to meet the debt had been obtained,
the lands would be immediately handed back to him# The King’s
officers, who would attempt to prevent them from taking possession
of the territories, were to be repelled by force, under the pretext that
these were "robbers" and "disturbers of the peace", who were acting
without Baja Sinha’s knowledge# In other words, war was to be carried
2
on against the King’s men in the King’s own name* This policy 
could not be carried out in 1643 because the truce negotiations of 
Boreel failed, and the lands around Galle remained under Portuguese 
control# With Caron’s expedition and the substantial reinforcements 
which he left behind the situation was altered# The Dutch now felt
1# cf# pp#io*"Oi above#
2# G.G* & C*, to Thijs# 20 Oct* 1642, Kol#Arch* 769 pp# 674-83* This
was similar to the policy adopted by the Dutch towards the Sultan 
of Temate in their occupation of -Ambaina and other places 
belonging to that ruler# cf# documents printed in Eeeres [Edl 
De Opkomst etc# 2nd Series, it# 194-95, 387-88; Ibid# iii# 205 
209 ns#
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strong enough to contend simultaneously with the Portuguese and with
Raja Sinha* if the latter should risk an open breach in an effort to
1
prevent: them from becoming a territorial power at his expense*
However* the Dutch authorities fully realised that the 
co-operation of the local inhabitants was essential if they were to 
derive full benefit from their possession of these lands# Thijssen* 
for instance* had once declared that even the Portuguese after so 
many years* experience of the island, still could not obtain a
2
single stick of cinnamon without the co-operation of the Sinhalese#
As early as September 1640* the government at Batavia had stressed the
importance of treating the Sinhalese as considerately a3 possible*
using "affable persons to deal with them", and in particular Marten
Vinck* who knew their language well# They even suggested that the
3
Sinhalese might be converted to the "true Christianity"* in order to 
attach them to the Dutch* In accordance with these instructions, Marten 
Yinclc was used as an agent in dealing with the Sinhalese* who were, in 
fact well treated# Severe penalties were imposed on any Dutch soldier 
who mistreated any of the inhabitants# Moreover, early in 1642, Thijssen 
enlisted in the Dutch service some 200 lascarins and sane coolies and 
dhaleas who had fled from the Portuguese to Galle#
1# Thijssen to G.G# & C», IB March 1644, Kol#Arch# 1069 fo# 322# G#G# & C# 
to Dirs#* 23 Dec# 1644, Kol.Arch. 1054 fos# 71-72# See below p#i56 
for further details# Tan Geer (138-40) was mistaken in his assertion 
that this policy was only envisaged in the event of a peace being 
concluded with the Portugiese*
2# Thijssen to Quast,##Hov* 1641* Kol#Arch 1046 fos# 102-05# cf# also 
Dagh-Reg# 1642, 228#
3# G.G# & C# to Coster* 26 Sept# 1640, Kol#Arch 767 pp# 619-37#
4# Thijs# to G.G, & C#, 22 May 1642, Kol#Arch# 1047 fo# 677; Dagh-Reg* 
1642, 254; "Resolutions of Galle", JCRAS xvll, 319-20* 341,
354* 398#
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Despite all these pneparatory measures, Thijssen found to his
chagrin that a contemplated expedition (in March 1644) to some of
the lands around Galle had to he abandoned because he found that
most of the lascarirm and coolies had suddenly left Galle on the orders 
1
of Raja Sinha# It appears, that immediately after the recapture
of Negcmbo by the Dutch, the King had sensed that his allies intended
2
to occupy quite soon the lands outside the fort of Galle# In an 
attempt to frustrate this, he had ordered the Sinhalese to leave the 
fort and take up their residence at a considerable distance from it#
Eq had summoned before him certain of the principal Sinhalese who had 
shown than selves too friendly towards the Dutch# Thu3 it was that 
most of the Sinhalese had soon left Galle# The same orders had
1# Thijs# to G.G# & C#, 18 March 1644 (Kol#Arch. 1059 fos# 321-26)
Fran the date of this letter it appears that the policy of taking 
possession of the lands ms begun while Caron was still in Ceylon#
2# Thijssen reported to Batavia in the letter of 18 March 1644 (Ibid) 
that everything that was done by the Hollanders was suspect to the 
King# This same letter contains a most interesting testimony 
to the fact that even the ordinary Sinhalese of the time had 
realised how the Dutch had set about achieving their aims: "Seer 
sehsaem wert hier onder den gemei jnen man van ons lui jden 
gediscoursert, geven voor df Holland1*? hare coninghs schulden 
van jare tot jare soodanich creseren dat hem van mi voortaen niet 
mogelijck is, met eijn gantsche coninckrljck t,selve te voldoen, 
waer uijt dan bi j hun lijden beslooten wert onsen aenlech niet 
anders te sijn, als maer den Portugees uijt Ceijlon hebben 
verdreven, ft landt te assurpeeren ende hun tot slaven maecken, 
ais noch andere diergel# allegation meer#n
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apparently been sent to the Negombo area, for there too, the
inhabitants including even the fishermen, whose means of livelihood
1^
lay on the sea-coast, had moved into the interior#
How worried the King had become over the actions of the Dutch, 
is clearly shown by the liters which he wrote at this time to them#
He had heard that they had disembarked at Kalutara or Abutgama for the 
purpose of fortifying themselves, and so, on the 23rd March, he wrote 
to Thijssen:
"If it is true#...... •even if it were for my;
service, or it were found to be useful by 
your Council, or in order to do harm to our 
enemies - do not disembark in order to fortify 
in any part of this island of Ce$m, without 
my license." 2
Twelve days later he wrote once again to Thijssen, this time giving him
a clear hint that he should remain within the fortress of Galle, without
3
extending his activities outside. On the 11th April, he wrote to Van 
Diemen:
"Should they £i#e. the Dutch} make themselves 
master of the fortresses of the island of 
Ceylon against my wish, then they' place them­
selves in danger of losing their credit and the 
money that I owe to the Company - without 
enjoying any profit from the land".
1. Thijs. to G.G. & C. 18 March 1644, ibid.; Thijs. to Arnold Heud^ en,
28 March 1644, Kol.Arch. 1054 fos. 561-62. Dagh-Reg. 1643-44, 234-55
2. Pagh-Reg. 1645-44. 307-08. Note how the King has tried to anticipate,
and safeguard himself against the stock-pretexts used by the Hitch 
to justify their actions.
3. Ibid., 310-11.
4. Extract quoted in G.G. & C. to Thijs. 26 July 1644, Kol.Arch. 771
p. 468. Van Geer (137) is quite misleading when he says that the King 
had practically all along preferred to destroy the produce# of his 
lands rather than to hand it over to the Dutch. The documents, which 
he cites (137 n.l) to support his statement, refer only to lands 
which were devastated because they were on the point of falling into 
Portuguese hand3. Note that Van Geer himself had earlier (89) drawn 
the correct conclusion from these documents#
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In the me antimQ tbs difsaues of Matara and Sabaragarauwa had been
busy seeing that the inhabitants were obeying the royal orders# After
all th© principal inhabitants within a nine-or ten-mile radius of Galle
had been removed into the interior* the Dissawe of Matara, Ekanayaka
Kudaliyar, appeared at the fort itself on the 16th of April# His
intention was to remove all those Sinhalese who still remained at Galle#
But he was effectively foiled by Thijssen, who arrested one of the
Dissawe*s lascarins, who was found driving out some of the Sinhalese#
1
Thereupon, Ekanayaka went back without accomplishing his object#
Although Thijssen had thus safeguarded the Sinhalese, who still
remained in Galle, he was unable to achieve much more# The King*s
dissawes remained in practical occupation of most of the lands around
Galle, end he did not, or could not, drive them away#
When Van Diemen and his Council heard of this situation they wrote 
2
to him on the 26th July# upbraiding him for what they implied was his 
pusillanimity# They then went on to explain what he should have done:
"You know well that we help Raft a for no other purpose 
than to help ourselves#••• • ###consequently, you must 
not allow the coolies and cinnamon-peelers and others
to be removed from the jurisdiction of Galle# .
If you read carefully, the letters sent through the 
Commissioner Borcel, you will find yourself fully 
authorised to do what the service of the Company 
requires##.#We do not ask you to break formally with 
Raija, to declare war against him - that is not our
meaning - but that you shall carry on war in his name 
against those who try to hinder the Majesty*s fortst&i
1# Thijs# to ArnoldM’eussen, 28 Mare}* 1644, Kol# Arch# 1054
fos# 561-62; Thijs# to G.G# & C#, 24 Bpril 1644, Kol# Arch#
1654 fos# 606-09#
2, Kol# Arch# 771 pp# 462-74#
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"and people in (jteylon from obtaining proper sustenance
frcsn His lands................ .............. .
*..*.»• .But we would be gLad to see tbat they[i*e* the 
few Dutchmen who were at Batticaloa] continue there, even 
if it were only one or two persons, in order not to 
create greater suspicions in the fciind of the faithless 
Raija, that we wish to break f omally with him; although 
it, apparently, must come to that*"
Despite these incitements to a bolder policy, Thijssen found
himself unable to do more than take over some of the lands in the
immediate vicinity of Galle* It was only later on in the year that
he extended the Company* s sway over a larger area* But before taking
more particular note of that, it is necessary to see the reactions of
the Portuguese to the loss of Negombo*
As soon as the Conde dfAveiras heard of this disaster, he
Z
dispatched to Ceylon on the 9th February a force of 280 men* Be had
great difficulty in gathering further reinforcements, because almost
everyone was found reluctant to go to Ceylon* But the Conde, who
always considered that island to be the most important possession 
3
under his charge, spared no pains to gather relief for it* And he,
1* -See above p*»53 n*l-
2* It is interesting to note that at about the same time that
Thijssen believed that the King was about to conclude peace with 
the Portuguese, the Viceroy was fearing that Raja Sinha would soon 
lay siege to Colombo in eanbination with the Hollanders, cf* Thijs* 
to G.G. & Cl, 18 March 1644, Kol*Arch* 1059, fos* 321-26; Viceroy 
to King (of Portugal) 15 Feb* 1644, Bk* 48* fo* 290 (Bks of the 
Monsoons) I*0*L* Port* Rees* (Trans*)* 15*
3, cf* Tfrfcftg eg. Viceroy to King, 1 May 1645, Bk* 48 fo* 151 and same 
to same, 5 March 1643, Bk* 48 fo* 149 in (Bks of the Monsoons) 
I*0*L. Port* Rees* (Trans) 14*
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therefor©, succeeded in sending a goodly force of about 500
men under Fernao de Mendonca Rirtado* In April he sent flirt her
nan and materials in seven vessels*
On receipt of all these reinforcements Dam Philips Mascarenhas
was able to master a force of about 1300 Portuguese for the recapture
of Negombo which he had sworn to effect* As a preliminary measure,
however, he sent an embassy to Raja Sinha* The ambassadors took with
them a letter (dated the 14th May) to the King from the Viceroy,
who had doubtless recommended Mascarenhas to seek peace with the
King# In his letter, the Viceroy assured the King that whatever was
1
concluded with Mascarenhas would be held inviolate*
Raja Sinha, who had become thorou^ily alarmed at the attempts,
which the Dutch were making to gain possession of the lands around
Galle, gave a more favourable reception to the embassy that he would
otherwise have done* But he made it clear to the ambassadors that
there could be no question of a peace between him and the Portuguese#
The most that he could do for them was to refrain from helping the
Dutch in Heganbo* In return for this favour he, it appears, wanted
2
the restitution of his brother Wija^apala, to ensure which he detained 
one ambassador, Diogo de Sousa da Cunha#
Dam Philips now moved with his army for the recapture of
1# cf* Thijs# to Maetsnijcker, 5 Oct* 1644, Kol*Arch* 1055 fos*
510-11; Dagh-Register 1645 . 280 ff jRibeiro, 153-54
2# This was what Thijs* had heard (Thijs# to Maet*, 5 Oct* 1644, ibid *) 
Indeed, this seems to be the most likely explanation for the 
detention of da Cunha* Except for what Ribeiro (153-54) says, the 
published Portuguese sources give, as far as I know, no 
infonnation regarding this embassy#
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Negcmbo# For nearly two months (from the close of May to the close
of July) he kept up a close siege of the fort* But at the instance
of the Captain - Major, Fernao de Mendonca Hurtado, who was
impatient at this slow siege, it was decided to make an assault#
On the 23rd July about a thousand Portuguese made a general assault
on the fort in three waves# Within two hours they were routed, and
retired with the loss of more than half their number, among the
dead being the Captain-Major himself# The attempt to recapture
1
Negambo had proved a sad failure#
The Conde d'Aveiras, although he had applied all diligence to
send relief to Ceylon, for the purpose of recovering Negambo and
improving the position of the Portuguese there, yet had no illusions
as to the strength of the enany, and the losses which the
Portugiese would thereby sustain, in the long run# For instance, he
2
wrote at this time, to the King of Portugal, thus:
"Should there be a delay in the coming of relief, 
which she [Portuguese AsiaTS begs for today, It 
might so happen (which may God not permit) that 
when it arrives, it will be of little use, 
because there will not be anything to relieve.”
D’Aveiras, therefore, attempted to reach a settlement with the Dutch,
before the situation became worse#
On the 8th April he wrote to Van Diemen offering to come to a
settlement on the terms proposed by Boreel, promising to release the
1# For details regarding the siege and assault see: Diary of
Negambo fort, 27 May to 31 Aug# 1644c, Kol#Areh# 1055 fos# 445—
508# Lengthy extracts from this document are given in Pieris,
Some Docs#, 96-118; Viceroy to King, 23 Dec# 1644, Bk# 48 fo#
187 (Bka of the Monsoons) I#0#L# Port# Rees# (Trans) 14; Queyroz,
890-92; Ribeiro, 154-57* % ^
2# 15 Feb# 1644, Bk.48 fo# 290 (Bks* of the Monsoons) I*0#L# Port#
 ______________ Baca* (Trans^  ___  _
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rich merchandise in the Paaw? together with the ship itself (which
j
had fallen into Portugese hands the previous year) In return he
wished Van Diemen to agree to a restitution of all conquests made
since the time when news of the ratification of the truce had been
1
received in the East#
The Batavian authorities were, however, not prepared to agree
to such restitution, which would mean the handing over of Kegombo to
the Portuguese# On the other hand, they were now not averse to
concluding a truce, provided, of course, their rights to Negombo were
granted# Till the truce was over, they felt they could remain
satisfied with the major share in the Ceylon cinnamon which they
could claim through the possession of Galle and Negombo,{which latter
place was supposed to lie in the richest cinnamon area in the
island#) Moreover, by a continuation of the war, they could not hope
to capture Colombo either easily or soon# But, above all, what made
the authorities think of effecting a settlement, was the fear that
owing to Portuguese diplomatic pressure in Europe, the States-General
might impose a truce in the East, whether the Company liked it or
not# Van Diemen and his Council rightly felt that it would in every
way be better If they made a truce, on their own teims, with the 
2
Portuguese#
T ___________________________
1# cf# G.G# & Co* to Dirs#, 23 Dec* 1644, Kol#Arch# 1054 fo# 70 ff*
A relevant extract in Van Geer, App# XXIV, p# 54#
2. G.G* & C#, to Thijs#, 26 July 1644, Kol*Areh* 771 p* 462; 
Instructions for Hetsnijcker, Kol#Arch* 771, p# 489# cf#
Van Geer, App# XXV p# 61#
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Thus It was, that In August 1644, they despatched a member
of their Council to conclude a truce with the Portugiese# The
msnber chosen, Joan Metstoijcker, had, in addition to his great
talents as a jurist, a thorough grasp of matters connected with the
truce and with Ceylon, for it was he who had kept the Batavia
"diary* of the earlier negotiations regarding the truce and it was
he who had drawn up the instructions for Francois Caron, the previous 
1
year*
2
MaetsviJcker was instructed not to carry on any negotiations 
with the Viceroy if he heard that the Portuguese had re-captured
1# cf# G.G# & C., to Dirs# 32: Dec# 1642 Kol#Arch# 1047 fo# 10; Realia. 
ii#33#
Me ester Joan Maet^Hijcker had been sent out to the Bast in 1636 as 
a "Pensionary* of the Council of Justice at Batavia# Although he 
was suspected of being at best but a poor Calvinist, his able 
services had won recogiition and he was a "Councillor of India* 
when he was sent to conduct negotiations for a truce# After the 
successful performance of this mission he returned to Batavia#
But in 1646 he was back in @ylon, riiere he continued as Governor 
until Feb# 1650# Within three years of his return to Batavia he 
became Governor-General, a post which he continued to hold till 
his death, nearly twenty-five years later#
2# Instructions for Maetsiiijcker, 9 Aug# 1644, Kol# Arch# 771
pp# 483-95# Part of these instructions are summarised in G#G#
& C# to Dirs#, 23 Dec# 1644, Kol#Arch# 1054 fos# 19-80# Van 
Geer (App# XXV pp# 60-61) gives only a very short extract from 
the instructions for Maert#; he has (in App#JXX2V p# 60) also 
a relevant extract from the letter of 23 Dec#
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Negcmbo# In that case, he was to use the 13 ships mi3 the 3045 Tmiw' ■ 
who were placed at his disposal, for the re-capture of Hegombo#
With Negcmbo and Galle safely in the hands of the Dutch, he was 
to demand from the Viceroy the exact half of the lands between Negoinbo 
and Colombo and between Galle and Colombo, at least provisionally 
until a decision on the matter should arrive freer the sovereigns in 
Burope#
If the Viceroy was unwilling to concede these terms, and
proposed that the war should be continued only in Ceylon, Maetsiftjcker
1
was to agree to this as a last resort#
As Boreel had been instructed previously so Maetsi&jcker was 
now told that the policy towards Raja Sinha was to depend on the 
success or failure of the negotiations with the Portuguese# If the 
Viceroy agreed to the Dutch terms and peace was concluded with the 
Portuguese, then Maetsift jcker was to confer with Marten Vinck (who was 
to accompany him from Galle) as to whether it would be necessary to 
declare war on Raja Sinha# If this was considered necessary, then he 
was to sound the Viceroyfs mind in a discreet manner in order to find 
out what his attitude regarding the King was# If the Viceroy*s 
disposition was suitable for the purpose, then an amed alliance against
1# The reason forlhis order was not, asVan Geer (123-24) says, because 
the Dirs# had clearly ordered G#G# & C# to continue the war only 
in Ceylon; it was rather because the Dirs# had expressed their 
doubts as to whether they could successfully defend the action of 
continuing the war everywhere on a ccount of a dispute In Ceylon# 
Therefore, what was feared was the intervention of the States— 
General at the instance of the Portuguese and other interested 
parties (cf# on these points, Instructions for Maet, 9 Aug# 1644, 
ibid#, Dirs# to G.G# & C# 31 Aug 1643 and 10 Sept# 1643 in Kol#Arch#
454), In fact, the true reason for this order Is clearly 
indicated in Van Geer's own App# XXVI, p# 62#
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1
Raja Sinha was to "be concluded with. d*Aveiras#
However, no open hostilities were to he begin against Raja Sinha, 
if the war with the Portuguese had to he continued# This advice 
was given for two reasons: firstly, in order to prevent a
combination between Raja Sinha and the Portuguese; secondly in order 
to retain the excuse of warring on the Portuguese on behalf of the 
King in fulfilment of tfeaty obligations# But JSaetswd jcker was told 
that even if the war was continued with the Portuguese, the policy 
of taking possession of the territories around Galle must he 
continued, in the name of the King, although in defiance of him#
Leaving Batavia with these instructions on the 10th August, 
Maetsnijcker reached Ceylon early the following month# There he found 
that Negcmbo was safely in the hands of the Company# Therefore, he 
left for Goa, whs re he arrived at the end of September# After the 
lapse of about two weeks, spent in an exchange of letters with the 
Viceroy and in various formalities, MaetswCijcker was at length able
1# *###sal 17#E# met advijs vanden Commissaris Vinck###over den
toestant van onse gelegenthei jt op gemelte Eijland overleggen, 
off nodich sal sijn met Raija Singa breecken#...#welck 
nodich geacht werdende sal U.E# geduchte Grave Vice 
Reij discretelijek sunderen, hoe ontrent die sake gehumeurt 
zij, ende des geraden oordelende,#*•••♦• .met si jn Extie# 
contracteren, ende besluijten soodanigen alliantie ende 
verbont van wapenen jegens Raija Sin^ i cm tot onse 
gerechticheijt te geraecken, als onsen staet nodich ende 
voordelije sal achten#1* Thus it is clear that an armed 
alliance was to be concluded only if a declaration of 
war on the King was considered necessary# Van Geer (140,144) 
has completely missed this vital fact#
1
to set foot on laud on the 13th October*
But the negotiations did not in any way run smoothly# The 
Viceroy*s deputies for the negotiations were not prepared to 
recognize the Dutch conquest of Negombo# On the contrary, as 
having been captured after the date when the truce should have been 
proclaimed, they wanted it restored along with the vessels and goods 
which the Dutch had captured since that date# But when Maetssdjcker, 
defending the acquisition of Negombo as having been made on hehalf of 
Raja Sinha, pointed out that the Dutch were determined to carry on 
the way till their claims to Negombo were recognized, the Portuguese 
had no alternative but to bow down to the might of Dutch arms* But 
before doing so^he Portuguese made a last effort to get back 
Negombo# The Archbishop Primate of Goa was specially deputed by 
dfAveiras to offer a bugle price for the restitution of Negambo; 
but Maet sat jcker declared that the Dutch had no intention of selling 
Negambo for any price# On one point, however, the Viceroy was 
adamant; he could only agree to a provisional division of lands; 
the final division must he left to the sovereign authorities in Europe# 
The reason which he gave for this stand wqs, that from the earliest
1# The main sources for matters connected with MaetsnijckerT3 mission 
(both in Goa and Ceylon) are: Diary of Maet stti jcker, Kol#Arch 1060 
fos# 401-76; Report of Maet#, 11 April 1645, Kol#Arch# 1060 fos# 390- 
400 (This very important document has been overlooked by Van ^ eer, 
cf# Van Geer, 130 n#l); Maet# to G.G* & C#, 15 Nov# 1644, Kol#
Arch 1054 bis. fos# 466-74; Maet to Dirs#, 30 Nove# 1644, Kol#
Arch 1055 fos# 20-39; Same to Same, 7 Dec# 1644, Kol# Arch#
1057 fos# 141-55; Thijs# to G.G# & C., 5 March 1645, Kol#Arch#
1059 (Bis) fos# 436-51; Dagh-Reg# 1645. 283 ff; Viceroy to King,
23 Dec# 1644, Bk# 48 fo# 187 (Bks of the Monsoons) I#0#L#^
Port Rees# (Trans) 14# This last document is fragmentary#
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times, the Viceroys have been expressly forbidden to alienate any
immovable property of the Crown, in any manner, or under any
circumstances, without the orders of the Crown* As DTAveiras declared
that even if the war was resumed as a result of it, he could not
agree to anything more than a provisional division of the lands,
MaetsuLjcker agreed that: while the lands between Galle and Colombo,
and between Colombo and Negombo, were to be divided ecjially between the
two parties, it was to be a provisional arrangement only, until a final
division was made by the sovereign authorities in Europe; the
produce, which the Dutch enjoyed frcmi the lands provisionally assigned
1
to them, was to be kept in deposit until the final division was made
in Europe; if, according to this final division, the Dutch had to
return any lands to the Portuguese then the relevant incomes held in
deposit must also go to the Portuguese*
Some of the other important provisions of the agreement, which
2
was signed at Goa on the 10th November 1644 , were the following# The
1* Maetsui jcker while agreeing to it, made a special protest in the 
agreanent itself, declaring that this concession (made in order 
to avoid further shedding of "Christian blood*} was not to 
prejudice in any way the rights or the possessions of the States- 
General*
2* Dutch translation of the Treaty, (which was drawn up in Latin and 
Portuguese) in: Kol*Arch* 1655 (Bis) fos* 603-07* cf* Dagh-Reg*
1645* 266 ff and Heeres, Corpus* Dip* 1*430-37 for printed versions.
It is interesting to note that shortly after swearing on the 
Holy Bible to maintain the agreement without any direct or indirect 
violation of it, Maetsaijcker wrote (on 30 Nov* 1644, Kol*Arch 
1055 fos* 29-39) to the Dirs*: "In any case, if it is decided in 
Europe, and the States General requested, that Negombo should be 
handed back, we can always excuse ourselves by saying that these 
are Raja Sinha*s forts and lands, the Company having only the 
mortgage of than**
The owners and long-lease holders of property, which was situated
in the lands provisionally under the Dutch, could resume possession
of their property, provided they or their renters reported themselves
within six months, and provided they paid the accustomed dues to the
Dutch; they were to enjoy freedom of worship and their priests were to
he permitted to visit them everywhere, except in the Dutch fortresses#
Th9 Chaleas were to be made available for the service of both parties#
Ho difference or dispute between the two parties was to upset the
agreement; on the contrary it was to be maintained fully and
religiously; while the settlement of any dispute was pending, the
object of the dispute was to remain in the possession of the defendant
party# finally, both sides declared that the present agreement must
not cause any prejudice to the decision which their respective
sovereigns might arrive at#
As regards Raja Sinha, the Viceroy agreed by Article 5 of the
treaty to make peace with him if the King wished it# Maetsuijcker
did not broach the subject of an armed alliance against the King,1
because he had heard fran Thijssen that the King had almost certainly
made peace with the Portuguese# But the Viceroy seems to have
guessed correctly the Dutch intentions regarding the King, for he tried
his best to induce Maetsuijcker to agree not to war on the King without
1
the consent of the Portuguese # But Maetsuijcker was not to he
persuaded on this matter.______________________________ _
1, Maet. to G.G. & C. 15 Nov. 1644, Kol .Arch. 1059 bis. fos. 465- 
74. c£ Van Geer, App. 1X7111 p. 67.
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Within four days of the signing of the Treaty, Maetsuijcker
S8nt the greater part of the Dutch fleet to Ceylon under the Commander
Blocq, with a copy of the treaty sigied at Goa* Immediately on
hearing from. Blocq. of the concluded peace, Jan Thijssen went; with the
copy of the treaty, to meet the Portuguese Captain-General*
“Mascarenhas, who, incidentally, had only recently heard news of his
appointment as the new Viceroy, caused the truce to ha published, with
a happy face* But regarding the division of the territories which,
according to the 4th Article of the Treaty, had to be made by the
respective Governors in Ceylon, he had rather unexpected ideas*
According to him the division should take place in the following manner:
From the most landward point of, say Negombo fort, a straight line
should be drawn to the most landward point of the Portuguese fort,
Colombo* The territory enclosed within this line and the sea-coast
was to be divided equally between the two parties; but everything to
the interior of that line was to belong to the Portuguese* In the
same manner, should the territory between Galle and Kalutara, so said
Mascarenhas, be divided* In his opinion, Kalutara, and not Colombo
1
was the Portuguese fort nearest to Galle* Despite all his attempts, 
Thijssen failed to alter these opinions of Mascarenhas*
When Maetsnljcker himself finally arrived in Ceylon at the end 
of December and conferred with Dam Philips, the latter maintained the
1* This second argument of Mascarenhas had a good deal of substance 
in it, as the Dutch admitted in their correspondence amongst 
themselves (cf* e*g* G»G* & C* to Dirs* July 1645, Kol* Arch* 
1057 fos* 18-23)
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position which he had taken against Thijssen. But with MaetsniJcker, 
had arrived a special envoy, Goncalo Yeloso, sent by drAveiras to 
inform Bom Phi lip a of matters pertaining to the truce# This envoy 
it was who finally induced Dorn Philipe to agree, although under 
protest, to a division of lands in the manner understood between the 
two parties at Goa#
1
Finally, on 10 January 1645 an agreement was signed at 
Colombo, delimiting the boundaries of the two parties# Towards noon 
of the same day, Mascarenhas had this agreement proclaimed throughout 
the city#
The division of the territories between Galls and Colombo was 
determined by the Bewtcta-ganga# The territory to the south of this 
river was to belong to the Dutch, and that to the north, to the 
Portuguese#
Regarding the lands between Colombo and Negambo, however, it
was decided that although an equal division of the total territory was
to be made, entire Korales or provineee were, as far as possible, to
be assigned without mutation^ to each party; the reason given for this
decision was, that confusion and conflicts regarding jurisdiction
2
could be thereby avoided#
1# Kol#Arch# 1059 bis# fo# 796 ff; Dagh-Reg# 1645# 292 ff; Heeres, 
Corpus# Dip# i# 443 ff#
2# Even where the division Is said to be of territory situated between 
Colombo and Negombo, it is found that, in reality, the division 
is of all the land around Negombo to the North, South and East of 
the fort# The decision to divide by Korales and the actual 
division Itself, indicate quite clearly that Raja Sinha was correct 
when he told Maetsnijcker that the Portuguese had deceived the 
Dutch "like the rogaes that they are" (Letter of 16 Feb# 1645,
Dagh- Reg# 1645, 299 ff)
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It was further stated that to the north of Negombo, Puttlam 
and Kalpitl^a were to remain in Portuguese hands*
While it was agreed that this division of the lands was to 
be observed until a final decision on the1**ownership of-the- lands 
should come from Europe* a proviso was added* at Maetsnijker*s 
instance* to the following effectt since the Dutch did not have 
a very precise knowledge regarding the lands* they reserved the right 
to claim redress* if within a year they found that in the above 
division they had been considerably deceived# Nevertheless* it was 
also agreed that if the parties could not agree over the claims of the 
Dutch, no recourse was to be had to arms; but the truce was to be 
maintained inviolate#
The agreement between Maetsnijclcer and Mascarenhas* also 
contained a stipulation regarding the Chaleas: every year* at a fixed
time* the Dutch were to place at the disposal of the Portuguese* 
half the 6kaleas of Welitara and Kosgoda; the cinnamon peeled by these 
Shaleas was to be divided equally between the two parties, who undertook 
to share the costs incurred in the peeling#
With the signing of this agreement* matters had at last been 
rather satisfactorily settled between the Dutch and the Portuguese#
But the relations between the Dutch and the Sinhalese King, at this 
time* were* perhaps more unsatisfactory then they had ever been before# 
It was seen earlier how Thijssen’s efforts at taking possession 
of the territories around Galle and drawing their incomes* had been 
countered by the King’s policy of removing far into the interior almost
all the inhabitants, living in the vicinity of the fort* On the
King’s orders, even many of the Sinhalese living within the fort had
moved inland# Mere land, without inhabitants, was valueless;
therefore, as a result of the King’s measures, Thijssen had made little'
headway in his policy*
But urged on by the sharp orders from Batavia, and encouraged
by the fact that the King showed himself unwilling to take any
military measures against the Dutch, Thijssen (towards the latter half
of 1644) began to act more vigorously than before. In spite of the
King13 diesawes, he managed to secure about fifty 6haleas, wham, he
immediately employed in peeling cinnamon# He took good care to see
that these men took up residence at places within easy control of
Galle# He sent detachments of troops to various parts of the Matara
dissawani, and called upon the Inhabitants, in the King’s name and in
1
his own, to deliver the customary dues to the Dutch#
The King himself, thereupon wrote, on the 5th October, to 
Thijssen ordering him to desist frcoi the policy, which he was following# 
If the Sinhalese, whom the Dutch had won over to their side by money, 
were not immediately handed over to his dissav/e, so wrote Raja Sinha, 
he would not have any faith in the treaty concluded with Westerwolt#
And he further ordered Thijssen to withdraw jteith his armies into the
1# Thijs# to Maet#, 5 Oct# 1644, Kol#Arch. 1055 fos# 510 ff; Thijs# 
to G.G. & C., 8 Dec# 1644, Kol#Arch 1059 fos. 420-28; Same to 
same, 10 Sep. 1644 (summary in Dagh-Reg# 1645 280 ff#)
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fort, immediately on receipt of his letter, alleging that the
1
inhabitants had become frightened by the presence of the Ditch aimies# 
But Thijssen paid little heed to these orders because it 
was abundantly clear both from the King’s letters and from his 
actions that he did not wish to proceed to extremities* Therefore, 
when the dissawe demanded, in the King’s name, the handing over of 
all the lascarins and 6haleas in Dutch service, Thijssen refused the 
demand, and the dissawe went back empty-handed*
However, the results, which he achieved by this more rigorous 
policy, fell far below expectations* The King’s dissawe of Matara, 
whom Thijssen was afraid to drive out, sabotaged his efforts at 
obtaining the produce of the lands, by secretly forbidding the 
inhabitants to deliver anything to the Dutch* And, except in a 
gradually increasing ring of territory immediately around Galle, the 
inhabitants listened to the dissawe’s orders and not to those of 
Thijssen*
Matters were in this state, when at the end of the year, 
Maetsnijcker had arrived in Ceylon* It will be remembered, that 
Maetsnijcker had not broached to the Viceroy the subject of an aimed 
alliance against Baja Sinha, because he had heard from Thijssen that 
the King was in alliance with the Portuguese# But when he came to 
Ceylon, Maetsnijcker soon found that no such alliance had been concluded*
1* Summary of letter in Dagh-Reg* 1645, 280 ff*
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He was, therefore, free to conclude the projected armed alliance 
a^ iinst the King* But before doing so he decided to sound the King's 
intentions*
Accordingly, on. 4 February 1645, he sent to the King two letters
together with copies of the agreements made at Goa and Colombo* One
letter, he sent in his own name, and the other in that of Van Diemen,
although bot|i had been composed by him, in accordance with instructions
1
given to him at Batavia* The letter, purporting to be from Van
Diemen, skilfully explained the objectives of the expedition, sent 
under Maetsitijcker, as having been none other than the realisation of 
what was most to the service of the King* In the letter sent in his 
own name, Maetsnijcker tried to explain the pax partition of the lands 
made between him and Mascarenhas, in the most pleasing manner to 
Raja Sinha* For instance, the lands assigned by that partition to the 
Dutch, were always referred to as lands assigned nto Your Majesty***
In this same letter, Maetsnijcker explained that he had sent soldiers 
to kill all the "robbers**, who he had heard, were justifying their 
actions by falsely saying that they had been sent by KLs Majesty*
R£ja Sinha replied to these letters, by letter of the i6th 
2
February* He pointed out that in the agreement regarding the
1* The letters dated 27 Jan* 1645 and 9 Aug* 1644 are to be Ibund in
the Diary of Maetsni jcker, Kol*Arch* 1060 fos* 401-76* Translations 
appear in Fieris, Some Docs* 121-26* In the instructions drawn up 
for him Maet* had been told (Kol*Arch* 771 p* 494) that since the 
Batavian Council could not foretell how the situation in Ceylon _ 
would be when he arrived there, they were not writing to the King# 
But he was asked to compose a letter to suit the circumstanffes, In 
Yan Di amen* s name; for this purpose he was given a blank paper with 
the G*G*'s* signature#
2* In Diary of Maet#, (Kol#Arch* 1060 fos* 401-76); cf. also Dagh-Reg* 
1645, 299-301; JCRAS XVIII* 185-87(a translation made frcm the 
original, by Donald Ferguson)*
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partition of. the territories, instead of his name* that of the Dutch
m s  given; although he knew that the Portuguese had done this,
on account of their great hatred for him, yet he wished this
rectified in the Dutch copies of the treaty* He further pointed out
that the Portuguese had deceived Maetevijcker over the division of
the lands by assigning to themselves territories which he was
occupying* But if the Portuguese were not prepared to grant his
just claims, he was going to wage war on them* As regards the
armies which the Dutch had in the field, the King told Maetsvijckear:
X
"Since you people are at peace with the Portuguese, and there is also 
peace between me and the Hollanders, we do not have any other enemy, 
who will disturb the same [i*e* the landsJ Wherefore will you 
please order the aforesaid garrison to retire to my fortress of 
ITegombo." Finally, he asked Maet sad jcker to send him a trustworthy 
envoy, with whom ha could discuss certain matters of importance#
2
Maetsnijcker replied to the King by letter of the 1st i&rchf 
He put all the blame on the Portuguese for those features of the 
agreement with Mascarenhas regarding which the King had eis^ ressed his
displeasure* He excused himself from withdrawing the armies from the
1# Ferguson translates "Y*M*" (Vossa Merce) in the original by
"Your Honour** The Diary of Maet * and the Dagh-Reg# 1645 has 
"UI>* (- U lieden) which I have rendered as MYou^ People”• "You" 
and "You People" seem to render more accurately than "Your Honour" 
the tone adopted by the Kingtowards Maetsnijcker* Incidentally, 
Ferguson rightly points out that Van Geer had been mistaken when he 
had said that the King had remained silent throughout the whole of 
1645 (cf. JCRAS mil* 258 n. 128).
2* In Diary of Maet*, (Kol*Arch* 1060 fos* 401-76), Dagh-Reg 1645,501-02* 
cf. translations in Pierls, Some Docs*» 126-28 and JCRAS, XV111 
187-89* The second translation is much less faulty than the first#
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field by saying that on account of the late war, the lands were full
of "highwaymen" and "riff-raff" who had to be first eliminated before
the annies could leave the field; unless this was done it would not
be possible to draw from the land the incases which alone could help
to clear up His Majesty’s debt# As regards the request for an envoy,
ho expressed his sorrow at being unable to send one owing to his
immediate departure for Batavia; but he suggested that the King
should send ambassadors to Batavia to decide all matters, which he
wished attended to#
Immediately after the despatch of this letter to the King,
Maetsvijcker discussed with Thijssen and Yinck the idea of concluding
with the Portuguese an alliance against Baja Sinha It had been the
wish of the Batavian Council that such an alliance should be concluded,
if Maetsvijcker thought that war with Raja Sinha was a necessary matter#
Maetsvijcker, Vinck and Thijssen certainly seem to have thought this to
be a necessary matter# They were most perturbed by the fact that the
King had not declared his intention of entering the concluded truce,
but had, on the contrary, shown an inclination to continue the war with
1
the Portuguese# Besides, he shewed too imch of a "happy face" in the 
not very happy situation In which he found himself# This made the Dutch 
suspect that he was only dissimulating and waitingfor a suitable oppor­
tunity for refenge# There was a further consideration which made the
1# This Is the phrase used by Thijssen himself (to G.G# & C# 5 March 1645 
Kol#Arch# 1059 Bis# fo# 441)#
In s
Dutch decide to conclude an alliance against the King: such an alliance
waild give the Dutch and the Portuguese greater reliance in each other
1
and a greater sense of security*
An alliance with the Portuguese had became not only desirable but
also feasible to the Dutch because their relations with the Portuguese
bad become very friendly since the signing of the Agreement of the 10th
January* It is true that the Padre Goncalo Yeloso had made two reqiests
from Maetsvi jcker and both had been refused* Veloflo had requested that
Negombo should be handed over to the Portugiese promising in return to
give the IXitch the annual incomes from the lands around Negombo#
But Maetsui jcker refused this politely, suggesting that he shaild
make this request from the Council at Batavia* The Padre had also
revested that the Dutch should give authority to the Portuguese priests
(in the Dutch territory) to continue their old practice of coercing
the Sinhalese Christians to attend their churches and to bring them 
2
their food; if this authority was not given, Christianity in Ceylon,
so said the padre, would be reduced to ashes* But Maetsvi jcker refused 
1* diary of Maet1* (Kol*Arch# 1060 fos* 401-76)
2# On Veloso*s requests and Maet^i jokers replies see (among others):
Report of Maet*, 11 April 1645, Kol*Arch* 1060 fos* 392-99; G.G* & C* 
to Dirs* 9 July 1645, Kol.Arch* 1057 fos* 18-23* MacLeod (ii#147) 
misunderstood the meaning of part of the relevant extract frcm the 
second of these documents* He mistakenly concluded that the 
Portugiese clergy had been accustomed to keep the Sinhalese devoted 
to their church by providing these latter with food for their bellies# 
A still more erroneous translation of the relevant extract is given 
in Dr# Pierisf, Some Docs* 129* The many sins of omission and 
commission in this latter translation, illustrate very clearly how 
unreliably the documents contained in this work have been 
translated#
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to grant this request too, saying that it ms not the custom of the
Dutch to coerce anyone in matters of religion* But although these
requests had been thus refused, the relations with the Portuguese
appeared very friendly. In fact, Maetsrijcker reported that he and
Dam ^ illipe had become great friends and that the new Portuguese
Viceroy had declared his intention of establishing the friendliest
1
relations with the Dutch Governor-General* On account of this
friendly attitude of the Portuguese, Maetsui jcker was all the more
encouraged to conclude an armed alliance against the King*
On the 9th March, Maetsvi jcker on the one hand, and Goncalo
2
Veloco on the other, signed the alliance, at Galle. In a long 
preamble to the terms of this, treaty it ms stated, that since the 
people, who dwell in the mountains of Ceylon - (meaning thereby, of 
eourse( Raja Sinha and the Kandyans)- are always accustoned to 
devastate and depopulate the lowlands, it was necessary to take 
measures against them in order to enjoy the fruits of the lowlands* 
Therefore, said this preamble, the following terms had been agreed 
upon between the Portuguese and Dutch ambassadors. The Portuguese 
and Netherlanders bound themselves to protect, according to ability 
and the necessities of the case, each other's lands and peoples 
against the invasions and devastations "of the aforesaid peoples, 
whoever the same may be, or by whomever they may be sent*" But in case
1* Report of Maet., 11 April 1645 (Kol*Arch* 1060 fos. 392-99)
2* Teims in Dagh-Reg* 1645, 303-04; Heeres, Corpus Dip* i*448-50,
Van Geer, App. XXX111 pp* 87-89
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either of the parties wished to completely destroy the above people 
and thought it necessary to declare war and pursue then beyond the 
territorial boundaries of that party, them the other party was not 
bound to assist in this work unless it had been undertaken with 
common agreement# The two parties also promised to assist each other 
in quelling any rebellions, which might arise in their respective 
territories# Finally, each party bound Itself to refrain from 
negotiating with the King of Kandy - here he was ezplicitly referred 
to - anything which might be prejudicial to the other party# For the 
better observance of this agreement, which, incidentally, was to 
last till a final decision regarding; the lands was notified from 
Europe, the governors of both parties were to swear on oath that they 
would fully maintain the above terms#
Immediately after the conclusion of this alliance, Maetsvi jcker 
wished to proclaim it in Galle# But Veloeo wished this to be post­
poned until the Portuguese ambassador, Diogo de Sousa da Cunha, was 
released from Kandy (where he was still detained by the King) or until 
the Captain-General of Colombo should request the proclamation to be
made# Maetsvi jcker agreed to Veloeots suggestion, and no proclamation
1
of the alliance was made#
Before he left Ceylon, Maetsuijcker attended to several details 
of administration# For instance, In Negambo, he appointed Marten Vinck 
as Chief; in Galle* he effected various changes in the composition of
1# "Explanation by Governor Joan Thijssen (of reasons) for declaring 
war against Raja Sinha", 23 Oct# 1646, Kol#Arch# 1061 fo# 575#
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the Council# He raised Jan Thijssents salary and status, appointing
him Governor of the Company*s possessions in Ceylon, on a salary of
1
200 florins a month*
linally, accompanied by Goncalo Veloso, he left Ceylon on 
the 12th March for Batavia, where he arrived on the 11th of the 
following month - eight days before the death of Antonio Van Diemen*
1# Report of Maet*, 11 April* 1645 ( Eol#Arch# 1060, fos# 592-99)
CHAPTER VI
The Period of the Truce.
Thijasen's efforts at taking possession of the 
cinnamon lands around Galle had not met with great 
success up to about the end of 1644* But with the 
proclamation of the truce in Ceylon, and the division 
of lands agreed upon with Mascarenhas, the territorial 
power of the Dutch rapidly expanded.
Since there was nothing to fear from the Portuguese , 
Thijssen was able to employ all his field-forces for 
the purpose of driving out the Ring's men from the 
territories obtained by the Dutch at the partition of 
10th January Many of these territories were in
the possession of the King at the time of the partition. 
When Thijssen began to occupy them, he was thus actually 
waging war against the King in the King's own name.
1*cfRaja Sinha to Maetsuijcker, 16> Peb.-1b^5> in Diary 
of Maetsuijcker, Kol.Arch.1060 fos.V01-76. (cf.also 
Dagh-Reg. 299-301; JCRAS XVIII. 185-87.);
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In the i&alle area, almost the entire Matara 
Dissawani was brought under Dutch rule by means of 
armies stationed at Matara, Gintota, Mapalagama and 
Bentota. The Sinhalese chiefs of the Weligam, Dolosdas 
and Morawak Korales came to offer their submission- and 
promised to obey the Dutch in the same manner as they 
had previously obeyed the Portuguese. But the people 
of Kolonna Korale remained refractory until Thijssen 
sent a force of 200 Dutch and 100 lascarins under 
Captain Van der Laen to Hakmana to bring that Korale 
to subjection. Lack of sufficient troops prevented 
Thijssen from occupying the half of Sabaragamuwa 
Dissawani which had been assigned to the Dutch at the 
partition*
Following the example of the Portuguese 
administration of these territories, a Dutchman,
Captain Lambert Camholt, was appointed Dissawe of 
Matara* Subject to the superior jurisdiction of the 
Governor and Council at Galle, the Dissawe was in charge 
of the civil, judicial and military administrations of 
the Dissawani. The Mahabadda or cinnamon, department 
was likewise placed under a Dutchman, subordinate to 
Thijssen and his council at Galle.
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The allegiance of the inhabitants who submitted, 
was further strengthened by the parcelling out to them 
of J00 villages. But Thijssen was disappointed to 
find that almost all the inhabitants who were in his 
territories were men of little importance, most of 
the chiefs being still detained in the hills. Moreover, 
in vast areas, even the common folk were missing and 
the lands were desolate- On account of almost famine 
conditions prevailing at the moment, in Dutch territory, 
it was not likely that the men who had been removed by 
the Kandyans would be very anxious to escape from 
detention and return to their old homes*
In the Negombo area the lands were in a much worse 
state because the King's men had combed most of the 
villages clean of inhabitants. Consequently, the field- 
forces were hard put to it even to find any provisions 
from the villages and for that reason almost all their 
provisions had to be brought from Negombo. Nevertheless, 
the Dutch moved their forces far into the interior, 
both in order to protect the inhabitants, who remained 
and in order to encourage others to return and resume 
possession of their lands. But a wave of sickness which 
swept over the Dutch camp at Hiwalgedera in Dewamedi 
Korale, forced the troops to retire on Katugampola Korale
1*2
Even, the relations with the Portuguese were more
unsatisfactory in the area of Negambo than in that
of Galle. For one thing, the Chief, at Negambo, Marten
Vinck had become persona non grata to the new Captain
1
General, Manoel Mascarenhas Homem who had succeeded
Pom Philipe Mascarenhas, in March, when the latter left
for Goa to take up his duties as Viceroy. More serious
than these differences of a personal nature, was the
dispute over the villages of Alauwa and Wisinawaya.
The Dutch claimed these villages as appertaining to
them according to the Agreement of 10 January, but the
Portuguese did not recognise this claim and occupied
2
these villages.
The Portuguese, on their part, complained that not 
only in Wegambo, but also in Galle, many Portuguese 
ownerB of property, lease-holders and renters, had been 
unlawfully denied the Xands, which should have been handed
1. Had been Captain-Major of the Field in Ceylon for a 
brief period in 162J; Captain-General of Sao Tome 
(Meliapur) in C^ > tain-General of Ceylon, 16^5-55; 
interim Governor of Portuguese India, 1656-575 clied
at Goa, Sep*l6575 an irresolute and unpopular
character among his compatriots.
2. For the above, see in particular: Thijs. to G.G.&C.,17 
April 1&f5> Kol.Arch.1059 (Bis.) Same to 
same 26 May 16^5, KQl.Arch.1059 fos.259-62; Thijs. to 
Arnold Heussen, 20 March 1645, Kol. Arch. 1059 fos. JH-lij-; 
Diary of Negambo. 20 March to 28 April 1645, Kol.Arch. 
1059 fos.596-if.O7.
back to them, in accordance with the 6th Article of
the Treaty of 10 November i6Mf.
Thus, with these complaints and counter-complaints,
it appeared that relations between the Dutch and the
Portuguese were not running smoothly. In fact, on the
2
17th April 16^5, Thijssen wrote regarding the
Portuguese to Batavia :
1 It looks as if we shall not be able 
to keep any good-neighbourly relations 
with this evil brood. But time will 
teach us what we must do. H
But although the relations with their new allies
were not satisfactory yet the Dutch had no fear of a
resort to arms by them. Conscious of their own might
and of the weakness of the Portuguese, they were
convinced that their ertswhile enemies would not dare
to resume hostilities. There was all the less reason
1. cf. p.166 above and Heeres, Corpus Dip. . i.if^ i*.*
Fr.Goncalo Veloso, who made these and other complaints 
at Batavia was told by G. G.&G. that they would write to 
Thijssen ordering him to make amends. Thereupon,Veloso - 
asked for an extract from this letter. The letter was 
written and the extract was supplied. But below the 
portion of the letter which was given in the extract 
there was a sentence, which asked Thijssen to act 
w sonder aenschouw van het gene boven gesecht is, meer 
ter contemplatie vanden ambassadeur als dat onse 
meijninge juijst sodanich soude zijn. M ("Councillors 
of In dia" to Thijs. , July 16^5, Kol.ftrch.772 pp.
29^ 07).
2. Kol.Arch. 1059 (Bis). fos.^O-^ii-.
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to fear the Portuguese because there appeared to be 
no prospect of an alliance between Raja Sinha and 
his old enemies.
On the contrary, these two parties were fighting, 
probably, as bitterly as ever before. Shortly after 
the partition of territories with the Dutch, the 
Portuguese invaded the districts in Sabaragamuwa and 
the Pour Korales which were occupied by the King; but 
they were beaten back by the King's dissawes. Returning 
to the attack, the Portuguese were so successful that 
they were able to encamp within sight of the Balana 
range, which commanded the gateway into Kandy$ But 
this was not for long; sickness and the opposition 
of the Kandyans, forced them to retire, disconsolately, 
to Monikkadawara. Hostilities were, however, continued 
with, and the continued detention of da Cunha at Kandy 
was a sign of the continuance of hostilities.
1. Raja to Maet. 16 Feb. 1&f5, in Diary of Maet.,Kol.Arch. 
1060 fos.WI-76; Thijs. to G.G.&C. , 26 May 16^5, Kol. 
Arch.1059 fos*259-62. Queyroz (894) and more 
particularly Ribeiro (153-^0), are wrong in depicting 
the period from 16^5-1652 as being one of peace between 
Raja Sinha and the Portuguese. Queyroz (9*10-11) and 
Ribeiro (17^) themselves have evidence, which 
contradicts their earlier assertions, cf.also Maet* 
to G.G.& G. , 15 April 16^7, Kol.Arch. 1065 fos*79-87.
Meanwhile,
jMo open hostilities took place between Raja 
Sinha and the Dutch. By writing to Thijssen and to 
Maetswijcker, the King had attempted, in vain, to 
obtain the withdrawal of the Dutch armies from his 
territories. But seeing the failure of these 
efforts, he did not take any strong or desperate 
measures against the Hollanders. On the contrary, 
he scrupulously.avoided any encounter with them.
When the Dutch armies advanced against his Dissawe 
of Matara, the latter retreated into the hills, 
abandoning the lands.
But although the King's policy was to avoid open 
warfare with the Hollanders, he did not intend to let 
them enjoy, undisturbed, the full benefits from their 
new possessions. Particularly in the Hegambo area, 
his troops were active in driving the inhabitants from 
the Dutch-occupied territories. On one occasion his 
men had moved to within five or six miles of Negambo 
fort and carried off an Augustinian monk living within 
Dutch territory. Regarding this incident, Thijssen 
remarked that although the Portuguese were displeased 
at the inability of the Dutch to prevent its happening, 
yet, in their own territories the Portuguese themselves
\?6
were unable to prevent such incidents.
This remark indicates that the King’s attempts at 
depopulating the lands (and thereby making them useless 
to the Dutch) were meeting with much success. A pointer 
in the same direction was Thijssen’s confession that 
he could not hope to obtain more than ^00 bahars of 
cinnamon that year, through lack of sufficient Ghaleas, 
although he had earlier given hopes of obtaining a 
much larger quantity.
It was doubtless in an attempt at drastically 
improving the situation that Thijssen decided to 
declare war on Raja Sinha. If the King was humbled 
by means of open warfare, then not only would the 6haleas 
and other inhabitants be secure from him thereafter, 
but he could also be forced to release those inhabitants, 
whom he kept detained in the hills,and without whom, 
the Dutch could not obtain the large profits, which 
they expected from their territories*
1. Thijs. to G.G.&C., 26 May 1&f5> Kol.Arch. 1059 fos.259- 
62. In Batticaloa where the merchant Laurems de 
Maerschalk was stationed primarily for the purpose of 
receiving merchandise from the King, the displeasure 
against the Dutch showed itselfx in many ways* For 
instance, he was deprived of food-provisions for a 
long time, and all the illicit trade, which he had 
been stealthily carrying on up to that time, was 
suddenly stopped. As an example to others, two Veddahs 
who had secretly supplied him. with wax-not food as 
Aalbers (Rijcklof Van Opens ) wrongly stated- were 
put to death on the King’s orders.(Maerschalk to Thijs. 
18 Feb. 164.5 and 9 April 164.5, Kol.Arch. 1059 fos. 515, 
4-2 5 . J
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Thijssen had little difficulty in coming to this
decision because he knew full well that his superiors
at Batavia had for long been contemplating the idea
of declaring war on the King, once the truce was
1
concluded with the Portuguese. Moreover, the actions 
of the King’s dissawes, in avoiding any encounter with 
Dutch forces, had strengthened Thijssen*s conviction 
that it was quite an easy matter to humble the Kandyan 
King* The Dutch Governor had no fear (for reasons seen 
earlier) that the Portuguese Captain-General would assist 
Raja Sinha against him.
Thus it was, that when in May 164-5 Manoel Mascarenhas 
Homem requested him to make public the Armed Alliance 
of Jth March , Thijssen did much more than requested; he 
added a special proclamation of his own, explicitly 
declaring war on Raja Sinha^
The quick success, which, very probably, Thijssen 
had expected to obtain over the King, did not, however, 
follow. Beyond his claim of having subjected a fourth
1. cf. pjxy n.» ; pp*j57,fciand p./63 n. i above.
2. In his letter of 18 March 164-4- to G. G.&C(Kol. Arch. IO59 
f0.322) Thijs. had said: ”If the Portuguese had the 
daring to fight both the King and us^ we could also 
maintain our own against Raija and the Portuguese.1
3. Thijs. to G.G.&C*,26 May 1 64*5 , Kol. Arch. IQ59 fos.311-14. 
Thijssen’s proclamation* is also given in: Van Geer, 
App* XXXIV pp*89-90; Heeres, Corpus Din* i.4-50-51; 
Dagh-Reg. 164-51 $11-12. The last-mentioned work also
has a version of Thijssen’s letter of 26 May, but there 
are several innacuracies in this version, even the date 
being given as 28 May.
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of Sabaragamuwa, Thijssen appears to have achieved 
little of note during the months following the 
declaration of war which had been made on the 25th May.
In part, the failure to achieve anything noteworthy 
was due to the difficulties caused by the famine, which 
was raging in various parts of the low-country; in part, 
it was due to the epidemic of fevers which had caused 
terrible mortality among the troops, especially in 
Negambo, where over a hundred men had died within a 
period of three months* For a large part, however* 
the failure seems to have been due to the greater 
activity, which the Kandyans had shown since the 
declaration of war. In the Kolonna Korale, a Kandyan 
force under a dissawe had made its appearance, and the 
Dutch were not in a position to drive him out. In the 
area of Negambo, particularly in the rich cinnamon- 
yielding Seven Korales, the King’s troops were operating 
almost at will, driving out from the villages the 
Inhabitants, who still remained in them.. Although 
Thijssen sent a reinforcement of seventy-five men to 
strengthen the forces in Negambo, yet the situation
A
continued to deteriorate in that area.
1. Thijs. to G.G.&C. , 20 Aug.l6if5, Kol.Arch. 1058(Bis). 
fos.660-70; cf. also Dagh-Reg.1645. J1^ff 
(The copy of the letter at the Rijksarchief is more 
detailed than the Dagh-Reg.version, which has some­
times left out important facts.
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Shortly after war had been declared on him by 
Thijssen, the King had released the Portuguese
ambassador, da Cunha, and offered to conclude a truce
with them if they were prepared to hand over certain
territories, previously in his possession, and now in
theirs. This made Thijssen rather apprehensive,
because the King would become a more formidable enemy,
than he was at the moment, if he concluded a truce with
the Portuguese.
To add to his difficulties, Thijssen found the
relations with his Portuguese allies none too
satisfactory. It was true that in two important matters,
Homem had shown himself very accommodating. On Thijssen’s
request, he had loaned the Dutch four decoy elephants
2
to enable them to catch elephants in their territories; 
he had also permitted them to copy out the foral (or 
register of the dues) of the villages of the Matara 
dissawani. But, on the other hand, the Portuguese 
continued to do as they liked with the lands of Alauwa 
and Wisinawaya, and it also appears that they had not 
proclaimed the Treaty of Armed Alliance with the Dutch.
1. Thijs. to G.G.&C. ,20 Aug.1645, I bid. : Raja Sinha to 
Thijs., 15 June 1b45* quoted in Instructions for Maet. , 
I Feb.164b, Kol. Arch. 775 pp.31-59.
2. Van Geer (142) mistakenly considers this loan to have 
taken place before 26 May 1645.
t<3 0
For one reason or another, therefore, Thijssen had
already begun to have serious misgivings about the
probable future consequences of his declaration of war,
when he received the letter of ^1st July 164-5* from
his superiors at Batavia. If he had needed it, this
letter gave covering sanction for Thijssen1s declaration
of war, for, in explicit terms, he was asked to declare
war on the King, if that was thought necessary . It
was further suggested that the capture of Trincomalee
and Batticaloa would be a good means of bringing the
1
King under better control*
But Thijssen had already begun to retrace his steps
somewhat; therefore, he replied that, unless the King
continued to disturb and depopulate the Dutch territories,
he should be left in peace, despite the fact that war
2
had been proclaimed on him*
1. lfCouncillors of India1 to Thijs.,p1 July 16*f5,Kol.Arch* 
772 pp.59^-W 7- This letter was sent before the receitt 
of Thijssen*s letter of 26 May (cf.Dagh-Keg. 16455.508)*, 
Among other things the Councillors said : ,fwes onsen 
voordesen gegeven. ordre , als noch blijven confirmeren, 
dat U.E. gelick wel heeft beginnen te doen,sich niet 
ontsien sal desselfs quade gangen met force tegen te 
gaen, het zij dan op sijn. eigen name, geljjck U.E. 
voordesen hebben gengeschreven, off wel opentlijck des 
nodich sipnde, sonder simulatie, also ons nu dewijl met 
den portugees in vrede en alliantie sijn daer |o© veel 
niet aengelegen laten.w Among those who signed these 
significant instructions, were Maetsuijcker and Cornelis 
van der Lijn, who was President of the Council until he 
became G. G.dbn Oct. 16M>.
See further p.ioan.1 below.
2.Thijs. to G.G.&C., 17 Sep. 16^5^ Dagh-Reg. 1645. 317.
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On hearing this unexpected reply, and the further
unfavourable reports of the situation in Ceylon, the
Batavian authorities must have become very perturbed.
But their perturbations turned into dismay, when, at
the close of the year, they received peremptory orders
from the Prince of Orange and the States-General,
asking them to hand over Negambo to the Portuguese, in
1
accordance with the agreement arrived at in Europe.
The only pretext under which this order could be
disobeyed, was that of maintaining that Negambo had
been captured and was being occupied on the King’s
behalf and that since it lawfully belonged to the King,
the Company had no power to restore it to the Portuguese.
But, obviously, it was impossible to make this pretext
appear even plausible, at a time when the Company had
2
declared war on that very King*
1. cf.‘’Councillors of India” to Dirs. , 1J Dec. 1645 ,Kol. 
Arch. 1058 fos*55-67. A lengthy/Jno’t adequate extract 
from this letter is given by Van Geer (App.XXXI pp. 78- 
85). He (145>152) was quite wrong in saying that no 
orders for the restitution of Negombo were ever 
received at Batavia. He has overlooked clear evidence 
to the contrary in pp*80, 84 and 85 of his App.XXXI.
2. The Batavian authorities , nevertheless decided to use 
this pretext and disobey the orders of the Prince and 
of the States-General. They were confident that the 
King could soon be reconciled and that thereby their 
pretext could be made rather plausible, cf. their 
letter of 17 Dec. 1645 1*^ ® Directors referred to
in the previous note.
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Under these circumstances, the Batavian authorities
decided on a volte-face» They decided to disown.
completely Thijssen1s action in declaring war. His
action, they now pretended, was completely against
their intentions and against their express orders;
therefore, they were sending a Special Commissioner
to undo the harm done by Thijssen and to make peace 
1
with the King.
The Special Commissioner chosen was Joan Maetsuijcker , 
the man who had previously conducted negotiations so 
ably with the Portuguese. Maetsuijcker was instructed 
to remove Thijssen from office and send him with his 
family to Batavia. The King was to be told that Thijssen 
was being sent as a prisoner to Batavia to be punished 
there for the criminal offences which he had committed 
in declaring war against His Majesty in flagrant 
violation of the orders and advices from Batavia*
1. tfCouncillors of India** to Dirs., 17 Dec..1 645,Kol.Arch^ 
1058 fos.55-67. The Councillors now feigned such 
surprise and righteous indignation at Thijssen*s 
declaration of war, that the Directors believed 
Thijssen to have acted quite contrary to the intentions 
and the orders of the Batavian authorities.(Dirs.to 
G. G*&C. , 16 Aug. 1646, Kol.Arch*455,fos.. 65-64)., In fact, 
Van Geer and all the other writers on the subject have 
been hitherto misled in the same manner, cf. (among 
others) : Van Geer, 145-47; MacLeod,ii. 148; Stapel, 
Geschiedenis., iii.259; Pieris, Some Docs.129-50.
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Furthermore, Maetsuijcker was to use all politic means
in order to have peace and , at least, a simulated friend-
1
ship with the King,
Among the other instructions, which Maetsuijcker was 
given, was a very important one relating to the future 
policy towards the Portuguese. He was to feign 
friendship towards them until he should see an 
opportunity of making a successful attack on* them. For 
instance, if they were engaged in battle with the King 
or they were found off their guard, then Colombo was 
to be captured by surprise. Thereby, the Company would 
become virtual masters of Ceylon. Before making the 
attack, Maetsuijcker was to have at hand some plausible 
casus belli; but if meanwhile the King had been, 
reconciled, no other pretexts would be necessary 
because the aggression could be justified in the King's 
name?
1. Instructions for kjbt. ,1 F e b * 6,Kol.Arch. 773,pp. ^ 1 -59. 
The Councillors also sent a letter of the same date
to Haja Sinha (Kol. Arch. 773 pp. 60-63). The main theme 
of the letter was an emphasis of their peaceful 
intentions and their goodwill towards him. They also 
apologised for the delay in sending a commissioner to 
undo the harm done by Thijssen.
Note that although Maetsuijcker was sent as a Special 
Commissioner, for a short period, he ultimately had 
to continue as Governor of Ceylon until Feb. 1b50.
2. "wij altoos 't gevolch van onse hostile aggressen op 
sijnen naem, gelijck U.E.kennelijcq. is justificeren 
cunnen.11
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On the 2nd February, Maetsuijcker left Batavia,
but on account of adverse sailing conditions, he was 
able to reach Ceylon only on the 27th April. Yfhen he 
arrived there he found that the war with the King had 
taken a serious turn.
It appears that by January 1646, the Dutch position 
in Negambo had so far improved, that the main field-force 
had moved its camp once more to Hiwalgedere. And the 
appointment of a Dutch dissawe for the Seven Korales, 
was an indication that at last the Company had effective 
control ore r that rich cinnamon-yielding area.
On 12th January, this dissawe , Jan Meermaa., made a
bold incursion into a part of Hiriyale Korale which was
occupied by the King's men. Defeating and driving
away a Kandyan force, which opposed him, Meermaa
captured four of the King's decoy elephants and returned
1
with them into Dutch territory.
1. Thijs. to W.Geleijnsen de Jonge, 25 Jan.
Kol. Arch. IO59 (Bis) fos. J22-23; Thijs. to 
Arnold Heussen, 1 May Kol. Arch. 1063 fos.
90-92.
Van Geer (lif6) is wrong in placing this event in 
April. He is equally wrong as to the nature of 
the event.
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When Nicholajjb Jacobsz Overschie (who had replaced
Vinck as Chief at Negambo) reported this exploit to
Thijssen, the latter was highly pleased, declaring
that the Portuguese had never been able to achieve
such a great victory over the King. But his pleasure
gave way to anxiety when he heard of the later
consequences of this victory.
As has been noted previously, the King had always
been anxious to avoid an armed clash with the Dutch,
even after the latter had declared war on him. But by
the capture of four of the royal elephants, the Dutch
had offered him an insult, which he oo uld not ignore.
Therefore, in order to drive out the Dutch from the
field he sent a force of 800 men which force was soon
1
reinforced and brought up to 2000 men.
The Kandyan force moved on the Dutch camp at 
Hiwalgedere, but two days after the appearance of tbe 
Kandyans the Dutch struck camp and retreated to Pannara, 
situated near the Maha Oya and about fifteen miles from 
Negambo. The Sinhalese followed them to Pannara, and 
prepared to attack them in their entrenchments.
1. So I interpret Macht:C !t and M20:C 11 (in‘'Councillors 
of India", to Maet.,3°^Aug.16^6, Kol.Arch.773 p.297). 
But in their letter of 15 Jan.lbifJ to the Dirs. (Kol. 
Arch. 1062 fos.2-7) G.G.&C. estimate the entire forces, 
after the arrival of the King himself at 8000 men*
As soon as Thijssen heard of these events, he
hastily sent a mission to Colombo to reguest assistance
from the Portuguese Captain-General. But Manoel
Mascarenhas Homem refused to give any assistance, for
he was glad to see the Dutch continue in their 
1
difficulties*
This was the situation in Ceylon , when Maetsuijjcker
arrived there on the 27th of April* Three days later,
he igrote to the King, promising to restore the captured
elephants, and saying that Overschie and Thijssen had
been dismissed for their insolent and unauthorised 
2
actions*. At the same time, Maetsuijcker sent Adriaen 
Van der Stel (a one-time Commander of Mauritius) with 
reinforcements for Negambo*
1. cf. Resolution of Maetsuijcker and his Council,,
51 Dec. 16^6, Kol.Arch.IO65 (Bis.) fo.-758.
2. Valentyn,121. Maetsuijcker followed up this letter 
with one on 4- May and another on the 10th June. On. 
the 10th he wrote: f,0ok namen wij God tot Getuyge, 
dat noit de intentie geweest zy na eenig bezit in 
deze Landen^te tragten maer alleen om Zyn Majesteyt 
Assistentie te doenM (Valentyn, 121-22)„
Despite what Maet. sfrote to Raja, Overschie continued 
at Negambo. But in 164-9 he was convicted of feross 
irregularities and removed, from his post. His 
sentence was enhanced in appeal at Batavia and he 
was ordered to be repatriated.
As regards Thijssen , shortly after his arrival at 
Batavia he was sent as Governor of Malacca. The 
Directors were displeased that he was again appointed 
to a responsible post (cf.Dirs.to G.G.&C. , 4- Oct.164*7, 
Kol.Arch.4-55 fos.84— 85). But G.G.&C had to show their 
gratitude for the fact that in his written defence 
(Kol.Arch.1061 fos.574- 77) he did not even allude to 
their incriminatory .letter of 51 July, but mefcely 
contented himself making lame excuses.
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Meanwhile, the King himself had decided to join
his army at Pannara* But, before doing so, he wrote
on the 1st May to the Commander of the Dutch forces
at Pannara asking him to retire to Negambo, so that
matters could be settled peac4bly. Having joined
his army, the King wrote again on 9 May, expressing
his great desire to avoid blood-shed and hostilities.
And, indeed, his actions and the letters, which he
write at this time, indicate clearjy how much he wished
to settle the differences with the Dutch in a peaceful 
1
manner.
But although the Dutch had themselves decided to 
withdraw their army into Negambo, they did not wish 
to let the withdrawal appear as an act of submission, 
to the King. Therefore, it was decided to send the 
Commander Van der Stel with 14-5 i&eu aud two field- 
pieces to join the army at Pannara and thereafter, 
to retreat in a body to Negambo in an orderly manner.
1. For the King’s letters, see JCRAS XVIII.189-91. It 
is very interesting to find Saar.emphasising that the 
King was most anxious for peace, while the Hollanders 
were bent on war. (Johann. Jacob Saar, Ost-Indiawiische 
Funfzehen-Jahrige Kriegs-Dienste, Edited by S.P. 
L rHonore Naber, as Volume.VI of the Reisebeschrei- 
bungen, etc. , Hague, 19^0 , p. 99$ translation of
portions of Saar’s work dealing with Ceylon in JCRAS. 
XI. 270. Saar first arrived in Ceylon on 4- Oct. 164.7.
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Van der Stel's expedition was a humiliating
fiasco. On the 25th May, his relief column was
intercepted and cut to pieces by the Kandyan forces
not far from PanJkrS, the Dutch commander being among
those slain; three or four men remained as prisoners,
and only one escaped to Negambo. Van der Stel’s head
was sent dm a silver ira^ . to the Dutch commandant at
Pannare who promptly surrendered on the 16th May with
his garrison of 280 men; the surrender of another 60
men at Chilaw was obtained in the same way. This
triple reverse cost the Dutch a total of about 14-0 in
killed and J4-0 prisoners, apart from the great loss of 
1
prestige.
Two or three days after these successes, Raja Sinha 
wrote to Maetsuijcker offering to make peace, provided 
that the Dutch handed ore r Negambo to him, for he wished 
to raze it to the ground; also, he required all the 
territories outside the fort of Galle to be placed in 
the hands of his dissawes, who, he promised, would
1. The narrative of the above events has been based on: 
Maet. to G.G.&C. , 25 May 164-6, Kol.Arch. 1061 fos.518- 
24-; G.G.&C., to Mafct. ,30 Aug. 164-6, Kol.Arch. 775 pp. 
297-320; G.G.&C., to Dirs. ,15 Jan 164-7, KoKArch. 1062 
fos.2-7* There are different versions of these events 
in Saar (Reisebeschreibungen etc. .VI.99-1Q**) and in 
Johann Von der Be hr (ReisebeTschreibungen etc. , IV. 87-89) 
Both these soldiers outdo Ribeiro^s characteristic of 
conjuring up Kandyan forces of mythical proportions. 
But, on the whole, Van der Behr’s account is a much 
more sober one than that of Saar, who has much that is 
fancif ul(Von der Behr was in Ceylon during the events
(continued)... *.
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collect all the cinnamon and other merchandise and 
deliver them to the Dutch towards payment of the debt* 
When he did not receive a satisfactory reply, he wrote 
again to Maetsuijcker on the 10th June.
The latter, however, only made vague and conditional 
promises, attempting by a combination of threats and
p
cajolery to obtain the release of the prisonersr 
Therefore, the King broke off all communications with 
Maetsuijcker, whose letters he began to ignore.
(continued) :
of 164-6). The accounts of Van Geer (14*6)
Mac Leod (ii. 14-8-4-9) Pier is (port.Era, ii.^8-51); 
etc* suffer from various inaccuracies.
1. This letter itself is not forthcoming. But its main 
contents can be gathered from Raja Sinha*s letters of 
21 May and 11 June to the commander of Negambo 
(JCRAS XVIII. 152,195) and from G.G.&C. to Maet. ,
50 Aug. 164.6, Kol. Arch. 775), pp.257 - 52O.
2. Many of Maetsuijcker1s letters are given either in 
summary form or in extense by Valentyn (121-27). Of 
these only a few are available at the Rijksarchief at 
The Hague or (as far as I know) anywhere else. On 
account of this, Valentyn*s extracts and summaries 
are invaluable. But they must be used with caution, 
as comparison with copies of some letters available
at the Hague , shows that he has not stuck close enough 
to the original letters (cf.p.207n. h and p.208 n.3 etc). 
Donald Ferguson has referred to all and translated 
some of these letters given by Valentyn. (cf.JCRAS 
XVIII. 185-204- passim.) “ “
The Beknopte Historie van de voornaamste gebeurtenissen 
op Ceilon etc.. (Trans. in JCRAS XI.IffV also contains 
summaries and extracts from some of these letters; 
but they seem to be mostly derived from Valentyn.
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Early in July, the King was forced to withdraw with 
the bulk of his army and the prisoners to the highlands, 
on account of the great mortality$ among his men 
through sickness. Moreover, the famine-conditions of 
the low-country mad© it impossible to find provisions 
for his troops, despite the fact that the Portuguese 
had ordered their subjects to give all available 
provisions to the Kandyans.
Although the King left with the bulk of his army, 
his dissawe of the Seven Korales continued in control 
of all the territories around Negambo fort, preventing 
the Dutch from obtaining anything from the lands outside. 
The lands in the vicinity of the fort were utterly laid 
waste and all the inhabitants removed to the interior.
And although the Dutch were expecting to remedy this 
situation, by again re-occupying these lands, some day, 
the fact was that with the defeat at Pannare, they 
lost the bulk of the Seven Korales for all time to come.
The victories of the King had a profound effect even 
on the inhabitants in the Matara Dissawani. When the 
King sent a dissawe to occupy some of the outlying 
districts,, these submitted to him quite readily. Mapy 
of the inhabitants of territories nearer Galle, fled 
into the forests and hid themselves, fearing that they 
would be kidnapped into the interior. For, although
^0I
almost all the low-country Sinhalese had their 
sympathies with the King, yet they did not wish to 
lose their homes and possessions and live in a 
miserable detention in the hills, where they could 
not hope to find nev/ horned. But, among a few* 
sentiment was greater than self-interest* A notable 
example among this latter cla&sof people was one 
Katapitiya Appuhami,“ who went over to the King and 
subsequently wrote to his friends in Matara, explaining 
that the only reason for his action was his desire 
1fto serve the gods of his forefathers, and his lawful 
king.
With most of the inhabitants flying to the forests 
and some going over to the king, the situation in the 
Galle area might have become very serious for the 
Dutch, but for Maetsuijcker1s prompt measures. 
Immediately, he had heard of the disaster at Negambo, 
he had promptly brought within the fort of Galle the 
families of the Chaleas and the lascarins (which he 
maintained at the Company's expense). By this well- 
tried expedient of the Portuguese, he assured himself 
of the loyalty of the two classes of people, most useful
1. Quoted by Maet* in his letter of April l£if7 to 
Batavia, Kol. Arch. 1065 fo* 82.
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for drawing the desired profits from the lands. In 
order to overawe the the disaffected and the waverers 
and to reassure those who wished to return to their 
homes, he removed the sailors from passing ships, and 
made them march into the interior along with the 
available Dutch and Sinhalese troops* Thus, when he 
had thereby created the impression, that the Dutch had 
huge forces at their disposal, he withdrew the sailors 
and embarked them once more on their ships, which then 
proceeded on their way. This policy had much success 
and many of the fugitives were emboldened to return 
to their homes. Finally, in order to prevent the 
people from abandoning their homes, he published a 
placcaet forbidding them to do so and threatening 
severe penalties on any who did?
1. "Without Chaleas we cannot get the fruits of the
land, and the lands have to be protected and kept 
in peace by means of the lascarins, without whom 
warfare cannot be properly conducted in this island.M 
Maet. to G.G.&C. , 13 April 164-7 of. E.Reimers (Ed.) 
Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker. 1650. p. ifO.
2. For the above, see in particular : Maet- to Heussen, 
27 June 164.6, Kol. Arch 1063 fos. 101-102; Maet to 
P. S ter the mi us, 19 Aug.164-6, Kol.Arch IQ63 fo. 102; 
Maet. to G.G.&C., 12 April 164-7, Kol. Arch.1065 
fos. 79"87$ Same to Same, 18 Nov. 164.7, Kol. Arch. 
IO65, fos- 302-18; G.G.&C. , to Maet. , 14- Sep. 164-7*
Kol. Arch 774- pp. 4-87 - 504-.
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Meanwhile, he was confronted with a difficult 
problem by the Portuguese. Shortly after his arrival 
in Ceylon, the Portuguese Captain-General had written 
to him, requesting the restitution of Negambo , in
1
accordance with the terms of the Provisional Treaty 
of the 27th March concluded between the Portuguese
and the Dutch in Europe. This request could not be 
refused on the pretext that Negembo belonged to Kao a 
Sinha, because the Dutch were at v/ar with the King. 
Tterefore, Maetsuijcker decided to play for time, until 
he should succeed in making peace with the King.
He replied to Homem pointing out, that Article 9 
of this Treaty of 2J March stipulated that if a 
provisional agreement had already been reached between 
the two parties in the East, then that agreement was to 
remain valid; therefore the Provisional Treaty of the 
10th November 16*}4, and not that of the 27th March, 
should apply regarding Kegambo. Thereupon, Homem 
pointed out that the Viceroy had agreed to the Provisional 
Treaty of November 16 4^ , only under express protest 
and until the decision of the sovereign in Europe was 
made known; in the circumstances, Negambo must be handed
1. Terms of Treaty in Aitzema, Historie of Verhael etc. .
vi. 62-65.
zot*
over to him according to the terms of the decision
made in Europe.
As Iviaetsuijcker continued to insist on the validity
of the Treaty of November 1(44 and refused to restore
Negambo, the Viceroy, Dom Philipe Mascarenhas, sent Fr.
Gon^alo Veloso to demand it from Maetsuijcker. When
Veloso arrived at Galle in the latter part of October
164-6, Maetsuijcker had still failed to obtain peace
from Raja Sinha. But he had recently received certain
nev/s of the violation of the truce by the Portuguese
in Brazil. This news he now used to good purposes.
To Veloso1s demand for the restitution of Negambo, he
replied that even if the Portuguese claims were well-
founded, he would still refuse to hand over Negambo,
on account of the violation of the truce in Brazil.
With this reply, Veloso left on the 5th November
1
empty-handed for Goa.
It was at about this time that Maetsui^cker received 
from Batavia rather noteworthy instructions regarding
1. Protest of Homem to Maet., 15 June 164-6, Kol.Arch. 
1065, no pagination; Reply of Maet. to Homem, 15 
Aug.164-6, Kol.Arch. 1061 fos.562-75; Maet. to Dirs. ,
9 Nov. 164-6, Kol.Arch.IO65 fos.265-64-; Maet. to 
G.G.&C. , 15 April 164-7* &ol. Arch. 1065, fos. 79 - 87.
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negotiations with the King. By letter of 30th August 
he was told that if the King proved irreconcili- 
able, then (as previously suggested by Maetsuijcker) 
the harbours of Batticaloa and Trincomalee should be 
blockaded in order to prevent him from obtaining salt 
and other necessaries from outside. But it was very 
much to be wished that peace could be obtained from 
him, even by promising to yield v/hat he had demanded - 
Negambo and the Matara Dissawani. But the proper 
fulfilliient of those promises was another matter. The 
Matara dissawani was to be re-occupied as soon as the 
situation improved. Negambo, was not to be handed 
over, even temporarily; with one excuse or another, 
its surrender was to be postponed until the situation 
improved so far that it could be boldly refused.
1. Kol.Arch. 773 pp.297-^20. Re Negambo, they said ; 
**ende staet daerom te overwegen off dan tot 
reconciliatoit humeur bij uijtstellingh van een 
jaer off anderhalff niet te bewegen soude sijn, 
om hem eeniger maeten. in hoope te stellen van 
testitutie te sullen crijgen, waermede op gevolchde 
acceptatie sijn tegenstrevigheijtjfgewonnen soude sijn, 
excuserende den geconditioneerde uijtstel, dat sulcx 
ten principalen geschiet int reguard vanden
portugaleesch,  .........wanneer jegens d'expiratie
vanden geprefigearde tijt het niet mancqueren sal aen 
politijcque consideratien ende impulsive motijven tot 
verder dilaij "
x w a t  ihtjetoowit } < 2 . won^e*-?, veel
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On his own, Maetsuijcker had already thought of a
policy similar to that suggested by the Batavian
authorities. For instance, in his letter of 11 
1
September (164-6) he had suggested to the King that
the Butch should be allowed to occupy Negambo for another
six or seven months, implying thereby that they would
hand it over at the expiry of that period.
Maetsuijcker1s difficulty, however, was to make
the King listen to his proposals. Before his letter
of 11th September, he had written to the King on 21st
2
June and 12th August, but to none of these letters had 
he obtained a reply.
While he was considering what he should do next, 
he heard at the close of December, that the Portuguese 
had recently sent ambassadors with rich presents to 
the King. The ambassadors, Sebastiao de Fonceca, Rector 
of the Jesuit College, and Dorn Jeronimo de Azavedo, were 
considered to be the two most important Portuguese next 
to the Captain-General in Ceylon. The news of this 
distinguished embassy revived and strengthened all 
Maetsuijoker*s fears of a possible peace and alliance 
between the King qnd the Portuguese. Therefore, he 
decided to make another effort at coming to an under-
1. Valentyn, 124-* Summary contents of this letter are 
found in Maet. to G. G.&C. , 13 April 164.7,Kol.Arch. 
1065, fos. 79-67*
2. The letter of 12 August is not mentioned by Valentyn
(continued).....
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1
standing with the King.
2
On the 8th January 164-7» ke w**ote to Raja Sinha 
offering to send on an embassy, the merchant Laurens 
de Maerschalk (who was known to be persona grata to 
the King). He requested a safe-conduct for Maerschalk, 
if the King was pleased to give audience to the latter.
For well over six months, Maetsuijcker waited in 
vain for a reply. But at last, on the 27th of July, 
two Kandyan envoys arrived at Galle, bringing with 
them a letted (dated the 12th July) from the King.
Raja Sinha pointed out that the arisen differences were 
due to the evil conduct of the Dutch officers; but 
that since he had not called the Hollanders to the 
island in order to quarrel with them, he desired nothipg 
but peace. Therefore, he would be glad to receive the 
ambassador, who could come with perfect assurance of 
safety.
4-
On 11th August, Maetsuijcker replied to the King’s 
letter saying that the ambassador would be sent at an 
early date. As he was at the moment expecting new orders
(continued) s
but is referred to in Maet’s letter of 1^
April 16^7 referred to in previous note. The letter
of 21 June is found in Valentyn., 12j)..
1. of. Resolution of Maet. & Council„ 51 Dec. 1646,Kol. 
Arch.1065 (Bis) fo.758.
2. Valentyn, 124-*
5. Kol.Arch.1065 fo. ^21.
4. Kol.Archiofcffo. 522. Valentyn, 124*. By comparing Valentyn1 s
version of this letter with that at the Rijksarchief,
I find that Valentyn has considerably condensed this 
letter.
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from Batavia, he did not, in fact, wish to dispatch 
Maerschalk in a hurry* But when he received a hint 
through one of the King’s dissawe’s that Haja Sinha 
was impatient at the delay, he decided not to wait 
for the advices from Batavia. He dispatched Maerschalk
on the 22nd of August, via Batavia, with a letter 
informing the King that when terms were agreed upon 
with this ambassador he would send a more distinguished 
embassy to swear to the new agreement.
In the meantime, the King had grown impatient at
why the ambassador had delayed to come. He also
pointed out that the Portuguese ambassadors were
importunating him for peace; but since he had an
alliance with the Dutch nation he did not wish to give
an answer without consulting the Hollanders.
3
On the 10th September, three days after the receipt 
of the King’s letter, Maetsuijcker sent a reply. He 
cleverly excused the delay in sending Maerschalk as 
having been due to the fact that the vessel which was 
to take the latter to Batticaloa, had needed more repairs
1. dated 21 Aug. 162*7, Kol.Arch. 1065 fo.322*-; Valentyn 
(125) has again a considerably condensed version. 
Ferguson (JCRAS XVIII.198) wrongly translates Meen 
aanzienelyker Ambassadeur” by ”a regular ambassador11.
2. Kol.Arch. 1065 fo. 321. - .
3. Kol.Arch.1065 fos. 324— 26. Valentyn (125) has left
out some important details of this letter.
1
the delay and wrote on the 29 August asking Maetsuijcker 
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to make it sea-worthy than originally expected. As 
regards the Portuguese request for peace, he said that 
war between the Dutch and the Portuguese was imminent 
and that if the King made peace with the latter, the 
only result would be,that the Dutch would fight them 
on their own account and|. on that of the King; in 
that case, when Colombo was captured, the King would 
have no claims on it.
Meanwhile, on the 11th of September, Maerschalk 
reached Kandy, where he was received ceremoniously and 
in the most friendly manner by the King's officers. On 
the 23rd, he was summoned to Court. After he had 
greeted the King and handed over Maetsuijcker's letter 
(of the 21st August), he put forward various excuses and 
propositions in the manner instructed by Maetsuijcker. 
The differences, which had arisen between the Dutch and 
the King, had only been caused by the wicked calumnies 
of the Portuguese, who had even gone so far as to say 
that the Dutch were trying to take possession of the 
King’s fortresses and lands - "which, God Almighty 
knows, has never been in our thoughts." The fort of 
Kegembo and the cinnamon lands will be handed o've r 
within a short time; the fulfill nt of this will be 
promised with the most awesome and sacred oaths, which 
the King might stipulate.
1. Instructions for Maerschalk,22 Aug. 16k-7.Kol.Arch. 106s 
(Bis).fos.775 - 75. J
iI
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After he had listened to these fair promises,
Haja Sinha dismissed Maerschalk for the nonce, without, 
however, giving any reply to the Dutchman’s proposals. 
He then left with his court for his country-palace at 
Kundasale, where he seems to have deliberated with 
his councillors over the proposals of Maerschalk.
Heturning to Kandy on the 2nd October, he summoned 
Maerschalk for an audience three days later* When the 
latter appeared before him, he indicated certain 
articles of the Treaty of 1638 which he wished altered 
in a manner proposed by him. As Maerschalk had no 
authority to agree to the proposed alterations, he 
promised to inform Maetsuijcker, and await his 
superior’s instructions.
On the following day, the Portuguese ambassadors 
received audience, and according to Maerschalk, the 
Padre ambassador importunated the King thus : "Your 
Majesty please think of our utter misery and conclude 
peace with us, or else we are lost.1 But no favourable 
reply could be elicited from the King, who wanted the 
Portuguese to first fulfil their promise of restoring, 
Wijayapala to him. The Portuguese, on the other hand, 
were unwilling to release the Prince unless the King 
was prepared - which he was not - to sign a perpetual
Zll
1
peace with them.
2 „
Meanwhile, on the 14-th September ? Governor-General 
Cornelia iVan her Lijn and his Councillors wrote to 
Maetsuijcker that it would be best for the Company to 
bring the King to terms by means of open war, to 
commence which, they were awaiting orders from Holland.
In their opinion, the King was too embittered by the 
loss of the cinnamon lands to think of making peace 
with them.
But the reports, which he recei'ved from his 
ambassador, convinced Maetsuicker that the King was 
inclined towards peace. As regards the suggested 
alterations in the existing treaty, he was willing to 
consent to all except one. According to the proposed 
revision of Article 10, the King would acquire the 
right to sell cinnamon and other products to nations 
which were at peace with the Dutch. But the legal 
monopoly of the cinnamon was too big a privilege to 
be given up* Therefore, he instructed Maerschalk to 
reply to the King, that provided the monopoly of the 
cinnamon, was safeguarded for the Company the revision,
1. For what took place at Kandy during this period see in 
particular : Maerschalk to Maet., 24 Sep. 164-7, Kol# 
Arch. 1065 fos.334—  35* Same to game, 10 Oct.164.7, Kol. 
Arch. IO05 fos.3.35-37; Revisions of Treaty proposed 
by Haja, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 338-39; Maet. to 
Maerschalk, 18 Oct. 164-7, Kol$. Arch. 1065 fos.328-29.
2. Kol.Arch.JJk- pp. 4-87-5^- expected orders for a 
war with Haja Sinha did not, however, come from the 
Dirs.
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of Article 10 would be agreed to.
The removal of the Dutch monopoly of cinnamon was 
the most important element in the revisions proposed. 
Therefore, the reply entrusted to Maerschalk was going 
to be most unsatisfactory to the King. It was doubt­
less in order to soften this expected sense of 
dissatisfaction, that Maetsuijcker sent a number of 
presents, which he knew would be pleading to the King. 
Raja Sinha1s craze for strange and rare birds and beasts 
was well known, and so among the presents were a 
cassowary, a Dutch bear, and a Persian greyhound. In 
an attempt to please the King further, Maetsuijcker 
instructed his ambassador to say that as soon as peace 
was concluded the Dutch would place His Majesty’s 
eoat-of-arms over the fort-gates of Galle and Negambo 
and at other public places, so that all the world could 
know to whom these places belonged.
Negotiations at Kandy, however, did not go very 
smoothly. Probably, the King realised that the Dutch 
promises of handing over Negambo and the Matara 
dissawani were much too vague and evasive; the reply 
regarding his proposal for the revision of Article 10 
of the 16^8 Treaty was also unsatisfactory. Therefore,
1. Maet. to Maerschalk, 5 Nov. 16^7, Kol.Arch. 10 
fos. 55O - 52.
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till he obtained satisfactory conditions, he refused to 
release the prisoners or conclude peace. Moreover, it 
appears that for several months, from the close of 164*7 
onwards, he was passing through what was considered to 
be an inauspicious period. During that time, he shut
1
himself up at Bintenna and would give audience to no one.
Maerschalk was unable to send any letters to Galle
as he could not obtain permission for it during the
Kingfs absence from Kandy. Meanwhile, Maetsuijcker, who
found himself without news from his ambassador, decided
on a ruse in order to get some news from Kandy. On
the 28th December 164-7 ke wrote to Maerschalk asking
him to offer the services of the Dutch in case His
Majesty wished to send any letter to his brother
Y/ijayapala or wished to find out about the Prince’s 
2health* This offer, Maetsuijcker expected, would be 
eagerly grasped by the King, who would then write to 
Galle or ask Maerschalk to do so. Unfortunately for 
Maetsuijcker, his ruse for obtaining information from 
Kandy failed because it appears the King was keeping 
himself in.seclusion . A  further letter written on 25th
5
March 164-8 also elicited no reply. Finally, on the 10th
1. Maet. to G.G.&C. , J Feb. 16^ -8, Kol. Arch.1067 fos. 
202-Qif; Same to Same, 17 May 174-8, Kol.Arch.1067
fos.154— 59*
2. cf. Maet. to G.G.&C., 7 Feb. 164-8, 1 bid.
5. Referred to by Valentyn (125); but no details given*
Z14*
1
September, he wrote to the King requesting the release
of Maerschalk, if it were true that His Majesty has
concluded an offensive alliance with the Portuguese
against the Dutch.
It was, therefore, a pleasant surprise for him when
on the 15th October two envoys arrived at Galle bringing
with them a letter (dated Jrd October) from the King.
By this letter Haja binha informed him that he intended
sending Maerschalk and the captives with all their
weapons, in a short time. Ten days later he heard from
Maerschalk himself that an ^eternal alliancew had been
concluded and that he would be returning soon with all
2
the captive Hetherlanders.
When Maetsuijcker heard of these good tidings,
he wrote to the King, on the 27th Octobe^, expressing
his pleasure at the news, and promising to send another
ambassador in place of Maerschalk. It was this letter,
according to Maerschalk which made the King change his
intentions. At the time the letter was received,
Maerschalk and the Dutch prisoners were due to leave
for Galle in three days1 time. But after he had read
T. Summary contents of letter in Maet- to G.G.&C., 51 0ct7 
164-8, Kol. Arch. 1066 (Bis), fos. 115-22; Extract 
from letter, in Valentyn, 125*
2. Maet. to G.G.&C. , 51 Oct. 1648, Ibid.
5. Valentyn, 125* -----
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this letter, Raja Sinha immediately gave orders that 
the prisoners were to he detained until he gave further
instructions]
There now took place a long correspondence between 
Maetsuijcker and the King, Raja Sinha wished to pin 
the Dutch down to definite promises regarding the 
handing oyer of Negambo and the Katara dissawani; the 
Dutch on the other hand made evasive and equivocal 
promises on this matter* In order to soften the King*s 
attitude, Maetsuijcker sent him some rich presents, in 
particular, a fine Persian horse* But the King was not 
to be cajoled and Maetsuijcker had to promise the 
immediate restitution of Negambo and the Matara 
dissawani. As regards the dissawani, however, he 
requested the King to appoint a Dutchman as his dissawe,
in the same manner in which he had a Portuguese as his
2
dissawe of Walawe.
1. cf.G.G.&C. to Maet., ~J Oct. 16^9, Kol.Arch. JjG fos* 
159“^ *  ' It is n°t possible to say why the King changed 
his mind, because full details of Maetfs letters are 
not available; nor is Maerschalk1 s diary (referred to 
by G. G.&C. , in their letter) forthcoming.
2. Incidentally, in his letter of 2J June 1 9 (see next 
note, below) Raja pointed out that this Portuguese was 
only Vidana of Paname*
For the correspondence mentioned at the beginning of 
the para, see Valentyn, 125 - 26*
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Finally, when he found his demands satisfactorily
met, Raja Sinha sent to Galle Maerschalk and two of
his envoys with a letter dated the 27th of June 16^9*
He wished Maetsuijcker to sign the revised terms of
the Treaty of 1658 which he was sending along with
this letter. When these terms were duly signed, the
new Dutch ambassador was to bring the document to
Kandy and swear on behalf of the Prince of Orange and
the Company, to observe the revised Treaty faithfully
and sincerely. Then he (the King) would himself sign
the Treaty, and order the release of the prisoners.
Just as in 16KO, Coster had sent him a Dutch officer
authorised to remove the garrison of Trincomalee and
hand over the fort, in the same manner, Maetsuijcker 
send
should/in company of the new ambassador an officer 
authorised to hand over Hegembo to him. He was pleased 
to appoint a Dutchman as his dissawe for Matara, 
provided this dissawe took up his residence at the 
royal court in like manner as all his other dissawes; 
otherwise, he would appoint one of his own chieftains 
as dissawe*
1. Trans, from original by Ferguson in JCRAS 
XVIII. 200 - 02.
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These were some of the main contents of the letter,
which Maetsuijcker received on the H^ jth July, when
Maerschalk and the King’s envoys arrived at Galle. On
the bth August he signed the revised terms of the Treaty
of 1658. By the new Article 10, the Company did not
lose its monopoly of the cinnamon in the drastic manner
first proposed by Raja Sinha. The King, however,.
acquired the right to sell cinnamon and other
merchandise to nations at peace with the Company, from
the moment that he should succeed in squaring his debt.
Maetsuijcker agreed to this article with the perfect
conviction that the King would never be able to pay
his debt; if this ever appeared possible, a new treaty
1
could be imposed on him by force of arms.
1. In their letter of J Oct. 16A9 (Kol.Arch.776 fos.1^9- 
if4) G. G.&C. told Maet. that as they were Christians 
and therefore bound to keep their promises, they could 
not agree with his ideas on this matter. But the 
Directors in their letter of 10 Sep.1650 (Kol.Arch.% 
k-55 fo.195) entirely agreed with Maet’s views, and 
regarding the King’s debt they said : ’’die alrede
soo groot is, ende noch wijders soo gee^tendeert can 
werden, dat hij deselve nimmermeer sal connen voldoen.” 
And they continued : ’’invougen wij met d ’E n
Maetsuijcker mede soude nj[beslui-jvoorvallen sullen, 
ende dat den Radja tsijner tijt met de macht vande 
Compagnie tot reden gebracht sal moeten werden.”
j f  i dwij'se«4e Saecka*, i^ s c h e *  keijdv*
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On the 12th August, Maetsuijcker dispatched
Captain Burchard Cox as the ambassador for swearing
to the treaty. With him. went the Junior Merchant
Pieter Kieft, who w as to be at the court as the
permanent Dutch ambassador (the King's having consented
1
to Maetsuijcker fs request for appointing such an.
2
ambassador). By a letter which he sent through Cox, 
the King was informed that the ambassadors would beg 
permission to retain Negambo in Dutch hands till Colombo 
was captured. As regards the capture of Colombo, the 
King was informed, an armada was expected soon from 
Batavia to effect it.
The Dutch ambassadors were received with extraordinary 
honours at Kandy, and on the 2nd of November the new 
treaty was sworn to by Cox and Kieft. They further 
swore to hand over the Matara Dissawani; they likewise 
swore that when Laurens de Maerschalk (or someone in 
his stead) returned from Batavia, the fort of Negambo 
would be handed over. Thereupon, with a joyful 
countenance, Raja Sinha signed the treaty.
1. cf. Valentyn, 126.
2. Valentyn, 126* Valentyn gives the date as 8 Aug. 
But in Raja's letter of 16 Nov. 1649 (Kol.Arch. 1069 
Bis.fos.844-45) hate is given as 12 Aug. 
Incidentally, the summary contents of Maet's letter 
can be gathered from. Raja's letter, which serves as 
as useful check on Valentyn.
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Shortly after this, he gave Cox leave to depart
with the prisoners* As Cox was forced to admit that
no Dutch dissawe could fulfil the duties required by
him, he sent along with the Dutch ambassador, one of
his own chiefs as Dissawe of Matara. The chief chosen ,
Rampoth Adigar, was, next to the King, the second most
important personage in the Kingdom*. Before Cox left
Kandy, the Portuguese ambassadors were also given leave
to depart; but their departure was made so humiliating^
that when he heard of it Maetsuijcker suspected for a
moment that the humiliation was a pretence to cover up
some dark plot agreed upon between Raja Sinha and the 
1
Portuguese*
On the 1j>th December, Burchard Cox arrived at Galle 
with 126 prisoners. 1if others, who had been too ill to 
march, were expected to come from Kandy some time later* 
(Thus, of some prisoners the Dutch got back only 
140; a few had taken service with the King; the rest 
had all died). Along with Cox, there also arrived the 
new Dissawe of Matara, Rampotja, with J00 lascarins.
1. Raja to Maet*, 16 Nov* Kol. Arch*1069 (bis) fo&.
8KV+5; Maet to Dirs. , 5 Jan 1650, .Kol.Arch. 1069 (Bis) 
fos.Q^S—K9* Por the new treaty (which was considered 
by Raja as a renewal of the Treaty of 1638) see, : 
E.Reimers, Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker. Bijlage Of pp*
Heeres in Corpus.Dip. i.|p1^ —19 gives only 
some of the Articles.
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The Dissawe handed over to Maetsuijcker a letter,
1
dated 16th November, from Raja Sinha, In the letter 
the King asked (among other things) that all the 
territories and people of the Matara Dissawani should 
be immediately handed over to his dissawe. He stated 
that he was waiting for the return of Maerschalk from 
Batavia and the consequent handing over of Negambo. He 
also wished to know when exactly the fleet for the 
capture of Colombo would arrive.
After the King’s letter had been read and mutual 
courtesis had been exchanged between Maetsuijcker and 
Rampoth, the question of handing over the Matara 
Dissawani was taken up.. The Dutchman expressed his 
sincere desire to hand over the dissawani immediately, 
provided the King cleared up certain, doubts, which had 
arisen in his mind regarding this matter. Was the Galu 
Korale, which had for many years past been administered 
by a separate chief, a part of the Matara dissawani ?
Was the Mahabadda or cinnamon department also a part 
of it ? He did not think so, although the dissawe was 
of the contrary opinion* Moreover, without His Majesty’s 
special orders, he could not hand over the villages, 
which had been rented by the Company. Prom those 
villages came annual incomes, which greatly helped to
1. * bid.
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liquidate His Majesty’s debt*
As Maetsuijcker proceeded to make these
1
“subterfuges and pretexts’/ the dissawe quickly 
realised that his royal master had been sadly deceived 
and that he him self would gain nothing by arguing 
any longer with the Dutchman* Therefore, he soon 
informed Maetsuijcker that he had decided to go back 
to Kandy and represent matters to the King*
Although he did not think that the King would go 
to war on account of the deceipt practiced on him, 
Maetsuijcker yet considered it necessary to appease 
his wrath. Therefore, he sent several presents, in 
particular two cannon, to the King through the Dissawe.
1. Maet. wrote to the Dirs. on 3 Jan.* 1650 (Kol.Arch. 
1069, Bis.fos. 8^8-K9) explaining his policy thus: 
“...met vast gestelden resolutie van onse sijde hem 
de landen niet in te willigen, maer hetselve met 
alle practicabile wtvluchten en tergiversatien te 
excuseren.“
Although Van der Lijn and his councillors had them­
selves suggested a policy of deceit regarding the 
King’s demand for Negambo and the Matara Dissawani 
( See p*lo(f and p.Z.o5“n.l above) they now expressed 
great indignation at Maet's. policy. In their letter
of 18 Sep* 1650 (Kol.Arch. 777 PP*37*l~89) they told
Kittensteijn: “ Wij prijsen het goet ende geluckigh 
success, de verlossinge onser arme gevangenen, weer 
over ons oock met haer verblijden, maer het beleijdt, 
ende de middelen daer toe gebruijckt, en connen wij 
niet vrij van opspraeck, noch sonder reprochje
houden..............   al en contra moeten wij oock wel
wachten, van iets, te belooven, ende dat niet naer te
comen   in’t gehouden dagh-register der commissa-
rissen Burehart Cox ende Pieter Kieft, bij den 
coninck in Candia sijnde, sien wij, dat hij op Radja
(continued)
ZlZ
More important, perhaps, was the cleverly phrased letter, 
which also he sent through Rampoth. He expressed his 
regret that as yet he had received no answer from 
Batavia regarding the handing over of Negambo and the 
commencement of the war with the Portuguese. He was 
hoping to return to Batavia within about three weeks, 
but he would not leave His Majesty's service without 
once more “kissing His feet with a short letter". As 
regards the doubts which had arisen in his mind over 
the claims and representations of the Dissawe, it was 
all the result of his concern for His Majesty's service.
At the mere appearance of the dissawe several people had 
fled from their homes in terror and others were in a 
panic lest their lands should be taken from them and 
given to favourites of the Dissawe. Therefore, unless 
changes were made showly, it would be harmful for His 
Majesty's lands, for the inhabitants would fly to the 
Portuguese through fear. Having made these and other 
pretexts for his actions, Maetsuijcker proceeded to 
discredit Rampoth by damning him with faint praise. 
Finally, with the aid of two post-scripts to his letter
(continued) :
Singas versoeck, om Negombo in sijn gewelt te 
mogen obtineren, hem tot andtwoordt geven, sij vertrouwen 
dat d'Ed. Heer Generael Sijne Majt sulcx niet soude 
refuseren; dat misslagen ende ijdele toeseggingen sijn, 
die daer naer niet anders als quade vruchten geven."
> N .p.
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he made it appear that Rampoth was saying one thing 
on one day, and the contrary on another, and as such 
behaviour was unbecoming in a Dissawe, he requested 
that the king should appoint a Dutchman as Dissawe of 
Matara. Along with this letter Maetsuijcker sent 
another to kieft instructing him in what manner he 
should explain Dutch actions and placate the King.
"With these letters and the presents Rampoth left Galle 
on the j)1st of December 164-9* Me did not go to
Kandy; sending on to the King Maetsuijcker’s letters 
and presents and his own report on the Dutchman’s 
actions, he remained at Katuwana in Dolosdas Korale. 
From there he sent orders to various parts of Dutch 
territory, asking the inhabitants not to to obey the 
Dutch, and indeed in the villages in his immediate 
vicinity, the people came to submit to him.
On receiving nev/s of Rampoth1 s activities, 
Maetsuijcker sent against him a force under the Dutch 
dissawe, Marcus Cassel. The Kandyan dissawe, however* 
did not wait for the Dutch force., He retreated further
into the interior from where he sent several insulting
1. Maet. to Raja, 2J Dec. 164-9 (with P.S. of28 and of 
29 Dec.) Kol.Arch. 1069 (Bis) fos. 850-5^  Maet. to 
Kieft, 29 Dec. 164-9, Kol.Arch. 1069 (Bis) fos. 4-29 -
z z ^
messages to the Dutch, callimg them traitors and asking
them to leave His Majestyds lands and amuse themselves
in their element, the sea. On the withdrawal of the
Dutch force, he came once again to Katuwana. Thereupon,
Maetsuijcker himself marched with his forces against
the Kandyan. On the 28th January he sent an ultimatum
to him in the King’s name, asking him to withdraw
within twenty-one hours unless he wished to he attacked
and driven out. But nothing was achieved because
1
Rampoth evaded the Dutch forces.
Meanwhile Raja Sinha had received Maetsuijcker1s
letter and the report of his dissawe. a s soon as he
realised what had happened he was bitterly angry at
the deceit practiced on him. As he had decided not to
write any letters to Maetsuijcker, he wrote to Kieft
2
on the 12th January, complaining of the deceitfulness 
of the ’casta Hollandesa* (as he throughout this letter 
referred to the Dutch);
"And if I had thought that the casta Hollandesa 
would not fulfill that which they had said and 
sworn at the peace, I would not have allowed 
them to swear in my royal presence.11
1. On the above, cf.Maet. to Kieft, 11 Jan. 1650, Kol.Arch. 
1071 fo. 4-21; sanie to same, 15 Jan. 1650 Kol. Arch. 
1071 fos.4-31-23; Maet. to Thijssen, 10 Jan. 1650, Kol. 
Arch. 1071 fos.4-02-02; Ultimatum of Maet. to Rampoth,
28 Jan.1690, Kol.Arch. 1071 fos.291 - 92.
2. Kol.Arch. 1071 fo. 4-02*
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Before he left Ceylon, Maetsuijcker "kissed the King’s
1
feet" with two,further letters, written on the 11th 
January and the 2^rd of February. In both these letters 
he maintained an attitude of righteous indignation at 
what he considered to be a breahhof the peace on the 
King’s side, and urged the recall of Rampoth in order 
to redress this grievance. In the letter of 2j>rd 
February, he took strong exception to the insult of 
being called "casta Hollandesa"; he further explained 
to the King that the Dutch were not accustomed to deal 
in a deceitful manner, and that therefore, all the 
arisen differences were due to the "deceitful lies of 
Rampoth and other Portuguese creatures." But the King 
deigned no reply.
At the close of February, maetsuijcker left for
Batavia, leaving for his successor, Jacob van Kitten-
1a 2
steijn written instructions, in which it was
particularly stressed that under no circumstances, should
1. Kol.Arch. 1071 fos. 4-4-2-W- and 4-4-5—^7 respectively.
1a.Had served for 14- years in various factories of the
Company in North-India, and in 164-9 was on the point 
of repatriating, when Van der Lijn persuaded him to 
take up the Govern ment of Ceylon in succession to 
Maetsuijcker. In Nov.1651 he was promoted from the 
rank of President to that of Governor. In Oct. 1622 
he was relieved of his charge at his earnest reguest 
But on 2b Dec. 1622 at Batavia before he
could undertake his long-desired voyage to the 
Netherlands.
2.Reimers (Bd. ) , Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker.
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the Matara Dissawani (or any other territories in the 
Compnay’s hands) be handed over to the King. Since 
the l^th December, when he landed at Galle, Van Kitten- 
steijn had been following every step of Maetsuijcker1 s 
diplomacy and so he found no difficulty in continuing 
the policy hitherto followed.
The Dutch had been daily expecting Rampoth to go 
back to Kandy as he had not more than fifty or sixty 
men with him, the rest of his >^00 men having gone back 
to their homes through sickness. But although all his 
men had advised him to leave the lowlands he had refused 
to do so, declaring that even if everyone left him, he 
would not go back but rather die in the low-country. 
Moreover, not content with harassing the Dutch from 
Katuwana, he moved further south near Hakwana, taking 
into his hands the dues hitherto paid to the Dutch.
When he found that Rampoth was determined to harass 
the Dutch as long as he could, Kittensteijn decided to 
drive him away before further harm was done. Before 
undertaking the enterprise he wished to assure himself 
of the loyalty of the chiefs and lascarins who would be 
used for the attack on the King’s dissawe. Therefore, 
he made them bring their families within the fort of 
Matara (which had been begun by Maetsuijcker and was 
now nearly complete). Having taken this essential
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precaution, Kittensteijn sent his Dissawe, Marcus 
Cassel along with the Sinhalese chiefs and lascarins,
against Rampoth.
On the 2j>rd March, Marcus Cassel proposed to the 
chiefs, the plan of attack on the King’s Dissawe. He 
was astounded at the audacious reply of the chiefs?
Among other things they told him that the Portuguese 
too had sworn a lasting peace with the King, on three 
occasions. On each occasion they had broken the peace 
and each time earned their just retribution, from God.
The Dutch too should remember that having sworn a peace 
with the King before God and the world, they v*ould earn 
similar retribution for breaking it.
As soon as he heard that the Sinhalese chiefs were 
unwilling to attack the King’s Dissawe, Kittensteijh 
ordered the withdrawal to Matara of all forces from the 
Weligam, Dolosdas and Morawak Korales, leaving behind 
only two outposts at Walasmulla and Kirama. The chiefs 
were now aghast at the result of their own audacity.
With the lands virtually abandoned to the King’s Dissawe, 
they stood to lose the incomes and the profits, which 
they had hitherto enjoyed. Therefore, turning from sent­
iment to self-interest, they promised the Dutch to help 
in the attack on Rampoth*
1. cf. Marcus Cassel to Kittensteijn, 24- March 1650,
Kol. Arch. 1071 fos. 24-1 -4-1*
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Although he had hardly fifty men with him., the
King’s Dissawe was acting as boldly as before. Early
in April he drove the Dutch outpost from Kirama and
placed his own men there and at Katuwana. But,, shortly
after this, the Dutch effectively got rid of him.
On the 15th April, Kittensteijn sent large bodies
of Dutch and Sinhalese troops by diverse paths to fall
upon Rampoth.. One of these detachments commanded by
one Wijesundera Mudaliyar came unawares upon Rampoth
and his men; who were able to escape by flight as the
Mudaliyar did not fire a single shot or order a pursuit,
A short while later, however, Marcus Gassel sent a
detachment of more loyal Sinhalese and these returned
with three captives. Although Rampoth escaped, he did
1
not return to trouble the Dutch any more.
1, For the affaire Rampoth and certain other connected 
matters, since the departure of Maet, see (in parti­
cular) Kittensteijn*« to Thijssen, 21 March 1650, Kol, 
Arch. 1071 fos. 592-9^; Kitt. to G, G.&C. , 29 March 
1650 , Kol,Arch.1071 fo, 9 7 Kitt, to Heussen, 1 April 
1650 , Kol.Arch.1071 fos. Vp1-52J Resolutions of Kitt*
& G., 19 March and 26 March 1650, Kol.Arch.IO77 fos. 
^95-98; Kitt. to G.G.dcC. , 10 May 1650, Kol.Arch. 1071 
fos. 924-93*
To my knowledge, MacLeod is the only writer hitherto 
who has consulted the documents at the Ri.jksarchief 
for a study of the negotiations between Maet-and Raja 
and for the affaire Rampoth. But Mac Leod’s account 
(ii.970-74) of these matters is guite faulty, as he 
has missed many of the salient facts.
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Meanwhile, the King was following a rather curious 
policy. While he had railed at the Dutch and 
contemptuously ignored Maetsuijcker’s letters, he had 
refrained from reinforcing Rampoth or ordering any acts 
of hostility. Moreover, through his Dissawe of the 
Seven Korales he had delivered to the Dutch in March, 
over a hundred bahars of fine cinnamon. And, finally, 
despite the deceit practised on him, he kept to his word 
regarding the sick prisoners, and released them.
It thus appeared that the King’s anger had probably
subsided and that he wished to avoid hostilities. But
when he heard that his Dissawe had been driven out of
the Matara Dissawani , Raja Sinha sent a rather sharp
1
letter to Van Kittensteijn on the ^rd of May. He wrote: 
"But if on account of the cupidity, which they have for 
the lands of Matara, the Hollanders wish to break the 
terms of peace and desire war, I shall be glad to know 
it. M As Maetsuijcker and Kittensteijn., had continually 
harped on the theme of the King’s debt, he asked for a 
full statement of what he still owed the Company,
1. Kol.Arch. 1070 (Bis), fos. 646—48. cf. also a translat­
ion from the original, by Ferguson in JCRAS XVIII 204- 
06; also in Pieris, Some Docs.. 155-57. A comparison 
of the translation in Some Docs, with that of Ferguson., 
will indicate, once again, the innacuracies of the 
translations in the former work. (The Dutch copy of 
this letter at the Hague agrees in content with 
Ferguson’s translation).
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pointing out.that he had made this same demand many
1
times before. He wrote once again, on the 11th of the 
same month, demanding to know whether the Dutch were 
prepared to fulfill their promises or not*
Van Kittensteijn was convinced that his reply 
would not be agreeable to the King; he, therefore, 
decided to delay it as long as possible. Meanwhile, 
in order to please the King, he released the three 
lascarins, who had been captured from Rampoth.
Soon, however, alarming rumours reached Van 
Kittensteijn. It was said that the King was gathering 
his forces to come down* on the Dutch territory, and 
that he had also asked for assistance from the Portuguese. 
Van Kittensteijn*s spies were unable to find out whether 
the rumours had substance or not, because the Kandyans 
were closely guarding all approaches to their kingdom.
And Pieter Kieft, who had sent much secret information 
at the beginning of the year, had sent no news there­
after.
While Van Kittensteijn was contemplating what he 
should do in the circumstances, he heard that the
1. Kol.Arch. 1070 (Bis) fos. 648-49; also in Some Docs.
158-99* Kitt. had written to Raja on 1 April (Kol* 
Arch.1071 f0.357) and on April (Kol.Arch.1071 fos. 
358-59). The second of these letters is given in 
Some Docs. 154- - 55.
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renegade Portuguese, who was serving as Raja Sinha’s 
Vidana of Panama, had sent a message to the Sinhalese 
chiefs of Matara. In this message, the Vidana advised 
the chiefs to make their immediate submission to the 
King before the latter marched into the Matara 
Bissawani.
Van Kittensteijn was now certain that the King was
furious with the Butch and was planning to attack them#
He, therefore, withdrew into Matara, all the Butch
forces from the field, because he feared that if the
King himself came down the episode of Pannara might
be repeated. At Akuressa and Hakmana., he left some
lascarins and eight Hollanders to serve as outposts.
In order to placate the King, he wrote on the 2^rd 
1
July, saying that he had asked for advice from Batavia 
regarding the differences which had arisen over the 
Matara Bissawani. He further assured him that the reply 
from Batavia would be sure to meet His Majesty’s wishes. 
But Van Kittensteijn deliberately avoided any answer to 
Raja Sinha’s demand for a statement of the debt# He 
knew that his superiors at Batavia did not wish to
o
present the bill until a more favourable opportunity^
1. Kol.Arch.1070 (Bis) fos.651-52: cf.also Some Docs..
159-60.  ;—
2. Kitt. wrote to G.G.&C. ,on 20 1651 (Kol.Arch.IO77
fos.577-87) saying that the King had asked for the 
account and offered to pay the debt within one year, 
and that he could give no other reply to this than :
(continued).....
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1
The King’s reply to Van Kittensteijn was so 
friendly in tone that it appeared as if he was reconciled 
to what had happened. But it was just possible that 
the friendly tone was just a pretence, and therefore, Van 
Kittensteijn decided not to risk his forces outside 
the Matara fort for yet some time more.
At the close of April 1651, Van Kittensteijn. learned 
from secret information sent by Kieft, that the King was 
equipping a great expedition, the purpose of which the 
Dutch ambassador did not quite Know. In July and in 
August, Kieft sent further secret information to say 
that the King was preparing to attack the Dutch territory. 
Indeed, in August the King him self informed Kittensteijn- 
that he intended visiting the lowlands in order to 
discuss the disputes which had arisen previously. But 
although the King’s preparations for war caused alarm
(con tinued) :
Mdat sulcx sijne Maijt. te swaer, en ons te 
nadelich soude vallen, mitsgaders sijne Mts. Reecq.e 
van d ’gesupporteerde ongelden in sijnen dienst van 
Bat. sijn verwachtende, t welck hij entwijfel. voor 
frivole excusen soude aennemen.”
1. 25 Aug.1650, Kol.Arch.1070(Bis) fo.^JO* cf.also Pieris, 
Some Docs. ♦ 16>0* This translation is as innacurate
as most of the others in this book.
Prom the translation of Kitt.’s letter of 6 Kov.1650, 
Dr. Pieris (Some Docs. 162) concludes that the com­
munications of the Dutch with their outposts at 
Hakmana and Akuressa were cut off. In Kitt’s. letter 
there is no evidence at all to that effect.
1
the Dutch territories were left undisturbed.
In September, Kieft was caught holding a secret 
correspondence with a captive Portuguese priest# At 
about the same time, one of Kieft’s Dutch attendants 
had, in a fit of drunkenness wounded one of the King’s 
hunting buffaloes. Van Kittensteijn was quick to 
offer his apologies over these incidents, and the King 
was prepared to overlook them. In the follov/ing month, 
however, he was once again displeased with the Dutch*
The excessive vanity, which had sometimes been revealed 
in his letters, appears to have developed into some­
thing like megalomania, and he now required the Dutch 
to address him as 1 God our Lord" .* But this the 
latter were not prepared to do, despite his pointing 
out that not only his own subjects but even foreign
princes and the Portuguese gave him that title or others
2similar to it, when addressing him.
1. cf.on abovelf Diary of Kieft, March-April 1651, Kol. 
Arch. 1077 fos.504-16; Kieft to Kitt. 5 ,4,8 Aug.1651 , 
Kol.Arch. 1077 fos.517-21; Raja to Kieft, 1 Aug.1651, 
Kol.Arch.1077 Raja to Kitt, 25 July l651,Kol.
Arch.1077 fo.526; same to same, 10 Aug.1651, JCRAS 
XVIII-209J Kitt. to G.G.&C., 5 April 1 651, Kol.Arch. 
IIO77 .fos .411-—'17$ Kitt. to G.G.&C. , JQ Aug. 1 651 • Kol. 
Arch.1077 fo. 474.
2. Kitt & C. to G.G.&C. , 25 Sep.1651, Kol.Arch. 10JJ fos. 
476-86; same to same, 9 Nov. 1651, Kol.Arch*1077 fos. 
489-90; G.G.&C., to Kitt., 22 Nov.1651, Kol.Arch.778- 
p.401 - G.G.&C., to Dirs. , 24 Jan.1652, Kol.Arch. 1074 
fos. 28-29. 1
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Throughout 1b^2 the Dutch continued on friendly
terms with the King. On September Raja Sinha
wrote to Van Kittensteijn, asking the latter to inform
him before commencing war with the Portuguese. On
October 2bth Van Kittensteijn informed the King of the
resumption of war, which was then earnestly taken in
1
hand by Raja Sinha.
At this point, it may be well to consider why 
Raja Sinha did not go to war with the Dutch over the 
deceit practiced on him by Maetsuijcker. One of the 
most important reasons, which prevented him from taking 
to the sword was his belief that he was under unlucky 
stars during this period. In fact, somewhere about the 
beginning of 1650 or earlier he had been even warned 
by his astrologers to stay out of his capital-city of
Kandy for two years in order to mitigate the evil
2
planetary influences. Another reason for the King’s 
peaceful policy, was the trouble, which he had with
3
some of his subjects, who tried to do away with him;
1 • „ Kitt.&C. to G.G.&C., 29 Feb. 1652 , Kol. Arch. 1086 fos. 
57Q-78* Same to same, 21 April and 16 May 1652, Kol. 
Arch.1086 fos.581-90; same to same, 7 July l6§2,Kol. 
Arch.1086 fos.594-60b; Raja to Kitt., 5 Sep.1652 
JCRAS XXI, 260-bo; Raja to Kieft, 10 Jan.1 6^2.JCRAS 
XVIII. 210. “ ’
,2. cf(3Jlsabove p. £ 13); Diary of Kieft, Marfih-April
1651, Kol. Arch. IO77 fos., Ko-l»Aroh»-1Q77-f-03. 504-1 6; 
Raja to Kieft, 10 Jan. I652, JCRAS XVIII. 210^!- 
J.cf. Adriaen van der Meijden to Kitt. 26 Feb.1650,
Kol.Arch., 1071 fos. 417-18.
(Undoubtedly he must have drawn a strong connection 
between his evil planets and the disaffection of his 
subjects). Then again, the bitter hatred, which he 
always bore towards the Portuguese, was continually 
overshadowing his bitterness towards the Dutch. More­
over, he knew that the Portuguese fully returned the 
compliment, and he was, therefore, afraid that his old 
enefay might make a sudden flank-attack on him, while 
he was engaged with the Dutch. Besides, he was too 
aware of the fact that, whatever success he might obtain, 
he could not drive the Dutch from their fortresses; a 
limited success would not alter the situation 
permanently in his favour*
In addition to all these reasons, certain measures 
taken by the Dutch also influenced the King towards a 
peaceful policy. Van Kittensteijn seems to have 
correctly guessed that Raja Sinha wished to capture a 
sufficient number of Dutch prisoners, so that he could 
once more be in a position to dictate terms. Therefore, 
by withdrawing the Dutch forces, into the fort of Matara, 
he had effectively frustrated the King’s intentions.
The way, however, by which the Dutch most inclined the 
King towards a peaceful and indeed, a friendly dis - 
position, was by the succession of presents and the
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constant flattery, which they bestowed on him. It was
1 not
Maetsuijcker, who had first suggested that^only Raja
Sinha1s craze for the strange and the rare, but also
his vainglorious nature should he satisfied as much
as possible, in order thereby to cajole and to placate
him* This suggestion was put into effect by Maet -
suijcker himself and continued even more thoroughly by
Van Kittensteijn. Kven when he was unable to send a
present along with his letters, Van Kittensteijn found
that an extra amount of flattery could more than make
up for the absence of one. For instance, on the 17th
2
September 1650, he wrote to the King :
tvtuch
"We would regret that we have nothing of 
_any value to offer His Majesty; but 
before long, we hope to send His Majesty, 
something that will be worthy of pre - 
sentation before so great a Potentate as 
His Majesty. '*
Apart from greatly helping to ensure peace, these
flatteries and presents had the added advantage for the
Dutch that Raja Sinha sometimes sent return-presents,
which were many times the value of what had been sent
to him. ■(
1. Maet. to G.G.&C., 18 Nov. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 
fos. 505-18.
2. Kol.Arch. 1070 (Bis) fos. 652 - 55.
5. cf. G.G.&C., to Dirs. 2k- Dec. 1652, Kol. Arch. 
1080 fos* 15^ - 66. ■
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Ever since the military disasters of 164-6 
the Du ten had been anxious to he on peaceful terms 
with the King, and at last they had achieved their 
aim. But regarding the Portuguese, the Dutch had been 
anxious for nothing so much as for a resumption of 
hostilities.
It will be remembered that Maetsuijcker had been 
sent from Batavia with secret orders for a surprise 
attack on the Portuguese. But on account of the hostile 
relations with the King and the losses sustained at 
his hands, friaetsuijcker found it inadvisable to attack 
them until the situation improved somewhat. He was, 
hov/ever, convinced that on account of their weak 
situation they would not take up arms, unless the 
gravest provocation was given to them. Therefore, he 
had no apprehension in refusing to place the Ehaleas of 
Welitara and Kosgoda, at their disposal, although, he, 
thereby, violated the agreement of 10th January 164.5.
By the end of 164-6 he felt confident enough to decide 
to expel all the Portuguese from Dutch territory and to 
confiscate their lands. But when he heard, early in
Z3S
i64.7, that the Portuguese hah recently obtained
considerable reinforcements from Goa, and that they
were carrying on secret negotiations with Raja Sinha,
he decided to carry out his intentions at a more
favourable opportunity. But he expelled two Portuguese
priests, who had continued their activities in Dutch
territory, and also one Prancisco Antunes, whom he
considered to be a very harmful influence amongst the
1
Company’s subjects.
2
Meanwhile, on 15th January 16if7, Cornells van der
Lijn and his Councillors wrote to the Directors of the
Company asking for permission to resume the war v/ith
the Portuguese. By letter of 26 January, Maetsuijcker
too suggested the same idea to the Directors. Two years 
if
later the Batavian authorities wrote once again on the 
subject, pointing out that as the Portuguese 7/ere 
carefully refraining from affording them any excuse for 
commencing hostilities, there was no way of breaking the 
truce unless they received positive orders to do so.
1. cf. on the above: G.G.&C. to Maet., 50 Aug.l6if6,Kol. 
Arch.775, PP*29 R e s o l u t i o n  of Maet.& C., 51 Dec* 
I6if6, Kol.Arch.i065 (,Bis) fo.759; Maet. to Dirs. ,26 
Jan* l6lf7> Kol.Arch. 1065 fos*2b6-72; Maet. to G.G.&C., 
15 April l6if7, Kol.Arch. 1065 fos* 79 - 87*
2. Kol.Arch. 1062 fos. 2 - 7.
5. Kol.Arch. 1065 fos. 266 - 72.
if. 18 Jan. 164-9, Kol.Arch. 1066 fos* 75 - 85*
The idea of commencing war with the Portuguese, was 
an attractive one for the Directors, who saw in it the 
only means of preventing the Portuguese from competing 
with the Company in the European spice-market and 
thereby reducing its profits. Therefore, in their 
letter of ifth October 16^7> they asked the Governor- 
General and Council to begin the war if there was a 
defensible excuse for it. But they must confine them­
selves to only defensive warfare in Ceylon, where the 
number of soldiers must be greatly reduced in order 
to diminish the burdensome expenses of a huge garrison. 
The blockade of Goa, however, was to be taken up in 
earnest. But in their letter of the 9th of the following 
month, they thought it advisable that all available 
forces should be used in Ceylon in order to drive out 
the Portuguesef completely from that island. This idea 
was even more clearly expressed in their letter of 28 
March 16M8. But in September of that year, they were 
once more enjoining Batavia to reduce the garrison in 
Ceylon, and to think of being on the defensive there.
And on 2^rd September I6df9> they sharply ordered the
Batavian authcrities to follow instructions and reduce
1
the forces in Ceylon.
1. The letters referred to in this para are found in s 
Kol.Arch. 5, fos* 75 - 85, fos. 97 - 98, fo. 102*., 
fo. 11b and fos. 14*5 - k-6 respectively, cf. also 
MacLeod ii.571.
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Prom all these instructions, it is apparent that 
the Directors were in two minds regarding the war 
question. Realising this,, Van der Lijn and his 
colleagues acted warily, and the result was,that, 
until after the expiry of the Ten Year’s Truce, war 
was not resumed.
Meanwhile, throughout the period of the Truce, 
the Portuguese were well on their guard because they 
knew that the Dutch would not neglect any good 
opportunity of attacking them. Por the same reason, they 
took care not to give the Dutch sufficient reason for 
a casus belli.
They v/ere not so fearful, however, as to let the 
%
Dutch have their own way in the disputes, which arose 
during the period of truce. Wherever possible, they 
either held their own or took retaliatory measures.
Por instance, despite all threats, they refused to budge 
from the lands of Alauwa and Widinawaya. And when early 
in 16^9 Maetsuijcker made bold to expel all Portuguese 
property-holders from Dutch jurisdiction, Homem 
retaliated by refusing passage through Portuguese 
territory to the Chaleas, who were sent from Galle to 
peel cinnamon in IMegambo. (As a result, the Dutch had to 
undergo much expense and inconvenience in transporting 
the dhaleas and the cinnamon by sea).
2,1+1
The Portuguese did not content themselves with 
merely defensive or retaliatory measures. Where they 
saw an opportunity of harming the Dutch, without 
running the risk of thereby precipitating a war, they 
took it. For instance, when in 1646 Raja Sinha came 
down on the Dutch in Kegambo, Homem secretly ordered 
the inhabitants to take supplies to the King’s army. 
Then again, by threats and other unscrupulous means, 
he prevented many Indian me rchants from trading with 
the Dutch ports. The Viceroy himself caused much harm 
to the Dutch by successfully inciting the Nayaka of 
kadura to expel them from Kayalpatanam.
For the attitude of the Portuguese and the measures 
taken by them, see, in particular: Instructions for 
Maet., 1 Feb. 1646, Kol.Axcn.775 pp.51-59; Resolution 
Maet. & C., 51 Dec. 1646, Kol. Arc^ i. 1065 (Bis) fo. 
759; Maet, to G.G.&C., 18 Hov.1647, Kol.Arch. 1065 fos. 
505-18; Same to same, 17 March 1649j Kol.Arch. 1069 
fos. 452-67; Arent Baerentsen to G.G.&C., 22 May 1649, 
Kol.Arch. 1069 fos. 487-89; Viceroy to King (of 
Portugal, 14 Jan. 1649* Bk.59.fo.5O (BP*, of the Mon­
soons) I. 0. L. Port.Rees. iTrans) 16.
In retaliation for the expulsion of the Dutch from 
Kayalpatanam, Maet. led an expedition to the Coast of 
Madura early in 1649* the course of this expedit­
ion the Portuguese at Tutucorin had to pay for the 
sins of their Viceroy, cf. MacLeod, ii.576-82; M.A.P. 
Roelofsz., De Vestiging der Rederlanders ter gusfos 
Malabar (Vol.4 of the Verhandelingen van het Koninkli.ik 
Instituut, etc., Hague 1945) 125 - 28.
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Despite their friendly neutrality towards Raja 
Sinha during the latter’s campaign against the Dutch,
the Portuguese, as we have seen earlier, were unable 
to obtain peace from the King. And although there
fact was that during the years of the Truce with the
Dutch, the Portuguese lost a large amount of territory
to the King, particularly in the Pour and Seven Korales.
With Raja Sinha continuing at enmity with them, and
the Dutch awaiting orders for a resumption of war,
the Portuguese applied themselves to strengthening
1
and improving the fortifications of Colombo , on the 
strength of which lay their hopes of survival in Ceylon.■
1. Although the Portuguese have accused Homem of having 
completely neglected to attend to the fortifications 
of the city, the Dutch always refer to the fact that 
Colombo was being "incessantly” fortified during the 
truce years, cf. eg. Instructions for Maet. 1 Feb. 
1646, Kol.Arch. 775 pp.21-59; Kitt. to G.G.&C., 5 
April 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 411 -17; Same to 
same, 29 Feb. 1652, Kol. 1086 fos. 570 - 78.
lulls to the fighting, the
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CHAPTER VII
Aims And Methods Of Dutch Administration, 1644-52*
By 1652, the Dutch East India Company was de facto 
ruler over a considerable extent of territory in Ceylon. 
In the south-west portion of the island, its territory 
stretched along the coast from the Bentota-Ganga to the 
Walawe-Ganga. At certain points of this coastal strip 
its sway extended up to some thirty or forty miles 
inland; but at certain, others, its authority did not 
extend so far. In terms of the Korale or district 
divisions of the country, this territory comprised the 
Dolosdas, Morawak, Weligam and Galu Korales and small 
portions of tne Walallawiti and Pasdum Korales. Por a 
brief period in 1645* Governor Jan Thijssen seems to 
have controlled the Kolonna Korale, but during the war
1. But they Kept up the fiction of holding the lands 
only until they should have paid themselves, from 
the produce of theae lands, the “enormous debt” which 
was owing to them from the King.-In their correspondence 
I with the King, all the Governors (and Presidents,etc)
\ I signed themselves as “His Majesty’s humble servant” 
and the forts and territories were referred to as “His 
Majesty's forts” etc. The legal position regarding 
the lands was thus given by Maetsuijcker: “...dewijl 
de landen op’s conincs name besitten, ende~deselve 
oock inflerdaet de sijnen moeten blijven, bij aldien den 
inhoude des contracts voldoet.“ Maet. to G.G.&C.,
18 Nov., 1647, Kol.Arch. 1065 fos. 505-I8. cf. also 
Memoirs of Joan Maetsuijcker. 25-26.
with the King, it was lost for good. As a result of 
this same war, the Company lost the rich and extensive 
Seven Korales, in the area of Uegambo, where it was left 
with only a small territory in the vicinity of the fort* 
The Company’s lands were ruled by a President or a 
Governor (as the case may be) assisted by a Council.
The Governor (or President) and Council were under the 
supreme authority of the Governor-General and Council, 
without whose previous con sent no major decisions were 
generally taken., and, to whom regular reports on all 
important matters had to be sent*
Apart from the Governor and the Secretary, the 
officers usually represented on the Council were the 
Senior Merchant, the Fiscal, the Receiver of the Lands* 
Incomes, the Chief Captain of the Armed Forces, the 
Captain of the Mahabadde and the Captain of the Galu 
Korale. These last two officers were not necessarily, 
or even often, military men, as their functions were 
more civil than military* In the Council, the person 
next in rank to the Governor was the Senior Merchant, 
who was in charge of matters connected with trade and
2, if?
1
finance*
In theory, the Governor was expected to decide 
important matters only in consultation with the Council; 
in practice, however, he did not fully adhere to this 
principle. But when in 1651 the Batavian authorities 
received secret information that Van Kittensteijn had 
taken certain important decisions without the consent 
of the Council they sent the following explicit orders 
to him :
1 We require that in future you will not under­
take or decide any matters of importance, 
except with previous consent and common decision 
of the Council - as happens here and every­
where, v/here good order is maintained. And, 
so that the Councillors may have the fuller 
knowledge of all matters concerning the affairs 
of government, they will, in future, sign 
the letterSpfto Batavia, apparently} along 
with you. M
1. It has been wrongly maintained that "the Dutch 
Government of Ceylon remained primarily of a military 
character and composition "up to 1658 and that a 
regular civil administration was set up only from 
that date (cf. M.W.Jurriaanse, Catalogue of the 
Archives of the Dutch Central Government of Coastal 
Ceylon. I6if0-1796. 5. and K.L.Brohier, Land. Maps
(fc1 Surveys. Colombo 1^5°> i.11) What is said earlier 
§nd in the following pages (of this thesis) is 
sufficient evidence to prove the contrary. How anxious 
the Dutch were to maintain the predominantly civilian 
character of the administration is further indicated 
by their great reluctance to place a military officer 
in charge of Negambo, although at this time the 
importance of Hegambo was more military than economic 
(cf. Arent Baerentsen to G.G.&C., 22 May 16if9, Kol. 
Arch. 1069 fos. if87 - 89).
2. G.G.&C. to Kitt. if April 1 651 , Kol.Arch. 778 pp.126- 
32.
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These orders seemed to have had much effect, because 
there after,~ at least up to 165B - the Batavian authorities 
heard of no instance where the Governor had acted in 
any matter of importance, without the consent of the 
Council.
The Dutch territory in Negembo was administered
by an Qpperhooft or Chief, who was subordinate to the
Governor and Council in Galle. Nevertheless, he
exercised a considerable measure of independence,
because the authorities in Galle had no opportunity
of directly supervising his actions, except during a
rare visit, which the Governor might make to Negambo#
The day to day administration of the lands in the
Galle area was divided up among four officers, whose
actions were more or less effectively supervised by
the Governor and Council. They exercised administrative,
judicial and military authority in the territories
under their charge. But this authority was limited,
because they had to submit all matters of importance,
1
to the Governor and Council for advice and decision.
1. The limited powers given to the subordinate officers 
and the relatively strict supervision, which was 
maintained over these officers, were features, which 
were very much - if not entirely - lacking under the 
administration of the Portuguese. For the administrat­
ion of the Portuguese see : Queyroz, 1005 ff#; Hibeiro, 
25ft, passim. ; Pieris, Port.Era.>ii, 33-93; 
Codrington, Short Hist.. 124-32#
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Of these four officers, the least in importance, 
was the off icer-in-charge of the outposts along the 
Bentota-Gauga. In addition to his military duties, 
he administered the por tions of the Pasdum and 
Walallawiti Korales belonging to the Dutch. The laids 
and the number of inhabitants undejp his authority were 
of comparatively small proportions. In his work, he 
was assisted by the Sinhalese Adigar of Bentota.
The Captain of the I.lahabadda or cinnamon Department 
was another officer (from among these four) who 
administered a comparatively small area. The Chalea 
villages of Kosgoda, Y/elitara, Madampe, Akurala, 
ftatgama, Dadalla, Magalla and Lanumodera were under 
this Captain; so also were one or two villages of the 
Walallawiti Norale , in which lived the caste called 
the Panneas, who also were bound by ancient custom to 
peel cinnamon. The Captain of the Mahabadda was 
assisted by four Sinhalese Vidanas, in the task of 
administering the Chaleas (and Panneas) and in seeing 
that the prescribed quota of cinnamon was obtained 
annually. As cinnamon-, was by far the most profitable 
source of income from the island, for the Company, the 
Captaincy of the Mahabadda was one of the most important 
posts in the Dutch Government in Ceylon#
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The Captaincy of the extensive and populous Galu 
Korale was another important post. In administering 
the lands, the Captain was assisted hy a Sinhalese 
Mudaliyar. The Captain of Galu Corale, as also the 
Captain of the Mahabadda were members of the Governor’s 
Council, and they had their usual residence within the 
fort.
In charge of a much larger area than the Captain
of the Galu Korale, was the Dissawe of matara, Yfho
administered the Weligam, Dolosdas and Marawalc Korale s.
Although the Dutch Dissawe did not have more than a
2
small fraction of the powers, which the Portuguese had 
allowed their Dissawes to assume, yet he still enjoyed 
much respect and prestige among the Sinhalese 
inhabitants. As he administered the Dissawani from 
Matara, which was about thirty miles from Galle, the 
Governor and Council were not able to supervise his 
actions, constantly. This gave him a greater measure 
of independence than either the Captain of the Mahabadda 
OP the Captain of the Galu Korale could hope to have.
1. Note that the Chalea villages fell within the Galu 
Korale, but they were under the authority of the 
Captain of the Mahabadda.
2. Por the powers of the Portuguese Dissawes and their 
abuse of those powers, sees Queyroz, 97, 1099-1035* 
Ribeiro, M9. 9
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But he (as also the three other officers mentioned 
above) had to submit frequent reports of his actions 
and refer all important matters to the decision of 
the Governor and Council. Moreover, the Governor 
himself paid occasional visits to Matara to find out 
things for himself. By these means.a tolerable check 
on the Dissawefs actions was assured. The Dissawe was 
assisted in the work of administration by the Adigar 
of Matara, the foremost Sinhalese chief in Dutch 
territory?
The principal source of revenue from this territory 
was, as earlier remarked, the cinnamon*. On an average, 
about 800 bahars of M80 (Dutch) pounds the bahar were
annually sent to Batavia and thence to the Netherlands.
ii 2
Pricing j^ at the very low figure of one florin per pound
the Dutch could obtain at least 98^,000 florins annually
from this cinnamon*
The second important item of revenue was derived
from the sale of elephants. The inhabitants assigned
to the hunt, had, from ancient times, to deliver thirty-
four elepha&ts annually to the lord of the land. Por
1. See table at end of Chapter.
2. Even during the period of strongest Portuguese 
competition, the average price seems to have been 
about 1£ florins (cf. G.G.&C. to Kitt., 17 Aug.
1652, Kol.Arch., 779 fos. 528 - 99.)
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For various reasons, such as the lack of sufficient
1
decoy-elephants, the full quota was never supplied 
during the period under review. From the full quota, 
the Dutch could hope to obtain at least sixty or 
seventy thousand florins yearly.
The customary dues paid by the inhabitants, the 
rents and leases and the tolls, together constituted 
another important item of revenue. Annually some twenty 
to thirty thousand florins were realised from this item, 
from,which the Dutch were expecting to obtain more 
revenue in in the future, by such measures as raising 
the tolls.
The trade in arecanuts which v/ere found in great
quantity in the Dutch territory, also promised fair
profits. If the cloth, which was brought from
Coromandel in exchange for the arecanut, could be sold
at their own prices, the Dutch stood to obtain a larger
profit. But the Moors, who had long been doing this
exchange trade, were such keen competitors that the
2
Dutch had to be content with small profits*
1. One other important reason was that Manamperi Arachchi 
the man in charge of the hunt, was secretly hindering 
it. But in 1655 was caught going too far, when in 
the hearing of the Dissawe he boldly ordered his men 
to release a magnificent elephant, saying it was too 
good for the Hollanders. He was, therefore, soon put 
into prison, where he died (Kitt. to G.G.&C., 5 Dec* 
1655, Kol*Arch. 1092 fos. 525 - 45.)
2. Ho figures for arecanut sales during this period are 
available. But it is unlikely that more than a few
(continued)....,
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It is apparent from all that has been said above, 
that the profits from the cinnamon were about three or 
four times the total profits from all the other items 
of revenue in the Dutch territory in Ceylon, But the 
interesting fact was, that in calculating the hevenue 
and Expenditure Account of Ceylon, the Dutch did not 
include the cinnamon, as part of the Island^ revenue.
The Directors of the Company and the Batavian authorities 
wished the Island to balance its budget without its 
most important item of revenue.
(continued) :
thousand florins were realised annually,
Dor some details regarding the other items of 
revenue mentioned see : Extract from the Trade Books 
of Galle, Kol*Arch, 1116 fos. 884ff.
In order to oust the koors from the arecanut and 
cloth trade the authorities in Ceylon made various 
suggestions, the most notable of which were (a) to 
buy up all arecanut for the Company, thus creating a 
monopoly and (b) to hold up the Moor*s' cloth in the 
customs house until the Company had sold all its cloth. 
These suggestions were considered too premature and 
extreme by G.G.&C. (cf. Kitt, to G.G.&C., 6 Hov.1650, 
Kol.Arch,1070 Bis.fos.65^— JJ; Same to same, 5 April 
1651, Kol.Arch. IO77 fos.415-17; G.G.&C.. to Kitt., 4
April 1651 and 19 July 1651, Kol.Arch.778, pp.126-32 
and 271-72).
2.Hence the constant references to deficits in the Ceylon 
Accounts (eg. G.G.&C. to Dirs. , 20 Jan. 1651, Kol.Arch. 
1070 fo.7; Van Dam, Beschriivinge etc. Bk.2.pt.2 ,pp. 
393 > ^3^-33; MacLeod, ii.14o, 149) • Van Kitten­
steijn clearly proved that if the returns from the 
cinnamon were taken into the account, the Company would 
annually have (on an average) a nett profit of at least 
200,000 florins (Kitt. to G.G.&C., 6 Hov.1650, Kol. 
Arch.1070 Bis. fos.654-77).cf. also Camb.Hist.of India,
v.57. : "
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There was one big difficulty, which obstructed the
realisation of this desirable aim; namely, the expenses
involved in maintaining the comparatively huge forces
stationed in the Island. To get over this difficulty and,
at the same time, to consolidate the Company1s
position, the idea of founding a large Dutch colony
in Ceylon was taken up. It was felt that the military
forces could be reduced to very inexpensive proportion
by following the practice of the Portuguese and
entrusting the defence of the fortresses to the 
1
colonists.
It was Maetsuijcker, who first put this idea into
practice in Ceylon. He was convinced that the Company
possessed no place more suitable than Ceylon, for
2
founding a large Dutch colony. When he was in Ceylon
1. The project of colonisation in Ceylon was part of a 
larger scheme intended for all the Dutch possessions 
in the East. At least from the time of Coen, the 
project of founding Dutch colonies in order thereby
to consolidate the Company's power$ and greatly reduce 
its expenses, was entertained. Van Diemen considered 
this project desirable; but it was Maetsuijcker who 
expressed the greatest enthusiasm for it. cf. on these 
points: Colenbrander, Kol.Ges., ii.120-22; G.G.&C., to 
Dirs. , 5° Nov.1640, in J.K.J. de Jonge, De Opkomst van 
het Nederlandsch Gezag etc., (Amsterdam 1862-75) v. " 
242-45; k,Advice given to the Heeren 1 7... regarding 
the Netherlands colonies in India", by Joan Maetsuijckea 
Kol.Arch.44647
2. Maet to Dirs., 26 Jan.1647> hoi.Arch. 1065 fos. 266-72.
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in 16^5 in connection with the truce negotiations, he 
premitted several soldiers to leave the Company’s 
service and set themselves up as colonists. When he 
returned to Ceylon in 16W>, he continued this policy; 
so that at his departure for Batavia in 16^0 , there 
were nearly seventy colonists.
host of these men were provided with villages and
estates for their maintenance, and all were given every
possible help, short of anything that might be
considered prejudicial to the Company’s interests. For
instance, whereas tolls were imposed on all other
private merchants, the colonists could import rice
without paying any tolls. Then again from the time of
Van Kittensteijn even cinnamon (though of the coarser
varieties) was sold to the colonists, who were permitted
1
to re-sell it in various parts of India.
Nevertheless, despite all efforts, the project of 
colon isation did not progress satisfactorily. With but 
few exceptions, the colonists showed little or no 
enterprise and energy. They were content with merely 
drawing the incomes from the villages allotted to them. 
There were some, in fact, who were too lazy to look 
after their villages and estates and rented these out 
for half their value. Those who had not been given
1. Kitt. to G.G.&C» , 6 Nov. 1650, Kol.Arch. 1070(Bis)fos.
65^ - 77.
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sufficient lands, rapidly went to ruin through poverty.
And as the Company had no more lands available for
allotment, Van Kittensteijn stated that there was
little of no prospect of an increase in the size of
the Colony. In fact, many colonists were importunating
1
him to take them back into the service of the Company.
Apart from the colonists1 lack of enterprise and
disinclination for hard work, the character of the native
women, v/hom most of them married, had much to do with
their failure. The Directors had expressed their desire
to see the colonists married to native women of the 
2
best castes. But, in reality, that desire was hardly 
ever realised. Few, except those who had nothing to lose 
and everything to gain, had the courage to marry the 
Dutch soldiers (for almost all the colonists were 
soldiers). And these women, either through their un- 
faithfulness, or their extravagant habits or both, 
dragged many of the colonists to ruin.
1. Kitt. to G. G. &C. , 6 Nov. 1630, 1Ibid.
Same to Same, 20 Jan.1631, Kol.Arch.1077 fos.377-87;
Same to Same, 29 April Ibjjl, Kol.Arch. 1077 fos.426-29. 
MacLeod (ii.376) is, however, incorrect in saying that 
the Council in Galle prevented marriages with native 
women.
2. Dirs. to G. G.&C. , 5 Sep. 1bif1 , K o l . A r c h . n o  paginati­
on. The Dirs. were very enthusiastic about the idea of 
colonization, because they could be rid of heavy ex - 
penses if, instead of mercenary soldiers, the colonists 
undertook the defence of the Company’s possessions.
They were even prepared to pay a “moderate premium,, for 
soldiers who married native women-and settled down^as 
colonists (cf.Dirs. to G. G.&C. ,26 April 1650, Kol.Arch.
(continued on next page; see also n. 3)....
Thus, through one reason or another, the prospects of 
improving and consolidating the Company’s position 
in Ceylon by means of a large colony, seemed doomed to 
failure. But there were other ways in which the Dutch 
were attempting to strengthen their hold on the 
country; for instance, by converting the Sinhalese
subjects to the Dutch Church.
1
As early as '\bk-Q, the Batavian authorities had 
been thinking of ways and means of converting the 
Sinhalese in order to make them loyal to the Dutch 
interests. But until 1 bif M and after, when they became 
a territorial power in the Island, they had no 
opportunity of carrying out their intentions.
n.2 continued) :
4-^ 5 fos.159“bO; MacLeod, H . M 34-) The emphasis on 
the colonists' marrying native women, was because it 
was more expensive to send Dutch families from the 
Netherlands and it was not possible to prevent these 
families from returning home. But in the case of 
those who married native women, their permanent stay 
in the East, could be assured by prohibiting their 
return to Europe, unless their wives and children 
were all dead. (cf. Realia, iii. 127).
n.3 from previous page) :
To prevent the unfaithfulness of these women, 
Maetsuijcker made the interesting (and amusing) 
suggestion that they should, be kept indoors in “an honour­
able confinement’* (“e^Lijke opsluitinge”). Maet. to 
Dirs., 2b Jan. 1 Gk-J, Kol. Arch. 1063 - 72.
1. cf. p. 15*3 above.
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When, finally, they began the task of converting 
the Sinhalese, they had to contend with - among others - 
the Portuguese priests and the homan Catholicism of 
many of the Sinhalese. By virtue of Article 6 of the 
Treaty of 10 November 16Ai, ,(made at Goa) the Portuguese 
priests had been permitted to return to their churches 
in territory assigned to the Butch, by that Treaty.
These priests were badly hit by kaetsfyuijckerfs
refusal to authorise them to coerce their flock to
attend church and supply them with food. Their position
was further harmed by the Vidanas and other headmen,
who were secretly ordered by the Butch to prevent the
inhabitants from atten ding church and to create all
possible difficulties^ for the priests. As a result
of this, many of the priests were soop forced to give
up their activities in Butch territory. Those who still
zealously persevered at their ministrations, were finally
- 2
expelled by Maetsuijcker in 164-7.
1. cf. p. \$G above*
2. "Councillors of India" to Thijs.,31 July 164-5, Kol. 
Arch. 772, pp.394^4-07;-ThjLJs. to G.G.&C. , 20 Aug.164.5, 
Kol.Arch.1Qp8 Bis. fos. 660 — 7Oj "Councillors of 
India" to kaet., 30 Aug. 1646, Kol. Arch. 773 pp* 
297- 320. us* *
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Concerned as the Dutch were over the influence of
Homan Catholicism, they were much more apprehensive
regarding "the heathendom" or Buddhism, which was the
religion of the majority of their subjects. The fact
was, they soon found that many of those who had been
most open to Portuguese cultural and religious
influences, were the men who were most loyal and
1
attached to the new rulers. But the "weak Christians", 
as the Dutch termed them, and the Buddhists, often 
revealed their sympathies and affections for the King of 
Kandy, whom they considered as the defender of their 
ancient faith and traditions.
But while the Dutch had expelled the Portuguese 
priests and forbidden the practice of the Roman Catholic 
religion, they did not dare to go so far with regard to 
Buddhism. This was because they feared the possible 
reactions of their own subjects, and of Raja Sinha himself. 
Nevertheless, they were prepared to go as- far as possible 
and at least to prevent an extension of Buddhist 
activities. For instance, in 164-7 they stopped the 
construction of a new temple begun by the chiefs of
1. It was no mere accident that almost all the chiefs,, 
on v/hose loyalty the Dutch were able to place most ' 
reliance, had names such as Dorn Joan da Costa,
Anthonio llebello, Bras Rodrigo and Antonio Mendes.
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Matara. But at least in the period under review (and 
indeed even up to 1658) the Butch appear not to have 
interfered with existing temples or religious practices 
of the Buddhists.
The measures against Homan Catholicism and Bhuddism 
were, however, only the negative aspects of their 
religious.policy. On the positive side lay their 
attempts at converting the Sinhalese to the"Reformed 
Religion."
The main work of conversion was conducted through 
the religious schools, established at most of the 
populous villages along the coast, and at one or two 
places in the interior. At first, a few "black" school­
masters were sent from Batavia; but very soon teaching 
in these schools was done by Sinhalese, who had
1. Maet. to G-.G-.&G. , 18 Kov.1bif7> Kol.Arch. 1065 fos.
505-18.
In the period under review (and indeed up to 1658)
'the above is the only example (in the Hague records) 
of interference with Buddhist activities. But without 
taking any strong measures, the Butch must have 
attempted to incommode Buddhist activities by various 
indirect measures. The declared policy regarding 
Buddhism was: !,de affgoderije onder de inwoonderen, soo 
veer als ons gebiedt street, en willen niet gedoogen, 
maer moet de selve met sachtigheijt, ende de 
beguaemste middelen, van dat onbesnoeijde volckje, 
werden affgeweert.w (G.G.uO. to Maet. 1b Sep. 16^8 , 
Kol. Arch. 775, pp.^00 - 01).
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previously taught in the Portuguese religious schools.
What had to be taught was prescribed by the Predikant
or Preacher, who gave certain formularies drawn up in
Portuguese for the purpose. The work of the school-
2
masters was supervised by the Krankbesoekers. ar visitors 
of the Sick. Both these were supervised by the 
Predikant during his rounds through the villages, once 
in two or three months. At such times, he also did some 
preaching to the inhabitants, with the aid of an 
interpreter. Furthermore, he baptised children, and 
solemnised the marriage of those who appeared before 
him for the purpose.
1. Maet. to G.G.&C. , 1J May 1b^8 , Kol.Arch. 1067,fos*
15^ - 159*
Although the formularies were drawn up in Portuguese, 
they were probably translated into Sinhalese by the 
schoolmasters, because the teaching was in that language 
Incidentally, since noifce of the Dutch religious 
workers knew enough Sinhalese the task of super­
vising the work of the schoolmasters must have been 
quite imperfectly done* 4 t/
2. Also called "ziekentroosters^ (lit.sick-comforters)•
They lie Id an ill-defined position, midway between a 
licensed preacher (Predikant) and a male nurse. Their 
duties consisted chiefly in visiting the sick, reading 
the daily prayers and singing a verse or two of the 
psalms for the garrison (or ship’s crew, as the case 
may be.) They were not allowed to preach extempore 
sermons, but could only read extracts from duly 
authorised printed collections. They also sometimes 
gave elementary school lessons to soldiers, sailors 
and others. Contemporary narratives are very critical 
of their educational attainments and way of life; it 
being commonly alleged that they were better termed 
drankbesoekers than krankbesoeckers. cf.C.A.L. Van 
Troostenburg de BruynY De Hervormde Kerk in Nederlandsch
(continued)
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| During this period, no direct compulsion seems to have been
j used in effecting conversions. The Sinhalese chiefs, who had been
if
i Homan Catholics, seem to have "been insinuated into "becoming
! Calvinists. The lure of bestowing various offices was also held
out to converts. To get children to attend school various agreeable
inducements, such as the present of small sums of money, were
1
made.
The policy of conversion did not, however, meet with great 
success. Except in the towns of G-alle and Negambo, the number of 
converts seems to have been small, and of the converts, many 
(if not most) were so only in name.
(continued):
Oost-Indig onder de Oost-Indische Compagnie, 1602-1795 
(Arnhem, 1882*.) pp. 342 ff; A.S. Carpenter Alting, “Predikanten 
en Ziekentroosters op de Vloot”, in Verslagen der Marine-Vereeniging, 
No.2 (Den Eelder, 1907-08) pp•139-74; Oost-Indise Spiegel, in 
J.C.M. Wamsinck [Ed], Reisen van Nicolaus de G-raaff (Werken 
Vitgegeven door de Linschoten-Veree raging, XXXIII], Pt. II. 28-29,
51.
2. Councillors of India” to Thijs., 31 July 1645, Kol. Arch.
772, pp.394-407; Maet. to G-.G-. & C., 13 April 1647,
Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 79-87; Albert Hooghland to Kitt., 
28 April 1631, Kol. Arch. 1077 fos. 446-47.
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There were several reasons for these poor results, 
the
For one tiling,^  Predikants and Krankbesoeekers were too 
few to undertake the work of conversion properly. At 
first there was only one Predikant in Ceylon, but by 
1650 there were three of whom one was at Negambo. As 
regards Kranbesoeckers, there were not more than six 
or seven. Ministrations to the Dutch militia at Galle 
and Matara and at the outposts, left these religious 
workers little time to devote to conversion. Then 
again, their ignorance of Sinhalese and imperfect 
knowledge of Portuguese severely limited their pro­
selytizing activities. Much depended, therefore, on 
the schoolmasters, on whose zeal no great reliance 
could be placed on account of their ready apostasy 
from Roman Catholicism. Indeed, on one occasion, the 
schoolmasters of Dondra had all to be dismissed "on 
acaount of their scandalous living and committed idolator^- 
ies". Finally many opthe Dutch religions themselves 
were found unsuitable for their vocation. For instance, 
the Predikants Lentsius and Hilarius had to be transported 
to Batavia, and thence to the Netherlands, on account 
of their improper behaviour. The Predikant Anthonius
1. Kitt. to G.G.&C# , 10 May 1650, Kol.Arch. 1071 fos.
325 - 35-
Z 6 Z
Stamperius was reported to have died at Negambo, in a
1
bout of drunkenness.
Fortunately, the Dutch did not depend too heavily 
on their religious policy, in their bid to win the 
loyalty of the Sinhalese to the Company's rule. Another 
line which they took in order to attain this objective, 
is indicated by the following words of Van der Lijn 
and his Council to Van Kittensteijn. ®
" This matter is clear and certain; namely, that 
we cannot obtain the fruits of the lands 
without the help of those people [.the Sinhalesej ; 
it is on account of this that they must be 
attached to us by means of all polite, 
friendly and mild treatment - and not because 
they merit such treatment or are worthy of it".
This was, indeed, the policy, which had already 
been put into practice, particularly during the Governor­
ship of Maetsuijcker; it was persevered in by Van 
Kittensteijn. In their attempt to rule with a mild 
and beneficient hand, these Governors were at times 
prepared to intervene actively on behalf of the in­
habitants, even against their own compatriots. For 
instance, in 1647 Maetsuijeker found that during the 
famine"foul profiteers, among whom,were several 
prominent servants of the Company", were fleecing the 
poorer inhabitants by selling rice at exorbitant prices^
1. Maet. to G.G.&C., Oct.164-8, Kol.Arch. 1067 fas#
11^-22; Kitt. to G.G.&C., 6 Nov. 1650, Kol.Arch.1070 
(Bis) fos. 654.-77.
2. 18 Sep. 1650, Kol. Arch. JJJ pp. 371 - 88*
3. Maet. to G.G.&c 1* Anr»^ i ^  ^ ^<£0. , 13 April I6lf7, Kol.Arch.1065 fos.73-87
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He, therefore, instituted a price-control and, to make the control
more effective, “began to sell rice on behalf of the Company at the
controlled rate. The Dutch Governors also took strong measures
against those among their compatriots, who ill-treated the inhabitants,
through a sense of power and racial superiority. For example, a
Dutch Sergeant who had beaten a Sinhalese Arachchi, with a cane was
1
immediately removed frcm office and deported to Batavia.
It wa3 also thought to be a necessary and good policy to govern
the Sinhalese, in the main, according to their ancient laws and 
2
customs. Thus the village administrations and the settlement of 
most judicial matters were left in the hands of the Sinhalese chiefs. 
Only the important administrative and judicial matters were taken up 
by the Dutch - and even then, generally, in consultation with the 
chiefs. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that among
3
the Commissioners of Daily and Civil Matters in Galle, were
1. Maet* to G.G. & C., 18 Nov. 1647, Kol. Arch. 1065 fos. 303-18.
2. At the Convention of Malwana in 1597 > the Portuguese had sworn to 
govern the Sinhalese according to their ancient laws and customs. 
But mainly because the Portuguese Government allowed its sub­
ordinate officers (both Portuguese and Sinhalese) to rule almost 
according to their desire, the spirit of these laws and customs 
was seldom kept, even though the fom was generally retained.
cf., Queyroz, 1008, 1010, 1019; Ribeiro, 25-26; Pieris, Port. 
Era, ii. 82*.; Codrington, Short History, 129.
3. "Commissarissen der dagelijcksen en civile saken.r Kol. Arch. 
1077 o^. 492. No details regarding the powers and functions of 
this body are known. The functions, apparently, were judicial 
and quasi-administrative,
(continued)....
three Sinhalese chiefs, the rest of the Commissioners 
being three high officials of the Company, and two 
colonists. Regarding the powers of the Adigar of 
Matara, it was declared that "the administration 
(of the katara lands) belongs to him in addition to 
the Dissawe. "
The Dutch were particularly anxious to uphold the 
chiefs in most of their ancient privileges and positions. 
By such a policy they hoped to win over this class, 
which, they believed, could preserve or destroy the 
Company1s power, in case of war with the King of Kandy.
It was no secret to the Dutch, that the chiefs of the 
Weligam, Dolosdas and korawak Korales, had very strong 
sympathies for that King. As they were almost all 
Buddhists or only nominal Christians, they looked up 
to Raja Sinha as the patron and defender of their faith. 
The Dutch hoped to counteract this sentimal attachment 
to the King, by giving the chiefs such material 
advantages under their rule that none of the chiefs
(continued) :
As the third-ranking person in the 
Dutch Government and the Fiscal, were members of 
this council, it must have had considerable powers#
1.G.G.&C. to Kitt. 3 July 1651, Kol.Arch. 778 pp-233- 
^8. cf. Memoir of Joan Maetsuijcker. ^0.
would wish for a change of government, TtThe richer
they are, the trustier they must become, as their
wealth is like a security of their loyalty.11 said
1
the Batavian authorities. Therefore, in addition 
to maintaining the chiefs in their old positions and 
privileges, they were given liberal grants of land 
particularly out of the confiscated Portuguese 
properties.^
All these measures must have made Dutch rule 
more palatable to the chiefs. Nevertheless, they 
v/ere yet far from being fully reconciled to it. On 
2^rd September 1651, Van Kittensteijn is found
5writing tnus to Batavia, regarding the chiefs of the
. 1. G.G.& C. , to Kitt., 5 July 1651 , 1 bid.
2. Por Dutch policy towards their Sinhalese subjects,cf: 
Maet. to G.G.& C. , 1J May 1648, Kol. Arch. 1067 fos.
194-59i same to same, 20 June 1649* Kol.Arch.1069 
fos.480-82; Kitt. to G.G.& C. , 10 May 1650, Kol.
Arch.1071 fos. 325 - 55* same to same, 5 April 1651, 
Kol. Arch. IO77 fos. 415 - 17; G. G.& C. , to Kitt.,
18 Sep. 1650, Kol.Arch. JJJ pp. 571 - 88. Same to 
same, 5 July, 1651, Kol. Arch. 778 pp. 255 - 58, etc. : 
Memoirs of Joan Maet., 28-54. Valentyn (128-55) 
has a lengthy though often innacurate extract from 
this invaluable Memoir (cp.eg. Valentyn, 150 with 
relevant sentences on p. 27 of the Memoir .Aalbers 
(62-65) has utilised parts of the extract in Valentyn.
5. Kitt. to G.G.& C. , 25 Sep. 1651, Kol. Arch. 1077 
fos. 476 ~ 86.
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Matara area:
"From our daily experiences we judge that 
they imagine that so long as they have 
to submit to our rule (although in peace 
and quiet) they consider themselves to 
be in slavery.M
In these circumstances, the loyalty of the chiefs 
was mainly assured, through the military power of the 
Dutch. The fort of. Galle had always stood like a 
pistol pointed at the head of the chiefs of Galu Korale; 
the construction of a new fort at Matara similarly 
overawed the chiefs of the Korales around Matara.(The 
fact was, that a fort on the coast was something which 
the Sinhalese kings had never succeeded in capturing) 
Their freedom of independent action was still further 
limited, when Maetsuijcker induced them to take up 
residence in Matara. Unlike when they were spread out 
all over the land, their actions could now be closely 
watched by the Dutch, and as their families had always 
to be in Matara, they could not easily rebel against 
the rulers, without risking the loss of their families. 
In this manner, the Dutch maintained a strong hold on 
the loyalty of their subjects in Ceylon.
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Chapter Till
Expulsion of the Portuguese# Dutch. Power Predominant
The long-awaited orders for a resumption of the war with the
Portuguese, reached Van Kittenstei jn and his Council on the 20th June 
1
1652* Along with these orders, they had been sent only twenty
Javanese as reinforcements# They decided, therefore, to postpone a
declaration of war, until they should have received more reinforcements
from Batavia# They were all the more induced to make this decision,
because elephant-hunting and cinnamon-peeling were on at the moment;
any military set-backs might not only derange these activities but
2
also result in the loss of the cinnamon, and the cinnamon-peelers#
In September, 150 soldiers and three warships were received as 
reinforcements from Batavia# Before the end of that month, the 
cinnsmon-harvest had been gathered, and elephant *-hunt ing concluded#
Van Kittenstei jn and his Council, therefore, considered the moment 
appropriate and sent the Merchant Si jbrandt Groes to inform Mascarehhas
1# Kitt. & C$# to G.G. & C., 7 July 1652, Kol#Arch# 1086 fos# 594-606#
Batavia itself had received orders for the resumption of the war, on 
5 April, by letter of 14 Oct# 1651 from the Dirs# (Kol#Arch 455 
fos# 231-53}
2# Kitt# & C# to G.G. & C#, 7 July 1652, Ibid# Aalbers (44) gives only 
one reason for the postponement; he omits the more important one 
regarding the lack of sufficient forces#
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Hcmem that the war would be resumed immediately#
Mascarenhas Hamem plainly showed his disappointment and vexation
at the news which was brought to him# In any case, he refused Groes
permission to proceed to Negambo in order to inform the garrison of
that place, that the war had been resumed# Fortunately, the Chief
at Negombo had been warned seme months earlier by Van Kittensteijn,
1
that the war would soon be resumed; Hence he was on the alert#
Moreover, as soon as Groes informed the Governor and Council of what had 
happened, they sent news of the resumption of the- war, by sea to 
Hogombo#
The news of the war caused terror and alarm among the inhabitants 
in Portuguese territory, bordering on the Dutch frontiers# As soon a3 
the envoy Groes had crossed on to Dutch territory, many subjects of 
the Portuguese followed in his wake# That vary night the Moor Midaliyar 
in charge of the forces around Alutgama, deseifced to the Dutch with many 
Moor las car ins and nearly a hundred cinnamon-peelers# On account of 
his abilities and extraordinarily faithful services, this man had been
one of the most trusted native officers under the Portuguese# His
1# Kitt# & C* to G.G. & C#, 7 July 1652, Ibid# Nevertheless, it was
certainly a blunder, not to have infoimed Negombo before informing 
Colombo of the actual resumption of the war# Aalbers (44) quotes 
approvingly the words of G.G# & C# to the Dirs#, to the effect 
that, in any case, It was not at all necessary to have informed the 
Portuguese, because the latter should have known that the truce had 
not been prolonged in Europe. (24 Dec# 1652, Kol#Arch# 1080 fos# 
154-66)# But Aalbers did not know that the same authorities had 
earlier written to Kitt# & C# that before resuming the war they 
should see that **het bestant het sij aende Revier van Alican, ofte 
in Colombo opgeseijt werde op dat geen oorsaeck en nemen te clagen 
van ons verraet, ofte verrader te wesen.w(21 May 1652, Kol# Arch# 
779 pp# 265-78)
zio
desertion therefore, greatly disheartened the Portuguese and
increased the confidence of the Dutch, to whom he was able to give
1
much valuable information#
The Mudaliyar advised the Dutch to take advantage of the
low spirits of the enemy, and to occupy the lands up to Kalutara,
before which place alone, he assured them, the Portuguese would dare
to offer resistance# Following this advice, Tan Kittensteijn ordered
the lascarins to cross the Bentota-Ganga against the Portugiese, on 
2
the 15th October# Three days later, 350 Dutch and Javans under Van 
Kittensteijn himself, crossed this river and marched up, to find that 
the lascarins had already taken the fort of Kalutara which the 
enemy had abandoned without a fight# The Portuguese, about 150 in 
number (apart from lascarins) were, however, entrenching themselves 
on the other side of the Kalu-Ganga, with the intention of preventing 
the crossing of this river#
3
While the two parties were exchanging shots across the Kalu- 
Ganga, the Mudaliyar advised the Dutch to occupy the pass of Anguruwatota 
(situated higier up the river) in order to safeguard the possession of
1# Galle Councillors to G.G. & C#, 20 Oct# 1652, Kol#Arch# 1086, fos#
609-11; Kitt & C# to G.G* & C#, 6 Nov# 1652, Kol#Arch# 1086 fos. 612-24 
Queyroz (896) is wrong in Baying that the Mudaliyar deserted only 
after repeatedly appealing in vain for reinforcements from Homem.
2# Kitt# & C# to G.G. Sc C., 6 Nov. 1652, Ibid# Under the Portuguese {and, 
as It appears here, under the Dutch also]' the lascarins seem to have 
been usually placed in the van-guard, not merely in field encounters, 
but even in attacks on fortifications# See on this point: Queyroz,
452, 475, 941. Ribeiro, 351-53. On p# 98 Ribeiro asserts that it 
was the custom for the lascarins to be in the vanguard#
3# Queyroz (896) wrongly asserts that because of Homem*s orders the
Portuguese were not permitted to fire a single shot in reply to the 
Dutch#
2,7/
the newly-co nquered territories# Accordingly, fifty Dutch and 200
lascarins were sent to occupy this pass# This was accomplished
without difficulty as the Portuguese had already retired to the other
bank, where they were preparing to oppose a crossing# The lascarins
were, howsver, unwilling to continue at Anguruwatota* It appears
that they were annoyed and disturbed at the fact, that in their march
on Kalutara, the Dutch forces had joined them only after three
days# While the IXitch seem to have had no casualties, they had already
had some wounded, among wham was the Tidana of the Mahabadda, Anthonio 
Mendes#
When the Dutch army at Kalutara heard that the lascarins were 
unwilling to continue at Anguruwatota, it despatched the Lieutenant Jan 
Tan Westrenen with a good number of Dutch soldiers, to strengthen the 
forces at Anguruwatota, and thereby give greater courag9 to the lascarins# 
On the way, seeing a body of men ccming from the direction of 
Anguruwatota, the Lieutenant, followed by all his men, jumped in a panic 
into the woods# It was soon found that the party, which had been 
mistaken to be the enemy, was only a band of coolies returning from the 
Anguruwatota camp# Nevertheless, the Lieutenant and his men were 
reluctant to proceed any further and returned to Kalutara# Consequently, 
the forces at Anguruwatota were not strengthened and their commander, 
Ensign Brouwer, was forced to yield to the clamour of the lascarins 
for a withdrawal# USThen the Portuguese noticed this, they began a heavy 
cannondding, at which the Dutch and the lascarins all took to their heels,
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1
even though the enemy had not crossed the river in pursuit#
On the 1st November, the Dutch re-occupied Anguruwatota with a 
larger force then previously# Elve days later their any at 
Kalutara made preparations for crossing the Kalu-Ganga# As a 
preliminary measure, they sent by sea, four vessels to bombard the 
Portuguese entrenchments at the mouth of the river# But on the mere 
sight of these vessels the enemy fled in great disorder, leaving behind 
much ammunition and food-provisional They finally halted at a place 
about six miles from Colombo# At about the same time the Portuguese 
forces near Anguruwatota, abandoned their positions and joined the 
army which had fled from Kalutara#
The Dutch were now in full occupation of the Walallawiti and 
Pasdum Korales, and considerable parts of Raygam Korale# ^mong the 
inhabitants who thereby came under Dutch rule, were 250 lascarins and 
150 Chaleas# To devastate the lands which they were unable to occupy, 
they frequently sent parties of lascarins right up to Panadura, sane 
sixteen miles from Colombo#
Although Van Kittensteijn had declared war during the first week 
of October, it was only on the 26th of that month, that he wrote to the 
King giving this news and requesting assistance against the Portuguese.
1# Kitt# fit C# to G.G. fit C#, 6 Nov# 1652, Kol#Arch# 1086, fos# KL2-24;
Sajje to Same, 19 Nov# 1652, Kol#Arch# 1086, fos# 629-54#
2# Kitt# & C# to G.G# fic C#, 6 Nov# 1652, Ibid; Valentyn, 137# In the
above letter to Batavia, Kitt# says that the Portuguese had already
sent an ambassador with a rich present to the King# As far as 
I know, none of the Portuguese sources make any mention of this 
embassy#
2.73
But he did not expect any help from the King, because he fully agreed
with the "view of the Batavian authorities, that the King had no wish
to see the Portuguese driven frcrn Colombo# His policy was to keep
the two European nations balanced against each other; therefore,
as the Portuguese appeared to be too weak, he was sure to assist
1
them, if not openly, at least secretly# He must be knowing that
"if we could drive -the Portuguese once and for all ,fram Colombo#♦.••#
2
we shall make him dance to our tunes#"
As so often before this, the Dutch failed to understand the
extent of Raja SinhaTs hatred for the Portuguese and his passionate
desire to see them driven from Colombo, wthe Mother of all evil*#
He was speaking from his heart when he declared later on:
When my imperial person summoned the said Dutch nation
to this my anpire, the principal reason was that they
might help me, and likewise capture the city of Colombo: 
since the most serene and famous Raja who was King of 
Ceitavaca laid several seiges to it and could not take it, ® 
for this reason I took into my imperial heart to capture it#"
1# For the ■views of G.G-. & C#: G.G# & C. to Kitt# & C#, 21 May 1652,
Kol#Arch# 779 pp# 265-78; Same to Same, 17 Aug# 52, Kol#Arch# 779 
pp# 528-39# For Kitt?s agreement: Kitt# & C# to G.G# & C#, 7 July 
1652, Kol#Arch# 1086 fos# 594-606# Aalbers (46) readily accepts 
the above views of G.G. & C* as expressed in the "Generale Missive " 
£i#e# G.G# & C# to DirsJ of 24 Dec# 1652, because he did not know 
that the Dutch officials generally misunderstood or misrepresented 
the King*s policy# Note for instance the new theory which was put 
forward to explain away the Kingfs all-out war against the 
Portuguese# On 6 Nov# 1652, Kitt# asserted (Kol#Arch 1086 fos# 
612-24) that the King would continue in friendship with the Ditch
as long as they appear to be the strongest 
2# G.G# & C# to Dirs#, 31 Jan# 1653, Kol#Arch# 1080 fos# 221-54#
3# Raja tp Van der Meijden, 23 Oct# 1656, Kol#Arch# 1105 fo# 957;
a translation from original of this letter, inJCRAS XV111# 242-43 
The Dutch themselves were not unaware of his hatred for the 
Portuguese, and his passionate desire to capture Colombo# Regarding 
the latter, see the foil# words of G#G# & C., to Kitt#, 17 Feb#
1653 (Kol#Arch# 780 fos. 12-21): "#♦# dat hij haer [ie# Portuguese]
/Over
eijndelijo^ als de noodt aende man sal gaen trachten te adsisteren, 
of wel dat deel inde victorie ofte overwinninge sal willen hebben 
van die stftdt die hem ende sijne voorouderen soo veel quaets berocke 
heeft, ende daer hij soo opgebeten is*rt
zih-
Raja Sinha knew fully well that onee the Portugese were 
completely driven out from Ceylon, the Dutch would attempt to make 
him dance to their tunes# But, to him the establishment of Dutch 
power seems to have been undoubtedly preferable to the continuance of 
Portuguese rule in the island# Moreover, he seems to have had full 
confidence in his ability to contain Dutch power within rather narrow 
territorial limits; the expulsion of the Dutch from the Kolonna and 
the Seven Korales must have increased his confidence#
Quite naturally, therefore, he entered with heart and soul 
into the war with the Portuguese# He sent his dissawe of the Four 
Korales against the Portuguese at Menikkadawara; his Dissawe of the 
Seven Korales was ordered to cut across Portuguese territory, via 
Deraniyagala and move upon the Portuguese-occupied parts of
1
Sabaragamuwa, where he would be supported by the Dissawe of Sabaragamuwa*
The movements of the King's men forced the Portuguese Dissawes
of the Four and the Severn Korales to retire towards Colombo* Shortly
2
afterwards, the army at Sabaragamuwa retired on Colombo, it is said, 
on the orders of Mascarenhas Homem, who wished to prevent it from 
joining the Menikkadawara army, which had mutinied* But it is likely
that Kandyan troop-movements had more to do with this withdrawal than
Tl Kitt# & C. to G.G. & C*, 6 Nov* 1652, Kol.Arch* 1086 fos* 612-24# "
The mutiny of the PortugueseJlsee text, below) undoubtedly took 
place some time after Raja's entry into the war# Kitt's successor, 
Van der Meijden, falsely declared in 1660 that Raja had been very 
march induced to enter upon the war, on account of this mutiny# 
cf# Valentyn, 141 (In pp. 141-48, Valentyn gives an extract from a 
Report of Van der Meijden made in 1660# Although no acknowledge­
ment is made by Baldaeus, pp* 142—47 of his work on Ceylon is 
almost a transcript from this Report#)
2# by Ribeiro (167), Queyroz (898) however, indicates some doubt on 
this point#
Z7?
the orders of the Captain-General; for, the retreat was made in such 
disorder that large stocks of provisions and merchandise were left 
behind*
At Menikkadawara, where the main Portuguese army was stationed,
the men mutinied against their Captain-Major, LopoBarriga, primarily
because they were dissatisfied with, the incapable leadership of his
father-in-law, Mascarenhas Eomem, to whom they attributed treacherous
designs# The retreat of the Portuguese forces frcm Kalutara and
Anguruwatota, from the Four and Seven Korales and Sabaragamuwa, were
all considered to be part of a treacherous plan to sell Colombo to 
1
the Dutch* Having deposed Barriga, the army elected the valiant
and resourceful Gaspar Figueira as their Captain-Major* Despite the
attacks of the Kandyan forces, Figueira withdrew the army safely near
Colombo* The declared intention of Figueira and his men, was to depose
Manoel Mascarenhas Homom* This the latter tried to oppose; but
finding few to support him, he was ignominiously forced to submit to the 
2
inevitable#
On the 30th November the army took over control of the Government* 
The General wqs deposed and three Eleitos were elected to form the 
Government; but the real power remained in FigueiraTs hands* By their
actions the new rulers demonstrated beyond doubt that what the Portuguese
1# who expressed their surprise, when they heard of this accusation
(cf. G.G. & C* to Dirs* 19 Jan* 1654, Kol#Arch. 1087 fos. 264-81).
2* It was a sad irony of fate that in 1623, the soldiers who had
mutinied against their Captain-Major, Gomes da Silva, should have 
"accepted as Captain-Major, Manoel Mascarenhas Home, who knew how 
to punish them thenceforth in the proper way" (QueyTOz, 733-34)
lie
had hitherto lacked, was not an army, but proper leadership#
Having despatched two detachments to the Four and Seven Korales,
Figieira himself marched towards Negcmbo with nearly 700 Portuguese#
His attempt to lay an ambush for a party of thirty-three Hollanders,
was foiled through the incompetence of one of his officers, rrtd
although he was able to capture a considerable amount of baggage and
ammunition, all but three of the enemy succeeded in escaping# He
arsfc next approached the fort of Negambo; but found the garrison strong
and ably commanded by the well-known Dutch Captain, Jan van der Laen#
Binding it impossible to effect anything against Negambo, Figueira
marched south with over 500 Portuguese and many lascarins, with the
intention of capturing Anguruwatota#
For nine days the garrison of Anguruwatota held out in the hope
of being succoured by the main Dutch amy which was hardly a dayTs march
1
amy, at Kalutara* Finally, on the 8th January 1653, the stockade was
surrendered with one hundred Dutch and twenty-four Javanese soldiers
and a hundred-and-forty lascarins, together with a good quantity of
aims and anmunition and provisions#
Figueira was, however, unable to hold Anguruwatota for even a
day after its capture, because the Kandyans had begun to attack his line
2
of communication with Solombo, and to cut off supplies# At about the
1# Kitt# & C# gave the curious explanation that Anguruwatota could not 
be relieved in time, because the Kalutara army had summoned 
eighty meh from Negambo and that until these arrived the march 
had to be delayed# (G*G# & C*, to Dirs# 19 Jan# 1654, Kol#Arch* 
1087 fos# 264 - 81) Reinforcements could have been sooner obtained 
from Galle# From Valentyn (137) it appears that the Dutch consi­
dered the King at fault for not having infomed them in time of 
the movements of the Portuguese#
2# Kitt. to G.G* & c#, 3 Dec. 1653, Kol.Arch# 1092 fos 523-45#
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same tins, a Kandyan force attacked the Portuguese Dissawe of the Four 
Korales at Tihariya* The Portuguese ©ere saved from an utter rout, only 
by the death of the Kandyan Dissawe* Finding, that the Kingfs men 
were on the offensive everywhere, Figueira marched with about 800
■the
Portuguese and a larger number of lascarin3, againstjKandyan forces on
the upper reaches of the Kelani-Ganga* At a village near Arandora he
won a considerable victory* He then followed this up with another
1
victory in this region* Firther south, however, the Kingts men con­
tinued to have the upper hand* In fact, at one stage a Kandyan 
Dissawe pushed up to Guiubewila, which was situated less than twenty 
miles from Colcanbo* But he was forced back by the Portuguese, who tfcok 
the offensive and proceeded as far as Kendangomuwa# Here, the Portuguese 
were halted and driven back once again to Gurubewila; for, the Kandyans
were in great strength on this front, because Raja Sinha himself had
2
arrived with his forces (estimated at 18G00 by Queyroz) somewhere about the 
end of March 1655*
Raja SinhaTs arrival in the lowlands, with the avowed object 
of attacking Colombo was unwelcome news for Van Kit tens teijn. From the
1# It is difficult to give much lv%enoegto the accounts of Ribeiro and 
Queyroz regarding the details of these encounters* In the first 
encounter near Arandora (which Queyroz, unlike Ribeiro, rightly 
places after the battle of Tihariya) Ribeiro (171) gives the Kandyan 
casualties at more than 3000 dead, and the Portuguese, at 13; Queyroz 
(910) gives the Kandyan losses at over 100, and those of the 
Portuguese at 7* Regarding the second "encounter,* Queyroz (911) 
says that after a nine-hour battle more than 300 Kandyans were 
killed, without any loss to the Portuguese#
2# Queyroz (911)* This figure, cannot, however, be relied upon as the 
proportions of the Kandyan forces seem to be, generally, magnified 
very much by both Queyroz and Ribeiro (see above, for a
concrete proof regarding such exaggeration* Kittensteijn
/Over
mentions the interesting afaoE fact that when Raja Sinha appeared in 
the lowlands, the subjects of the Dutch went in crowds to pay their 
'respects to the Kin^* Kitt & C* to G.G# & C», 30 April, 1653, Kol# 
Arch* 1092 Tfos* 488-511#
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very beginning, be had tried to dissaadsand to divert the King from
1
caning down into the lowlands or thinking of attacking Colombo*
He had suggested that while the Dutch concentrated their attention on
Colombo the King should attack and occupy Kalpitiya, Manar and Jaffna#
When the King expressed his intention of proceeding to attack Colombo,
Van Kittensteijn gave the singular reply that this was not advisable
because that city could not be won without blood-shed#
There were at least two reasons why the Dutch wished to keep
Baja Sinha away from the lowlands# PLrstly, they were afraid that
he might attempt to pay off old scores, by suddently making a
treacherous attack on them# Secondly - this was the main reason, -
they feared that he might capture Colombo by himself, and do as he
pleased with it; even if he captured the city in conjunction with them,
he would still have too much of a say on account of the strength of 
Z
his forces#
Baja Sinha seems to have easily guessed from Van Kittenstei jn*s 
letters, that the Dutch were very probably thinking of occupying
1# See, for an explicit reference to his continual efforts in this 
direction, his letter cited in the previous note#
2# These idea3 are expressed in most of the letters (of this period) 
between Batagia and Galle# See eg#: Kitt# & C. to G.G# & C#, 50 
April 1653, Kol#Arch# 1092 fos. 488-511; G#G. & C. to Stitt Kitt.
17 Aug# 1652, Kol.Arch# 779 pp# 528-39# Maetsuijcker (and his 
Council) believed that if the King was allowed to came near the 
Dutch army* they would be unable even to trust their own 
Christian lascarins, whom he described as: "a faithless people, 
always more attached to their own lule than to ours or to that of 
the Portugiese; which has became apparent as often as they had a 
chance of ridding themaP^ eyes 6f them £l#e# the Portuguese^ G.G. & C. 
to Dirs# 31 Jan# 1653, Kol#Arch# 1080 fos# 221-54#
Z19
Colombo after its capture, in the same manner as they had occupied
Negombo* He, therefore, repeatedly demanded reassurances that the
agreement with Coster and the later promises of the Dutch regarding
Colombo (and also Negombo) would be fulfilled#
Van Kittenstei jn had little hesitation in giving the
required assurances and premises, because he felt that their fulfill-
1
ment was quite another matter* He was, however, very apprehensive
that the King would capture Colombo, by himself* A Dutch corporal,
who had been present at some of the recent engagements between the
Portuguese and the Kandyans had infonned Van Kittensteijn that owing
to very severe discipline imposed by the King, Kandyan troops had fought
♦excellently’; two Portuguese deserters had continued this information#
With Colombo blockaded by sea, and the King having large faeces at his
disposal, there was little doubt, that if the Kandyans continued to
fight so well, the city would soon be in the King’s hands# These
thoughts made Van Kittensteijn express the fervent hope that his ally
would "knock his head well against the enemy and, thereby, be forced to
2
keep still for some time#”
1# “Hij hout op vorige beloften cm Negambo aen, als Colombo sal
gewonnen wezen, het welcke wijjhem ten dezen tijde niet hebben derven 
ontseggen, gedenkende als het eens soo verde is, die sake neffens 
veel andere daer over ten dien sal gekibbelt, wel sal gereddet worden" 
Kitt# & C. to G.G* & C., 30 April 1653, Kol#Arch* 1092 fos* 488-511.
Prom his previous experience, the King must have realised how 
little reliance could be placed on the premises of the Dutch* But 
there was nothing he could do to ensure that the forts would be handed 
over to him; he had to depend entirely on the sincerity of the Dutch*
2* Kitt# & C. to G.G* & C*, 30 April 1653, Kol#Arch* 1092 fos# 488-511.
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While distrustful of the King, and secretly wishing him ill,
the Dutch yet considered it necessary to feign friendship, and keep
M m  well-disposed towards them# Therefore, promises, flatteries and
presents were continually showered upon Mm# When a drunken
Lieutenant killed one of the King’s messengers, Van Kittenstiejn was
so fearful of giving any offence to Raja Sinha, that he ordered the
Dutchman to he executed, even though the King had ignored the
incident# In his persistent efforts to please the King, the Governor
had gone so. far as to send, at Raja Sinha’s request, a company of
Hollanders under an Hnsign to serve iir.hjs body-guard# The fact was,
that despite his apprehensions that the King might capture Colombo,
Van Kittensteijn was also rather thankful to him for having prevented
the Portuguese from following up the success at Anguruwatota. In a
1
letter of 30 April 1653 the Governor and Council wrote thus to Batavia:
"It is eertain that (next to God) His Majesty is the 
only cause, that has enabled us to keep things 
going in this form, for so long; therefore we ought 
to be rather obliged to Mm" '
They also added that the King’s enmity towards the Portuguese and
friendship towards the Dutch, could not be doubted any longer#
On receipt of this letter, Governor-General Maetsuijcker and
his Council were rather perturbed at what they considered was a lack of
understanding in their subordinates at Galle# They, therefore, replied:
1# Ibld» Later on, Kitts’ successor Van der Meijden said more or less 
the same tMng, though in less enthusiastic language# (V der M. &
C,to G.G-# & C#, 4 Dec# 1653, Kol#Arch# 1092 fos# 559-65#
Heedless to say, Aalbers (47) is quite wrong Tdien he says that up 
to 1655 (at least) the King had remained peacefully in Kandy 
without taking an active part in the war with the Portuguese 
either fcn person or through his commanders)#
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"Ha hates the Portugiese, because they are occupying 
his lands; and that is what we are also doing* He 
will hate U 3  all the more, because he will observe 
that we are more powerful than the Portuguese# Tie re- 
fore, we must never let ourselves be so far misled, as 
to imagine, that he will mean rightly by us#tt 1
In the event of the capture of Colombo, they advised the follow­
ing line of conduct:
"But regarding Colombo, you must regilate yourself 
according to circumstances and the strength of 
our available forces# If we could capture that city, 
without the King being present we should gladly 
see, that it was held until our further deliberation 
and order in case this could happen without great
danger    .But if this cannot happen without
danger and great calamity, then you will let this city 
be demolished for the contemplation and desire of the 
King#"
Meanwhile, the Portuguese had obtained considerable reinforce­
ments and a new Captain-General sent frcfa Goa to succeed the deposed 
Mascarenhas Hcmem# On the 15th May, hardly a week after the Dutch 
vessels blockading Colombo had been forced to sail to Galle on account 
of inclement weather, Francisco de Melo de Castro put Into Colombo 
with 250 soldiers and fourteen vessels# TCLth him came a new Captain- 
Major of the Field, Dam Alvaro de Ataide, who replaced Gaspar Figueira#
The Portuguese continued to have most of their forces array$ed 
against the Kandyans, who, the Dutch reported, were in great straits 
through lack of sufficient provisions# A wave of sickness had spread 
through Raja Sinha*s anny at Batugedera# Finally, at the cjlse of Augist,
the King was forced to move his camp# Through one of hi3 Dissawes ha___
1# G.G# & C* to Kitt#, 13 Aug# 1653, Kol# Arch# 780 pp# 309-23# The real 
reason why the Dutch mistrusted and misrepresented the King’s actions 
Is thus apparent. Incidentally, this letter appears to be the first 
sent to Ceylon, after Maetsui jcker became Governor-General# Carel 
Reijniersz who had succeeded Van der Li jn in 1650, died on 19 May 
1653 and Maet# was chosen to fill his place#
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he ashed the Portuguese for a free passage for his stores. This ms
agreed to, and the King himself, m&ved on to Kendangcrauwa where only
a river separated him from the Portuguese* But nothing happened
until the end of September, when he wrote to the Dutch asking them
to create a diversion in Raygsm Korale, as he was preparing to attack
the enemy. The Dutch, however, were not prepared to do this* But
on the 20th of the following month, the Portuguese suddenly retired
to Malwana* The reason for this withdrawal appears certainly to
have been the anxiety caused by the arrival at Negcanbo of the Commisioner
1
Bijcklof Tan Goens, with four vessels#
Van Goens, who was on his way to Surat and Hingurla on a tour 
2
of inspection, had neither the time nor the necessary forces to
undertake an attack on the Portuguese. After a short inspection of
the Administration in Ceylon, he left the island on the 15th November#
3
As for the new Governor, Adriaen van der Meijden, who had succeeded
1# Kitt# to G.G. & C., 3 Dec# 1653, Kol*Arch* 1092 fos. 523-45; V. der 
M. & C., to G.G. & C., 4 Dec. 1653, Kol.Arch. 1092 fos. 559-65. Van 
Goens to G.G. & C., 14 Nov. 1653, Kol.Arch. 1092 fos. 568-75.
Queyroz (914) mistakenly attributes the retreat to llalwaija as having 
been made immediately after the King had been promised a free 
passage for his stores#
2. For his activities in this connection see Aalbers, 68 ff. He had risen 
rapidly in the ranks of the Company, and was hardly 35 years old at 
this time# He was again in Ceylon in 1658 when he captured the last 
Portuguese strongholds in the island# In 1662-63 and 1665-75, he was 
Governor of Ceylon and from 1676-80 he was Governor-General at Batavia# 
3# He had been to Kandy with Helmondt and Thi jssen in 1637; thereafter, 
he had served in various capacities on the Coromandel Coast# From 
1649-50 he was Chief at Negombo. Finally, in April 1652 he was once 
more sent to Ceylon, to serve as the second person in the adminis­
tration until tfce departure of Van Kittensteijn for Batavia, When 
the latter left, fee succeeded as Governor. In 1657, he became a 
Councillor Extraordinary and in the following year, a full-fledged 
Councillor of India# He served as Governor till 1662#
2. S3
Van KittensteiJn on the 11th October, ho too did not dare to talcs the 
field against the Portuguese. Thus, throughout the whole of 1653, 
the Dutch seemed to be under the cloud of the defeat at Anguruwatota. 
The lascarins, however, had been sent out on ravaging expeditions, 
from both Negcmbo and Kalutara. The inhabitants living between this 
latter fortress and the outskirts of Colombo, were summoned to cone 
over to the Dutch; many of those who failed to do so were captured 
and sold as slaves, the lascarins who effected the captures, being 
rewarded with a third of the proceeds* In March, the Negombo 
lascarins had made successful ravaging expeditions against ICalpitiya 
and Manar, which had been much devastated by the Kandyans a short while 
before. These lascarins were once more active in November, when they 
killed the Portugiese guards at Hutwal. Beyond these isolated raids 
and the naval blockade of Colombo, the Dutch had attempted in 1653 
little or nothing against the enemy.
Although his men were suffering great privations, Baja Sinha 
had continued in the lowlands with his anny, because he expected that 
the Hollanders would be reinforced from Batavia and .wculd, thereafter, 
attack Colombo. He apparently considered it wisest to move on that 
city, only when his allies were prepared to do the same. Ihen at 
length it appeared that the Dutch did net intend attacking Colombo 
for quite a while, he decided early in November to return to the high­
lands* By this time provisions were so scarce in his aimy, that even 
the Chiefs were feeling the want. He had ordered his Dutch bodyguard
to be well-provided; but they obtained little because the stores were
so empty and, consequently, "to fetch something from nothing, is magic",
1
reported the Ensign in c cram and of the bodyguard#
When they heard that the Kinghad retired to Kandy, the Portuguese 
attempted to re-occupy same of the territories, which had been lost to 
him* They met with only moderate success, because they encountered 
strong opposition from the King’s Dissawes. They had most success in
the Seven Korales, where they were able to proceed as far as Alauwa;
2
but further south, they were halted at Gurubewila#
Against the Dutch too, they took the offensive, and by-passing
Kalutara made frequent raids as far as Maggona# At length, on account
of the harm which they were causing through these raids, the
Hollanders sought them out at Tebuwana, where a fierce battle was
fought on the 26th March 1654. After several hours of fighting, both
sides eagerly separated themselves from each other on account of the 
3
losses sustained#
1# i^a to "those who are in the Government of my Imperial fortress 
Galle",2 Nov# 1653# Kol.Arch# 1092 fo# 593# Letter and Diary 
of Jori3 Hervendonck, 3 Nov# 1653, Kol.Arch# 1092 fos# 591-92.
The "soberstreatment" which Aalbers points out was meted out 
by the King to this bodyguard, was merely the result of the 
scarcity of provisions# See on this point: V der M & C# to 
G.G. & C., 14 Nov# 1654, Kol#Arch. 1094 fos# 685-7Q4#
2# V* der M» & C# to G.G. & C#, 25 Aug* 1654, Kol#Arch. 1094 fos 679-84.
3# G.G. & C# to Dirs# 7 Nov# 1654, Kol.Arch# 1099 fos# 75-79, Queyroz, 
916-17; Ribeiro, 180# Ribeiro is perfectly correct as to the 
date, and his figure for the Portuguese casualties appears to be 
more reliable than that of Queyroz (It looks as if Ribeiro &imself 
was present at this encounter). He is, however, mfetaken as regards 
the reason for the flight of the IXitch from Kalutara* Dr* Pieris 
(Port* Era. Ii# 381-82) incorrectly places this battle in 1653#
The Dutch, retired to Kalutara; but did not tarry a moment 
there when they heard that five galleons had put into Colombo after 
having defeated the three ships blockading that harbour# This news 
caused such fear that the Dutch did not stop their flight until they 
were at Welitara*
The news of this flight caused a great stir amongst the
S'tX
subjects of the Dutch* ^ Appuhamis fled from Dutch territory with a
good number of their lascarins* One of them was trapped and shot dead;
but the other five fled to the King’s territory and caused much ham by
their frequent marauding expeditions into the lands near Matara* Even
more significant than the desertion of these Appuhamis, was that of the
Mudaliyar, Kulatunga, one of the foremost chiefs of Matara* The old
1
man was, however, overtaken and soon died under torture*
The disaffection of these chiefs, as the Appuhamis themselves 
explained, was mainly the result of the disrespectful way in which the 
Dutch officers treated them* While Maetsuijclcer and Van Kittensteijn 
had always been particular to see that their subordinates gave the 
chiefs no cause of offence, Van der Maijden was less concerned about 
this matter* Moreover, his aim was to transfer most of the 
important offices from the Sinhalese to his Dutch, officers; he had 
already made a beginning in this direction, for example, by appointing
a Dutchman to fill the place of the Moor Mudaliyar, at the latter’s
1* G.G. & C* to Dirs# 7 Nov* 1654, Ibid*; V, der M* & C*, to G.G* & G. 
25 Aug* 1654, Kol*Arch* 1094 fos* 679-84* Dr* Pieris (Some* Docs 
169) is incorrect in caying that the Appuhamis deserted to the 
Portuguese*
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death# Maetssri jcker and his Council, however, decided that the time 
was not yet ripe for such changes, and that the Chiefs should be
2
treated in the most winning manner possible for yet sons time more; 
the desertion of the Appuhamis had confirmed them in this opinion# 
Meanswhile, the apprehension caused among the Dutch, by the 
coining of the galleons, passed off when it was found that hardly any 
soldiers had been brought to Colombo by these vessels# The subsequent 
news of the total destruction of these galleons by Rijckloff van 
Goens very much raised the fallen prestige of the Dutch# Neverthe­
less, Kalutara and the lands so precipitately abandoned, continued in 
the hands of the enemy#
On the Kandyan front, the Portuguese were having a difficult time* 
Towards the middle of the year, they were twice defeated; once in the 
Saven Korales and later on in Raygam Korale# They, therefore, attempted
it
to treat with the King for peace# Some time previously the Captain-
General had written to Raja Sinha, but had received no reply.# Now
once again, on the 15th and 19th July, the Dissawe Manoel Gil and the
Captain-Major, Gaspar de Araujo Pereyra wrote to the King suggesting 
3
a peace# But Raja Sinha was not prepared to talk of peace, although 
it was aaid that he was faced with internal dissensions, as a result
of which he had already ordered several Chiefs to be executed# In
1# Kitt* to G.G# & C., 3 Dec. 1653, Kol#Arch# 1092 fos* 523-45.
2# G.G# & to Y der M# & C# 30 June 1655, ivol#Arch# 782 pp# 305—15#
3# The originals of these letters together with copies of his replies 
were sent by the King to Y> der who refer^ummarily to their 
contents in Ys der M# & C# to G.G# & C# 14^Nov# 1654, Kol# Arch#
1094 fos* 685-7 04. See also Queyroz, 925#
September, It was rumoured that his nephew, the young Prince of
Mat ale had rebelled against him, but that his Dissawes had soon suppressed 
1
the rebellion# The Portuguese had doubtless taken advantage of the
Kingfs difficulties; for, towards the close of the year, they had
pitched their camp at Pitigaldeniya, about thirty miles frcm Kandy*
In December, the King sent against the Portuguese, a new Dissawe who was
so successful as to drive them not only from Pitigaldeniya but also from
the entire Four and Seven Korales# He devastated the lands up to
Malwana, and removed many of the adherents of the Portuguese as
prisoners# For the moment the enemy could do little but guard the
approaches to the city#
In the meantime, the Hollanders had not been inactive. Following
up the victory of a successful ambush, they determined to attack the
Portuguese entrenchment at Bentota# On the 16th of December, 790 Dutch
and Javans and 700 lascarins attacked the enemy, whose strength was
hardly 350 Portuguese and 600 lascarins# After some severe fighting,
the Portuguese left their entrenchments and retired towards Kalutara,
pursued by the Dutch# YJithin a short time, however, the pursuit was
given up on account of the strong resistance of the enemy, who
inflicted on the Dutch greater losses than they themselves sustained*
Nevertheless, this engagement had an advantageous result for the
Hollanders in that, thereafter, the enemy did not venture far from
1# Regarding these internal troubles, see: V, der M & C# to G.G. & G#,
25 Aug* 1654, Kol# Arch# 1094 fos# 679-84; Same to Same, 14 Nov#
1654, Kol# Arch# 1094 fos# 685-704#
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Kalutara#
While the Portuguese went on to the defensive against the 
Hollanders, they took the offensive against the King’s men# In view 
of the recent astonishing success of the Kandyans, it was felt that 
GasparFigueira was the only man, who could deal successfully with the 
enemy* Early in January Figueira was appointed Captain-Major, and sent 
against the Kandyans with some 300 or more Portuguese and many 
lascarins# He encountered little opposition at first; but did not 
proceed far until the receipt of further reinforcements# These were 
soon sent when on the 30th of January 1655, a fleet of nineteen
vessels had brought to Colombo (among other items) a force of 200
2
soldiers# As soon as he had received these reinforcements Figtieira
marched against the King’s Qissawes at Arambepola in the Seven Korales#
With the loss of only nine Portuguese, he drove the Dissawes right into
the Kandyan territories# Early in April, he won a still greater
victory at Kotikapola. He had heard that the King himself had decided
to take the field, and had ordered two of his Qissawes to prepare
accommodation for him at Kotikapola# With the skill characteristic of
him, PLgieira surprised the Dissawes, and utterly routed them, killing
3
one dissawe and about 200 men and captu&ing about a hundred# Shortly
1# Y. der M. & C., to G.G# & C# 14 Nov# 1655, Kol*Arch# 1100 fos* 406-19; 
G.G. & C# to Dirs#, 24 Dec# 1655, Kol.Arch. 1100 fos# 93-100# "Marrafr 
tive of the Events which have taken place in East India during the 
monsoon of 1655*’ Library of Evora, Collec# of MSS# Cod 
fo# 46 (I#0#L#Trana#) Qieyroz, 932-24; Ribeiro, 184-85#
2# Y# der M* & C. to G.G# & C*, 14 May 1655, Kol* Arch* 1100 fos 406-19# 
The naval blockade of Colombo was not effective enough to prevent the 
Portuguese from receiving considerable reinforcements from time to 
time#
3# Y# der M# & C., G.G# & C., 14 May 1655, Ibid. "Narrative of the 
Events........ during the Monsoon of 1655"# (I.O.L. Trans);
/Over
Queyroz, '927-28; Rfbeiro, 2:90* tihile Qpeyroz exaggerates the 
Kandyan losses *by ah ait 3 'or 4 times the actual amount, Ribeiro 
r magnifies the losses 50 to 60 times*
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afterwards the King*s troops defeated a Portuguese detachment
and followed it up with s everal successful engagements; hut it
made little difference to Flgueira*s position* He not only re-occupied
seme of the territories, which had heen lost for the last ten or fifteen
years, hut even made daring raids into the King's lands* Nevertheless,
the Kandyan front was such an extensive one that Figueira could control
only part of it; Raja Sinha*s dissawes more than held their own in
2
other parts of this front.
Before sending his dissawes to Kotikapola, the King had informed
the Dutch of his plan to attack the Portuguese, and had asked them to
create a diversion for the enemy, hy attacking Kalutara* Accordingly,
they made a show of force from the 3rd to the 12th of April before that
fort; but with their available forces, they did not consider it
advisable to attack it*
In the following month the Dutch obtained a victory, which they
considered to be nothing but a God-send* On the 18th May, Antonio de 
3
Sousa Coutinho, who was sent frcm Goa as the row Captain-General of 
Ceylon, wa3 (through the incompetence of his pilot, and the force of
the currents) driven with his fleet near Galle* On seeing this fleet
1* T* der M* & C* to G.G* & C*, 14 May 1655, Ibid* Note, incidentally, 
that Ribeiro (191) is quite incorrect in saying that after 
Kotikapola, fck he forbade his mentto attack Portuguese territory. 
2* cf. Raja to V* der M., 16 Aug. 1655 (Trans in JCRAS XY111. 221-22.)
3* After valiantly conducting the defence of Colombo till it3 surrender, 
he returned to Goa, where he became interim Governor (1656-58) of 
Portuguese India along with Prancisco de Melo de Castro, his 
predecessor in Ceylon*
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the Datcli immediately sent two warships against it, and soon had the 
satisfaction of seeing half the fleet captured or destroyed*
Coutinho himself made good his escape via Batticaloa to Jaffna, 
with four of his vessels and only about 230 out of the 400 soldiers, 
whom he had brought frcm Goa. Marching overland from Jaffna, the 
new Captain-General reached Colombo, towards the middle of August.
In this same month of August, the Governor-General and his
Council at last found themselves in a position to send a force, which
would be strong enough to attack Colombo. Hitherto, on account of
1
the troubles in the Moluccas and the war with England, and, more
particularly, because the Directors had sent insufficient troops and
ships, they had been able to send only very meagre relief to Ceylon.
In fact, in May 1655, Van der Meijden had been constrained to point
out that the total strength of the aimy had fallen to 98C men; whereas
2
in time of peace there had ordinarily been 1300-1500 men. But, with 
the large reinforcements, which they had received in 1654 and 1655 from 
Europe, the Batavian authorities were finally able to more than remedy 
this situation#
On the 14th August (1655) they dispatched to Ceylon the Director-
1. The war with England was not hailed with "great joy" by the Batavian
authorities, although Aalbers (32) says it was. They were very 
sorry that it would interfere with the proper prosecution of their 
enterprises against the Portuguese (cf. G.G. & C. to Dirs.;19 Jan. 
1654, Kol.Arch. 1087 fo. 6; G.G. & C. to V. der M. & C., 19 Oct. 
1654, Kol.Arch. 781, pp. 482-83; etc. )
2. V. der M. & C. to G.G. & C., 14 May 1655, Kol.Arch. 1100 fos.
406-19.
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General, Gerard Hulft, with a force of 120G soldiers and 14 ships#
He wa3 instructed to effect the capture of Colombo before under­
taking any other exploit; although the Directors had repeatedly 
recommended the blockade of Goa as being of paramount importance#
As a result of the capture of Colombo, the Company could not only 
become "sole masters of the cinnamon", but it could also cut down 
expenses in Ceylon, because,with the Portuguese virtually driven from 
the island, less garrison-forces would be required#
Whether the city (after its capture) should be garrisoned or 
handed over to Raja Sinha, they were not decided# They, however, 
felt that at least until the serious difficulties in Amboyna 
were overcome, it might be safer to hand over the city to the King,
"in fulfillment from our side, of the aforesaid Contract [Treaty of 
1649*] and with the hope that in that case he will acquire more 
confidence in our good intentions and will try from his side also to 
fulfill the same c^ontract}"# Although this was their opinion at the 
moment, a final decision on this matter was left to Hulft, who, in
consultation with Van der Meijden and his Council, had to consider
. - 2 
what was best according to the situation in Ceylon#
1# A man equally at home with the pen as with the sword; had served, in 
the war against England, at the head of a company of 24 men main­
tained* at his own expense;' had been Secretary of the city of 
Amsterdam, when he was taken into the V#0#C# service; In Jan# 1654 
sent to BataVia to take up duties as Director-General; during the 
expedition to Ceylon, conducted affairs with great ability and 
resourcefulness until his death on 10 April 1656*
2# Instructions for Hulft, 14 Aug# 1655, Kol#Arch# 782, pp# 475-95# 
Fculowing the story from the "Generals Missiven" Aalbers (53 n#4) 
was misled into believing; that Hulft had been categorically 
instructed to demolish the fortifications and to hand over the city
to the King# The instructions to Hulft explain the true views
/Over
* G.G* & C.j nr
"...maer laaten het selve U.E. ende des Gouver * ende 
Raets voorsigtig oordeel bevoolen, naa dat de saecken ende 
geleegentheeden ter plaetse sullen bevonden worden 
te vereijschen, het sij dan dat U.E* met malcancter goetvinden 
alle beijde voorz*. fortification [i.e. {jjegombo and Colombo"! 
te abandonneeren ofte wel een van bei jde, of soo wel 
dfeen als d’ander in te houden"* 
cf. also p*281 above, and p 308 nZ below.t
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One and a half months before the departure of Hulft from
Batavia, Van der Meijden and his Council were sent news of the
1
intended expedition* In the general letter to the Governor and Council,
it was stated that the expedition would first undertake certain
exploits against the Portuguese on the Vfest Coast of India, and
thereafter arrive in Ceylon; but in a secret letter to Van den Meijden
alone, the true objectives of the expedition were explained* Van der
Meijden was instructed to send secret advices regarding the best course
of military action to Kulft, to a rendezvous near Cape Comorin*.
When Hulft arrived at the appointed place, on the 12th September,
he did not find the expected advices (which, incidentally, had been
held up by adverse sailing conditions)* On the following day he
decided to proceed to Negombo and march overland from there to Colombo
with the idea of cutting off the Portuguese field-forces from the city*
But during the inarch from Negombo there was such heavy rain, that he and
his Council decided to retire; because the men were feeling unfit,
and the matches and gunpowder had got wet*
It was then decided to re-embaik and make a landing to the snuth
of Colombo* The ships were, however, driven too far south, and ultimately
Hulft. landed at Maggona (to the south of Kalutara) on the 28th September*
There he was joined by the forces under Van der Meijden* The combined
forces immediately marched upon Kalutara, which it laid under siege*
After having resisted for two weeks, the garrison of 255 men surrendered
1* 30 June 1655, Kol. Arch. 782, pp. S05-15. The secret letter to
V. der M* of same date in, Kol. Arch. 782, pp. 315-17*
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through lack of provisions to hold oat longer#
Meanwhile, the Portugaese in Colombo had decided to relieve 
Kalutara* For this purpose, they recalled Gaspar Figueira from the 
Kandyan frontiers and entrusted him with a force of 450 men* Fust 
before Figueira was about to start fbr Kalutara, some vessels from 
Goa, after eluding the Dutch cruisers, put into Colombo with 200 
soldiers* These men were also placed under Figueira, who then started 
with 650 men and a thousand lascarins for Kalutara*
On the night of the 16th October the Di.itch had a sharp 
skirmish near Panadura with the advance guard of FLgueirafs troops*
The Portuguese retired leaving behind some prisoners, and fifteen to 
sixteen dead; but the Dutch losses were negligible* From the 
prisoners they learnt that Figueira would make his appearance the next 
day; therefore, they took up a favourable position on the beach and 
awaited his ccming* Although the Dutch force had all the advantages 
of numbers and a favourable position Figueira attacked it with 
confidence; but after a short contest, he and his men took to 
head-long flight* Hardly 200 of the 650 Portuguese succeeded in 
reaching Colombo; the rest were killed in the battle or slain or 
captured in the pursuit by the lascarins of the Dutch#
Moving up to Colombo on the 18th, the Dutch occupied, after 
overcoming some resistance, the outer positions at Mutwal and 8a6 
Sebastiao and ringed the city on all sides* The historic siege of 
Colombo had begun#
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At this juncture Hulft received a letter, written at Baja 
Sinhars command, by the Ensign, Joris Hervendonck, to the effect 
that despite his illness, the King intended arriving near Colombo 
before long# In reply, on the 20th, a note was despatched to the 
King, informing him of the recent victories, and attempting with
1
various covert arguments to dissuade him from coming down upon Colombo#
Tvtfo days later, the Dissawe of Sabaragamuwa appeared before Colombo
with his forces# After moKIng solicitous enquiries from him regarding
the Kingfs health, Hulft informed the Dissawe that he had arrived in
the island for no other purpose than to capture the towns of Colombo,
2
Llanar end Jaffna and hand them over to His Majesty#
Yihen his Dissawe reported what Hulft had said, Raja Sinha was
over-joyed# It appeared to him that at last he could have much
confidence in the premises of the Dutch# This was reflected in the
very next letter to Eulft, not only in its contents but even in its
superscription, in which the Hollander was addressed as: "Director-
General of the Haval Squadron of the upright, faithful Netherlands 
3
nation# n
Meanwhile, Hulft had begun a heavy fire on the bastions of the
cf# Hulft to G.G#, 14 Nov# 1655, Kol#Arch# 1102 fos# 226-31#
2# cf# Raja to Eulft, 29 Oct# 1655, in Baldaeus, 68-69# The work of 
Baldaens is invaluable for a study of matters connected with the 
years 1655-56, because he gives information and documents which 
are not available fran. other sources# But. as noted earlier (e#g# 
p.tt'H't.f'ten# I above) hiw work has to be used very carefully#
3. Raja to Hulft, 29 Oct# 1655 (Ibid) cf# the superscriptions In the 
previous letters (in J/CRAS XVlli# 169—222, passlm#
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city# After two weeks of suck tattering it appeared that the
defences were sufficiently crumbled to make a stoxm feasible; besides,
the return-fire of the Portuguese had latterly become so unsteady,
that little opposition could be expected from them# Therefore, on the
9th November, he sent a courteous note to the Captain-General,
calling upon him in Raja Sinha’s name and in that of the Company, to
1
surrender the city# On the following day he received a valiant reply, 
in which de Sousa Ccutinho expressed his determination to defend the 
city to the last# Eulft, thereupon, determined to carry the city by 
stom on the 15th#
On the land side, the attack was concentrated on four bastions, 
and an ill-defended point near the house of one de Azavedo# It was 
only at this last position that a penetration was made; but owing to 
the valour of the defenders and the i 11-discipline of the attackers, 
many of those w £lo entered within were killed, and the rest forced 
to surrender# At the four bastions the attackers courageously rushed 
towards the walls; but at the critical moment the ladders were not 
forthcoming, because when many of those carrying them were mowed down 
by the fire of the enemy, the others abandoned their ladders and fled# 
Although Hulft himself tried to set an example by laying hold of a 
ladder and rushing up, he was forced to turn back when he saw his 
officers and men all retiring in confusion# On the sea-side, two 
ships were ordered to attack the bastion of Santa Cruz which commanded 
the bay; under cover of this attack a large number of soldiers and 
sailors were to make a landing frcan some smaller vessels and capture__
1» For this letter and the reply, cf. Baldaens, 69-70; Queyroz, 949.
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the bastion# Unfortunately, only one of the ships reached its
appointed place in time# As a result, the attack by sea also failed#
As the Dutch declared in bewilderment, the resistance of the
city had been unexpectedly strong and courageous# Apart from
seventy'^ four taken captive, they had lost: at least 300 in dead, and
about an equal number or more were wounded# The losses of the enemy
1
seem to have been hardly a third of the Dutch losses#
In view of the heavy losses sustained, it was debated in Council 
whether the attempt to capture Colombo shoiiM be given up or not# 
Finally, it ms decided that the losses could be made good by rein­
forcements from Batavia, and that for the sake of the CcmpanyTs 
prestige, it was necessary to continue the enterprise against the 
city, which could never be captured if the attempt was given up now#
A few hours after the ill-fated stoxm, Eulft received a letter, 
dated‘the 5th of the month, frcm Raja Sinha, At the same time, the 
King had also sent a copy of the letter which the Captain-General had 
written to him on the 27th October# In this letter, de Sousa Continho 
had begged for the Kingts friendship and assistance against the Dutch, 
and in return had promised to handover to him the lands around Colombo# 
He had further warned the King that the Dutch would never hand over the
1# For a full account of the stom and event^preceding it cf: Bilft
to G.G. & C#, 24 Nov# 1655, Kol#Arch# 1100 fos# 878-84# cf# also
V# der Ml to G.G. & C#, 14 Nov# 1655, Kol^RArcIu 1102 fo# 232;
Baldaens, 61-74; Saar (Reisebeschreibungen, 71# 132-40); Queyroz, 
934-54; Ribeiro, 193-201; Pieris, Port. Braf il# 397 - 413#
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1
city to him, if they captured it# Although Haja Sinha ignored the 
rest of Continho’s letter, the mrning regarding the policy of the 
Dutch, seems to have revived his suspicions of the good faith of his 
allies; for, in his letter to Hulft' he considered it necessary to 
express his confidence that according to treaty, and repeated promises, 
Colombo would be handed over to him by the Director-General#
For a moment Bhlft was somewhat apprehensive, thinking that 
the King might change his attitude towards the Portuguese, when he heard 
the outcome of the stoim* Eis doubts were set at rest when on the 
19th, the Dissawes showed him a letter, which they had just 
received from the Chiefs at the Court; written at his orders, this 
letter indicated the King’s grief at the loss suffered by the Dutch, 
and expressed his determination to hurry to their assistance; until
2
his arrival, he wished that no further assault should be undertaken# 
Hulft himself had already decided that beyond maintaining a 
close siege of the city, he could do little else, at least, until 
reinforcements should arrive from Batavia# At the moment, the 
besieging forces were not more than 1200 men, apart from the 3000
1# For the contents of Raja’s letter and that of Coutinho 
cf* Hulft to G.G* & C., 24 Nov# 1655, Kol# Arch# 1100^ 
fos* 878-84; . also Baldaens, 74*
2# cf# Bulfit to G.G* & C*, 24 Nov#. 1655 (Ibid); Y* der M# 
to G*G. & C*, 24 Nov. 1655, Kol.Arch 1102 fos* 241-49#
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Kandyans, who were guarding the approaches on the south side of the
city# As the city was over four miles in circuit, Hulft beliefed
that, without the help of the King’s Dissawes, he could not besiege it
1
adequately enough. But for the pioneers, whom the King supplied,
2
he could not proceed with the siege-works; nor could he continue
with his forces before Colcmbo for long, if the Kandyam discontinued
3
the provisioning of his army. L'oreover, apart from the great
advantage resulting from the King’s favour, Hulft was keenly aware
of the grave danger that would follow, if Raja Sinha became hostile,
and combined with the Portuguese. He believed that the Dutch could
4
not withstand such a combination.
1. Hulft to Dirs.. 5 Beb. 1656, Kol. Arch. 1100^ fos. 861-77. cp. 
Aalbers (51-52). Even G.G. 5c C. felt that now that a siege had to 
be undertaken, the King’s assistance was more necessary than ever; 
but, a3 they explained, there was one big difficulty in this 
matter: ttalsmen den Coninck maer vertrouwen mocht, dat sijn 
bedencken grootelijcx heeft, gelijck U.Ed. bekent is om den quaden 
achterdocht die hij heeft dat wij hem soo de Portugasen eens 
meester connen werden niet een hair beter sullen tracteren dan 
deceive hebben gedaen, tot welcke gedachten wij hem veel oorsaeck 
gegeven hebben” (G.G. 5c C., to Dirs., 1 Feb. 1656, Kol. Arch* 1102 
fos. 64 - 72) Seldom were G.G. 5c C. so frank.
2. cf. Baldaeus, 66, 78, 92; Safir (Reisebeschreibungen, VI. 138); 
Queyroz, 944, 965.
3. cf. G.G* 5c C. to Dirs., 31 July 1656, Kol. Arch. 1104 fos.
105-06.
4. Hulft to G.G. & C., 24 Nov. 1655, Kol* Arch. 1100 fos. 878-84.
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On account of all these considerations, he deemed it imperative
to refrain from giving the King the slightest cause of offence*
Doubtless on the advice of Van der Keijden, he had at first ventured
to accept the submission of seme of the villages near Colombo, and
to place Yidanas over them; but when the Dissauos complained to
Raja Sinha over this action, Hulft realised his mistake and forthwith
1
left the villages entirely to the Dissawes.
To remove any suspicions, which his action might have aroused,
Hulft wrote to the King a series of letters, in which he repeatedly
asserted that he had been expressly sent from Holland to capture the
remaining Portuguese strongholds and, to hand them over together
with Negpmbo to His Kajesty. He made the same assurances through the
King's Dissawes and through the Lieutenant of his guard, Joannes
Hartman, whom he sent on two occasions to present his greetings and
letters before the King. Finally, when the King himself appeared in
the lowlands, Hulft wrote to him on the ffith February 1656, expressing
his eagerness for permission to appear before the royal presence,
and to explain "the true friendship and affection with which the
Honourable Company strives to persevere to the end" in the imperial 
2
service.
The promises and assurances of Ehlft, seean to have rung true
1. cf. Ibid*, Baldaeus, 95.
2,cfLetter in Baldaens, 85-86 (cf. also trans. in JCRAS X71H. 228) 
cf. on Hulftfs policy towards Raja: V. der M. to G-.G, & C.f 24 
Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch. 1102 fos* 241-49; Hulft to G.G. & C.,
24 Nov. 1655, Kol. Arch, 1100^ fos. 878-84; Hulft to Dirs.,
5 Feb. 1656, Kol* Arch. llOCr fos. 861-77; Baldaens, 66, 78, 79,
95, 104-06. In the above-mentioned letter to the Dirs* Ehlft
explained: "Telckens hebbe ick hem met de beste inckt geantwport." 
Aalbers (53) appears to have believed that Hulft was only imitating, 
the "Eastern rhetoric" and "flattering courteousness" of Raja Sinha.
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to the King’s ears* HI received all as perfect truth into my 
1
imperial heartn* Convinced of the Dutchman’s sincerity, Raja Sinha
came to have a certain amount of genuine regard and affection for
him* When, therefore, the Portuguese Captain-General and the citizens
of Colombo separately wrote to him making a last desperate appeal for
2
assistance, he entrusted the replies to Hulft* The good relations
between the King and Hulft reached their climax on the 8th April, when
the latter had audience of the King, and in the name of the Prince of
Orange and the Company solemnly repeated the earlier promises tqhand
3
over the fortresses, after their capture* Raja Sinha had nothing
4
more to wish* Three days later, however, Raja Sinha was weeping bitterly; 
for, on that day, the Dutch interpreter Jurgen Bloem brought him the news, 
that Hulft was dead (When inspecting the siege-works, the Director- 
General had exposed himself too much and a chance bullet had mortally 
wounded him)*
1* Raja to Hulft, 20 Jan* 1656, in JCRAS, XV111* 225-26* Hulft could 
make his assurances ring true all the more because he had almost 
decided to hand over the city to Raja, once it was captured (cf*
Hulft to Dirs*, 5 Feb., 1656, Kol. Arch. HOCTfos. 861-77*
2* cf* Baldaens, 92-94, 96; Qieyroz, 967.
3. cf. Raja to V. der M., 21 May 1656, in JCRAS, XV111* 239, cf. also 
Baldaens 104-06*
4* cf* "Extract frcm the diary of Jan Volckertsz" in JCRAS, XI, 148*
Aalbers (52-53) suggests unjustifiably that the hyperbolical epithets 
of affection used by the King towards Hhlft were entirely 
hypocritical and made in order to induce the Dutchman to hand over 
Colombo to him# Incidentally, it is curious to note that Raja soon 
came to believe that Hulft had been done away with by the Dutch them­
selves (cf* Raja to Van Goens, 6 July 1658, Kol* Arch* 1121 fo* 253)*
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Now that nthe most faithful servant that he had ever known*
[ was dead, Raja Sinha had to deal once more with the Governor, AdiSaen
iI
; van der Meijden, regarding whose nfaithfulness" he did not have very
| great confidence* YJhen, on the 18 April, he wrote to the Governor
saying that he wished to be previously informed of any intended
attack, the latter ventured to suggest that His Majesty need arrive
before Colombo only after its capture* This aroused the Kingfs
suspicions, and he thought it necessary to remind Van der Meijden that
according to treaty, and repeated promises, Colombo must be handed
over to him immediately after its capture# His feelings towards the
Governor were not improved when shortly afterwards, the latter,
1
sent him a letter written on half a 3heet of paper*
Meanwhile, the Portuguese had been defending their capital-city 
with the most astonishing bravery and steadfastness* With their 
artillery, the Hollanders battered much of the fortifications into 
ruins; but under the heaviest fire the Portuguese were busy repairing 
the damage done and, strengthening the walls with fascines* The Dutch 
assiduously attempted to mine the bastions; but they were each time 
frustrated by effective counter-mining of the enemy# Moreover, the 
Portuguese did not confine themselves to merely defensive measures; 
mrtflii but resolute bands repeatedly made bold sallies, from which they 
almost invariably returned with great success* Civilians and priests 
defended the city with as much bravery as the soldiers; in fact, one
1* cf# on the above: Baldaetts, 95, 111—18, passim*
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of the most conspicuously daring fighters, was the Jesuit, Ihther
Damiao Yieyra# What with one thing and another, the defence was
such that Hulft had exclaimed with admiration: "The gallant opposition
1
of the defenders does not seem to acknowledge a superior force*n
Time and circumstances were, however, against the Portuguese#
After about two or three months of the siege, the scarcity of provisions
caused a famine# In an attempt to remedy the situation somewhat, thousands
of non-Portuguese men, women and children were driven out of the city,
and left to die outside the walls (because the Hollanders, wishing to
encumber the enemy with the maintenance of these unfortunates drove
2
them back towards the city, which would not receive them}% Even this 
inhuman measure could not save the Portuguese; as the days passed 
by, the famine became more severe. To add to the misery, there came a 
plague, which together with the famine daily carried off so many that the 
corpses lay unburied# Some Portuguese, unable to bear the intolerable 
conditions any longor, fled to the enemy; but the majority held on, 
fanatically# Two desperate appeals to Raja Sinha, had been in vain*
The only hope lay in the arrival of the long-awaited reinforcements -
which, however, never came*_________________________________ _____
H  Halft to Dirs. 5 Feb, 1656, Kol. Arch. UCO4 fos. 861-77.
2. According to the Report: of Godskens (as given in Baldaens, 95) the 
King approved of this action of the Dutch*
3* Throu^ Sj^  the war between the Dutch and the Portuguese, a vital factor 
which always told heavily in favour of the Dutch was their 
overwhelmingly superior naval power* This was never more signi­
ficantly apparent than during the siege of Colombo; for although 
reinforcements were at length sent from Goa, the Dutch warships 
effectively prevented them from reaching Colombo* (cf# G.G# & C#, to 
Dirs*, 4 Dec# 1656, Kol# Arch* 1104 fos* 52-59#
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The Dutch had summoned the city on the 18th April, and had
received a brave reply frcm the Captain-General# But the difficulties
within the city and the weakness of the defenders, was no secret
because deserters daily brought information regarding these things#
Van der Meijden and his Council, therefore, thought it advisable to
undertake an assault before the Portuguese should be relieved from
Goa# On the morning of Sunday; the 7th May, at a time when almost all
the Portuguese were attending Mass, the Hollanders swarmed into the
bastion of San JoK;/ and captured it with ease# When, however, they
attempted to penetrate further they were thrown back with heavy losses
by the enemy, who had hastily rushed to anas# Nevertheless, despite
two desperate assaults the Dutch could not be dislodged from the
bastion# For two days they suffered heavily from the fire of the
enemy frcm the other bastions; but when they in turn were able to
sweep the city from cannon placed on this point, the enemy hoisted the
white flag on the 10th# On the following day, three deputies came from
1
the Captain-General, to the Dutch camp, to negotiate for terms#
Under very honourable terms, the Portuguese surrendered the city 
on the 12th May after withstanding a siege of nearly seven months#
1# V# der M# & C# to G*G> & C., 31 May 1656, Kol# Arch# 1104 f03# 455- 
63# gfingrfchu Baldaens (121-22) mentions that the Kandyans had joined 
in at the beginning of the assault, on 7th May; but that they were 
of little or no use# For the siege and capture of Colombo, see 
(in addition to the letters of Hulft and V# der M# cited earlier): 
Baldaens, 75-122, 205-32 (wrongly paginated 105-32); Saar (in 
Eeisebeschreifcungen# VI# 141-146 ); Queyroz, 955-84 ;
Ribeiro, 201-17#
Among these terms were the following: All Portuguese officers, ”
both civil and military, as wall as the citizens, were pemitted
(with certain reservations) to remove with them all their movable
goods* The unmarried soldiers, who were born in Europe, alone were
to be transported to Europe; all other soldiers, officers and
civilians were to be transported to the Coast of India at the earliest
opportunity* As long as they were under the charge of the Dutch,
everyone was promised freedom from ail, injury either to persons or to 
1
goods • The natives were to be at the discretion of the Governor, 
who would favour all L!udaliyars,arachchis and lascarins and treat them 
’•like his own men"*
Immediately after the surrender, the Dutch manned the bastions*
The tems of surrender had been granted "in the name of the Imperial 
Majesty of Ceylon, the High and Mighty Sfcates-General" etc* Never­
theless one of the first steps of the Dutch Governor was to shut out 
the Imperial Majesty’s troops, from the city#
Raja Sinha received the first news of the terms of surrender 
from his chefs, on the 11th* On the following day he was sent a copy 
of the terms by Van der Mei jden, who wrote at the same time, urgently 
requesting the King’s Standard, in order to place it over the city#
1# On the admission of the Governor Van der Mei jden himself (to G#G* & C.
31 May 1656, Kol*Arch* 1104 fos* 455-63) this undertaking was badly 
violated by the Dutch* The fact that Baldaens hotly denies this 
(230, wrongly paginated 130) and adduces specious evidence to 
support his denial, indicates how untrustworthy his statements can 
at times be* (It must be remembered that he was in Ceylon within 
a few months of the capitulation of ColobLbo* cf* on this point,
G.G. & C* to Dirs* 4 Dec* 1656, Kol* Arch* 1104 fos* 52-59) For
teims of surrender cf* Heeres, Corpus Dip* ii# 85-92* The terms 
as given by Baldaens and Queyroz are accurate, but those given by
Saar are almost entirely fictitious (cf* previous note)#
The King replied, expressing his sorrow at the deceit practiced on
him, and warning the Governor that no good would result from it*
On the 14th May, and on the 20th, Van der Mei jden wrote assuring the
King of the good intentions of the Dutch* On the 21st the King
reminded the Dutchman of the solemn proraises, which had been made
1
regarding the handing over of Colombo and Negombo. To this the
latter replied that Bulft had several times expressed hi3
conviction, that His Majesty himself would desire the retention of
a small portion of the city and the destruction of the rest* He
therefore wished the King to send men to demolish a portion of the
2
city and the entire fort of Negombo. Eight days later the King replied
1* Aalbers (51) says that the payment of the King’s debt to the Company 
was a necessary pre-condition for the handing over of Colombo* The 
truth, however, was, as we have seen already, (cf* pp^in.a. above) 
that the Dutch had agreed to surrender Colombo to him under all 
circumstances whether he had paid his debt or not* nevertheless,
G.G. & C* maintained (after the capture of the city) that they were 
not bound to hand over Colombo, since the King had not paid his 
debt. (cf. G.G. & C* to Dirs., 31 July 1656, Kol* Arch* 1104 fos* 
105-06 and Aalbers, 57 n*l*) Note the significant fact that in 
addition to all this, G.G. Sc C* falsely reported on 4 Dec. 1656 to 
their superiors (Kol* Arch* 1104 fos* 52-59) that Raja had had secret 
intelligence with the Portuguese during the siege of Colombo*
2. The offer to hand over Negombo for demolition was a false one#
By letter of 29 May 1656 (Kol# Arch. 1105 fos* 954-55) the King 
infoimed V* der* M* that he was sending a dissawe to take over the 
fort; but it did not take him long to find that he was being fooled 
by the Governor* Note, however, that G.G. & C* made the Directors 
understand that the offer of handing over Negombo was a genuine 
one (4 Dec* 1656, Kol* Arch 1104 fos* 52-59)#
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that if the Governor wished to see the peace maintained he should 
fulfill the terms of the agreements, which had been sworn to previously, 
and should refrain from soothsaying# To this, Van der Meijden replied 
on the 31st May, in the following fashion:
••especially since we observe thereinjji.e# in the King's 
letter) how well cur meagre [thoughtsj agree with Your 
Imperial Majesty's excellent thoughts, in order to raze 
the largest part of this, Your imperial Majesty's captured 
city, and to fortify again only the smallest part; besides,
Jsincc we see in that letter1] that Your Imperial Majesty 
conducts himself according to the confirmed and sworn 
articles of peace with the Hollander nation which we also 1 
are fulfilling perfectly; thereby the peace shall endure"•
The King was powerless against the chicanery of Van dor I.Iei jden* 
He had no means of enforcing the fulfillment of the concluded treaties, 
and the repeated promises of his allies. The Dutch feared that he 
nculd ally himself with the Portuguese, in an attempt to remedy the 
situation* Baja Sinha, however, hated and distrusted the Portuguese 
so much that he could not thinh of allying with them; besides, he must 
have realised that with their poor naval power, they would never preyail 
against the Dutch, even if he assisted them. Unaided, he did not dare 
to try conclusions against the Hollanders, whose strength he did not 
underestimate, and, whose power was now strongly established in the 
island.
1. 31 May 1656, Kol# Arch* 1105, fo# 943# V. der M's letters to Raja
at this period were*da£ed: 12, 14, 20, 24, 30, 31 May; 10, 15 
June and 5 July. (Kol# Arch# 1105 fos# 938-45) Raja's letters 
were dated: 11, 12, 21, 29 May (Kol# A^ch# 1105 fos# 946-55)
There was also a letter of 13June (cf JCRAS, XV111, 241-42) and 
one of 1 July (Kol# Arch# 1105 fos# 955-56) the latter being 
written on Raja's orders by the Dutch interpreter George 
Blume. These two letters are interesting because they show 
that in the midst of all his troubles, he was passionately 
interested in one of his favourite pastimes - falconry*
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Nevertheless, without setting any amies in the field against 
then, he caused great loss and injury to the Hollanders frcm the 
moment he heard of the garrisoning of Colombo* The provisions from 
the interior which had up to that time maintained the Dutch forces, 
were immediately cut off* Soon famine raged once more in the 
unfortunate city, and in every letter to the King Van der Mei jden 
was forced to appeal for provisions, although in vain* Of the inhabi­
tants of Colombo, very many, both Sinhalese and Portuguese, being
1
instigated by the Dissawes, went over to the King*
To make the occupation of lands unprofitable to the Dutch, there 
was no better mean3 than to remove the inhabitants and devastate the 
lands* This was done thoroughly in all the lands around Colombo, and 
even in parts of the Galle and Matara lands* Almost the entire Horawak 
Korale was denuded of inhabitants* In other areas too, guerillas were 
active in kidnapping, and in killing adherents of the Dutch* Sometimes, 
Dutch soldiers themselves were the victims, and on one occasion four 
soldiers and their wives were kidnapped* Despite Dutch outposts in the 
Galle and Matara lands, the guerillas were at times able to operate 
even a mile or two from the coast, because most of the chiefs were in 
secret sympathy with the King* In fact, several chiefs went over to 
M~m with their lascarins* Not the least harmful consequence of the
hostility of the Kandyans, was that elephant-hunting and the gathering
1* V. der M* & C* to G.G* & C., 31 May 1656, Kol* Arch* 1104 fos* 
455-63* RLbeiro (£74-75) correctly points out that Haja Sinhats 
hatred was towards the Portuguese as a nation, and not as separate 
individuals*
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of cinnamon, which had "both been regularly conducted throughout
1
the war with the Portuguese, were now brought to a standstill*
It appeared to Van der Mei jden and his Council that the
situation could only be improved by driving the King’s amy from
the lowlands* They were very apprehensive that the King would ally
himself with the Portuguese; therefore it was in every way best to
deal with him before such a combination could take place* On the
31st May they wrote to the Governor-General and Council asking for
authority to attack Raja Sinha*
Kaetsttijcker and hio Council did not wish to take any
responsibility in this matter, on themselves* They even posed the
2
question, whether Colombo should be garrisoned at all; but left the 
decision entirely to Van der Mei jden and his Council* They only 
stated that in case of a successful war, no attempt should be mde to 
extend the territories beyond the lands, where cinnamon was to be
found; unless strategic reasons required otherwise*
1* For the harm caused by the hostillty-of the Kandyans etc* cf*
V* der M* & C*, to G.G* & C*, 31 May 1656 (Ibid); Councillors at 
Galle to G.G* & C*, 27 June 1656, Kol. Arch* 1104 fos. 470-72;
V* der M* & 0* to G.G* & C*, 5 Aug* 1656, Kol* Arch* 1104 fos*
475-76; Councillors at Galle to G.G* & C*, 15 Aug* 1656, Kol* Arch* 
1104 fos* 478-79; Baldaens, 132-39, passim*; Saar (in Heisebeschrei- 
bungen, vi* 148-49)
2* 7 Sep. 1656, Kol. Arch. 783, pp. 357-64* In their letters of 31 July
< (Kol* Arch* 1104 lbs* 105-06) and 4 Dec* (Kol* Arch* 1104 fos* 52-59) 
” 1656, they wrote to the * Dirs* that * in order to have good relations 
with the King, and in view of the difficult circumstances of the time 
etc* they were seriously considering the question of handing over 
Colombo, which undoubtedly would have been given to the King if the 
Hon* Hulft had lived to fulfil the Instructions they had given to him 
on the subject* These statements of G.G. & C* are a good example of 
the way in which they often played for safety* Fearing that a war- 
policy towards the King might bring about disasters similar to those 
of 1646, they did not declare definitely either approval or 
disapproval of V* der M’s action in occupying Colombo* But when they
/Over
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On receipt of these advices in October the Governor and his 
Council decided to attack Raja Sinha# Through scarcity of provisions, 
as well as through various sicknesses many of the King’s men had 
died or else load gone back to the hills, with or without the per­
mission of their officers# With him, therefore, there were less than 
3000 men# In July, he had made preparations to go back to
Buwarrwella, and had sent a Dissawe ahead, to prepare accomodation for 
1
him# But he had altered his plans, and continued at Raygamwatte#
Perhaps he was hoping that same favourable circumstance might turn
Up by which he could obtain s o u q  advantage over the Dutch# In June
and July, Van der Mei jden had written sane letters with appeals as well
as threats# But he ignored them till September, when on the 9th he
wrote upbraiding the Dutch by saying that they had behaved "like a
2
barbarous people, who have neither King, nor faith, nor laws". At
the same time he showed a vestige of friendliness, by infoming the
Governor that a Dutch ship had been wrecked near Batticaloa and that
the salvaged goods could be recovered when desired# The latter:"
3
replied on the 10th October* insinuating that the breach of faith was 
on the King’s side and that if the Dutch were not left in peaceful 
possession of their lands, war might result; he further explained how
sorry the Governor-General himself was over His Majesty*s attitude#
1# For the above, cf# V# der M# & C# to G.G. & C#, 5 Aug# 1656, Kol# 
Arch# 1104 fos# 475-76.
2# Kol# Arch# 1105 fos# 956-57#
3# Kol# A^ch# 1105 fo# 946#
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Raja Sinha replied on the 23rd of the month: ”if the Governor-General
and the Company are persons, who keep their word, they have reason
to be sorry; and if this shall go on after this manner there will
1
follow more and more sorrows*”
On receipt of this letter, Van der Mei jden and his Council 
decided on rar* On 27 October he sent an ultimatum to the King; after 
a lengthy statement, to the effect that ever since 1638 the Dutch had 
faithfully fulfilled the treaty-obligations, while the King had not, 
the Governor demanded the cessation of all acts of hostility and the 
return of all the kidnapped persons within ten days; otherwise there 
would be war*
As the King did not deign a reply, Van der Mai jden and the 
Safgeant-Major Van der Laen marched against him on the 10th November, 
with a force of 950 Dutch, all the available Indonesian troops, most
9f 2
of the lascarins and a party of Topass# About a mile from the city 
they encountered seme opposition from the Kandyan outposts; but
thereafter, the march up to the royal camp at Raygamwatte, was
1* Kol* Arch* 1105 fo* 957* At the same tin© he sent a copy of a letter 
which the new Captain-General, Antonio de Amaral de Menezes had 
written to him* De Menezes was humbly requesting the King's assist­
ance against the Dutch* By sending this letter to V* der M* the 
King, apparently, wished to indicate that despite the wrong done to^  
him by the Dutch, he remained steadfastly hostile to the Portuguese#
2* This force has been described as a little army (cf* Geyl, Camb* 
Hist* of Ind* v* 47; Stapel, Geschiedenis* 111* 314}* In actual 
fact, it was the largest field-force which the Dutch had employed 
up to that time (in Ceylon); besides, its numerical strength does 
not appear to have been much less than that of the Kandyan forces*
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■virtually unhindered* Nevertheless, as the Dutch had taken one-and-a-
half days to march the seven or eight miles to that camp, the King
had had ample time to set fire to his encampments and retire to Kandy#
Btom Raygamwatte the Dutch, marched futther along the Kelani Ganga
expecting that some of the local inhabitants would appear to offer
submission* But no one appeared; because all the inhabitants had
been carried away with their cattle and goods, by the Kandyans*
1
Thereupon, the Dutch returned to Colombo*
The activities of the marauding guerillas did not, however, 
cease with the retreat of the Kandyans. Van der Mei jden complained 
to Batavia that the guerillas were active even up to the town-limits 
of Matara* Moreover, he sd on heard rumours that the King was 
clustering his forces to cone down in strength against the Dutch; 
also, that Gaspar Sigueira had been sent to him frcm Jaffna, apparently 
to command his troops*
Nevertheless, despite these rumours, and the depredations of 
the Kandyan guerillas, the Dutch decided to refrain from hostilities, 
unless the King sent any armies to attack them or allied himself with the 
Portuguese* If he did so, they intended (among other things) to put a 
stop to his trade at Batticaloa and Trinccmalee by a naval blockade of 
those ports* But they anxiously hoped that they would have no war with 
the King until they had expelled the Portuguese completely from Ceylon*
1* cf* on the above, V* der M. & C* to G.G* & C., 19 Nov* 1656,
Kol* AfCh* 1105 fos* 927-33.
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The Dutch did not feel secure in the island, so long as the
Portuguese continued to have a footing on it through the possession
of Planar and Jaffna• For still greater security they considered
it also essential to capture Tutucorin and Negapatam on the neighbouring
coasts of India, so that the Portuguese would he unable to menace
the island from these bases#
The value attached to Planar, Jaffna and Tutucorin and Negapatam was,
however, not merely strategic* but also economic# Planar and
Tutucorin were particularly important for their famous pearl-banks#
Tutucorin, furthermore, produced coarse cloths, which were manufactured
in Kegapatam and, to a lewser extent, in Jaffna as well# The entire
Penninsula of Jaffna was known to be a very rich territory with
1
elephants and chayaroot as the main canroercial products#
To capture these places, as well as to undertake certain
other exploits, the Batavian authorities sent the Councillor Extraordinary,
Rijcklof Van Coens, with seven ships and nearly 700 soldiers, on 6
2
September 1657* His instructions were that he should first sail to Goa 
and obtain further reinforcements from the fleet of nine ships under 
Commander Roothaes which were blockading that harbour* He was then to 
attempt the capture of Diu, if that task did not appear too hazardous; 
thereafter, he ms to sail down to Ceylon and attempt the capture of 
Jaffna and the other Portuguese strongholds in its vicinity* He was
1# cf# on these points; Instructions for Van Goens, 5 Sep# 1657, Kol# 
Arch# 784, pp# 415-25#
2* Ibid#
authorised to modify these instructions according to circumstances# 
The attitude to be adopted towards Raja Sinlia, was also to 
be regulated according to circumstances* If the power of the 
Portuguese appeared to be so weal-: that there was nothing to fear from 
a combination between them and Raja Sinha, then, Van Goens should 
not pay any attention to him; but if the situation was otherwise,
Mhe should be ccmplimented, the sooner the better, and be sent 
a valuable present, with the excuse that the troubles and misunder­
standings, arisen between Kis majesty and our people, gave us the 
greatest sorrow, but that, nevertheless, we remained unalterably 
inclined to maintain sacredly the contract made with His Majesty - 
in order, by that means, to divert him, if possible, from the plans, 
which he might be able to resolve upon with the enemy#”
After a difficult voyage, Van Goens reached Goa in November# 
There he learnt that the Portuguese fleet in the harbour was much 
stronger than had been calculated in Batavia* Instead of obtaining 
reinforcements from the fleet of Roothaes, he had now to reinforce 
that fleet from his own forces# It was decided that a successful 
attack on Diu was not possible on account of the weakness of his 
forces; he, therefore, sailed for Ceylon, where he arrived on the 1st 
January 1658#
In view of the strength of the Portuguese both at Goa and in 
Ceylon (where at Manar alone, there/was said to be, a thousand men) it
I
was decided that a friendly letter should be dispatched to Raja Sinha
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in the manner advised by Maetsui jcker and his Council* Such a letter
1
was sent on the 8th January 1658* Van Goens feared that if the
King wished to do so he could greatly hinder his enterprises against
the Portuguese; therefore he instructed Van der Mei jden:
”If he [i.e# the King] replies, .♦••and if a speedy answer 
is to our advantage, compose an answer in my name and 
send it to him, in order to keep him well-disposed, until 
we shall have settled our affairs in Kanar and Jaffna, when 
we shall be^nble to reply to the Imperial Majesty, better 
than now*” **
It was, however, rather doubtful that the King would show a friendly
disposition, because only a few weeks earlier his dissawe of
Sabaragamuwa had threatened to march upon the llatara territories,
thereby forcing the Dutch to withdraw their forces from Katuwana to 
3
Hakmana#
Having reinforced his forces with 350 Dutch soldiers and 300 
Sinhalese, Van Goens sailed for Tutucorin, which he captured on the 
25th January, without meeting much opposition# On the 19th of the 
following month, he was before Ilanar, where he fcxind the Portuguese 
resolutely prepared to oppose him# For two days their vessds 
prevented him from effecting a landing; but on the third day, despite
1# Kol# Arch# 1116 fo# 921# Aalbers (Appendix 11, pp# 215-16) 
reproduces this letter in full*
2# Memo rile for V# der M# from Van Goens, 14 Jan# (not 19 Jan#, as 
Aalbers, 141 n#, gives it) 1658, Kol* Arch# 1116 fos# 918-20#
3* cf* V# der M# to G.G* & C#, 30 April 1658, Kol# A^h# 1117 fos* 
253-62*
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stout opposition, he gained the, beach* The Portugiese were soon
driven in flight leaving behind seventy captives and many more dead,
among idiom was the Captain-General of Ceylon, Antonio de Amaral de
IJenezes* On the 24th February, the fort of Ivlanar surrendered without
a fight* With the 124 captives from the fort, the Portuguese had
lost in Manar nearly 300 men in dead or captured; about 400 had,
however, succeeded in escaping to Jaffna*
Leaving a garrison of sixty men on Ivlanar, Van Goens marched
overland to Jaffna* From the 7th to the 18th of March, he encountered
considerable opposition from the enemy, who kept up a house-to-house
resistance* At length, they were driven to take refuge within the
citadel, “which”, Van Goens wrote to Batavia, "deserves that name
1
better than any other that I have seen in India*w In view of its
strength he decided not to risk a storm, but to lay siege to it*
He determined, however, to capture a smaller fort on the island of
Kayts which was preventing the Dutch vessels from approaching close
to the shore* After a few days* resistance the garrison of a hundred
men was forced to surrender as it had run short of drinking-water*
For over three months the fort of Jaffna held cut In the
expectation of relief - which never came, because the Commander
Roothaes kept Goa closely blockaded* Frcm the cannonading of the
enemy, the beleaguered suffered same casualties, but "the greatest
2
battle was with famine and pestilence*” .On account of these miseries
1* V. Goens to G.G* & C., 17 March 1858, Kol. Arch* 1117 fo* 244*
2* Queyroz, 998*
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there appeared signs of a mutiny brewing amongst some of the
Portuguese* IJinien the outlook appeared so desperate, the Commander
surrendered on the 23rd June*
1
The terms of the capitulation were much harder than those
granted at the surrender of Colombo* Lloreover, they were dishonourably
kept by Van Goens* By Article 4 it had been stipulated that all civil
and military officers of the rank of Captain, and above, should be
transported to Goa at the earliest opportunity* He, however,
decided to send them to Batavia instead* By this means he hoped to
prevent these officers, for a long time, from serving against him in
his further enterprises on the mainland of India; for, he even
of these
requested the Batavian authorities to detain the most valian/officers
somewhat longer than the others, as he considered them to be "cattle
2
uith the most, dangerous horns*n
1* cf* Heeres, Corpus. Dip* ii* 124-27*
2, V. Goens to G,G* & C*, 6 July 1658, Kol. Arch. 1117 fos. 277-87* 
Aalbers (166-68 and 167 n* 3) Attempts to explain away the 
conduct ot Van Goens, but G.G* & C* had the correct view of the 
matter when they wrote to him (30 Sep. 1658, Kol. Arch* 785, fos* 
506-20): w.**.en behoort men si jn woort niet te verbreken dat men aen
gevangens gegeven heaft sonder dat hiertegen in consicfvetie can comen 
dat eenige vande selve getracht hebben contrarie bet accordt.. *eenich 
goudt ende juwelen uijtte brengen*♦*.om dat daertegen voorsien 
conde warden door naeuw recherche als andere middel, nochte can ons 
oock excuseren dat vele ender de selve cloeke soldaten sijn die ons 
in onse vordere desseijns boven andere sullen eonnen hinderl* wezen 
alsoo wij dat te vooren souden hebben moeten bedacht al eer onse 
woort te geven..**t
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A few weeks after the capture of Jaffna, Van Goens sent the
Sargeant-Major, Van der Laen with 700 soldiers in eleven ships to
blockade Negapatam until hi3 own arrival later on with more forces;
when an attack could be made on the town* Immediately on arrival at
Negapatam, Van der Laen, however, decided to summon it to surrender on
very favourable terms* With the examples of the defeats at Manar and
Jaffna before them, the Portuguese had no hesitation, and accepted the
offer with alacrity* On the 23rd July Negapatam passed into Dutch
hamds; thereby, the Portuguese were driven from the last stronghold
from which the Hollanders feared tbeir position in CeyLon could be
1
seriously threatened#
Meanwhile, throughout all the military operations of Van Goens, 
Raja Sinha had kept still* There had been disturbing rumours, that he 
would send assistance to the enemy; but they all proved to be false*
It was true that the Portuguese had sent ambassadors to request help; 
bat they had not even obtained an audience from him# At the same time, 
however, he had shorn no friendliness towards the Dutch* Van Goens had 
written to him once again on the 18th May; but neither to this letter, 
nor to that of 8th January, had he deigned a reply* Moreover, he had
1# For the capture of Tutcorin, Manarr, Jaffna and Negapatam cf*
V* Goens to G.G. & C., 17 March 1658, Kol# Arch# 1117 fos* 238-49; 
Same to same, 6 July 1658, Kol# Arch# 1117 fos# 277-87; Baldaens, 
147-58, passim; Saar (in Reisebeschreibungen, vl. 154-63, passim); 
Queyroz, 993-99; Ribeiro, 219-24* Saar's account contains much that 
is fanciful and can bear no comparison with that of J^ Lbeira#
Aalbers (135-70) gives a well-nigh excellent account of these 
events#
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allowed his guerillas to continue sporadic depredations#
With the fall of Jaffna to the Dutch and the complete 
explusion thereby of the Portuguese, from the island, Raja Sinha 
witnessed that he had exchanged one foreigner for another, or, as 
his subjects caustically put it: ’’He gave pepper and took gLiigir”*
The fact, hovever, was that he had realised quite early that such an 
exchange wculd take place, and had become more or less reconciled 
bo it; because he preferred to have the Dutch as neighbours rather 
than the P0rtuguese - if he could not be rid of both*
The situation in 1G58, when compared with that at the 
beginning of 1638, indicated that the exchange, had been an advanta­
geous one* In 1638, he wa3 hemmed in by a ring of coastal fortresses, 
and the Portuguese territories sprawled up tO within fifteen or twenty 
miles west of his capital* In 1658 almost the entire east coast and a 
considerable portion of the west coast were his; and, to the west of his 
Capital, all the territories within a sixty-to■•■seventy-mile radius were
under his authority* In 1638 he had had to deal with "His I-iighness, the
2
King of Malwane” at Colombo; but in 1658, there was in ”Hi3 majesty’s
3
city of Colombo”, "His Majesty’s humble servant”, the Dutch Governor*
1* For the d^ ove, cf* V. der M. to G-.G. & C*, 30 April 1658, Kol* Arch* 
1117 fos* 253-62; Councillors at Galle to G.G. & C*, 8 May 1558, Kol* 
Arch* 1117 fos. 264-65; V* der M. & C. to G.G. & C., 15 June 1658, Kol 
Arch. 1117 fos. 268-69* Raja Sinha did reply to Van Goens before 
the year was out; but I consider his reply to belong to a new chapter 
in the relations between him and the Dutch*
2. cf. Queyroz, 1074; Ribeiro, 132*
3* Note, incidentally that Coloinbo became the capital of the Dutch Government 
in Ceylon only in 1658 (cf* G.G* & C* to Van Goens, 30 Sep* 1658, Kol# 
Arch* 785 pp. 506-20) and not in 1656, as hitherto believed (cf. e*g*
Van Resandt, De Gezaghebbersf 58)*
Whether the favourable situation of 1658 would continue, was, however,
another question#
As for the Dutch, haetsuijcker triumphantly explained to the
Directors the position which they had won in the island, thus:
"And thus is the Company, through God's merciful blessing, 
become master of the renowned Kingdom of Taffananpatnam. * *
we have thereby become complete masters of the whole 
island of Ceylon, as far as it has been occupied by the 
Portuguese* .....and now the King Raja Singa can also be 
Kept under better allegiance, just as the Portuguese, 
before our arrival, have always known very well how to 
coerce him#n
The establishment of Dutch power in Ceylon, was complete.
1# This was not strictly true, because many of the old Portuguese 
territories in the west and south-west of the island, were now In 
the King's hands. This letter of Kaetsvijcker (and his Council) 
was dated 14 Dec. 1658 (Kol. Arch. 1115, fos. 49-50).
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G L O S S A R Y
Adi gar» the two chief Ministers in the Kandyan Kingdom
were called Adigars; of these the Palleganpahe 
Adigar ranked as the first, and the Udagampahe 
Adigar ranked as the Second Adigar* In the 
Portuguese territories, however, Adigars are met 
with as officials subordinate to the Dissawes* 
The Portuguese practice was continued by the 
Dutch*
Appnhami. an honorific applied to men of good descent*
Arachchi, a military officer in command of a ranchuwa or 
company of about twenty-five lascarins*
Bahar, a measure of weight equated at 480 Dutch pounds;
a Portuguese Bahar was equated at 584 Dutch pounds, 
a Dutch pound being 9$ more than the avoirdupois 
pound*
Careas, a caste of Tamil fishermen who seem to have been
found not only in the Jaffna area, but also at 
various points on the East Coast, such as at 
Batticaloa and Trineoralee»
Dissawe, Governor'of a Dissawani or Province*
v
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Dissawani,
Korale,
i
i
I Lascaiin,
Mudaliyar,
Topass,
Vidana,
YFanniya,
Xerafim,
largest territorial unit within a Sinhalese 
Kingdom* The division into dissawanies was 
continued by the Portuguese and the Dutch*
a territorial sub-division of a dissawani*
a term applied by the Portuguese (and continued 
by the Dutch) for the Sinhalese soldiers whose 
proper (Sinhalese) name ms He way o*
chief military officer commanding the lascaiins*
a name used "for dark-skinned or half-caste 
claimants of Portuguese descent, and Christian 
profession*”
a supervising officer with degrees of importance 
varying according to the nature of the charge 
entrusted.
a hereditary chief* The territories of the 
Wannlyas were all located on the eastern and 
northern borders of the Kandyan Kingdom*
a coin worth about 1-g- florins (a florin being equal 
to about 1 sh* 10d*)
1* Colonel Henry Yule and A*C* Burnell, Hob son-Job son* A Glossary 
of Colloquial Anglo-Indian Word3 and Phrases, (Hew Ed* by 
Vin* Crooke, London, 1903) 953*
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